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ABSTRACT 
An Exploratory Examination into the Relationship between Corporate Governance and 
Risk Management in Islamic Banks: Disclosure and Survey Analysis 
Hanimon Abdullah 
Whenever corporate and financial failures and crises arise in the world, issues of corporate 
governance and risk management are always highlighted as major causes of the event. In 
order to substantiate such claims, it is first important to specify which factors, in either 
corporate governance or risk management, actually cause these failures. Furthermore, if such 
factors were identified, might these failures be avoided in the future? This line of questioning 
provides the rationale behind this research. 
This study thus aims to explore and examine corporate governance and risk management 
practices as well as the potential relationship between the two variables in the case of Islamic 
banks in various countries. In doing so, the research explores corporate governance and risk 
management practices by employing disclosure analysis through annual reports, by using 
content analysis, with the objective of identifying the state of Islamic corporate governance 
and risk management practices in Islamic banks. To achieve this, the study analyses 181 
annual reports from 53 Islamic banks. In addition, the corporate governance and risk 
management practices of Islamic banks were also explored through perceptions analysis, 
based upon the responses obtained by questionnaire survey from Islamic bankers and 
financiers from 28 Islamic banks from 6 countries and locations. An attempt was also made to 
locate the correlation between corporate governance and risk management with both data sets 
as it is expected that good corporate governance practices should moderate risk exposure and 
establish a better risk management process. Thus, this study is predicated on the notion that if 
banks have good corporate governance practices, the risk management practices should then 
be efficient.  
By using qualitative and quantitative methods of data analysis, including correlation analysis, 
this study found that the relationship between corporate governance and risk management is 
not incredibly strong in the case of the Islamic banks involved in the period that this study 
covers. However, in examining the type of relationship, it was established that there was a 
positive relationship between the two. Thus, it can be said that with regards to bank failures, if 
corporate governance is the aforementioned trigger, it is also partly due to risk management – 
based on the fact that a positive relationship exists between the two. The findings of the study 
reveal two important results: corporate governance and risk management do not have a strong 
correlation between them. The findings show that most Islamic banks have very poor scores 
in Shari’ah compliance and Shari’ah governance. Poor scores are also revealed in other 
dimensions such as ethics, audit and board composition. 
However, in determining which aspect of corporate governance has the stronger propensity 
for creating problems, it is important to establish the actual dimension which affects corporate 
governance and risk management the most. This study reveals that Shari’ah-related dimension 
has the highest bearing on the overall corporate governance positions. Risk management, on 
the other hand, depends very highly on reporting and disclosure.  
A further aspect to consider is that not all dimensions positively affect corporate governance. 
For instance, the structure, committee and senior management has a negative impact on 
corporate governance. For risk management, all dimensions had positive impacts except for 
primary key areas, which are market and liquidity risk and operational risk. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
Corporate scandals and failures have now become a reality of everyday life. Despite 
the fact that they are triggered independently, they all still share similar elements in 
terms of sources and consequences. For instance, in general, they are all related to 
corporate governance and risk management issues (Lang and Jagtiani, 2010). This has 
led to an increase in the amount of academic literature on crises, examining the causes 
and aftermaths of financial and corporate failures in cases such as that of Parmalat, 
Enron, Barings Bank, Northern Rock, and the Lehman Brothers (Shin, 2008).  
Many studies have examined these corporate failures in detail. For instance, 
Parmalat’s scandal was associated with a conflict of interest between shareholders 
(Segato, 2005). The controlling shareholders had tried to extract private benefits at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Enron’s failure, on the other hand, came from 
abusing accounting practices (Coffee, 2005) triggered by internal controls. The 
collapse of Enron proved a watershed in corporate governance when it filed for 
bankruptcy in 2001. Similarly, the Barings Bank scandal was a consequence of 
failures in its internal controls and was triggered by a rogue trader (Stein, 2000). The 
failure of Northern Rock may be seen as a result of the board and shareholders taking 
too many risks (Shin, 2009). In the same vein, the Lehman Brothers went bankrupt 
due to failures in the board, the senior management, and the risk management (Sikka, 
2009).  
Banks are vital in economic growth through their immense impact on the financial 
system (Demirgüc et al., 2013). When banks fail, they have very large impacts on the 
system (Haldane and May, 2011) compared to other non-banking corporations. The 
repercussions from their failures have an adverse effect on the country and public 
welfare at large. As is widely discussed in the literature, banks need to implement 
high quality regulations to ensure that the running of their businesses is aligned 
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between the banks’ interests and that of their stakeholders. Thus, corporate 
governance as a form of regulation is required to act as a pedestal to ensure improved 
relationships with the banks’ stakeholders and to enhance the quality of the rules and 
regulations.  
Corporate governance (CG) and risk management (RM) have, thus, become 
increasingly popular areas of academic and professional research as they emerge in 
endless discussions following corporate failures. However, despite prolonged and 
protracted discussions, not much seems to have been done to ensure that financial 
crises and CG failures will not happen again. 
All these corporate failures indicate corporate governance related problems, which 
also demonstrate how disastrous corporate governance and risk management can be if 
not well managed effectively and efficiently. In fact, it is because of these failures that 
the search has begun for alternative systems that can mitigate the risks inherent within 
the conventional system. For instance, Abdullahi (2013) claims that the current 
financial crisis has actually accentuated Islamic banking’s position over conventional 
or interest-based banking system. This position is shared by Alzalabani and Nair 
(2013) who state that the resurgence of interest in Islamic finance has been triggered 
by the various global financial crises and economic recessions. In supporting this, 
Wilson (2008) posits that the collapse of leading Wall Street institutions, notably the 
Lehman Brothers, has encouraged a focus on Islamic banking and finance as an 
alternative model to the conventional one.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, despite the crises occurring within the 
backdrop of conventional banking, corporate failures do not confine themselves to the 
conventional banking scene alone. During the early 2000s, a string of crises relating to 
Islamic finance lead the financial world to wonder what could have gone wrong in 
institutions where practices were based upon the moralistic principles of Islamic 
economics. Questions relating to the feasibility of the financial system spelt out by 
Islamic economics in accommodating to the modern world then found themselves 
being discussed. The failure of Ihlas Bank, an Islamic bank in Turkey, for instance, 
demonstrated that there were surprisingly weak corporate governance rules (Hasan, 
2012).   
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Since Islamic finance is considered to provide a resilient base for preventing or 
mitigating the impact of corporate failures and financial crises (Chapra, 2008), it is 
essential that it should be explored.  It therefore should be noted that Islamic finance 
in different forms and structures has been practiced since the prophet era. Literature 
records that Islamic finance was the dominant system before eventually being 
replaced by the conventional system due to colonisation and westernisation. However, 
it was not until four decades ago, in a banking system not attuned to the needs of the 
devout, that the IBF emerged, on a modest scale, to fill the gap of more Islamic 
methods of finance (Imam and Kpodar, 2010:6). According to Alzalabani and Nair 
(2013:16), while Shari’ah principles were used as the basis for a flourishing economy 
in earlier times in the history of Islam, it was only in the late 20th century that a 
number of Islamic banks were formed to apply these principles. According to Imam 
and Kpodar (2010), how fast the conventional financial system is to expand, Islamic 
finance, on the other hand, has not matched this pace as it only began three decades 
ago. Ullah (2007:11) mentions that the expansion of Islamic finance, after a few 
years, was expedited by the introduction of broad macroeconomic and structural 
reforms in financial systems, the liberalization of capital markets, and the 
privatization and integration of financial markets. 
In view of this revival, it is expedient that a kind of enabling environment be 
implemented to help strengthen IFIs so that mainstream acceptance of Islamic 
banking may be obtained. However, this may be difficult to implement as it was not 
until recently that the corporate governance of Islamic financial institutions was 
thoroughly explored, despite the fact that corporate governance as a system of conduct 
is not particularly new to Muslim institutions and Muslim financial institutions. 
However, financial developments in the world have recently resulted in an increased 
attention to the Islamic perspective through a dynamic and wider corporate 
governance understanding. This stems from a series of corporate failures affecting the 
global financial system. Corporate governance has therefore become a more 
prominent tool in helping IFIs regain international acceptance. 
In the modern understanding of conventional economics and economic policy, 
without indicating the objective of corporate governance, the definition, process, and 
substance of corporate governance is considered value neutral (Chapra and Ahmed, 
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2002:13). However, since developments in social theory inform us that social realities 
are socially constructed, therefore economic-related issues are thus also value-loaded. 
Thus, because it is derived from the Quran and Sunnah, Islamic corporate governance 
may have more objectives than mainstream corporate governance, and in certain parts, 
may have mandatory requirements placed upon it.  
While perhaps the process can be similar in Islamic and conventional corporate 
governance, the substance of the two may differ, as Islamic corporate governance has 
an outer layer called ‘tawhid’ which dictates the corporate governance framework’s 
operations. As mentioned by Tapanjeh (2009:556), Islamic corporate governance 
cannot compartmentalise the roles and responsibilities in which all actions and 
obligations fall under the jurisdiction of the divine law of Islam. Nevertheless, Islamic 
corporate governance has more obligations compared to mainstream corporate 
governance (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002). 
The main concern of Islamic corporate governance is to fulfil responsibilities and take 
care of mankind’s welfare with aims being essentially to enhance the ethical 
operations of Islamic banks (Slahudin 2008) and other organisations.  
However, it is important to note that, apart from achieving Shari’ah objectives, 
Islamic corporate governance also shares certain principles with mainstream corporate 
governance. For instance, effective corporate governance helps mitigate the effects of 
adverse managerial behaviour. In terms of management, corporate governance 
provides a better structure and allows for more efficient resource allocation 
(Claessens, 2006). Because of corporate governance, access to financing is made 
easier (Hoque et al., 2013), thus encouraging investment, leading to more 
employment and thus more economic growth. Furthermore, good corporate 
governance also helps make banks more credible (Levine, 2003) by helping it to attain 
higher market confidence. 
Countries with a good corporate governance system often have strong corporate 
growth and are better able to attract investors (Slahudin, 2008). Corporate governance 
also encourages businesses to create better working environments to increase 
investment. By reducing costs of financial intermediation capital, corporate 
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governance also helps banks get better returns, and thus allows them to be more 
competitive.  
As a discipline, corporate governance guides business conduct and shapes future strategic 
direction. It plays an important role in ensuring efficient financial systems by 
improving the running of business operations, putting an effective decision-making 
process in place, whilst also taking care of the stakeholders’ interests. A well-
managed corporation is often associated with good corporate governance, which then 
ensures the better performance of the entity. On the side of consumers, good corporate 
governance increases a bank’s efficiency, thus enabling the bank to provide them with 
better access to financing. Furthermore, an improved operating environment leads to 
increased performance thus improving efficiency. By and large, corporate governance 
can thus be said to help achieve systemic stability in the corporate sector and financial 
system as a whole.  
Nevertheless, with the news of scandals associated with certain high profile 
companies in recent years, it may be the case that corporate governance alone is 
insufficient to guarantee the health of the financial system. In recent years, the world 
has been confronted with numerous catastrophes when development in the global 
financial system was interrupted by a wave of crises. Incidents such as the collapse of 
a number of banks impacted the economy and public welfare globally, not only in 
their specific countries. A failure in one bank causes ripples within the stock market 
which then spread across the world (Acharya et al., 2010). 
The occurrence of bank failures puts the bank’s reputation at risk, resulting in thinner 
public confidence with the bank. Consequently, banks eventually face liquidity risk as 
they have constraints in lending, which affect the public at large and eventually affect 
investments. A lack of investments leads to lower production resulting in lower 
productivity and slower growth. Literature asserts that had there been effective risk 
management in place, this may have helped the banks mitigate the financial risk.  
Thus, risk management is an important element to firms (Drennan, 2004) as it 
prevents excessive risk-taking. From the Islamic perspective, the increase in the 
number of Islamic banks as well as the participation of conventional banks in Islamic 
banking has heightened competition in Islamic banks. In order to stay competitive, 
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many Islamic banks have adopted corporate governance to work hand-in-hand with 
risk management. As highlighted by Asutay et al. (2010), in indicating the breadth of 
current Islamic finance practice, its risk management including Shari’ah risk, 
Shari’ah governance, and Shari’ah-compliant investment should be developed. On 
another note however, there has not been much discussion in literature that clearly 
spells out the line between risk management and corporate governance. 
In Islamic corporate governance, there are additional characteristics of risk 
management that need to be fulfilled in order to adhere to the Shari’ah. These include: 
proscribing the transfer of risk to another party, disallowing excessive risk-taking, and 
prohibiting uncertainties such as gambling (Ayub, 2009). Factoring in all these 
characteristics, risk management fits in well with Islamic corporate governance of 
which both are based on the same foundations, i.e. ‘tawhid’, which essentialises every 
component in life as part of the same order and interacted manner with responsibilities 
towards each other. In principle, risk management, thus, acts as both the foundations 
of internal control and corporate governance, which functions to control operations 
and risk exposure through a process by which risks are identified, mitigated, 
controlled, and monitored. 
Risk management plays its roles by controlling and monitoring the banks’ operations 
and restraining the management’s expropriating behaviour, which should, therefore, 
be considered as another type of corporate governance mechanism (Fischer, 2008). 
Following on from that, corporate governance can be classified into two types of 
mechanisms called internal and external mechanisms (Denis, 2001). The internal 
mechanism mainly comprises the board and senior management while the external 
mechanism involves regulations, audit, risk management, and financial reporting 
which controls managerial behaviour. Risk management and regulations are part of 
the external mechanism of corporate governance.  
With good corporate governance, banks can be more prudent in their risk-taking 
activities. For instance, looking briefly at the case of Barings Bank, United Kingdom 
(1995), it can be seen that the scandal was the result of excessive risk taking (Tickell, 
1996). Poor governance, and a poor understanding of how the senior management 
undertook its procedures caused huge losses to the bank. Had the bank adhered to 
Shari’ah principles in its risk management, the financial disaster could have been 
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mitigated or the impact could have been moderated. This is due to the fact that risk 
management is done more stringently under Shari’ah principles. 
Islamic banks must be more careful in evaluating risks (Ayub, 2007), as they have 
additional risks due to the risk sharing nature of Islamic finance (Ahmed, 2009). 
Furthermore, by adopting Islamic corporate governance, failures can be reduced 
because every single aspect of the bank’s governance is taken care of by a framework 
that embraces and upholds tawhid, the utmost comprehensive layer of governance. 
Thus, issues of mismanagement such as being overly dependent on one staff and 
unethical working practices when unsupervised, among other issues, may not have 
surfaced in the first place.   
Both corporate governance and risk management are deemed important due to their 
accountability in serving the public. Normally, a well-managed company has good 
corporate governance achieved through an effective risk management function. In 
recent years, enormous losses have been recorded as a result of corporate failures due 
to the management’s behaviour in excessive risk-taking. To reduce the potential for 
such loss, improved corporate governance through risk management functions such as 
controlling managerial behaviour has clearly become important for banks.  
Corporate governance is used to moderate bank risk-taking through the imposition of 
restrictions on the management (Gompers et al., 2003), as good corporate governance, 
through risk management, ensures that the management allocates the appropriate 
controls before making decisions on risk-taking. Fischer (2008), therefore, mentions 
that internal risk management should act as the first line of defence for financial 
systems. As interested parties are concerned with how risk exposure is distributed, 
internal control, which is part of the risk management process, puts measures in place 
to help safeguard assets and reputation. Thus, it is through good corporate governance 
and appropriate risk management structures that banks attain their efficiency and 
effectiveness. 
Grais and Pellegrini (2006) state that as IFI assets continue to expand, Islamic 
corporate governance will have an important role to play. It is hoped that Islamic 
corporate governance might solve the principal-agency problem. Besides that, Islamic 
corporate governance also protects stakeholders (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). 
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As for the relationship between corporate governance and risk management practices, 
in the initial analysis they seemed to be correlated. Thus, with respect to corporate 
failures and financial crises, CG and RM always find themselves being scrutinised 
from all angles. People lament on questions such as: what the board did, how good the 
risk management is, how internal controls are implemented, the ownership structure, 
the performance of the institutions, and many more such questions. However, nothing 
is ever mentioned with regards to the connection between CG and RM.  It may very 
well be possible that there exists a relationship between CG and RM, that an effect on 
CG will also cause something in RM. The possibility exists that an inadequacy in RM 
could be reflected in CG. Conversely, rectifying inadequacies in CG may also 
improve RM. Could the answering of these questions help mitigate the effects of 
crises? Somehow, it is felt that such answers may hold the key in giving a tentative 
direction towards identifying important issues with regards to the crises.  
When discussions are held, quite often it is implied that CG incorporates RM. In 
many instances, CG is almost always related to the board. There are also occasions 
that CG is seen to encompass RM. However, nothing has been found so far that gives 
a clear indication as to the scope of CG and what specifically categorises issues as 
belonging to either CG or RM. This, together with corporate governance and risk 
management practices, is the subject matter of this research. 
1.2. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
This study aims to explore and evaluate the corporate governance framework and risk 
management practices of Islamic banks through disclosure and perception analysis, 
which also aims to explore and examine the potential relationship between the two 
through statistical analysis.  
This research, hence, examines corporate governance and risk management practices 
in Islamic banks through unobtrusive research based on disclosure analysis and also 
through the perceptions of Islamic bank employees. Whilst doing so, the participants’ 
perceptions on both corporate governance and risk management are compared against 
what is communicated by the Islamic banks through annual reports.  
In fulfilling the identified aims, the following objectives are developed: 
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(i) to study corporate governance and risk management theories and theoretical frames 
and model in Islamic banking through the established literature;  
(ii) to develop indices for good corporate governance and efficient risk management 
practices through which to evaluate the practices of the sampled Islamic banks; 
(iii) to explore and examine corporate governance and risk management practices of 
sampled Islamic banks through an unobtrusive research based on annual reports of the 
sampled banks with the help of disclosure analysis; 
(iv) to explore and examine corporate governance and risk management practices of 
sampled Islamic banks through a questionnaire survey conducted with the relevant 
staff of Islamic banks; 
(v) to examine the corporate governance framework in specific manner with regards 
to how it relates to the specific risks of the banks; 
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The study aims to answer the following research questions based on a gap analysis 
derived from literature reviews. In line with the research aim and objectives, the 
research questions are formulated in order to give direction to the research. Analytical 
responses to each of these questions are provided through a qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of its associated empirical results in the later chapters. The 
research questions are as follows: 
(i) What are the main distinctive features of corporate governance in Islamic finance? 
(ii) What are the main distinctive features of risk management in Islamic finance? 
(iii) What form of relationship exists between the corporate governance framework 
and risk management adopted by the Islamic banks? 
(iv) What form of relationship exists between each dimension of corporate 
governance framework and risk management adopted by the banks? 
(v) To what extent does the corporate governance framework affect risk management 
in Islamic banks and vice versa?  
Page 10 
 
1.4. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
Focusing on corporate governance and risk management, this research is confined to 
Islamic banks and institutions that offer Islamic financial products and services. It is a 
study conducted specifically on IBs sampled from Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Turkey, UK and Yemen.  
The research explores the corporate governance framework from the Shari’ah 
perspective by examining every aspect of corporate governance such as the board, the 
committees and senior management, the act and regulations, as well as the support 
and operations functions. Similarly, the study also explores the risk management 
practice of the IBs so as to analyse how the latter relates to the corporate governance 
of the respective banks. 
1.5. SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
In view of a lack of intensive and in-depth research in the areas of corporate 
governance and risk management with regards to Islamic principles, this research is 
an attempt at studying the relationships between these two nexus in Islamic banks. As 
no work has been located that sufficiently explains the relationship between corporate 
governance and risk management theoretically and empirically, the attempt presented 
in this study should be considered an original attempt. 
The literature indicates that there are studies on the corporate governance performance 
mainly specialised on Shari’ah governance issues and also on a number of empirical 
and discursive studies in risk management in Islamic banking. However, there is no 
other study identified in the Islamic finance literature that focus on the state of 
corporate governance and risk management practices and also the potential 
relationship between the two. Having two types of data sets and using extensive 
qualitative and quantitative methods in responding to the identified research questions 
(as above and in Chapter 1) this should also be considered an area of significant 
contribution of this study. 
This research, thus, is an empirical study of corporate governance in relation to the 
risk management practices of Islamic banks. An extensive review of the literature did 
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not indicate the availability of any papers on the subject matter in Islamic finance 
while similar studies were scarce in conventional finance as well. Thus, this study 
should be considered as a novel and humble contribution to the available body of 
knowledge. This novelty is also its strength and significant contribution in terms of it 
being an empirical study in the field, something which has not been explored until this 
study. 
Based on the primary data and secondary data that was collected through surveyed 
questionnaire and the disclosure approaches (from the sampled countries as 
mentioned above), the findings indicate that corporate governance in Islamic banks is 
associated with the banks’ risk management. The findings from both the approaches 
reveal that there are positive relationships between CG and RM with an indication of 
relationships between CG and RM. The results also revealed that there are certain 
dimensions in CG and RM that affects the CG framework and RM practices. For 
instance, ‘Shari’ah compliance’ and ‘supports and operations’ are very important 
dimensions in CG from the questionnaire and disclosure approach respectively while 
‘reporting and disclosure’ and ‘general risk management (practice)’ are the most 
influential dimensions in RM based on both the questionnaire and disclosure 
approaches respectively. Thus, the significant contribution of this study is mainly in 
the empirical evidence produced in the case of Islamic banking on this topic. 
Even though some of the principles of corporate governance and risk management in 
the conventional banks are shared with the principles outlined by the Shari’ah, 
mainstream banks do not have extended obligations similar to those in Islamic 
corporate governance and risk management so the findings may only hold in the case 
of Islamic banks. 
1.6. RESEARCH METHODS 
In responding to the research questions, this study adopts a qualitative research 
methodology as it examines CG and RM based on how they are conveyed by human 
behaviour. In operationalizing it, the research uses a combination of research 
approaches: explorative and descriptive. The explorative approach is used due to its 
nature in exploring the various frameworks of CG and RM while the descriptive 
approach is used as this design provides a snapshot of thoughts which can be based on 
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surveys. In essence, this research is a qualitative research as it attempts to gauge 
feedbacks which are qualitative in nature (with regards to CG and RM relationship 
based on the respondents’ perceptions which will be explained further in Chapter 5). 
However, the research is also a quantitative in nature as it quantifies qualitative data. 
The research utilises both the primary and secondary data in the analysis, gathered 
through survey questionnaires and a disclosure approach respectively. The primary 
data was obtained from a collection of a sample of 28 IBs from six countries while the 
secondary data was collected through 181 annual reports from 53 IBs from 15 
countries (as mentioned above). 
1.7. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
The paper has eight chapters, which are structured as follows: 
Subsequent to this chapter, Chapter 2 provides insights into the literature review. It 
reviews existing literature, text, and other relevant reference materials of corporate 
governance from both perspectives, i.e. from Islamic and mainstream perspectives. 
While providing an overview of corporate governance based on its concept and 
definitions, the chapter also tries to compare the models adopted in both perspectives. 
Beyond that, the chapter also briefly discusses the theoretical aspects of corporate 
governance in trying to provide a foundation to the models adopted by corporate 
governance. It also discusses some leading theories that underlie corporate 
governance structures while presenting some familiar models adopted by banks in 
various parts of the world.   
Chapter 3 presents the literature review on risk management. This chapter discusses 
risk management in both Islamic and conventional banking. While providing an 
overview of the risk management concept and its definitions, the chapter tries to 
compare the types of risks in both perspectives. In addition, this chapter also briefly 
highlights some issues faced in the implementation of risk management in IBs. 
Chapter 4 deliberates on the research strategy and methodology adopted for the data 
collection process. This chapter presents in detail the recommended research 
procedures by making reference to research methodology textbooks on the 
appropriate research processes and techniques to be used. The rationale and 
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justifications for each of the tools and techniques used throughout this study are also 
highlighted. In addition, the chapter provides a refined outline and worksheet to help 
with analysis in the empirical and statistical chapters. 
Chapter 5 provides a descriptive analysis of the findings based on a disclosure 
approach. In trying to identify the level of corporate governance and risk management 
practices of the IBs, the chapter employs statistical measures such Spearman’s rho and 
Pearson Correlation (using the SPSS software) to test for correlation. To further 
analyse the results, the strength of dimensions on the overall CG and RM were 
examined. The chapter employs tools such ANOVA and the Regression Coefficient to 
provide a more meaningful results. 
Chapter 6 presents an empirical analysis of the survey outcomes. In this chapter, the 
perceptions of the respondents are examined by analysing the outcome from the 
survey questionnaires. The chapter also provides the profiling of the respondents 
involved in the survey to gauge whether there are any contributing factors that 
influence their perceptions. This chapter employs tools such as the Kruskal-Wallis 
tests to examine the results. The data is also examined using ANOVA to provide 
meaningful results on the regression analysis. 
Chapter 7 concludes the study, which contextualises corporate governance in relation 
to risk management. It provides a summary of the major findings from the two 
approaches: the disclosure approach from annual reports and the perception approach 
from the questionnaires. Having presented and discussed the empirical and statistical 
findings in Chapters 5 and 6, which correspond to each of the research methods laid 
down in Chapter 4, Chapter 7 provides a contextualised summary discussion of the 
findings. It also makes cross-references to the theory and findings of previous studies 
in order to link all pertinent outcomes in this study together. In its attempt to offer 
suggestions for future research, it highlights the limitations of the study before 
offering recommendations. The outcome of this chapter gives some insight into 
deriving the overall conclusions of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONVENTIONAL AND 
ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES: PARADIGM, CONCEPT AND 
OPERATION MECHANISM 
 
2.1. BACKGROUND 
Recent financial crisis have brought increased interest into the field of corporate 
governance (CG), as it plays a vital role in the economy due to its essence and 
determining nature of the working mechanism of the financial system as well as 
corporate sector. This is due to the fact that it determines the behaviour of 
corporations in achieving corporate goals, thus affecting their performance. Due to the 
increased interest, consequently, many studies on corporate behaviour have been 
vigorously carried out. 
This chapter, hence, explores alternative perspectives on CG by comparing the 
conventional and Islamic model of CG; they are subsequently explored and discussed 
in Part 1 and Part 2. 
Part 1 comes in three sections. Section 1 introduces CG through some definitions to 
describe some conceptions of CG. This is followed by the theoretical frameworks of 
CG, which discusses about theories and issues. Finally, some CG models adopted by 
countries are described.   
Part 2 is outlined in four sections. Section 1 presents the background of Islamic moral 
economy to unveil the evolvement of Islamic banking through the history. Then, 
Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework of Islamic moral economy from the 
Shari’ah principles. Section 3 presents how Islamic moral economy is contextualised 
into CG. Section 4 sets forth the axioms that hold the pillar of CG from the Islamic 
perspective to rationalise how Islamic Corporate Governance (ICG) works in the 
context of Islamic banks. Finally, this is followed by a concluding remark to end the 
chapter.  
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2.2. CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Ever since CG became prominent during the 1980s, definitions have emerged from 
many sources such as theorists, academics, economists, and etc. Inevitably, CG is 
observed from many perspectives; thus definitions have been very diverse and any 
stereotypical patterns or conceptualizations of the definitions have been distinctive 
and are subject to the nature of reasoning in defining CG. This depends on the 
position and disciplinary background of the individual rendering the definition 
(Clarke, 2011) and a respective perspective, then, affects the particular way CG is 
applied. As Monks and Minow (1995) observes that CG definitions are often affected 
by the biases of those giving the definitions. Turnbull says that, “The various views 
on corporate governance can also be related to different cultural contexts, intellectual 
backgrounds and interests of scholars” stemming from “different academic 
disciplines.” Thus, “there is often little, or incomplete, integration between various 
disciplines” (Turnbull, 1997:184) in providing a definition for CG, as in other social 
science related concepts. 
Since definitions of CG often differ in various ways, simple generalisations of CG are 
difficult as inexhaustible definitions of CG exist in literature. One widely used 
definition is given by Cadbury (1992), which views CG as a system of control. In 
other words, Cadbury (1992) sees CG as trying to balance social and economic 
objectives while simultaneously being a structure promoting efficiency and 
accountability. Similarly, McRitchie (nd.:para. on McRitchie) sees CG as both the 
structure and relationship which directs the corporation and determines its 
performance. Thus, the definitions take the board as the centre where its relationship 
to other primary participants is critical. This mirrors Cadbury’s definition, as CG is 
highly related to the board of directors. Likewise, Turnbull (1997) sees CG in the 
context of the board’s structure and function. From a broader perspective, Monks and 
Minow (1995) base their definition on relationships, focusing on corporations that do 
not perform well, as, to them, CG may be defined as the affairs of the whole company 
and not just the board. 
CG may be seen as a discipline which looks at how incentives affect management, 
specifically in the sense of financial performance. On a similar note, Wójcik (2002) 
views CG from an investment perspective. In the narrow sense, he agrees with 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1997:738) who state that “corporate governance deals with the 
ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves return on their 
investment”. In the broader sense, he agrees with O’Sullivan (1998:1), who views it 
as “concerned with the institutions that influence how business corporations allocate 
resources and returns. Specifically, a system of corporate governance shapes who 
makes investment decisions in corporations, what types of investments they make, 
and how returns from investments are distributed”. 
In further exploring the concept, Okabe (2004) views CG from two perspectives. 
First, he views CG as a framework that allows shareholders to supervise management. 
He calls this a ‘finance approach’, as it is the corporate fund providers’ authority; or 
an ‘agency view’, since it regards managers as agents who manage the company for 
shareholders. This is similar to Wójcik’s (2002) narrow definition of CG. 
Alternatively, Okabe (2004) relates the behaviour of corporations to CG as a 
relationship in which competing interests are elaborated upon by stakeholders. He 
regards this later view as a “stakeholder view” as he believes that firms with the 
structure of authority, responsibility, and interaction among them belong to all 
stakeholders.  
Similar to previous definitions, Monks and Minow (1995) defines CG through an 
administrative viewpoint when he perceives CG as being how companies are directed. 
He sees good governance as essential to corporate success and sustainable economic 
growth. In this definition, a corporation exists as a structure allowing parties to 
collaborate and contribute capital to benefit others. According to him, research in CG 
is an interdisciplinary topic, which draws primarily from economics and law, and an 
understanding of business practices stemming from empirical studies in different 
national systems. 
Claessens (2006) defines CG as the relationship between the shareholders, directors 
and management of a company, as defined by the corporate policy. Thus CG is the set 
of obligations and decision-making structures that shape the complex set of 
constraints that determine the profits generated by the firm. 
In providing an integrated definition, Blair (1995) states that CG is about the 
arrangement in terms of legal, cultural and institutional which spell out the 
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corporations’ actions, the allocation of risks and return. This coincides with the view 
that CG is a system of management. By adopting a consequential approach, 
Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) claim that CG structures are the result of political 
decisions.  
In providing an organisational perspective, Arrow (1974) views CG as starting with 
an organisation with common objectives. He regards each member as having different 
goals which are not necessarily in line with the organisation’s objectives. He views 
that not all corporate or external information is shared among members. 
Meanwhile, Cochran and Wartick (1988) conceptualise CG from two approaches. 
They view inconsistencies between practice and the ideal with regards to the 
management’s interactions with stakeholders. Beyond that, they also suggest that CG 
may be conceptualised through an understanding of CG’s fundamental issues, namely 
the separation of ownership and control as well as clarifying the difference between 
governance and management. This leads to associated theories of CG, as explored in 
the following section. 
2.3. THEORIES AND MODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
This section aims to survey available models of CG in existing literature, which is 
preceded by theories associated to CG. 
2.3.1. Agency Theory 
Agency theory revolves around issues of separation of ownership and management. 
Its deals with conflicts of interest (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) triggered by 
individuals1 increasing personal wealth at the expense of the principal, usually by 
committing moral hazards (Tricker, 1994). Accordingly, agents usually abuse power 
do not perform in the best interests of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and 
may shun decisions that profit the firm as such decisions are made selfishly (Tricker, 
1994). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that agency theory assumes agents do not own 
resources; rather, they control the company using their skills. According to Donaldson 
                                                          
1 with different goals 
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and Davis (1991), agents’ actions do not follow those needed to maximize shareholder 
returns. However, Amihud and Lev (1981) state that agents are incentivised to pursue 
strategies that reduce the risk of employment, due to adverse selection that follows 
through from asymmetric information. Thus, Buchholtz (2001) highlights that 
asymmetrical power distributions may make firm owners engage in exploiting 
subordinates. This leads to what Williamson (1985) views as opportunistic managerial 
behaviour.  
Alternatively, agency theory may not necessarily be triggered from the economic 
perspectives alone but also from finance, management, and other perspectives. 
Eisenhardt (1989) supports this by claiming that the theory sees use in many fields 
and views it through a spectrum of risks, i.e. through the principal-agent relationship 
that cooperates with different objectives and views on risk. 
The literature sees agency theory from both formal and informal perspectives 
(Kochhar, 1996). “Much of the formal agency literature is concerned with issues of 
efficient risk bearing” (Williamson, 1988:568). Normative principal-agent literature, 
which outlines compensation contract design, is linked to optimum risk-sharing 
properties (Levinthal, 1988). On this, Beatty and Zajac (1995) note that organizational 
research using agency theory from the normative agency literature is lacking. They 
mention that the alternate and less formal perspective of empirically-based agency 
literature focuses on the separation of ownership and control and the role boards play 
as stated by Fama and Jensen (1983), Weisbach (1988), and Morck et al. (1989). As 
for Fama and Jensen (1983), their concerns are on techniques of monitoring and 
bonding the contract and organisation.  
In providing management and business perspectives, Donaldson and Davis (1991) see 
agency theory as being an influence to strategic management and business policies. 
Ross (1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and also Beatty and Zajac (1995) identify 
that agency theory is related to issues of CG and executive compensation. 
Agency theory assumes market efficiency to locate the optimal contract for the 
exchange and focus on managing the appropriate contracting actions, thus ensuring 
compliance and preventing moral hazards (Kochhar, 1996). From a risk perspective, 
Eisenhardt (1989) claims that it is difficult to monitor an agent unless the appropriate 
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governance structure is present. She believes that, in agent behaviour, the different 
risk appetites and preferences of the agent and principal contribute to conflict. 
Tricker (1994) observes that agents and principals often have incomplete contracts 
due to principals using ex-ante incentive instruments to overcome moral hazards. 
However, it is impossible to avoid moral hazards by using contracts as they are 
unenforceable (Tricker, 1994). However, based on the principal-agent arrangement, 
contracts may, at the very least, specify circumstances where managers can be 
replaced or assets purchased. Chakrabarti (2005) views that it is impossible to create a 
comprehensive contract which outlines every possibility as they are only able to 
specify why managers must be given pay related to performance.  
Agency problems trigger agency costs (Monks, 2011), i.e. costs incurred to in the 
supervision of management, which comprises monitoring expenditures; bonding 
expenditures2, and residual loss3 (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory uses 
check and balance systems with risk bearing procedures to reduce costs (Eisenhart, 
1989).  
It should be noted that, according to this theory, a compromise exists between 
incentives and risk sharing. The neoclassical theory assumes the significance of effort 
and cost, thus agency problems are required to balance efficiency and risk bearing. 
Alternatively, if agency problems are not taken into account, maximizing profit or 
minimizing cost may be performed by anyone so long as such efforts are compensated 
(Eisenhart, 1989).  
Besides giving rewards to managers to incentivise the maximisation of returns, 
agency costs also include methods of linking compensation and shareholder benefits 
(Eisenhart, 1989). However, as much as high incentives may work as motivation, low 
incentives should also be given to avoid too much risk-taking (Eisenhart, 1989). Thus, 
Eisenhart (1989) views that firms should provide balanced incentives for the 
management (as performance is linked to the management’s efforts) in order to 
                                                          
2 Bonding costs happen when agents spend resources to avoid indirectly harming the principal. 
3 Residual loss is the main element which principals want reduced (Williamson, 1988). It occurs when 
the firm’s value is reduced, i.e. when ownership is diluted or when shareholder returns are below 
expectations. 
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effectively realise firm profits. To decrease conflicts, debt is often used to lessen 
agency costs. Agency costs are also exacerbated when free cash flows in the firm, and 
this can be mitigated by limiting the amount of free cash flow to managers (Kochhar, 
1996).  
It should be mentioned that due to its nature, agency theory finds the most use in 
countries where the legal systems have been long entrenched, such as in the US and 
UK. It is favoured by shareholder theorists as it recognizes shareholder rights and 
protects minorities and shareholders which are diversified. However, agency theory 
tends to see man as a form of homo-economicus, which “depict subordinates as 
individualistic, opportunistic, and self-serving” (Davis, 1997:20), which then sees 
itself as becoming the main problem of CG.  
On another note, Donaldson and Davis (1991) who do not agree with agency theory 
posit that managers are not self-serving and actually work to benefit shareholders.   
2.3.2. Stewardship theory 
With roots in psychology and sociology, stewardship theory sees relationships from 
the perspective of behavioural patterns (Kluvers and Tippett, 2011). It deals with the 
relationship between the management and the principal when both their interests are 
compatible, while also assuming that shareholders and managers are synchronised. 
Stewardship theory opposes agency theory’s predictions on the structure of the board 
(Muth and Donaldson, 1998). It regards man as trustworthy, and therefore assumes 
managers as stewards. Therefore, the theory suggests that individuals are motivated to 
work to benefit the principal and also assumes that there are no problems with regards 
to motivating executives (Donaldson and Davis, 1989).  
Stewardship theory assumes that managers look to increase the performance of their 
organisations (Fox and Hamilton, 1994), as they are seen as striving to bring about 
large profits and shareholder returns. According to Donaldson and Davis (1994), 
managers require responsible work and thus it is in the best interests of organisations 
to give managers a mostly free rein. .   
Alternatively, Donaldson and Davis (1989) indicate that using non-executive boards 
as a moderation tool is not effective. They view that the board loses relevance once 
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there is a dominant and active shareholder, especially when that shareholder has 
vested interests elsewhere such as being family or being from the government. Pfeffer 
(1972), meanwhile, sees external directors as affecting the firm’s constituencies more 
than the managers. He found that industries with high regulation usually have board 
with greater amounts of outsiders. 
Tricker (1996) points out that directors must demonstrate their fiduciary duty to 
shareholders as part of the law. Within this idea of fiduciary duty lies the notion that 
directors are trustworthy stewards for the company (ibid.). This means that they are 
required to act on par with the principal as opposed to simply acting on behalf of the 
principal (Tricker, 1996).  
It should be noted that Tricker (1994) sees influential supervisory advisors as 
prevalent in Anglo-based cultures. Ghoshal and Moran (1996:14) opine that agency 
theory “can become a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby opportunistic behaviour will 
increase with the sanctions and incentives imposed to curtail it”. According to them, 
the same is also true of stewardship theory.  
Similarly, Donaldson and Davis (1994) see managers as good stewards who work in 
order to benefit the corporation and the shareholders. 
Changing business environments thus require corporations to change their focus away 
from profit maximisation and recognise that shareholders and stakeholders are both 
integral to corporate success. 
2.3.3. Stakeholder theory  
Stakeholder theory describes organisational management and ethics (Phillips et al., 
2003). It is responsible for other constituents, and as such Friedman (1963) tries to 
split stakeholders into two categories. According to one definition, stakeholders 
represent those that have an effect on, or are affected by, achieving the organisation’s 
goals. In the other definition, stakeholders are individuals integral to the 
organisation’s survival (Mitchell et al., 1997: 857). 
Clarkson (1994), on the other hand, defines stakeholder theory by looking at firms as 
systems of stakeholders which work within a society that provides the appropriate 
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infrastructure for their activities. From this, he also states that firms are aimed at 
creating wealth for stakeholders. Similar to Clarkson, Blair (1995) also sees the goal 
of management to be wealth maximisation. This can be done by allowing for 
ownership-like incentives to harmonise outside interests with stakeholder interests. 
Whether or not firms should take care of both stakeholder and shareholder interests is 
a controversial matter. Traditional theories of the firm require that all stakeholders be 
taken care of. Most other theories are based upon corporations trying to benefit more 
than just shareholders (Carrillo, 2007).  
Stakeholder theory emerged due to convergence, which in turn arose from 
globalisation. The internationalisation of capital markets itself has thus made 
stakeholder theory more attractive to firms. The theory has subsequently grown in 
popularity alongside business ethics as evidenced after the spark of many 
conglomerate failures.  
Stakeholder theory supports most European models and is practiced by a majority of 
European countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Greece (Jurgens et al., 
2010). It can be seen from many perspectives such as economics, law, business, 
philosophy, ethics and management.  
Controversies arise when stakeholder theory is used to balance stakeholder interests. 
This is because stakeholders often have interests which conflict (Jensen, 2002). Thus, 
Bowie (2002) views that stakeholders need not be placed on equal pedestals and 
instead sees the need to take care of relevant stakeholders as a moral obligation. 
With regards to morality, Bowie (2009) links stakeholder theory with corporate social 
responsibility, seeing successful firms as being the result of an environment which is 
moralistic in relation to human rights and society. He believes balance to be a problem 
as balancing all stakeholders’ interests makes stakeholder theory unrealistic. Van de 
Ven (2005), however, is keen to balance all stakeholder interests as he views that 
corporations are morally obligated to provide returns to stakeholders. 
On another note, shifts in business have also contributed to the acceptance of 
stakeholder theory. As Clarke (1998:183) says, “The attenuation of shareholders’ 
roles in managing business and the rise of professional management is associated with 
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growing recognition of the significance of the role and the contribution of other 
stakeholder groups to the performance of the company”.  
Jensen (2002) claims that stakeholder theory leads to an increase in agency costs. 
However, lacking any performance criteria, it is impossible to judge managerial 
performance effectively. Thus, Jensen does not view stakeholder theory as being 
particularly useful compared to value maximisation and posits that the theory is 
inaccurate and does not detail the purpose nor objective of the corporation, which may 
lead to conflicts. Thus, other alternatives need to be found.  
2.3.4. Transaction Cost Economics  
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is derived from the disciplines of law, economics, 
and organisations. As widely mentioned in the literature, TCE focuses on the 
governance of contractual relations in transactions between two parties. Two streams 
of TCE exist, one related to measurement and another related to governing contractual 
relations (Kochhar, 1996). Thus, it is a theory which debates upon the choice between 
hierarchy and market. The theory is related to research regarding governance 
structures. Williamson (1996) defines governance structures to be systems in which 
transactional integrity is determined, while also noting that such governance regimes 
also help dictate rules which help perform transactions cost-effectively. Thus, TCE 
makes the assumption that opportunistic actors will make the rational choice of a 
governance structure in which separate individuals will have differing information 
(Minnaar and Vosselman, 2009).  
Exchange costs may be reduced by matching TCE with transactions (Kochhar, 1996). 
According to Goldberg (1985), different structures of governance have varying 
transaction cost levels. As this theory sees firms as the centre of contracts, it tries to 
find the most cost-effective method to undertake transactions within the firm. This 
model, thus, relies on the notion that contracts are inherently incomplete and that 
models serve only as a governance structure for the sole purpose of decision making. 
Stiles and Taylor (2001) claim that TCE and agency theories are problematic in 
relation to the discretion of managers. They claim that, with boards being relegated to 
control mechanisms, managers act selfishly and tend to sacrifice profits for personal 
gain, thus not acting in the shareholders’ best interests.  
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2.3.5. Class Hegemony and Managerial Hegemony 
Other theories of CG include Class Hegemony and Managerial Hegemony. Class 
Hegemony theory makes directors accountable for their actions, whilst Managerial 
Hegemony theory allows the management to run the firm’s day to day business 
(Hough et al., 2005). Both these classes inherently possess systems of asymmetric 
information, as shareholders, and by extension the BOD, are deprived of information 
due to there not being similar levels of access to the information. Managerial 
hegemony posits managers becoming well-informed in terms of operations, and 
therefore disadvantages the board. They therefore become highly specialised in 
financing and attain the ability to calculate high investment via retained earnings. This 
means that, to a certain extent, managers will have power over the board. The Board 
is thus unable to strongly represent shareholder interests. 
Overall, CG structures may be explained by the theories above. Based on the cause 
and effects of variables in the theories (rather than based on one single theory), a 
combination of these theories could be used to develop an effective CG structure.  
For instance, agency theory will resolve agency problems arising from conflicts of 
interest. However some mechanisms do not work to solve agency problems due to 
rising agency costs. Thus, when resorting to stewardship theory, the agency problem 
does not apply because the agents act as stewards not bothered by compensation, i.e. 
they act towards the firm’s benefits. Alternatively, looking at stakeholder theory will 
make firms more harmonious as stakeholder interests are taken care of. Whilst 
addressing issues of CG, a combination of theories could be more practical to allow 
CG to be implemented according to the model that best suits the firm. 
2.3.6. Disclosures of Corporate Governance 
Beyond the prevailing theories on corporate governance, there are also strong 
fundamental principles that are related to corporate governance. These principles, 
being human-related behaviour, relate to disclosure, and to a certain extent, corporate 
governance itself is perceived through how it is reflected in terms of its disclosure.  
Mandatory disclosures are statutory disclosure while voluntary disclosures are 
information which is in excess of disclosure requirements (Damagum and Chima, 
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2013). Voluntary disclosures are “disclosures in excess of requirements, representing 
free choices on the part of company managements to provide accounting and other 
information deemed relevant to the decision needs of users of their annual reports” 
(Meek et al., 1995:555). It should be noted that the need for voluntary disclosures 
emanates from the fact that financial reports must be capable of meeting the needs of 
the various categories of users and also serve as a basis for investment decisions by 
investors and other stakeholders (Damagum and Chima, 2013:166).  
There have been many instances that reveal disclosure as being quite problematic and 
this is not easy to overcome although much is said about lobbying transparency. As 
mentioned by Forker (1992), the quality of disclosure is a concern and is debated in 
the UK. As such, before moving on to CG models in the next section, some pioneer 
works on disclosure are worth discussing, as this study is partly undertaken using a 
disclosure approach and content analysis.  
Based on the reviewed literature, most of the undertaken work on disclosure uses 
disclosure approach and content analysis as their research methodology.  The earlier 
work mostly focused on corporations with respect to disclosure on corporate 
governance. A study by Wallace (1988), for instance, looks at disclosure in terms of 
their mandatory requirements. Using the disclosure approach, his case study looks at 
disclosure on corporate-listed companies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
Hong Kong in which he mentions that the difference in terms of disclosure is affected 
by culture. His study is based on the characteristics of Hong Kong–listed companies, 
which, he mentions, provide mandatory information in a comprehensive manner in 
their annual reports. Based on the disclosure index that he developed using the scoring 
of annual reports disclosure, he sees culture as an important factor that triggers the 
difference between the disclosure levels between the two countries. Wallace’s (1988) 
study provides a basis that firm-specific factors help explain the variation in 
disclosure, besides stressing the role played by the environment of financial reporting 
which speculates on corporate reporting. He mentioned that either the 
comprehensiveness of the reporting or the mandatory disclosure affects investors in 
terms of governance, rather than business dealings, and explains how the social aspect 
of the unification that has impacted corporate reporting affects investors.  
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Similarly, using disclosure index which was developed in his research on public-listed 
companies, Owusu-Ansah (1998) investigates the adequacy of disclosure practices on 
mandatory information by the companies on the African stock exchange. He assesses 
the “stringency” of the mandatory disclosure of the regulated companies by the 
regulatory regime of that market and examines the relationship between mandatory 
disclosure and corporate governance attributes such as ownership structure, audit 
quality and company age, among others.  
In shifting the focus on corporate accounting, Haniffa and Cooke’s (2002) study 
indicates that the interaction of environmental factors influences disclosure practices 
with regards to corporate governance. Quite similar to the above mentioned work, 
using the disclosure approach, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) developed a disclosure 
index to examine companies’ annual reports in order to study the linkages between 
corporate governance variables. They reveal that some firm-specific factors could 
affect disclosure. Besides firm-specific factors, they also review the importance of CG 
and cultural characteristics as they highlight that disclosure in annual reports (of 
Malaysian listed corporations) could possibly determine the disclosure of the 
corporations. 
A recent study by Darmadi (2011) reveals disclosure on corporate governance in 
annual reports of Islamic banks. He reveals that board member and risk management 
are strong while internal controls and board committees are weak. As this study 
focuses on Islamic banking, the disclosure approach used is confined to financial 
institutions or Islamic banks specifically. 
2.4. MODELS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CG is determined by modes of corporate financing (Okabe, 2004). As such, CG 
models can be defined by two types of financial systems: market-based and bank-
based systems (Okabe, 2004). As this study focuses on financial institutions, it is felt 
that the models of CG could also be defined by its modes of financing4. As such, the 
next section will present the CG models based on the market-based and bank-based 
models. 
                                                          
4 CG models are classified as market-based and bank-based systems (La Porta et al., 2000). 
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2.4.1. Market Based Corporate Governance Model  
“The Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, granting total supremacy to 
shareholder interests, still dominates most free market economies” (Pearson, 2010: 1). 
It is based upon a fiduciary relationship between shareholders and managers (Clarke 
and Chanlat, 2009), and draws inspiration primarily from market capitalism, i.e. it is 
derived from the notion of self-interested, decentralised markets regulating 
themselves (Clarke and Chanlat, 2009). Furthermore, it is defined by individual share 
ownership with behaviour that is primarily profit-oriented. The firm’s owners are 
aided by the firm’s directors based primarily on this notion of a fiduciary relationship 
between the shareholders and managers. Investors are responsible for supplying 
capital and having ownership rights over the corporation, but it is the management 
that is legally responsible for the corporation’s actions.  
This model utilises a unitary board that has independent and external directors and 
board members which are focused primarily on enhancing shareholder value (Tricker, 
2010). This model is generally compatible with agency theory, which itself was born 
within a free market economy environment, and sees prevalent practice within the US 
and the UK. This model possesses a framework which readily defines the rights and 
responsibilities of management, the Board, and its shareholders. As a one-tier model, 
the board structure consists of management carried out by one board and reporting to 
a large supervisory board. 
As the Anglo Saxon model relies heavily upon regulation, it has a well-defined 
relationship between the management and the shareholders (Bryceson, 2006). 
Furthermore, the model is stricter on disclosure in the US as opposed to the UK and 
other countries. The US uses a more intricate and heavily moderated system which 
aids in communication between shareholders, directors, and management. 
Apart from the Anglo Saxon model, the next most common model is the bank-based 
model. In this section, the bank-based model is represented by Germany and Japan. 
While the Anglo-Saxon model is aligned with agency theory, the German model is 
potentially considered as being represented in the form of co-determination and 
Japan’s model is slightly similar to stakeholder theory. 
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2.4.2. Bank-Based Model  
As mentioned, there are mainly two models of CG based on bank-based model, which 
are explored below. 
2.4.2.1. German model of corporate governance 
Germany’s CG model may be better than CG models in the UK and the US. It is 
especially notable due to Germany’s position as Europe’s largest economy (Wójcik, 
2002). Based on its financial system and mode of CG, the model itself demonstrated 
high stability throughout the post war period until the mid-1990s (Clarke, 2009). This 
may be attributed to Germany placing more of a focus on long-term relationships 
between corporations, banks and investors as opposed to profit.  
The German model has a board which is two-tiered. It is comprised of a management 
board (Vorstand), that runs the firm, and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) with 
outside directors only (Sadowski et al., 2005). The management board and 
supervisory boards are separated by law, thus a clear separation of duties and 
functions exists. The German model is sometimes referred to as “an insider, 
networked, bank-based, or closed system” (Wójcik, 2002:5). This model applies legal 
rights which are more applicable to direct and active control on appointment and 
dismissal. The supervisory board has important rights and its members are comprised 
of numerous external individuals. The model is normally identified by its use of 
prominent shareholders, cross-holdings, and bank supervision. It promotes the usage 
of universal banks (Hausbanken) wherein banks have large stakes in companies with 
significant representatives in the boards. Höpner and Jackson (2001:2) opine that, 
with “The emergence of a market for corporate control”, Germany cannot be 
described as having “a bank-oriented, insider, or stakeholder model of corporate 
governance”. The German model observes a system of codetermination. The German 
system is thus not legally obligated to only pursue shareholder interests as firms 
prioritise a broader group of stakeholders (Allen and Zhao, 2007) rather than just a 
few shareholders. The model is explicit in focusing on efficiency and maximising 
stakeholder value (Goergen et al., 2005) while also avoiding information costs and 
allowing for greater managerial control. This differs from the Anglo-American system 
which is aimed at generating fair returns for investors. 
Page 29 
 
According to the model, shareholders and employees are responsible for the 
nomination of board members (Tricker, 1994). As rights and responsibilities are 
shared via the usage of dual-tier boards, employees are allowed voting rights on 
certain issues. While the model suggests that the executive board may have 
transactions which will need the supervisory board’s approval, the composition of the 
supervisory board is also variable and changes according to the size and type of the 
company, though its own size is legally set and this cannot be altered by shareholders 
(Tricker, 1994).  
According to the Goergen et al. (2005:2) the “German regime is characterised by the 
existence of a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders, cross-holdings 
and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with 
co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a 
non-negligible sensitivity of managerial compensation to performance, competitive 
product markets, and corporate governance regulations largely based on EU directives 
but with deep roots in the German legal doctrine”. The supervisory board is also 
responsible for choosing those in the management board.  
The model is also known for being egalitarian in what is often referred to as 
Rhineland Capitalism (Schmidt and Wahrenburg, 2003), in which decisions are made 
collectively (Clarke, 2009). This is linked to the model recognising long term goals 
and stability as significant (Clarke, 2009). Thus, firms are not necessarily obliged to 
generate high returns to shareholders (Lane, 2003).  
In contrast, “In Anglo-American systems there are no supervisory boards, the power 
of employees is limited, institutional portfolio investors are powerful, capital markets 
are strong and take-over activities are common” (Wójcik, 2002:5). Keasey et al. 
(2005), however, doubts that banks play an active monitoring role in most firms, but 
also notes that this is more likely the case in failing companies. Wójcik (2002) 
however, claims that banks are more significant in Germany as they possess more 
influence in companies with representatives in the boards. 
In the model, banks may also utilise proxy voting (Edwards and Fischer, 1994) to 
control other companies (Franks and Mayer, 2001). “Proxy voting rights also give the 
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banks’ voice a disproportional vote on the general meetings” (Keasey et al., 2005:15). 
Thus, the system itself seems to be opposed to outsider control. 
Retained earnings are one of the biggest sources of income for German corporations 
and thus this allows banks to be highly autonomous. Such long-term lending 
relationships also allow German banks more power, which is further supported by the 
bank also having a significant voice in the firm’s supervisory board (Keasey et al, 
2005). Thus, the scope and significance of bank control in the German model limit the 
role of portfolio investors and allow more power to be retained with the banks 
(Blommenstein and Funke, 1998).  
In Germany, the massive amount of control afforded to banks via cross-holdings and 
proxy voting makes the stock market only play a marginal role in controlling German 
firms (Wójcik, 2002). As far as employee stakeholders are concerned, the system 
allows them a certain degree of influence with regards to the operations of the firm in 
matters which may affect them while also entitling them to a share of the surplus.  
On matters of ownership, hostile ownership is almost unheard of in German 
companies. In fact, ownership concentration is high (Wójcik, 2002) with family 
ownership still being found in large firms. However, despite banks having significant 
control over the supervisory boards, their ownership in stakes is not high. Thus, it can 
be said that, with the control of firms by financial institutions in Germany, problems 
of agency may be mitigated by virtue of the financial institutions acting as external 
moderators for the large corporations (Allen and Zhao, 2007).  
It should be noted that the model does not utilise the securities market very much. 
Stock markets are insignificant, and therefore play only a small role in governing 
German companies (Lane, 2003). In fact, “The number of listed companies and their 
market capitalization are small in relation to the size of the economy” (Wójcik, 
2002:4).  
2.4.2.2. Japanese corporate governance model 
The Japanese model is in some ways similar to certain aspects of the stakeholder 
model of CG, which has traditionally been linked to broader views related to the 
efficient resource allocation of stakeholders and shareholders (Allen and Zhao, 2007). 
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The model is identified through heavy cross-shareholding5 among participant banks 
and clients, companies, or conglomerates (Monks and Minow, 1995). Thus, 
“ownership within Japanese keiretsu groups is more diffused through horizontal 
cross-shareholding" (Jackson, 2002) and investors remain unaffiliated with 
corporations as financial institutions play the more important roles in financing the 
enterprise and moderating the operations. 
The model places heavy reliance on debt-financing, characterised as a main-bank6 
system due to the borrowing (Okabe, 2004). High bank debt large shareholders are a 
characteristic of Japanese corporations (Yafeh, 1995). According to the 
conceptualisation of the model, since banks are the main financiers of the company, 
they effectively play a part in governing companies through cross-holdings and 
lendings. However, they lack significant roles in boards (Okabe, 2004). In the model, 
stakeholders are more committed towards the firms’ long-term survival, as opposed to 
the shareholder-oriented U.S. model which focuses on maximising shareholder-value.  
The ownership stakes of Japanese firms “are held among shareholders having strong 
commitment to specific firm and focusing on their strategic interests” (Jackson, 2002). 
The strength of Japanese-style management, thus, is of long employee retention and 
links with main banks. It is a model which promotes unity and encourages staff 
promotion based on performance and loyalty (Tricker, 1994). 
In this model, ownership stability reduces the market for corporate control (Clarke, 
2009) as the model relies on inside executive directors and a hierarchical structure. 
The structure, size of the board and the governance processes are dissimilar to the 
West, and firm structure influences resource usage (Aoki, 1990). Furthermore, the 
companies are incredibly competent through the use of fair compensation and long-
term employment.  
Theoretically, shareholders have more rights than those the US and the UK (Allen and 
Zhao, 2007). This is shown by the fact that shareholders can directly nominate 
                                                          
5 Cross-shareholding is when new shares are not sold into the market. They are held by the banks or 
other allied companies (Okabe, 2004). 
6The main-bank system is a relationship between a firm and a bank when: there is continuous large 
bank borrowing for a long period; bank is the main shareholders of the firm; bank performs other 
transactions with the firm; maintain close human relationship and offer rescue in the event of financial 
distress (Okabe, 2004). 
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directors and have a say on the remuneration of management during shareholder 
meetings. In addition, managers are not directly responsible to shareholders (in terms 
of the fiduciary relationship) and decision making is done collectively, involving 
debate and negotiation which is left to the top management’s ratifications. In the 
model, all directors are non-independent and executive and no committees exist with 
the sole purpose of monitoring executive management, executive remunerations, or 
board nominations.  Accordingly Grabowiecki (2006:37) states that, “management 
mediates between stakeholders by pursuing strategies that focus on markets for high-
quality products and the utilization of highly-skilled workforces and stable inter-
organizational relationships”.   
Thus, the fact that there is less of a market for corporate control in Japan seems to 
indicate that problems of agency are rare (Allen and Zhao, 2007). This, according to 
Allen and Zhao (2007), is due to the moderating influence of financial institutions on 
corporations.  
2.5. SUMMARY ON CONVENTIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Being a well-researched field in literature, CG has very diverse definitions, 
contributed to by many coming from different disciplines. The definitions are 
comprehensive in nature owing to their development in economic, investment, legal, 
management, and many other disciplines. The definitions, through their spectrum of 
defined objectives, direct how CG can be pursued which then relates to issues of CG 
today.  
Corporate governance structure could be explained by several theories discussed in 
the preceding sections. For example, agency theory is useful in context but is 
inevitably constrained by the problem of conflicts of interest between principles and 
agents. As such, it has to manage between efficiency and cost. To take care of the 
intersection of interests among stakeholders, the stakeholder theory claims that there 
is not supposed to be any trade-off between stakeholders. Whether this may possibly 
be achieved depends on the model adopted which best fits the corporations.  
Based on the cause and effects of variables in the theories, a combination of these 
theories could be used to develop an effective corporate governance structure. Whilst 
addressing issues of corporate governance, the combinations of theories could be 
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more practical in allowing corporate governance to be implemented according to any 
models that suits the firm. 
Having explored CG through the conventional understanding, the following section 
proceeds with an overview on CG from the Islamic perspective through the 
emergence of Islamic principles of economics as explained by Islamic moral and 
political economy.  
2.6. ISLAMIC MORAL/POLITICAL ECONOMY FOUNDATIONS OF 
ISLAMIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Economic principles are not new to Islam and can be traced back to the revelation of 
Qur’an, the holy book of Islam, to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) (Ayub, 2007). 
However, as far as literature is concerned, work on Islamic economics in the modern 
sense began as late as 1940s (Kahf, 2004). Historically, classical Muslim scholars, 
such as Ibn-Khaldun, IbnTaimiyya, and Imam Ghazali among many others, had 
written extensively on economics and finance related matters (Ashraf, 2012), 
evidencing that the ‘great gap’ in economics postulated by Schumpeter did not exist 
(Ali and Thompson, 1999), as Muslim scholars with their original work filled that 
gap. Using such historical heritage, Muslim economists in the 20th century aimed to 
revive Islamic economics in a constructivist manner as an alternative system of 
understanding for the economic development of the Muslim world and beyond. In 
contemporary times, the development in Islamic economics is further initiated by the 
work of Mawdudi and Sadr, to name a few (Zaman and Asutay, 2009). 
As far as Islamic economics is concerned, rising interests in this area are not confined 
only to specific Muslim countries (like the Middle East, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and 
Malaysia) but also the West (Kuran, 2004; Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). The first 
commercial Islamic bank was established in 1975 (Zaher and Hassan, 2002), which 
paved the way for the emergence of developments in Islamic finance in the modern 
sense. From the 1990s until the early part of the 2000s, Islamic banks (IBs) began to 
grow but at a relatively slower pace. Not until late in the 1990s did IBs begin to show 
a significant presence. 
Being located within Islamic economics, the early discourse of Islamic finance 
articulates the essentialised principles of Islamic economics including profit-and-loss 
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sharing while making reference to the social justice dimension (Asutay, 2012). Even 
though Islamic financial instruments in origin predate modern Islamic civilisation, its 
re-emergence did not occur until after post-colonial period, triggered by the quest for 
the meaning of ‘Islamic economic development’ that brings about IME (Asutay, 
2012). Thus, as an important part and main institution of Islamic economics, the 
emergence of Islamic banking and finance (IBF) as institutions had to wait for the last 
quarter of the 20th century when developments in legal frameworks and regulations 
began to take place (Asutay, 2012).  
Islamic moral economy, and therefore IBs, emerged out of a need for fairness and 
freedom, due to the fact that Islam itself promoted social equality and economic 
fairness (Chapra, 1985). This resulted in the inception of IBs, objectives may be 
served which aimed to perform interest-free activities based upon the Shari’ah, halal 
transactions, and risk-sharing among investors, banks and borrowers. Siddiqi (1989), 
for instance, regards Islamic economics as emphasising social justice. As an 
alternative to socialism and capitalism, Islamic economics is defined by the maqasid 
as-shari’ah and benefits from fiqh structures in determining the nature of how Islamic 
economics is seen as opposed to the actual financialised nature of Islamic finance.  
In his attempt to bring about the realisation of Islamic economics, Chapra (1992:4) 
stresses that the crucial test for an economic system lies not in the professed goals but 
in the realisation of the goals itself, in which he highlights the significance of world 
view to address the issues of the economic system. He sees the worldview as 
providing the function to support the foundation and strategy of the economic system 
before its goal can be attained, and he sees the economic questions as value laden. 
Choudhury and Malik (1992) state that Islamic economics should play a part in 
building up the economic structure from Islamic sources of thought rather than being 
merely a discipline which studies the problems of the system as it was originally 
aimed as a discipline by which the foundation of ethical economics would be derived 
from the ideological viewpoint of the world as operating according to the will of God 
and his laws.  
Islamic economics relies on a worldview which needs to be filtered before being able 
to be effective (Chapra, 1992). Similarly, Nomani and Rahnema (1994:41) view 
Page 35 
 
Islamic economic realities as socially constructed and thus on no account is any 
human endeavour value-free. Each action is produced and acted in a socially 
constructed manner which then justifies the difference in life’s undertakings (Asutay, 
2007). 
2.6.1. Definition 
Islamic moral economy is defined by the conceptual foundations of Islamic 
economics through the axiomatic approach. Islamic moral or political economy is an 
Islamic economy with a systemic political economy in nature in which epistemology, 
institutions, and functions are all interlinked through revealed knowledge.  
Formed by the philosophical foundations that themselves were built through the 
conceptual axiomatic foundation, Islamic economics or moral economy is a distinct 
discipline of economics with morals derived from the Islamic rationale embedded into 
it (Asutay, 2007). It is not a complete theory,  a simple application (Wilson, 2008), 
nor a substitute for mainstream economic theory but rather a way of approaching 
economics moralistically and rejecting the extremes of both capitalistic markets and 
command economies, and its utilitarian approach focuses on the maximisation of 
individual material satisfaction. 
Choudhury and Malik (1992) regard the Islamic political economy as a discipline 
which endeavours to study the relationships between policy, economics and politics 
while also aiming to integrate these with ethical and philosophical concerns. By 
integrating the epistemology of Islamic political economy into the wider Islamic 
economic structure and studying the theoretical structure of such endeavours, 
Choudhury (1999) views the Islamic political economy as a form of humanistic 
political economy which values humans as equals in all moral and ethical values. 
Meanwhile, Naqvi (1981) views Islamic economics as a system in which religious, 
economic, and social dimensions are all integrated to form an overall Islamic system. 
Still within the context of an order, Asutay (2007) sees Islamic economics as the 
economic and financial activities outlined by Islamic principles and undertaken by 
institutions. He views it is as part of the religion dealing with production that is based 
specific ideology with its own underpinnings.  
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Broadly speaking, Asutay (2007) views Islamic economics as an ecological order, 
articulating the concept as a combination of working components that work within the 
Islamic ethical foundation. Whilst Islamic economics recognises the failures of the 
current system in promoting welfare, it may also be described as the summation of all 
Islam’s ethical propositions and encourages considering the welfare of others and may 
also help in regards to the voluntary movement of wealth from rich to poor for welfare 
purposes (Asutay, 2007).  
The Islamic political economy is sourced from Islamic sources of knowledge like the 
Al-Quran and Sunnah and its operationalisation has been derived from the premises of 
law and the realities of the market (Choudhury and Hoque, 2004). Choudhury and 
Hoque (2004) stresses that with this base structure, essential elements relating to 
cooperation and economic stability are unlikely to manifest without there also being 
an ethical policy to support it. It is thus the axiomatic nature of this order which 
makes formation of the Islamic political economy in operationalising the Shari’ah in 
the Islamic economy possible. 
Naqvi (1981) tries to analyse Islamic economics by combining the religious and social 
aspects with the economic dimension. This is in an attempt to develop a distinctive 
framework capable of solving economic problems uniquely. He believes that ethical 
guidelines as the dominant force in economics will allow its rules to be derived from 
Islamic principles and thus help establish clear economic guidelines for policy-
making. In referring to the ethical foundations, Naqvi (2003) highlights how 
important religious morality is in achieving moralistic values due to how Islamic 
economics focuses on the behaviour of the individual human.  
By the same token, Kahf (1989:43) is of the opinion that the ethical base provides the 
value system which governs all forms of Islamic economic activities. Ethics 
represents the integral part of the Shari’ah which helps provide the foundations for 
Islamic economic theory formulation (Choudhury and Malik, 1992). Through the 
ethical value, Islamic order provides the economic system in which the process is 
managed by a set of axioms and principles to achieve the economic objectives 
(Asutay, 2007:4). In summation, Islamic moral and political economy is an Islamic 
economy with a systemic political economy in its nature in which epistemology, 
institutions, and behaviours are all interlinked through revealed knowledge.  
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2.6.2. The Structure of IME/IPE: The Axiomatic Framework  
IME is theoretically developed through strong foundational axioms based upon the al-
Quran and Sunnah to create a world order with an authentic value system in the 
economy (Asutay, 2007:167). In a socially constructed manner, IME aims to develop 
socially concerned and altruistically motivated individuals which can be defined as 
‘homoislamicus’ as opposed to utility maximising individual ‘homoeconomicus’ 
modelled by neo-classical formulation (Ariff, 1989; Asutay, 2012) 
In regards to IME’s axioms, Choudhury (1986) sees Islamic economics as being 
devised by humans but itself deriving primarily from independent sources, thus 
allowing it to be considered an alternative economic system. Choudhury (1992) 
regards Islamic economics as comprised of a few key principles: Tawhid and 
solidarity, felicity, distributive equity, as well as work and productivity which 
themselves are connected to IPE principles. It is a derivation of Islamic principles 
which allow the basis for an alternative economy based upon human welfare (Asutay, 
2007).  
Islamic economics is made up elements of addin7 (Dali et al., 2013), commitment, and 
the right of the poor to the wealth of the rich. Naqvi (1981) stresses that secular and 
religious ethics should not contradict each other. Furthermore, Islamic economics acts 
as a mechanism which accentuates the naturalistic human desire to perform good 
deeds (Ahmad, 1976).  
Tawhid, as Islam’s foundation, carries tenets of the Islamic faith, which governs all 
fundamental domains of human faith and actions (Choudhury, 1993) and it is not 
merely an abstract religious doctrine or metaphysical concept as it enumerates a 
comprehensive ideology and philosophy of life (Khan, 2012:9). Khan (2012:9) looks 
at Tawhid from three different levels: individual, socio-cultural, and politico-
economic. According to him, the individual level is a revolutionary concept requiring 
the liberation of man from all desires and temptations, thus fully submitting oneself to 
God. 
                                                          
7 Islam is a religion or a way of life that governs human kinds (Dali et al., 2013 ) 
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On the socio-cultural level, he sees Tawhid as freeing man from the superimpositions 
of other men (Khan, 2012:9). Similarly, on the politico-economic level, Khan 
(2012:9) views Tawhid as seeking to liberate man from the political oppression and 
economic injustice of other men. Choudhury (1993:6) views the Quranic concept of 
Tawhid from three perspectives: as psychological, moral, and social phenomena, 
which assume the principle of integration. Meanwhile Asutay (2007) regards Tawhid 
as a vertical horizon to equality, in which everyone is equally close to God and where 
everyone is part of the whole system that allows economic activities to take place. 
The second axiom, ad’l, ensures that everyone receives what they deserve. It refers 
specifically to equilibrium. Mawdudi (2011), however, does not see it as referring to 
equality. Different to Tawhid, he says that everyone is only equal with regards to their 
claim to resources. However, in order for this to work, al ad’l (justice) must be 
supported by al-ihsan (Naqvi, 1981). This, together with Tawhid, helps create balance 
in the system by fulfilling the needs of people and society. This translates to a quality 
of life via the equitable distribution of wealth used for growth through making of 
suitable policies.   
The third axiom, fard (mandatory action) means that everyone has obligations they 
must fulfil. This means that performing social good is meant to be a compulsory part 
of the religion rather than a voluntary action (Asutay, 2007). Thus, Islam fixes 
western concepts of individualism and capitalism by establishing concepts of fard ‘ala 
al-ain (individual responsibility) and fard ‘ala al-kifayah (collective responsibility) 
(Naqvi, 1981).  
Ikhtiyar, another foundational axiom, is about the free-will of humans. This freedom 
is entirely unrestricted and up to the human’s discretion (Naqvi, 1994). It constitutes 
functional norms of economic activity in Islamic economic systems by actualising 
justice through its given individual freedoms (Asutay, 2007:7).  
Rububiyyah, another axiom of Islamic micro-foundations, refers to the development 
path of all things in either a personal, social, or natural context (Arif, 1985), thus 
implying the integration of economic and social components. As an axiom, it suggests 
a divine arrangement for nourishment, sustenance, and directions to perfection 
(Ahmad, 1979:12), implying that everything has a ‘development’ path through which 
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to grow. Thus, human beings, the biological environment, and the social environment 
all have to develop through identified paths for sustenance and perfection (Asutay, 
2007:8). 
Tazkiyah, an important moral axiom, is implicative of purified growth in trying to 
attain falah (fortune in the world and the hereafter). It deals with growing towards 
perfection through the purification of attitudes and relationships (Ahmad, 1994). 
Tazkiyah operationalises the fundamental axioms and principles of the Islamic 
economic system. It is a result of the integration of Tawhid, ad’l, fard, and rububiyyah 
in order to make humans move towards self-development and hence social and 
economic development (Asutay, 2007). 
Khilafah refers to how humans are accountable before God as human freedom and 
accountability are parts of khilafah (Naqvi, 1981). The role of humans as vicegerents 
on earth is considered the only reason for their worldly existence. Ahmad (1979) 
asserts that this axiom leads to such unique concepts as individual trusteeship 
alongside various rules of social organisation. This implies that the khilafah axiom 
includes notions of universal solidarity, sustainable consumption in pursuing a 
humble lifestyle, and freedom to lead a life (Asutay, 2007:8). Asutay (2007) further 
explains that khilafah also relates to social accountability in terms of being aware of 
the consequences of the hereafter in all human actions.  
As a methodological paradigm, maqasid-al-shari’ah, a process-oriented concept 
meaning ‘the objective of Shari’ah’ with ‘the objective’ defined as human welfare, is 
achieved when institutions aim to maximise human welfare. It operationalises 
institutions in which there are Islamic economic systems by providing them with the 
working mechanism’s nature. In other words, maqasid-al-shari’ah is associated with 
shari’ah objectives, in the sense that it provides the structure for conducting economic 
activity. Furthermore, it is also a form of instruction, and helps to draw the line 
between licit and illicit sources of income as defined by the Shari’ah. 
As mentioned by Asutay (2010), IME determines the economic value system’s 
structure, its foundational and operational dimensions, and how individual Muslims 
are to behave normally. Asutay (2010) regards IE as a discipline to interpret and solve 
economic problems using Islamic sources of knowledge. As mainstream economics 
Page 40 
 
was deemed inadequate in dealing with issues of uncertainty, the Islamic economic 
paradigm was created as a response to that (Asutay, 2007). 
Since IME can be defined as a system as it was developed based upon a system of 
understanding, which defines the foundational axioms, values and norms, 
methodology, operational principles and functional institutions. As such, IBFs should 
operate in such a framework so that IME’s aims and objectives may be served better . 
Thus, IBFs may be regarded as functional institutions if operating within the IME 
system. Thus, as a form of IME’s institutionalisation, IBFs must regulate the economy 
while being confined by the Islamic framework and the limits this framework entails, 
all of which are delineated in the CG framework (Asutay, 2010). 
2.7. ISLAMIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Being a structure, Islamic corporate governance (ICG) encompasses the methodology 
with embedded moral values provided by Islamic principles to indirectly bring moral 
elements into the system. The previous section provides the rationale for Islamic 
corporate governance by laying down the micro religious/Islamic foundations. In 
other words, Islamic corporate governance, by definition, is developed from the 
Islamic norms, principles and values. Such foundational principles, having 
implications on every aspect life, by definition, hence, define the nature of corporate 
governance in Islam. Thus, Islamic corporate governance in its fundamental nature is 
not voluntary but dictated through the Islamic values by definition of Islamic ontology 
and epistemology, as explored in the following sections. 
The need to locate IBF in IME was hastened after a series of financial crises affected 
many economies. As crises are claimed to result from ethical deficiencies within the 
financial system and its related institutions (Kayed and Hassan, 2011), the ethical 
approach suggested by IME may prove useful in solving the problem. As some ethical 
deficiency-related failures have manifested themselves within corporate governance 
practices, it is thus important that an appropriate system of CG is created to provide 
an ethical outcome. Hence, IME’s foundational axioms can help to provide a structure 
for this undertaking. 
Islamic economics’ foundational axioms are aimed at creating a system of economics 
which is primarily human-focused (Asutay, 2007). The axioms define foundational 
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principles and incorporate elements of social justice (Asutay, 2007:5). On this, Naqvi 
(1994:47) demonstrates that deducing economic statements from ethical axioms is a 
scientifically correct procedure. 
Thus, because CG sees a definition in Islamic law and because of the value and norms 
implications of Islamic moral economy, a distinct ICG is possible. The operational 
axioms are all summarised under the Islamic corporate governance structure which 
will help every entity and itself.  
Therefore, a distinct ICG is possible by moving away from such axioms since they all 
refer to a particular aspect of creating an ICG with a distinct value system. To proceed 
with, some highlights on conceptual definitions of ICG may be deemed necessary. 
2.7.1. Conceptual Definitions 
Corporate governance is about regulating the rights and responsibilities of parties 
through a legal system of enforcement. It is responsible for determining how parties 
behave and what their duties are and also that these duties are taken care of (Chapra, 
2003).  
Despite its diverse definitions, Hassan (2010) views that the conceptual definition of 
CG do not differ much between the mainstream and Islamic. However, a standard 
definition of Islamic CG has yet to be achieved (Tapanjeh, 2009).  
On the other hand, as the above does not differ significantly from conventional CG, 
Ibrahim (2006) sees the distinctiveness of ICG as being in its structure, which requires 
validation to ensure all transactions are Shari’ah compliant. However, Tapanjeh 
(2009:556) says that ICG dimensions have a broader horizon and are unable to 
compartmentalise roles and responsibilities in which all actions and obligations fall 
under the jurisdiction of the divine law of Islam.  
Despite several underlying principles that support ICG, the following section attempts 
to rationalise CG from the perspective of the IME by referring to the foundational 
axioms. It is important to revisit the objectives of IME, within which ICG must be 
located, to understand the underlying principles of ICG, and the deficits which trigger 
factors underlining IBF issues. 
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2.7.2. Rationale for Islamic Corporate Governance 
According to Asutay (2007), the above axioms are associated with the state of all 
human activities and are thus combined to produce harmony and justice in all human 
endeavours. Furthermore, these activities are undertaken by human agents given free 
will and thus they are also responsible for the consequences those activities may bring 
(Naqvi, 2003). In advocating the entirety of Islamic economics, Nomani and Rahnema 
(1994) uphold that all methodologies in Islamic economics are deduced via the 
Shari’ah, thus allowing for an element of clarity to be had as far as ethical values are 
concerned. 
Hence, these axioms, in addition to tawhid, adalah, and ihsan, represent the core 
foundations of ICG, as corporations should strive to bring about the realisation of 
these axioms’ consequences within the greater tawhidi framework, which, in turn, 
requires that all stakeholders be made to share the objective of achieving human well-
being. 
In articulating the larger stakeholder nature of ICG, IME also assumes rububiyyah and 
tazkiyah as part of its axioms. While the former refers to developmental paths given 
by the creator to individuals, society, and the environment, the latter refers to the 
purification of stakeholder relationships and goals.  
ICG, being an IME model, refers to an ethical proposition and framework for Islamic 
banking. Islamic moral economy’s distinctive values are aimed at upholding ethical 
values in all human affairs inclusive of economic and financial matters that have 
consequences for organisational management, thus implying a distinct governance 
mechanism by essentialising the Quranic paradigm. 
2.7.3. Locating ICG within Moral and Political Economy of Islam  
Combining moral economics and the Islamic economic system via IBFs makes it an 
integral world system (Oshodi, 2010). Oshodi (2010:10) claims that by “allowing a 
combination of the moral economic core and the Islamic economic system via Islamic 
banking and finance would make this integral world system to reduce acts of 
immorality and corruption; influence better state and market coordination…”  to  
consistently reduce poverty level. Thus, it can be said that institutional, political 
Page 43 
 
vision, aim and leadership are some elements which are present in CG. ICG, 
meanwhile, introduces a distinctly Islamic ideology via the IBF. 
In terms of the functionality or articulations of ethics and morality, ICG is similar to 
the conventional CG as it sees transparency and ethical concerns such as 
accountability and honesty as part of their key principles. However, with regards to 
structure or framework, ICG is distinct as it places the Islamic norms and values at the 
topmost, above the shareholders’ level, so that the ideals of human affairs may be 
achieved (Choudhury and Hoque, 2004). 
As such, a thorough and comprehensive framework named Islamic corporate 
governance is located in IPE to provide the norms for the organisation to achieve the 
aim of the IME. Whether this is achievable through IBF, it depends on whether IBF 
are able to establish that legal, economic, social justice and other such dimensions are 
to be incorporated into its methodological framework. Islamic finance theorists like 
Choudhury, Naqvi, Siddiqi, and many others mention that the operational axioms of 
‘Tawhid’, ‘adl’, ‘fard’, ‘rububiyyah’, ‘tazkiyyah’, ‘khilafah’, and ‘maqasid al-
Shari’ah’ are important elements in outlining the operationalising nature of IBF 
(Islamic Banking and Finance), which includes corporate governance. By upholding 
the concept of addin, these axioms are conceptualised and operationalized into the 
various dimensions of ICG: board; structure, committees and senior management; 
regulatory disclosure and transparency; audit; policies and procedures; support and 
operations as well as risk management dimensions. The proceeding section explains 
the principles of CG based on axioms as developed by Naqvi (1994), Ghazali (1990) 
and Ariff (1983) as cited by Asutay (2007). Thereon ‘falah’ is achieved as described 
through the following:    
‘Tawhid’ when operationalised is reflected through the ‘board’ and ‘structure’ 
dimensions in ICG.  The vertical power between man and God can be translated into 
the power vested in the board in performing their mandate. As much as the board is 
highly empowered, they are liable for their action, as there is a supreme and utmost 
power beyond them. As for the horizontal power, this is operationalized between all 
levels in the structure. Mankind, regardless of their levels in the structure, they are all 
alike in the eyes of God which brings them vertically equal to God. As for their 
position between them, they should be horizontally equal in teams of rights. Through 
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‘Tawhid’, this assures equal rights to resources as Islam asserts that there is the poors’ 
right in the richs’ wealth. Furthermore, between the employee and employer, among 
the employees, stakeholders, shareholders and society at large, there is no issue on 
oppression by the powerful on the weak as all mankind are at the same horizontal line 
to the God. By conceptualising this axiom into ICG, the power vested in the board and 
shareholders is superseded by the divine power, at the utmost layer of the 
organisational structure that governs everything. As such any decision making 
triggered regardless of from which level, will be in line with Shariah principles as 
such, decision made should be at the ‘discretion’ of God. In this manner, oppression 
between mankind is liberated as everyone is owned by God thus by no means that 
man is subjected to oppression of his own mankind.  
With ‘adl’, its conceptualisation into ICG reflects in the way the shareholder and the 
stakeholders are being treated in whatever manner for instance, in terms of profit and 
loss, charges, payments and penalty, salary and benefits. As Islam acknowledges 
rights and responsibilities, committees such as the remuneration and nomination as 
well as the senior management that work through the conceptualisation fare better in 
terms taking care of the interest of the employees as no one will be deprived. Their 
actions are transparent, with trustworthiness and honesty instilled in them which 
create better working environments among the staff and management. The element of 
equilibrium can be operationalized. When ‘adl’ is conceptualised in ICG through 
comprehensive policies and procedures, this ensures standardisation and uniformity as 
Islam instils fairness, justice and transparency. This axiom, when conceptualised into 
ICG through risk management, also instils the elements of justice and fairness as 
Islam prohibits financial oppression or any kind of injustice and discrimination. 
The operationalization of ‘fard’ into ICG improves the ‘support and operations’ 
dimension in ICG as each person has his own commitment towards God, himself, the 
bank, society at large etc. By instilling accountability and commitment, moral hazards 
do not exist. In fact, along this line, with the axiom ‘ikhtiyar’ imposed by Islam, 
Muslims are forbidden from giving up and, should not lament that everything has 
been decided by God as the element of freewill is also operationalized alongside the 
‘fard’. 
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As for ‘rububiyyah’, it is the element or concept of obligation to show respect to the 
divine arrangement. From the ‘board’ and ‘structure’ dimensions of ICG, this 
improves the working environment through clear reporting lines as ‘rububiyyah’ 
promotes concern for order and unity. From the perspective of the employee, the 
conceptualisation of ‘rububiyyah’, when operationalised into the support and 
operations dimension of ICG, creates a peaceful and harmonious working 
environment. As for the axiom of ‘ihsan’, when it is operationalized, this helps to 
maintain social and environmental concept for nourishment and hence harmonious 
relations between different spheres of life. In addition, the axiom of ‘shura’ promotes 
discussions and feedback to ensure effective interactions thus employees and 
stakeholders are willing to adhere to rules and Muslims have to oblige to undertake 
their responsibilities and accountabilities through orders assigned to them. In the ICG 
context, ‘shura’ when contextualised in IBs ascertains fair and just decision-making 
in the Board meeting.   
‘Khilafah’ is conceptualised through the ethical criteria possessed by the ‘board’, 
‘committee’, and ‘senior management’. They earn respect from staff and stakeholders 
due to their ethicality, honesty, knowledge and fairness to name a few. As much as 
they are superior in terms of power, this does not entail taking advantage of the weak 
or allowing moral hazards to pursue one’s own interests. This axiom necessitates 
maintain harmonious relationship among all as their aspect of decision making brings 
justice to everyone.  
As for ‘Tazkiyah’, conceptualising this reflects in the banks growth with staff working 
in harmony. As this axiom sustains development, it uses the element of monitoring to 
ensure the right ways of doing things. Hence this is operationalized through the ‘audit 
dimension’ to ensure a check and balance to ascertain a harmonious environment as 
there should not be unethical and immoral actions between staff. In addition to the 
combination of tawhid, adl, fard and rububiyyah, there should also be transparency 
and standardization in terms of actions taken as everyone should be treated fairly 
regardless of their position.  
As mentioned, IME is developed through the formulation of Islamic economics in an 
attempt to develop its axiomatic foundations. These foundational axioms of IME are 
the articulation and operationalised aspects of maqasid al-Shari’ah which represent 
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the ultimate aim within the tawhidi framework. This debate, hence, has consequences 
for ICG (Asutay, 2012).  
IME is socially constructed with emphasis given on the consequentialist nature of 
economic development and its substance. Thus, the anticipated result is social welfare 
or social good with the embedded concept of adalah, justice, and haqq as the core 
objectives. 
As evidenced, a thorough and comprehensive framework named Islamic corporate 
governance is located in the IPE to function through the IBF as Islam provides the 
norms for the organisation to achieve the aims of the IME. The IBF thus needs to 
establish that legal, economic, social justice and other such dimensions are to be 
incorporated into its methodological framework.  
2.7.4. Social Failure of IBF and ICG 
IBFs are supposed to offer ethical solutions to economic and financial dilemmas, 
something which is unique to ICG and should be capitalised upon by Islamic financial 
institutions (Asutay, 2012). As mentioned by Tapanjeh (2009:561), corporate 
governance in Islamic law provides and embodies much larger and vaster guidelines 
with encompassing duties and practices on how to deal with economic transactions 
with the moral conduct of a Muslim without even defining the modern world 
corporate governance as such Islamic laws impetus corporate governance in every 
individual actions of Muslim up to the social environment. 
When IBs began to pick-up in the late 1990s, they were unable to function properly as 
they were developed without operational and methodological axioms, as research on 
IME was still under-developed. Consequently, IBs resorted to adopting the 
neoclassical economic approach, resulting in convergence with mainstream banking. 
Based on recent developments, IBs are claimed to be neglecting the spiritual and 
ethical dimensions (Atzori and Mattei, 2009) by converging with mainstream 
economics, thus not fulfilling the institutional and policy requirements of IE (Asutay, 
2012). Whilst analysing the paradigm shift from IMEs to IBs, Asutay (2012) observed 
divergence between IME’s aspirations and the IB’s realities. The divergence 
demonstrates ethical and social expectations that validate the claim of failure. Asutay 
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(2007, 2012) has deliberated on this by reverting to the source of the IBs’ failure for a 
remedy to fix the shortcomings.  
Despite claims that IBs would be highly insulated from the financial crisis, the 
credibility of such statements was shaken since its position as an alternative banking 
system was found to be questionable following its failure to uphold the foundational 
aspects of Islamic economics (Asutay, 2007). As a matter of fact, Asutay (2007) sees 
IBs often become too occupied with profit maximisation and lose sight of their goals. 
However, since its adoption in the 1970s, IBs have yet to fully be in line with the 
foundational aspirations of IME.  
Islamic economics is deprived of its aspirations to create a world order, as IBs diverge 
from their initial aim to support moral economics. As mentioned by Asutay (2012), 
IME (Islamic Moral Economy), which prioritises social good, is not simply about 
prohibiting certain activities like riba and gharar, but it is also about harmonising the 
various aspects of the economy. Thus, this manifests in IBF, an institutional tool for 
IME which is aimed at helping human economic development.  
CG is considered as one of the areas that the social failure of IBF is observed; as 
despite the fact that it is expected that IBF’s essentialise and operationalise around 
ICG values and notion, the observations indicate that they are rather share-holder 
oriented entities in their CG structure (Hassan, 2011), which implies that they only 
endogenise the interest of their shareholders with some charitable activities. However, 
ICG, which is an IME-based model, is commended for its endogenising efforts of 
larger stake-holders in CG as compared to the Anglo-Saxon share-holders and stake-
holder models. In fact, Hassan (2009) claims that the unique model of ICG actually 
fares much better than either Anglo-Saxon systems or the German and Japanese 
systems.  However, the experience shows that Anglo-Saxon practice of CG is 
prevailing. With IME, IBs should focus on the interests of stakeholders instead, 
through the ICG framework, which places emphasis on ethical and moral value 
(Hassan, 2009). Considering that one of the main reasons of the recent global 
financial crisis is CG failures, the importance of ICG is essential for IBFs to embed in 
their structures and operation. 
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2.7.5. Theoretical Perspectives on Islamic Corporate Governance 
After rationalising and providing the distinctive nature of ICG, this section focuses on 
theoretical perspectives developed to explain ICG. 
2.7.5.1. Stakeholders theory 
Most of the Islamic scholars and analysts encountered so far agree with stakeholders 
theory due to the nature of its accountability towards the interests of a wider scope of 
constituents, i.e. that of stakeholders and shareholders and not just shareholders. To a 
certain extent, as far as stakeholders theory is concerned, its accountability with 
regards to the stakeholders’ roles and the protection of their rights can be extended in 
the context of ICG, as it looks at property rights and responsibilities not limited to 
human beings alone but encompassing all aspects of life.  
Chapra (2003) acknowledges that stakeholder theory may be able to work with the 
Islamic framework with regards to the emphasis on the equality of stakeholders (even 
if they do not own equity). In relation to the principle of property rights, his view is in 
line with the model proposed by Iqbal where he opines that the CG model in the 
Islamic economic system helps protect stakeholders also rather than just shareholders.  
Chapra (2003), however, doubts that an ICG model would be effective without 
Islamic elements within it, even if stakeholder theory covers much more area than 
shareholder theory.  
Stakeholders theory supports property rights and ensures contractual obligations are 
honoured as prescribed by Islam. Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) agree that stakeholders 
theory aligns with ICG since they see the two as converging on the notion of 
protecting property rights. Firms in Islamic economic systems are seen as the hub of 
contracts, which are aimed at maximising returns and minimising transaction costs 
while also not performing any unethical activity to do so (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005). 
In pursuit of this, firms are therefore required to adhere to implicit and explicit 
contracts without also imposing on the social order. Apart from property rights, 
stakeholder theory from the Islamic perspective also involves responsibilities. On this, 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) are of the view that stakeholders theory is not just a matter 
of taking care of the stakeholders’ rights but also on sustaining their rights. 
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On the same note, Obaidullah (2004) agrees that stakeholders theory could see use I 
Islamic ethics since it also takes care of non-shareholders’ interests. This however, 
demands CG to take care of the legislation and regulation in relation to issues of CG. 
On a slightly different note, Obaidullah (2004) highlights how ownership works in 
Islam as it is comprised of two tiers: as belonging to God (first tier) and as belonging 
to man (second tier). Thus, Obaidullah (2004) agrees that the stakeholders theory of 
the firm provides a clear outlining what rights the various stakeholders have in firms 
in accordance with the Islamic state. 
2.7.5.2. Agency Theory 
As discussed earlier, agency problems have posed a lot of issues and conflicts in 
conventional CG. Supporting agency theory is difficult since many past efforts to 
overcome agency theory issues have led to a divergence from Shari’ah principles 
(Safieddine, 2009). As much as the contribution of stakeholder theory in CG aspect is 
concerned, the basis of its application in ICG is questionable. 
There have not been many reviews on agency theory pertaining to corporate 
governance from the Islamic viewpoint. Nevertheless, Kahn (1980s) uses agency 
theory in comparing mudharabah and interest-based loans in respect to economic 
efficiency (Zarka, 2008:12). Interestingly, according to Zarka (2008:12), Khan’s 
work, which shows the benefit of agency theory through the use of control cost on 
Islamic contracts to compare between different contracts, has triggered several other 
studies (on the cost control cost) to delve deeper into. Zarka (2008:12) also brings up 
a point on the importance of information asymmetry between the parties of the 
contract with respect to the control of cost in agency theory.  
In its quest to take into account the interests of the whole stakeholders as opposed to 
just the profit maximisation objectives, stakeholder theory plays a part in upholding 
the principles of Tawhid through its emphasis on ethics as confined by the Shari’ah. 
Nonetheless, with respect to decision-making, there are still three fundamental 
questions (by whom, for whom and with what resources) that need to be responded to 
by firms in an efficient manner (Azid et al., 2007:17). In this regard, Azid et al. 
(2007:17) suggests that stewardship theory could be considered to address some of the 
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Islamic CG issues as they state that the firm’s decision making is made in 
consideration of the spirit of partnership, taking into account the benefits of the firm. 
To date, there has not been much evidence encountered on conceptual ICG with 
respect to its underlying theories8. This could be due to it having to rely on 
conventional theories to support the framework. In addition to that, as far as literature 
is concerned, ICG is not as widely discussed compared to conventional CG (Hassan, 
2009), specifically in terms of theory. As far as IBs are concerned, its distinctiveness 
relates to the presence of another layer in its hierarchical structure, i.e. the presence of 
Shari’ah governance. 
2.7.6. Shari’ah Governance  
Since the operation of IBs requires, their operation to comply with Shari’ah, Shari’ah 
governance through Shari’ah Boards, the nexus of ICG, is often used interchangeably 
with ICG. For the sake of this paper, the term Shari’ah governance refers to functions 
of the Shari’ah board only, which is a key component of ICG.  
Shari’ah governance utilises the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB), a special board 
which ensures the operation of the IB is in accordance with the Shari’ah. Thus, if an 
institution desires to offer Islamic products, it must first appoint a Shari’ah board (or 
Shari’ah counsellor), and this has become the norm amongst IBs (Solé, 2007). The 
Shari’ah board is meant to be comprised of Islamic scholars who are knowledgeable 
in economics and it plays a role different to the main board.  
As Islamic finance is based on principles established by the Shari’ah and other 
jurisprudences or rulings (known as fatwa, issued by qualified Muslim scholars), it is 
always faced with complex issues, forcing involved institutions to seek the assistance 
of experts in interpreting them (Solé, 2007:para. on Shariah compliance). In essence 
the Shari’ah board is aimed at advising IFIs and monitoring transactions while also 
contributing to the creation of Shari’ah-compliant products (Ahmed, 2007).  
Rammal (2010:7) lists the functions of SSB as: issuing formal legal opinions 
pertaining to Shari’ah, reviewing and revising transactions and dealings, holding 
                                                          
8 Except for Choudhury’s (2004) philosophical view on Islamic corporate governance.  
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regular meeting to keep abreast with issues, preparing contracts, preparing studies and 
research in relation to zakat resources, carrying out technical reviews, and following 
up to ensure that controls are implemented as per Shari’ah requirements. 
Solé (2007:para. 8 under ‘Four Main Principle’) highlights that regulator’s rulings and 
decisions are supposed to be consistent with those of the Shari’ah boards of foreign 
supervisory agencies. It is widely agreed that Shari’ah matters are always open to 
interpretation and it is widely mentioned it is difficult to standardise Islamic products 
due to this fact scholars in the field. Often, IBs are criticized for a lack of uniformity 
in the way the Shari’ah principles are applied and supervised (Rammal, 2010:3). 
Having said that, IBs, or institutions offering Islamic products, must therefore utilise a 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board in order to make sure that their products comply with 
Islamic principles. However, different IBs often share the same scholars as there are 
not many scholars in the field. 
To a certain extent, the standardization of Shari’ah-compliant practices has actually 
increased the acceptance of Islamic products and IBs. Based on Ibrahim et al. 
(2009:233), IBs’ rapid growth is attributed to its value-oriented ethos, of which, based 
on his findings, more than 95% of the respondents felt that “compliance with Shari’ah 
law is a fundamental requirement in terms of ‘halal’ type of investment and 
investment structure”. This confirms the factor that the compliance attraction plays an 
important role in increasing the share of Shari’ah-compliant property investment, 
which then contributes highly to the growth of IBs.  
To achieve growth and stability, IBs must maintain customer confidence. By 
implementing good Shari’ah governance, it may be possible to mitigate issues of non-
compliance with Islamic principles. 
2.7.7. Comparing Corporate Governance Models 
After discussing the various aspects of CG and ICG, this section presents a 
comparison table to depict the difference between the CG models applied throughout 
the countries. The details can be found in Table 2.1, which helps to locate the 
differences between various models and also helps to essentialise the ICG. 
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Table 2.1: Comparing the Corporate Governance Models  
Aspects Anglo Saxon 
Model 
German Model9 Japanese Model Shariah Model10 
Theory 
orientation 
Shareholder Stakeholder  Stakeholder  Stakeholder  
Episteme Rationalism and 
rationality 
Rationalism and 
rationality 
Rationalism and 
rationality 
‘Tawhid’ 
Country 
practicing 
UK, US, Australia, 
Canada, New 
Zealand 
German, Austrian and 
etc.11.  
Japan No-specific 
country -
depending on IB’s 
locality. 
Corporate 
goal 
Shareholding 
control managers to 
increasing profit 
Shareholding control 
managers to increasing 
profit 
Shareholding 
control managers to 
increasing profit. 
‘Shari’ah’ 
objective 
Nature  Management 
dominated  
Controlling shareholder 
dominated  
 
Governed by 
Supervisory board12 and 
Management board13.  
Controlling 
shareholder 
dominated. 
Concept of 
vicegerency and 
‘shura’ process. 
Structure One-tier Two-tier14: executive and 
supervisory 
responsibility separate 
Two-tier board. No tier-specific-
Shari’ah board  
 
Board 
Composition 
 
“Insiders” and 
“Outsiders”15 
 
Boards’ size is smaller 
than Japan but bigger 
than US and UK. 
Supervisory board size is 
set by law16 
 
Insiders17 
Large boards18  
Many-sided i.e. 
main bank and 
financial network or 
keiretsu19. 
 
Shari’ah 
scholars20 
                                                          
9 The German corporate governance model differs significantly from both the Anglo-US and the 
Japanese model, although some of its elements resemble the Japanese model.  
10 In an ideal situation 
11 Some elements of the model also apply in the Netherlands and Scandinavia.  France and Belgium 
have recently introduced some elements of the German model 
12 The supervisory board appoints and dismisses the management board, approves major management 
decisions; and advises the management board. It usually meets once a month. Executive and 
supervisory responsibilities are separate. 
13 Management board is responsible for daily management of the company. The management board is 
composed solely of “insiders”, or executives. Supervisory board contains no insiders”, it is composed 
of labor/employee representatives and shareholder representatives. Management board is responsible 
for daily management of the company. The management board is composed solely of “insiders”, or 
executives.    
14 Composition of the Management Board (“Vorstand”) and Supervisory Board (“Aufsichtsrat”) in the 
German Model  
15 Board composition and representation is main concern. 
16 And cannot be changed by shareholders Supervisory board includes labour/employee representatives 
17 That is, executive managers, usually the heads of major divisions of the company and its central 
administrative body 
18 Generally larger than boards in the UK, the US and Germany. The average Japanese board contains 
50 members.  
19 The main bank system and the keiretsu are two different, yet overlapping and complementary 
elements of the Japanese model. 
20 Shariah scholars act as the Shari’ah advisor (or some banks have a Shari’ah committee) that monitors 
and ensures compliance (Nadwi, 2012). 
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Aspects Anglo Saxon 
Model 
German Model9 Japanese Model Shariah Model10 
Regulatory 
Framework 
Well-regulated 
system for 
shareholder 
communication21. 
 
Larger flow of 
information to the 
directors. 
Smaller flow of 
information to the 
supervisory board. 
 
Strong federal tradition22. 
Routine corporate 
actions requiring 
shareholder 
approval23.  
Country –specific. 
Disclosure 
requirements 
Very stringent 
 
Comprehensive and 
complex 
 
Stringent24 
 
Disclosure and 
mechanisms 
communication between 
corporations-
shareholders largely 
resolved. 
Stringent 
 
For transparency 
Monitoring  
 
 
By wide range of 
institutions.  
Strong relationship 
between corporation and 
main bank. 
Strong relationship 
between 
corporation and its 
main bank. 
Ethics25 
 
Financial 
Relationships 
 
Non-affiliated 
shareholders26 
 
Relationships are 
prohibited by 
antitrust 
legislation 
Banks are key 
shareholders. 
 
Banks develop strong 
relationships with 
corporations 27. 
Relationships are 
prohibited by antitrust 
legislation. 
 
Investors not affiliated 
with corporation28 
Strong relationship 
with a network of 
affiliated 
companies.  
 
Interaction and 
relationships among 
players.  
 
Relationships are 
prohibited by 
antitrust legislation. 
Strong 
relationship 
within the 
network. 
Share 
Ownership 
Pattern  
 
Wide range of 
financing sources29  
 
Representatives of 
affiliated 
shareholders 
(“insiders”) seldom 
sit on boards. 
Relying on a single bank 
- banks are key 
shareholders to obtain 
financing. 
 
German banks and 
corporations hold 
ownership of the equity 
Banks are key 
shareholders32 
 
Strong banks-
corporations 
relationships. 
 
Preferably affiliated 
 
                                                          
21 In the UK and US, a wide range of laws a well-developed legal framework defining the rights and 
responsibilities of three key 
22 Both federal and state (Laender) law influence corporate governance 
23 Such as: payment of dividends and allocation of reserves; election of directors; and appointment of 
auditors 
24 But not as stringent as in the US. Corporations are required to disclose a wide range of information in 
the annual report and/or agenda for the AGM 
25 Sha’riah audit is accountable for compliance. Also corporations should apply  ethical codes of 
conduct as instruments of self-regulation (Sacarcelik, 2013). 
26 Have no voice in AGM. As a result, there are few truly independent directors, that is, directors 
representing outside. 
27 Due to overlapping roles and multiple services provided 
28 known as outside shareholders or “outsiders”; 
29 Including the well-developed securities market. 
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Aspects Anglo Saxon 
Model 
German Model9 Japanese Model Shariah Model10 
 market30 - dominant 
shareholders  
 
Neither banks nor 
corporations are key 
institutional investors31. 
parties33. 
Role of Stock 
Exchange 
Strong role in 
corporate finance  
Reduced   
Market for 
corporate 
control 
Hostile takeovers 
are the ‘correction 
mechanism’ for 
management failure 
Takeovers restricted.   
Role of banks Banks play minimal 
role in corporate 
ownership 
Important both in 
corporate finance and 
control 
  
Ownership 
structure 
Widely dispersed 
ownership; 
dividends 
prioritised. 
 
Separation of 
ownership and 
control 
 
Legal liability for 
the acts of the 
corporation is 
avoided. 
Banks and corporations 
are major shareholders; 
dividends less prioritised. 
 
Co-determination34 
 
Share ownership of 
individual, and 
increasingly institutional. 
Dividends less 
prioritised  
 
Co-determination 
 
Financial 
institutions and 
corporations firmly 
hold ownership of 
the equity market35.  
 
Dividends are less 
prioritised, as 
organisations are 
expected to also 
maximise 
Maqasid as-
Sha’riah. 
 
Depending on the 
jurisdiction of 
IB’s country of 
origin. 
Source: Adopted from Hasan (2011:4), Clarke and Chanlat (2009:146) 
2.8. CONCLUSION 
As discussed, CG systems in different countries are varied. As much as the 
differences between the conventional CG models are seen, the models of CG between 
the conventional and Islamic point of view is even more distinct in many aspects. The 
main criterion of ICG is that it is based on epistemology sourced from the Qur’an and 
Sunnah. Its substance brings the insights of how Islam takes care of every aspect of 
life not only in economics, politics, and the financial sector but all other aspects of life 
                                                                                                                                                                      
32 and develop strong relationships with corporations, due to overlapping roles and multiple services 
provided   
30 Similar to the trend in the UK and US, the shift during the postwar period has been away from 
individual ownership to institutional and corporate ownership 
31 The mandatory inclusion of labour/employee representatives on larger German supervisory boards 
further distinguishes the German model from both the Anglo-US and Japanese models.  
33 In contrast, outside shareholders represent a small constituency. “Outsiders” seldom sit on Japanese 
boards. 
34 Regulate the size and determine the composition of the supervisory board; they stipulate the number 
of members elected by labour/employees and the number elected by shareholders 
35 Shift during the postwar period has been away from individual ownership to institutional and 
corporate ownership. 
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too. Its consequence on the financial sector can be operationalised through IBs. Thus, 
in achieving its aims and objectives, ICG is being steered and navigated by Islamic 
principles and shaped in accordance with morals and ethics. 
In concluding the meaning of IME should be looked at beyond economics. It is 
generally viewed as an economic system embedded with ethics and moral values. 
Despites its various definitions, depending on which perspectives it is looked from, 
IME is a complete humanistic system that blends religion, economics, and social 
aspects to reach balance from many aspects such as politics, economics, society, and 
religion. It is to achieve equilibrium in order to form unity by linking all the elements 
together as an integrated relationship, which deals with observations and interactions 
in addressing the many aspects of life. Such a paradigm inevitably has consequences 
for CG as well in shaping the relationship within an organisation.  As explored in this 
chapter, the details of the IME do rationalise such a view in developing a particular 
notion and mechanism of CG in the form of ICG with distinct values, norms and 
operational framework. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RISK MANAGEMENT FROM CONVENTIONAL AND ISLAMIC 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to present a survey of the literature in relation to risk management 
issues from both the conventional and Islamic perspectives. Whilst its aim is to enable 
comparison to be made on risk management between the conventional and Islamic 
perspectives, it also provides an overview on the structure that supports risk 
management in conventional banking before bringing the focus to the underlying 
principles that support the risk management structure for implementation and 
execution in performing Islamic banking operations.  
The chapter is organised into two main parts: Part 1 and Part 2 deal with the 
conventional and Islamic perspectives respectively. Part 1 presents some definitions 
and key risk areas to enlighten upon the conceptual definitions of risk. It then 
describes the principle dimension of the risk management framework including the 
sources and forms of risks, strategies, and types of risk. Similarly, Part 2 brings in 
some definitions of risk that are inherited by Islamic banks. The coverage on the 
underlying Islamic principles that uphold the risk management practices in IBs will 
also be discussed.    
3.2. RISK MANAGEMENT IN CONVENTIONAL BANKING 
The recent financial crisis impinged upon the macro economies of most of the 
countries in the world through changing the structure of capital allocation, affecting 
the financial system through banks and non-financial corporations. Banks especially, 
were subsequently bombarded with claims of a lack of corporate governance and risk 
management as the trouble unfolded (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Not only that, shortcomings 
in corporate governance is widely portrayed as the cause for the recent financial crisis 
and economic slowdown, the latter coming as a wake-up call for risk management as 
well, putting part of the blame on poor risk management of the financial institutions. 
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Recently, corporate governance has become distressed, stretched so far and has been 
unable to cope with the demanding financial environment, thus accentuating the need 
for risk management. As banks are often seen to play important roles in the financial 
environment, risk management has become a key issue (Styger and Wyk, 1998), 
especially when the banks’ ability to lend affects the macroeconomic environment 
(Egan, 2003).  
The fact that banks have been facing business risks that may negatively affects them 
have placed the board and senior management under pressure (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985). With the emphasis on types of risk and strategy to manage the risks, the board 
is expected to increase their knowledge and have additional capabilities for effective 
risk management so as to have an integrated view of risk control. To start with, a 
conceptual definition on the subject matter is worth revisiting. 
3.2.1. Conceptual Definitions 
Risk is implicative of different concepts and measures that lead to words like risk 
analysis and risk assessment being used in various interchangeable manners (Ansell 
and Wharton, 1992). Banking businesses face plenty of risks which have the potential 
to lead to varies effects in either profit or loss (Bessis, 2002However, definitions of 
risk and risk management can vary between people. For instance, Sobel and Reding 
(2006) define risk as a function of severity and likelihood that may or may not 
manifest in a variety of ways. 
Risk may be defined as an uncertainty value (Artzner et al., 1999). This can be seen as 
being comprised of two components: the probability of an activity’s consequences and 
how severe the activity’s consequences are (Graham and Rhomberg, 1996). Similarly, 
according to De Lorenzo (2006), risk is always related to future uncertainty and how 
decisions can spawn multiple outcomes. 
Regardless of how risk is viewed, it can be generalised as the possibility of 
uncertainties happening, something which is normally undesirable because the impact 
can be a threat in the achievement of objectives or result in a missed opportunity. 
Thus risk has to be managed to prevent or at least moderate the adverse impact.  
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3.2.2. Risk Management 
Paradoxically, risk management itself can be seen to have been triggered by the desire 
to survive (Ansell and Wharton, 1992). It represents the process by which managers 
identify key risks; obtain consistent and understandable operational risk measures; 
prioritise risks while also choosing how the likelihood of such risks may be either 
increased or decreased; and establish procedures to monitor resulting risk (Pyle, 
1997).  
Risk management may be seen as a process in which a financial institution defines a 
business strategy and responds to the strategy appropriately. This can be see within 
the State Bank of Pakistan (2010), which sees risk management as a discipline that 
forms the basis of the financial institution, encompassing all activities affecting 
related risks. It involves identifying, measuring, monitoring, and controlling risks. It 
regards managing financial risk as an integral part of its role as a financial 
intermediary while also stating that institutions should not take unnecessary risks nor 
absorb risks that can be transferred to other players. Rather, risks that are inherently a 
part of the bank should be accepted. Beyond that, Ahmed (2009) defines risk 
management as a strategy’s focus, highlighting the need for support, and the relevant 
processes and systems, to be in place. 
On a slightly different note, Scholes (2000) sees risk management in relation to 
documentation. Looking at risk management from a higher level (i.e. risk 
management systems) and based on a structural perspective, risk management should 
be treated separately to risk analysis. This ensures that decisions are objective and 
based on relevant information. Scholes perceives risk management to be an exposure 
accounting system36 and a control system that helps determine the firm’s capital 
requirements. He then broadly categorises risk into two parts. First is risk analysis 
involving risk identification, risk definition, risk evaluation, and the risk action plan 
and its impact. Second, he relates risk management to activities such as planning, 
monitoring, and controlling actions to deal with problems. Scholes (2000), further 
stresses that recording information is important in risk analysis and risk management 
as it supports overall risk management. 
                                                          
36 Scholes (2000) defines an exposure-accounting system as a dynamic system that assesses the effects 
of changes in economic factors. 
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The above definitions do not differ much from one another despite literally having 
slight differences in defining and structuring the process. Generally, the main 
components of risk management are: risk identification, risk mitigation, risk 
assessment and risk estimation. These processes, however, come with costs that 
organisations have to deliberate on. 
With regards to issues of risk management in banks, which is always associated with 
corporate governance, the decision-making part of risk management may only be 
relevant or play an effective role at certain levels within the institution. Clark and 
Urwin (2009) in their writing with regards to investments mention about decision 
making where, quite often, poor corporate governance stems directly from a weak 
BOD. Putting this into perspective, it can be said that weak corporate governance 
could also be related to risk management which has not been attended to by the BOD.  
Clark and Urwin (2009) lists five types of decision-making process affecting risk 
management. These are: structural decision making, strategic decision making, 
tactical decision making, operational decision making, monitoring and oversight 
decision making. In a relatively simplified version, his types of decision making of 
risk management are as follow: The ‘structural decision making’ refers to the 
institutions’ goals usually identified by stakeholders and shareholders. ‘Strategic 
decision making’ refers to matching the institutions’ goals with its investment 
strategies. Meanwhile, ‘tactical decision making’ refers to decision-making based 
reacting to events, and ‘operational decision making’ refers to decisions required to 
maintain banks functions which are ordinarily delegated to the senior executives of 
the banks. Apart from being a routine, the ‘monitoring decision making’ refers to the 
institutions’ oversight on how its investment decisions are undertaken.   
Based on the above, as far as risk management is concerned, with reference to the 
nature and scope of the decision-making process taken on by boards, the type of the 
decision made is important in addressing risk management issues. 
3.2.3. Motivation and Rationale for Risk Management 
The Global Financial Crisis demonstrated how the failure of financial institutions 
increases the probability that other similar institutions will also fail (Tao and 
Hutchinson, 2013). The need for risk management arose following a combination of 
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the heightened financial crisis and financial product innovation (Greuning and Iqbal, 
2008). An increase in bank competition due to bank mergers as well as changes in the 
banking system that now has direct accesses to the market have also contributed to the 
need for risk management (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). Aebi et al. (2012) mentions 
that the financial crisis following the US subprime crisis led to a growing need for risk 
management techniques and structures. They posit that there needs to be a focus 
improving the measurement and management of specific risks. Furthermore, the issue 
of how these risks may be summarised is also addressed.  
From the firm’s point of view, Christofferson (2011) mentions that RM may increase 
the firm’s value by reducing the default probability. He also believes that RM could 
increase the firm’s value by reducing the net present value of the future tax payment. 
He mentions that proper RM could allow firm to grow through debt financing while 
perceives that RM could reduce the cost to retain staff as firms become less riskier as 
according to him, the more risky the firms the higher compensation they have to pay 
to the staff.  Furthermore, Scholes (2000) points out that a risk management system 
can help determine the firm’s need for capital. Banks use capital as a buffer to finance 
debt so that, in the event of defaults, banks can cushion the loss. This can be achieved 
if the banks have an adequate and proper match of debt and equity.  
From a management perspective, Pyle (1997) sees risk management as a way to 
identify risks to maximise the value of the organisation’s activities and outline the 
manner in which such risks affect the organisation as it increases the likelihood of 
achieving the organisation’s overall objectives. Companies can then ensure that these 
risk are responded to and that the response is consistent with their overall strategy and 
compatible with their risk appetite.  
From the conventional economics perspective, Askari et al. (2010) examines the 
significance of risk in conventional banking. He reiterates the work of renowned 
economists such as Keynes, Fisher, Hicks, and Kaldor (1930s) who agree on the role 
of risk towards improving capital gains and hedging activities. Askari et al. (2010) 
also sees risk as crucial for generating income. He notes that there is more 
appreciation of the importance of risk with respect to arbitrage pricing and efficient 
markets as the vital components for the development of capital markets. 
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Developments in risk management are also seen to help reduce individual risk and 
improve economic output and welfare (Shiller; 2003; Askari et al., 2010). 
3.2.4. Types of Risks 
As much as there have been many definitions on risk, there are also many variations 
in terms of risk categories. Pyle (1997) categorises risks based on their value of loss. 
He views major sources of value loss as coming from market risk, credit risk, 
operational risk, and performance risk.  
According to (Santomero (1997), risks in business fall into two categories, namely 
market and financial risk.  He views market risks as a law of nature which can only be 
known precisely by God, which contrasts with systematic risk as man cannot control 
market risk. Meanwhile, he terms financial risk unsystematic, the opposite of the 
market risk.  
Risk taxonomy may be seen as artificial as distinguishing lines are unclear 
(Christofferson, 2011). For the sake of this discussion, this section will briefly go 
through a general consensus of the description of the five broad types of risks; credit 
risk, market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and reputational risk. 
Credit risk 
Credit risk is the probability that parties will default on financial contractual 
obligations. It is defined as “changes in portfolio value due to the failure of counter 
parties to meet their obligations or due to changes in market’s perception of their 
ability to continue to do so” (Pyle, 1997). Crouhy et al. (2006, 14) defines credit risk 
as “the risk of loss following a change in the factors that drive the credit quality of an 
asset”.  
Credit risk is also affected by counter party ratings, the size of the banking and trading 
book, the legal system, collateral quality, maturity of credit facility, and the internal 
control system (Alam and Shanmugam, 2007). Thus, according to Alam and 
Shanmugam (2007), credit risk is far more important and difficult to measure and 
control compared to any other risks. 
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Market risk 
Market risk arises out of possible adverse movements in market prices of 
commodities, stocks, bonds, currencies, derivatives. Christofferson (2012) defines 
market risk as the risk to the bank’s financial portfolio due to market price 
movements. On the other hand, Bessis (2002) defines market risk from the 
perspective of losses in balance sheet positions, also resultant from market price 
movement. Like most risk experts, Bessis (2002) views risk as subject to interest rate 
risks and equities in the trading book as well as exchange rate and commodities risk 
throughout the bank.  
Bessis (2002) views market risk in relation to risk measure. He looks at it from two 
perspectives which are the internal and the external views. According to him, there is 
a difference between the internal and external views of market risk measure where, 
from the internal perspective of the bank managers, a measure should allow active 
efficient management of a bank’s risk position. The external view is derived from the 
regulators, which is to ensure the bank’s potential for catastrophic net worth loss is 
accurately measured and that the bank’s capital is adequate to cover losses. 
Liquidity risk 
Bessis (2002) considers liquidity risk from the aspects of funding, market and assets. 
Funding liquidity is related to risk based on market perception. As for the market 
liquidity, it depends on the volume of trade. Its vulnerabilities owe much to its 
inability to raise money at acceptable costs. As for asset liquidity, it is caused by 
insufficient liquidity in the market to liquidate the assets. On quite a similar note, 
Crouhy et al (2006) regards liquidity risk as a component of both the funding and the 
asset of liquidity risk, considering funding liquidity risk is inherently linked to a firm 
meeting its cash demands. As for the assets, it is triggered by an inability to liquidate 
assets due to inadequate market demand.  
Operational risk 
Operating risks are the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people, and systems from external events, which includes fraud, damage to 
physical assets, business disruption, and legal risk. “Operating risks are risks 
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stemming from failed internal processes, people, and systems from external events” 
(Basel Committee, 2001). The definition refers to defects which may prove fatal to the 
institution (Bessis, 2002).  Jobst (2007), however, views legal risk to come under 
operational risks since he views that operational risk stem from a failure to comply 
with laws, standards, and contractual obligations. 
Some contingency plans that help manage operational risks include the creation of a 
system for registering and reporting undesirable incidents. These would be analysed 
continuously in order to limit the chances of them happening again or at all.  
Reputational risk 
Reputational risk is the risk of a bank being perceived negatively from events 
affecting it (Bessis, 2002). As a risk type, it came to prominence slightly later, i.e. 
after accounting scandals in the late 1990s. Based on a survey released in 2004, 34% 
of international bank respondents believe that reputational risk is the biggest risk 
compared to market and credit risks (Crouhy et al., 2006).  
Crouhy et al. (2006) asserts that reputational risk is particularly relevant in emerging 
issues such as from scandals in Enron and WorldCom to name a few. On that, the 
attention of regulators and investors is focused on strategic and business risks instead 
of quantifying risk in the market and credit risks. As reputational risk is a real threat to 
financial institutions, they need to gain credibility from their customers, regulators, 
and creditors at the very least (Crouhy et al., 2006). Crouhy et al. (2006) reasons that 
the development of new products places pressure on how accounting and tax rules are 
interpreted and whether or not certain transactions are legal, thus affecting the 
financial institutions’ reputation. As financial institutions are under increasing 
pressure to demonstrate their ethical, social, and environment responsibility, there is 
even more reason for them to clearly monitor and manage their reputation risks. 
3.2.5. Risk Classifications  
It addition to the above mentioned types of risk, for all the types of risk, they come 
from different categories. For example, regardless of its types, risks can be 
distinguished as either inherent or residual risk (Ahmed, 2009). Risks that are present 
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before any controls or actions take place are known as inherent risks. As for residual 
risks, they are the ones left after measures are undertaken.  
It should be mentioned that risks are categorised into three levels; institutional, 
organisational and product level (Ahmed, 2009). Ahmed considers institutional level 
risk to emerge from failures in the legal framework, which makes institutions less 
flexible and thus less effective in avoiding risks (Ahmed, 2009). Moreover, risk at the 
institutional level is triggered when procedures are not regulated. Thus regulators 
need to understand new risks and keep abreast with innovations. 
As for risk at the organisational level, it occurs due to absence of legislation. Ahmed 
(2009) views that this happens when the bank management fails to classify risks 
appropriately, i.e. as risks that can be shifted, avoided, and or accepted by the banks. 
At the product level, risk is seen as diverse and its idiosyncratic nature is based on the 
product itself. The probability idiosyncratic losses occurring can be reduced via the 
diversification of insurance and the bank’s internal controls (Ahmed, 2009). These 
could be managed through detailed procedures for activities in the operational units 
according to its risk treatments. 
With regards to risk treatments, different risk profiles exist for different products and 
thus each product must have its own treatment (Ahmed, 2009). This is also agreed by 
Crouhy et al. (2006) who suggests that understanding risk types is essential because 
of the many different categories of risk and their associated risk management skills. In 
fact, some risks can be eliminated and trusted. However, their complexity and how 
difficult it is to separate these risks from transactions requires them to be absorbed by 
the bank. 
As a further classification, some risks can also be mitigated or removed by 
transferring or selling these risks in well-defined markets. Some risks may even be 
avoided entirely. According to Crouhy et al. (2006), risk avoidance includes 
techniques that comprise standardising business-related activities, creating diversified 
portfolios, and executing schemes which call for accountability of actions. 
Furthermore, risk transferring mechanisms include using derivatives for hedging, 
selling, or buying financial claims.  
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To help address risk management issues in banks, they are required to prescribe 
procedures for risk identification, measurement, and assessment. Assessing risks is 
aimed at fact-finding and associating specific sources of risk with their possible 
outcomes (Graham and Rhomberg, 1996). In recent years, as per regulatory 
requirements, banks are obliged to manage their data according to the Basel II37 
requirement.  
3.3. RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN ISLAMIC BANKING 
Islamic banks have become a significantly important component of domestic 
intermediaries, as they begin to handle large volumes of assets. Their presence in the 
global front has become more prevalent, witnessing Islamic banks beginning to offer 
various financial products. Obviously, the expansion in the Islamic financial market 
has translated into growth, which later induces concerns among many Islamic finance 
experts, prompting their inquests into the banks’ risk management aspect. With a 
growing realization among IBs that “sustainable growth requires the development of a 
comprehensive risk management framework geared to their particular situation and 
requirements” (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008:4), risk management has become an 
important part in the operations of Islamic banks (Obaidullah, 2008).  
Islamic rules essentialise the important of risk, and therefore, theoretically the strength 
of Islamic banks is supported by the notion that they are linked to their risk-sharing 
features (El-Hawary et al., 2006). In addition, Islamic banks are perceived to have 
inherent risk-managements features that enable the smooth running of the global 
financial system (Marston and Sundarajan, 2003). However, Greuning and Iqbal 
(2008:4) states that “interpreting the Islamic financial system simply as free of interest 
does not capture a true picture of the system as a whole. Undoubtedly, prohibiting the 
receipt and payment of interest is the nucleus of the system, but it is supported by 
other principles of Islamic doctrine advocating social justice, risk sharing, the rights 
and duties of individuals and society, property rights, and the sanctity of contracts”.  
“From an economic standpoint, by prohibiting interest rate-based contracts and 
ordaining exchange contracts, the Quran encourages risk sharing and prohibits risk 
                                                          
37The Basel II framework helps to attain stronger risk management practices in the banking system as it 
presents a wide variety of risk rating models. 
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transfer, risk shedding and risk shifting” (Mirakhor and Krichene, 2010). Similarly, 
Mohieldin et al. (2011:2-3) view that “The core principles of Islam lay great emphasis 
on social justice, inclusion, and sharing of resources between the haves and the have 
nots”. Mohieldin et al. (2011:2-3) add that “Islamic finance addresses the issue of 
“financial inclusion” or “access to finance” from two directions—one through 
promoting risk-sharing contracts that provide a viable alternative to conventional 
debt-based financing, and the other through specific instruments of redistribution of 
the wealth among the society”.  
In relation to investment, the vast development in the use of Islamic products in recent 
years also has partly attributed to the enormous wealth in which investors in Islamic 
countries need to structure their investments for liquidity purposes in a Shari’ah 
compliant manner. As elaborated by IBI (www.newhorizon-islamicbanking.com: 19-
20), “in an Islamic finance system in which there are no risk-free assets, where all 
financial assets are contingent claims, and in which there are no interest rate-based 
debt contracts, it has been shown that the rate of return to financial assets was 
determined by the return to the real sector. Output is divided between labour and 
capital. Once labour is paid, the profit is then divided between entrepreneurs and 
equity owners. Since profits are ex post, returns on equities cannot be known ex ante.” 
IBs, with regards to Islamic product development however, are still lagging in their 
risk management (Ghoul, 2008: 1). As a consequence, product developers have been 
tasked with creating innovative channels to attract funds (Yunis, 2006). However, as 
Islamic products are quite unique, ambiguities in Islamic banking are quick to arise 
(Sattar, 2011). Thus, despite its special feature, Ali (2007) views that IBs’ 
experiencing financial distress is due to the fact that they are less susceptible to 
instability. As Marston and Sundarajan (2003) point out, Islamic banks are vulnerable 
because of their unique risks as they can pose drastic implications for systemic 
stability.  
Nonetheless, the vast development in the use of Islamic products in recent years is 
partly attributed to the enormous wealth in which investors in Islamic countries need 
to structure their investments for liquidity purposes in a Shari’ah compliant manner. 
Islam agrees with how important risk is, and is not opposed to Islamic finance 
following the conventional economics so long as such developments also prohibit the 
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notion of free-risk, interest-bearing debt (Askari et al., 2009: 49). It is through its risk-
sharing basis that the IB system facilitates lending, borrowing and investment 
functions (Khan and Bhatti, 2008). 
Islamic banks are claimed to be less susceptible to instability (Ali, 2007) than 
conventional ones owing to their risk-sharing feature. However, despite this special 
feature financial distress among Islamic Banks still exists (Ali, 2007). As Marston and 
Sundarajan (2003) point out, Islamic banks are vulnerable because of their unique 
risks as they can pose drastic implications for systemic stability. On another note, 
Hawary et al. (2006) theoretically support the notion that the strength of Islamic 
banks strengths may be linked to their risk-sharing features. Islamic banks are 
perceived to have inherent risk-managements features that enable the smooth running 
of the global financial system (Marston and Sundarajan, 2003).  
Despite the risk-sharing feature, Islamic banks can be more vulnerable than the 
conventional ones since the common hedging instruments of the latter cannot be 
applied in Islamic banking as they are not Shari’ah-compliant. As widely mentioned 
in the literature, foreign exchange, interest rate, and liquidity risk are all caused by 
asset-liability mismatches of Islamic banks.  These are discussed further at a later part 
of this section.  
Beyond this, Ayub (1997) sees the global financial system as subject to many types of 
risks. Despite the risk-sharing feature, Islamic banks can be more vulnerable than the 
conventional ones, since the common hedging instruments of the latter cannot be 
applied in IBs, as they are not Shari’ah-compliant. As widely mentioned in the 
literature, foreign exchange, interest rate, and liquidity risk are all caused by asset-
liability mismatches of Islamic banks.  These are discussed further at a later part of 
this section.  
3.3.1. Rationale for Risk Management and Its Underlying Islamic Principles 
The main difference between risk management in conventional and Islamic banks is 
that the latter upholds the principle of risk sharing. It is the concept of profit and loss 
sharing (PLS) that distinguishes Islamic risk management from its conventional 
counterpart. As an extension of this principle, risk-sharing nature of Islamic financing 
has implications for risk management.  
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Similarly, Dusuki and Dar (2005) believe that risk management represents a system of 
risk-sharing on stake and equity. It is clearly founded upon idealistic principles of 
collaboration which encourages mutual cooperation between investors and fund users. 
By sharing society’s burden, risk management encourages “risk-sharing, promotes 
entrepreneurship, discourages speculative behaviour, and emphasises the sanctity of 
contracts” (Iqbal, 1997). Thus, through its efficient risk-sharing facilities, risk 
management promotes and increases the diversification and allocation of resources 
(Askari et al., 2010).  
In the vein, Hassan (2006) who states that sharing risk and reward is considered as an 
integral part of Islamic risk management, associates risk-sharing concepts with the 
moral economy of Islamic finance, which help build economic justice as essentialised 
by Islamic principles. Therefore, Hassan (2006) locates Islamic risk management as 
an integration of the PLS concept and socio-economic justice, further claiming that 
justice in Islam is an essential part of human society as a society devoid of justice can 
only head towards decline and destruction. Justice, according to him, is only 
attainable if there is a set of moral values that humans agree to adhere to. Islamic risk 
management, thus, helps to support the pillars of Islam whilst supporting Islamic 
banking while taking ethics into consideration. 
Another notable difference is with respect to risk taking behaviour. Islam is not 
opposed to risk taking; it proscribes two extremes of risk which are risk avoidance 
and excessive risk-taking. Obaidullah (1998) sees Islamic risk management as a 
principle which leans towards creating a cornerstone of Islam. It can somewhat 
tolerate risk taking and uncertainties, but key elements such as riba, gharar, and 
maysir should clearly and strictly be prohibited (Obaidullah, 1998). Through its 
criteria of freedom from gharar, riba, maysir, and freedom of trade, to name a few, 
Islamic risk management upholds the concepts of Islamic finance. 
Ayub (2007) believes that assuming risks is necessary before any return on capital, or 
otherwise profiting over an investment, can be expected. This is also agreed by Kuran 
(1986), who argues that profit sharing solely through money is impermissible as it is 
impossible for money to earn a return when it does not act as capital. In this regard, 
Ayub (2007) does not oppose profit sharing provided the money is used as an 
investment via real activities, as he believes that transferring commercial risk without 
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also transferring the reward is impermissible as profits must be earned through risk 
and reward sharing. He views that Islam promotes taking calculated risks only when 
gains are expected. However, the encouragement of higher returns may also lead to 
moral hazards, as risk can also offer opportunities. Thus, Ayub (2007) sees risk-taking 
as one of the conditions for a party to be entitled to any profit over the principal. On 
that, despite his approval on Islamic banks taking risk mitigation measures, Ayub 
(2007) stresses that risk that can only be mitigated but not eliminated.  
As for Obaidullah (1998), besides achieving ethics, risk management helps achieve 
the regulator’s objective, namely to increase efficiency. As far as the regulation goal 
is concerned, a conflict exists between efficiency and ethics (Obaidullah, 1998). 
Obaidullah (1998) sees that, whilst moving towards ethics, the notion of efficiency is 
misplaced. He views that, more often, the regulation’s goal is to achieve efficiency 
over ethics. Obaidullah (1998) stresses that there is actually no real cost in terms of 
loss of efficiency in the market. He views that notions of efficiency are inherent 
within Islamic financial ethics and usually misplaced emphasis on certain dimensions 
of efficiency are the ones which cause the most conflict. 
Advocating the ethical Islamic banking, Obaidullah (1998) sees Islamic risk 
management as fulfilling the goal of regulations with regards to efficiency, and 
therefore, he stresses that Islamic banking needs Islamic risk management for its vital 
contributions to the financial market as the latter helps in mobilizing funds efficiently 
through the allocation of funds. Thus, if market efficiency is measured correctly, 
Islamic banks can help to achieve efficiency. Obaidullah (1998) explains that 
efficiency can be increased if funds from the saving-surplus unit can be allocated to 
the right fund-saving deficit unit in the economy. He also views other matters as 
including pricing efficiency, which can be achieved if transactions can be kept at a 
minimal cost. 
Risk management is a mechanism to reduce inherent risks to a certain level so that 
residual risks can satisfy the risk appetite of wider constituents of stakeholders 
(Ahmed, 2009). It is one of Islamic finance’s key functions that facilitate households.  
From a macro perspective, risk management is in high demand stemming from 
competitive developments in the Islamic financial market. High demands for Islamic 
Page 70 
 
products are present in both the GCC and non-Muslim countries (Ali, 2007). Increases 
in market volatility, financial innovation, shifts in banking business models, increases 
in competition due to mergers and acquisition, and regulatory requirements are among 
the factors that demonstrate the importance of risk management (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2007). 
Islamic risk management helps to pool and allocate risks (Ahmed, 2009). The concept 
of PLS based on a fair ratio financiers and FIs may lead to more efficient resource 
allocation as business risks are equitably distributed and thus help improve the 
investment climate (Chapra, 2001:313). 
Apart from upholding fairness and socio–economic justice in the IB sector, Islamic 
risk management has an instrumental role in prohibiting the receipt and payment of 
interest as the core of the risk management system. This can be achieved when it is 
supported by other principles of Islamic doctrine such as, advocating risk sharing, 
individuals’ rights and duties, property rights, and the sanctity of contracts (Ayub, 
2007).  
It is also important to note that risk management is part of a process to ensure a 
sustainable future for the next generation. It does not compromise on human well-
being. For example, risk management frees people from the burden of debt and the 
ones in need will not be deprived. This is evidenced through when those who are in 
need can then have access to funds which are made possible by banks which give 
priorities and preserve endowment and resources to them. It is again associated with 
the concept of PLS as banks become more equitable in wealth and income distribution 
via a more viable allocation of funds and resources. 
Also, instead of feeling discouraged by the prospect of seeing their ideas transformed 
into business entities (as financiers assess risk involved more cautiously), 
entrepreneurs and investors will feel more encouraged to engage in more productive 
economic activities through risk sharing (Ayub, 2007). This, however, depends on the 
onus of the entrepreneur to reveal to the investors the profit that they make. The 
allocation of funds is more efficient through profitability rather than looking at 
customers’ credit worthiness. 
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In the case of the banks and their counter-parties and depositors, they are to 
participate in the risk-sharing of their banking business. The depositors of investment 
accounts in the Islamic system are required to share the bank’s profits and losses with 
shareholders, and hence risk losing all or part of their initial investment (Swartz, 
2012). The shareholders and investors depositors should absorb any negative shock to 
Islamic banks’ asset returns.  
An element of direct market disciplines is also inherent within this principle (El-
Hawary, 2003; Iqbal, 2008). Risk management in IBs hinges on transparency. When 
an element of honesty exists, a disclosure of reliable and timely information to the 
market participants is possible. Thus lenders can monitor the use of funds by 
borrowers which will inculcate better lending discipline. It helps to avoid adverse 
selection and moral hazards by the borrowers. In addition, there will be a fair sharing 
of financial resources created by the IBs (Langton et al., 2011), which should become 
available to the poor in moderating inequalities of income and wealth.  
From the business perspective, risks management is an integral part of the business of 
financing as it ultimately ensures a good income flow and business continuity 
(Obaidullah, 1998), which is predicated differently from the one from conventional 
banks as it is based on one of the main principles of Shari’ah which emphasises 
justice and equality. Shari’ah requires transactions to be just, fair, and ethical in its 
dealings. In addition, one party may not financially exploit another as the balance of 
risk (and reward) should be proportionate (Ali, 2007). 
From the investment point of view, according to Mirakhor (2009), the risk sharing 
characteristics of Islamic risk management has better stability than its conventional 
counterpart as production is financed entirely by risk-return sharing or equity finance. 
He views that assets and liabilities both move in the same direction simultaneously 
when price changes thus the financial structure adjusts in tandem on both sides of the 
ledger. In fact this adjustment process has demonstrated that IBs has the ability to 
response to shock (Mirakhor, 2009). 
3.3.2. Risk Classifications in Islamic Finance 
Despite several factors influencing risks, the ones determining risk are human 
decision and behaviour (Ahmed, 2009). It depends on risk appetite, which reveals the 
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stakeholder preference (Ahmed, 2009). Risk classification varies depending on the 
definitions given by its scholars. However, as far as its conceptual definitions are 
concerned, it all boils down to the same meaning despite their literal differences in 
definitions.  
As mentioned earlier, Islamic banks usually have more risks attributed to them 
(Hassan, 2009) as compared to conventional banks. . Like conventional banks, Islamic 
banks face credit risks, market risks, liquidity risk, operational risk, and reputational 
risks, among others. Obaidullah (2002) broadly classifies the risks of credit and 
market risks as the main risks faced by Islamic banks. 
This section sheds only a brief highlight on the broad primary risks faced in Islamic 
banking such as credit, market, liquidity, operational and reputational risks as its main 
focus is on risks that are associated with the governance structure. 
As far as credit risk is concerned, Obaidullah (2002) opines that measuring and 
controlling credit risk is far more important and more difficult. Similar to the 
conventional bank, credit risk can also lead to liquidity risk. IBs face additional risks, 
some of which can be traced back to PLS; sales-based debt creating operations; and 
general disclosure in financial statements as per AAOIFI standard (Alam and 
Shanmugam, 2007). This credit risk is triggered from Islamic financial instruments 
particular to Islamic banks, for instance, ‘murabahah’ transactions, ‘salam’ contracts, 
and ‘mudarabah’ investments and their peculiar working mechanism (Obaidullah 
(2002). 
Ideally, a bank’s risk management system should integrate this source of risk with 
market risks in order to give an estimate of how much the bank stands to lose. Despite 
that, there exists a general agreement on the Islamic bank’s exposure to market risk, 
which is similar to their conventional counterparts. Similar to market risk, credit risk 
is triggered by a few risk factors such as mark-up risk, price risk, leased asset value 
risk, foreign exchange risk, and securities price risk (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). 
Liquidity risk in Islamic banks is stems from a lack of liquidity when IBs are unable 
to meet their liabilities and when IBs cannot borrow when necessary (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2007). It should be mentioned that liquidity risk is higher in IBs due to the 
limitations of Islamic products (Askari et al., 2010). Investment risk (Alam and 
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Shanmugam; 2007), meanwhile, is triggered by investing in equities when there 
already exist a large proportion of those assets in the IBs. These assets are more 
Shari’ah compliant than murabahah financing. It operates in financial environments 
dominated by the conventional system, thus any changes in interest rates are bound to 
affect the earnings and asset value.  A sharp contrast in PLS based murabahah, 
istisna, ijarah salaam will involve a mark-up or predetermined rate of return. In fact, 
a predominant part of the IBs financing is based on these models (Alam and 
Shanmugam, 2007). 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) posit that all risks may come from four overarching 
categories of risk: financial, treasury, business, and governance. Financial risk 
comprises credit, market, as well as equity investment risk. For treasury risk, it 
comprises liquidity risks, asset and liability risk, as well as hedging risk. In addition, 
business risk constitutes rate of return risk and displacement risk. Meanwhile, 
governance risk is made up of risks such as Shari’ah risk, operational risk, 
reputational risk, transparency risk and fiduciary risk (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007).  
For the sake of this paper, the section will highlight the risks that are associated with 
the IBs’ governance structure such as the governance risk, which is a subject matter of 
the research presented in this study. As Shari’ah risk, reputational risk and operational 
risk are associated with the governance risk, these will all be discussed. It is an 
attempt to gauge the extensiveness of the effect of governance risks on the Islamic 
banks. Other additional risks such as displacement risk, withdrawal risk, benchmark 
risk, rate of return risk, will also be brought to light.  
Governance risk 
Governance risk is relatively new as compared to other risks, and was picked up quite 
recently when corporate governance issues are widely discussed. The importance of 
having corporate governance in place as well as the need to manage risks in dealing 
with financial crises has made many realise the existence of both corporate 
governance and risk management. Governance risk occurs when institutions fail in 
their governance processes, fail due to negligence in their business, or when 
institutions fail to meet contractual obligations (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). 
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Governance risk also occurs when internal and external institutional environments are 
weak due to weaknesses in contract enforcement (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007).  
It should be noted that theorists have slightly different opinions in terms of what 
constitutes the governance risk. As for Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007), they view 
governance risk as the combination of Shari’ah, operational, reputational, 
transparency and fiduciary risks.  
Governance risk is associated with Shari’ah risk because IB’s governance is very 
much influenced by Shari’ah rule through the Shari’ah Board. Shari’ah risk is very 
distinct to IB as it stems from there not being a set of universally agreed upon 
Shari’ah standards (Obaidullah, 2002). It occurs when IBs face compliance 
challenges with Shari’ah rulings when there is no standardised way of defining 
jurisprudence (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). According to Jobst (2007), Shari’ah 
compliance constitutes a major challenge for the Islamic finance industry in general 
and risk management in particular. Although Shari’ah rulings (fatwa) and their 
underlying reasoning are disclosed, Jobst (2007) adds, that no unified principles (and 
no precedents) exist as of yet. Quite similarly, Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) associate 
Shari’ah risk with the structure workings of the Shari’ah boards at the institutional 
and systemic levels. They share similar reasons on the cause of Shari’ah risk with 
Obaidullah (1998) with an additional view (similar to Jobst (2007)) that the Shari’ah 
risk is also triggered by failing to comply with the Shari’ah. The different forms of 
Shari’ah rules leads to differences in Shari’ah reporting, auditing, and accounting 
treatments by Islamic banks (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007). Banks are exposed to non-
compliance risks with respect to Shari’ah rules dictated by the Shari’ah board and the 
relevant bodies.  
Operational risk 
As for the operational risk38, it is associated with the governance risk through 
operational processes.  Like the mainstream, it relates to the failure of the operational 
process. There are many ways that operational risk could be triggered, for instance 
                                                          
38 Operational in Islamic banks operational risk is associated with the loss resulting from “inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and system, or from external events, including losses resulting from 
Shari’ah non-compliance and the failure in fiduciary responsibilities” (IFSB, 2005a:26; Izhara and 
Asutay, 2010). 
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from ‘cancellation risks’ which arise from non-binding murabahah and istisna 
contracts to name a few.  
It should be noted that IBs often have a greater exposure to operational risk as they 
usually have inadequate expertise as well as inappropriate risk systems (Askari et al., 
2010). Askari et al. (2009) view that operational risk can sometimes be considered 
part of the reputational risk. The difference is that reputational risk is more subtle than 
the operations risk as the former deals with intangible items, but they also involve 
high replacement costs (Askari et al., 2009). Reputational risks arise when IB 
customers who place a special trust in IB (to fully comply with Shari’ah) lose faith in 
the latter (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008). Thus, unlike the conventional banks, 
reputational risk faced by IBs is more prevalent as any breach of trust by a single IB 
can affect the entire institution. As such, close collaboration and standardisation 
among IB players are among the first steps towards mitigating this risk. Reputational 
risk also relates to fiduciary risk.  
Fiduciary risk 
Fiduciary risk is a risk in relation to trust, which is triggered from an institution’s 
failure to perform in accordance with implicit and explicit standards applicable to its 
fiduciary responsibilities. It refers primarily to risk that arises when an institution does 
not operate in accordance with the standards of its fiduciary responsibilities (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2007). Should there be any divergence from the standards or objectives of 
the shareholders and the investors, it may lead them to face legal recourse actions of 
breaches of contract and fiduciary duties towards depositors and shareholders. As 
such, IBs are expected to act on the best interests of Islamic banks’ stakeholders to 
adequately manage this risk. In other words, fiduciary risk is caused by IBs violating 
contracts in the framework setting either through ill-managed funds or non-
compliance with the Shari’ah principles in their operations (Ahmed, 2009). 
Transparency risk 
Transparency risk is related to disclosure, which is related to the subject matter of this 
study. It is triggered when there is an inadequate disclosure of reliable and timely 
information that provides accurate information on the bank’s position for the public to 
make an assessment (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). 
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Commercial risk 
When equity holders’ returns are subsequently displaced, creating for them a 
commercial risk, which is triggered when there is a divergence of practice from the 
theoretical version. It is also reflected in the movement away from PLS activities such 
as mudarabah and musharakah, to other modes of financing like ijarah and 
murabahah (Hassan and Lewis, 2007). Mudarabah and musharakah are equity-based 
and riskier as they involve PLS where the rate of return is not initially outlined 
(Chapra, 2000). These shifts may even cause risk aversion in conducting asset 
allocation as well as vulnerability due to liquidity on the liability side. The outcome of 
this is for there to be dominance in the asset portfolios of short–term, low profit and 
safe trade related transactions which then reduces the funds which could be invested 
in more long term, profitable, and riskier endeavours (Chapra, 2000). 
Benchmark risk  
This relates to market risk. Different from the credit risk, market risk is shown in the 
trading book. It is due to exposure to changes in the market interest rate through the 
pricing system for their products. This happens when there is a difference between the 
margin of domestic rates of return (ROR) and benchmark ROR (Greuning and Iqbal, 
2008). Many IBs use external benchmarks such as LIBOR to price, for example, the 
mark-up in murabahah contracts, and thus any changes in the domestic rates will 
trigger an impact on asset price. Quite similarly to this is the rate of return risk. The 
rate of return risk is when benchmark rate changes resulting in investment account 
holders expecting higher rates of return due to a lack of pre-determined RORs (Grais 
and Kulathunga, 2007). Based on IFSB’s (2005:23) definition, it is a risk that relates 
to uncertainty in returns earned by IBs on their assets.   
Additional risk in IBs 
As for the additional risks existing in IBs, these include displacement risk, withdrawal 
risk, commercial risk, and benchmark risk. There are also other risks types such as 
ownership transfer risks, commodity risks, price or rate of return risks, legal and 
documentation risks, and etc. (Greuning and Iqbal, 2008).  
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Greuning and Iqbal (2008) defines displacement risk as the risk of losing depositors, 
which arises when the IB offers ROR funds that are higher than the competitive rate. 
When this happens, IBs have to forgo its profit which obviously affects its capital 
(Greuning and Iqbal, 2009). The different pricing of the rate of return in Islamic banks 
depends on profit, which is shared with the depositors as a predetermined ratio. In 
relation to this, withdrawal risks occur when IBs are exposed to losing customers to 
competitors when the banks’ rates of return are lower than expectations of what is 
offered by their competitors. When conventional banks offer pre-determined interest 
rates to their depositors, the latter may be inclined to withdraw their money from the 
Islamic banks and place it in conventional banks. In prevailing practices, the risk–
sharing advantage does not apply when IBs operate in mixed systems, and pay 
investment account holders competitive market returns regardless actual performance 
and or profitability (Solé, 2007). Consequently, the IBs may be pressured to provide 
returns exceeding the rate earned on assets financed by the depositors when the return 
on assets does not perform well as their competitors’, exposing them to displaced 
commercial risk .  
3.4. CHALLENGES AHEAD 
Islamic banks have difficulties in pursuing Islamic risk management. Despite vast 
numbers of theoretical research on risk management in IBs (Hassan, 2009), the 
number of empirical studies on risk management in IBs is found to be quite limited 
(Khan, 1997). Some of the contributing factors lie in the absence of supporting 
elements to help the systems. This view is shared by many others including Iqbal and 
Mirakhor (2007), who view that IB has several challenges in pursuing Islamic risk 
management. 
Among the difficulties are in establishing supporting institutions to carry out the risk 
management functions.  For instance, in the case of conventional banking, the legal 
infrastructure etc., are already in place to support them unlike for Islamic banking 
which does not have these to support them. With respect to infrastructure and 
resources, IBs may not be have adequate; be they costs, expertise, or technology to 
support them for the fact that they are small in size and new in the industry. In terms 
of gaining effective risk management through transparency and high standards of 
financial reporting, IBs might still be lacking. 
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Islamic risk management has not been able to compete with the fast and complex 
innovation in the financial products. This could be due to the intricate techniques used 
by the products. The capacity of risk management relates to its measuring and 
monitoring tools (for example, hedging) to gauge risk and this has been outpaced by 
the innovations of the products. For example, without the offsetting of products which 
allow investors to hedge investment risks linked to Shari’ah products, investors may 
be reluctant to include Shari’ah products in their portfolios. 
Based on the current trend, Islamic product development has tried to replicate the 
mainstream banking system in terms of its product line (Mahlknecht, 2009). This 
however, may not be cost effective because Shari’ah constraints will impose higher 
transaction costs (Mahlknecht, 2009).   
Going back to the many types of measures that can be used to measure risks, VaR is 
the most widely used, which measures how much a portfolio stands to make or lose. 
But, this measure ignores what may happen when the risk reaches its peak (Einhorn, 
2008), thus may not be the best available solution as yet. 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed risk management from the conventional as well as from the 
Islamic viewpoint. From the conventional aspect of risk management, some 
conceptual definitions are presented to give insights before the conceptual structure of 
RM and the rationale for the management of risk is discussed. As the Chapter 3 
moves on to the Islamic perspective, more risks are presented. To be able to see the 
difference between the two perspectives, some insights on how risk management 
works is highlighted. These include some constraints and limitations in managing the 
risks.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters review the literature on corporate governance (CG) and risk 
management (RM) with a particular emphasis on their articulation and practice within 
the financial system. To facilitate the empirical and analytical study of this research, 
this chapter discusses the research methodology and the methods it has adopted in 
conducting the research. Other types of research methodologies are also described so 
that comparisons can be made between research methodologies. This chapter also 
elaborates upon the research methods and research tools, and it explains the data 
analysis approach. The strategy of the qualitative methods, including fundamental 
assumptions in conducting the research, is also described.  
This chapter is presented in seven main sections. Section 4.2 describes the research 
methodology adopted by the study, while Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 deal with the 
research design and research strategy respectively. Section 4.5 elaborates on the 
research method followed by Section 4.6 which explains the data analysis. Finally, 
Section 4.7 concludes the chapter with the limitations of the study.  
4.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Research methodology refers to the science of studying how scientific research is 
done through the adoption of systematic problem-solving. Its aim is to describe and 
analyse methods, reveal their limitations and resources, and clarify the 
presuppositions and consequences relating to their potentialities to the twilights and 
frontiers of knowledge (Kaplan, 1973:23).  
Sridhar (2008:slide 7) views research as a voyage of discovery or a journey from the 
known to unknown, an attitude, an experience, a method of critical thinking, a careful 
critical enquiry in seeking facts for principles, and an art of scientific investigation. It 
is a process of arriving at dependable solutions to problems through planned and 
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systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of data that helps in understanding 
the products of the scientific inquiry as well as the process itself (Sridhar, 2008:slide 
7).  
With regards to how research is conducted, Karami et al. (2006:43-44) views the 
debate as being centred on the relative values of two different paradigms the positivist 
and phenomenological approaches. Logical positivism uses quantitative and 
experimental methods to test hypothetical-deductive generalizations while 
phenomenological inquiry uses qualitative and naturalistic approaches to inductively 
and holistically understand the human experience. (Karami et al., 2006:43-44) 
According to the two different types of identified research paradigms, there are two 
types of research orientations: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative research 
assesses behaviour more formally and thus relies on more objective statistical analysis 
methods, which ensures objectivity (Stangor, 2011). Stangor (2011) sees quantitative 
data in tandem with qualitative data as more informative as it is fully able to describe 
observations.  
Qualitative research, however, is reliant upon the researcher’s understanding of 
inherent social realities, such as an understanding of observed people and their 
relationships. According to Patton (1990), qualitative inquiry is useful for studying 
and understanding people in any situation. Furthermore, qualitative research is 
explorative and utilises subjective explanations, as it focuses mainly on observations 
and the description of events in order to fully understand the phenomena at hand 
(Stangor, 2011).  
Using data normally collected through formal observations or measurements, the 
behavioural aspect of the research helps to discover how people perceive their world. 
Qualitative research, thus, takes into account that viewpoints and practices in the field 
are different because of the different subjective perspectives and social backgrounds 
related to them (Flick, 1998:6).  
Research programs always involve human concerns (Stangor, 2011), and research 
based on the exploration, measurement, and comprehension of human behaviours, by 
using the collection and analysis of data, can aid in the generalisation process and thus 
help draw conclusions on human behaviour. 
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Since the aim of the study is to explore the aspect of social reality that is CG and RM 
as perceived and conveyed through human behaviour, this study essentially adopts a 
qualitative methodology. This approach is deemed to be most suitable for this 
explorative study due to its nature in exploring a particular phenomenon such as the 
relationship between CG and RM. With regards to boundaries, the scope of the 
qualitative methodology is confined to obtaining information pertaining to CG and 
RM in any Islamic banks regardless of location. A clear definition on the limit and 
extent of this research are indicated (in the subsequent empirical chapters) to ensure 
its scope remains feasible. 
This research is an attempt to explore aspects of CG frameworks in relation to RM in 
Islamic Banks (IBs). In doing so, it provides answers to the research questions posed 
at the beginning of the chapter. The applicability of the outcome depends very much 
on how extensive it dwells with the research questions. For that, the application of the 
research output is attributed to the depth and breadth of the conducted analysis, 
factoring in its relevancy in the context of addressing CG issues as well as RM 
shortcomings as presented in this paper. In other words, since this study aims at 
studying the nexus between CG and RM faced by IBs through the perceptions of the 
stake holders as well as from its communicated disclosure, it is constructed, by 
definition, as a qualitative research methodology.  
It is, however, also important to note that the research is extended to go beyond an 
exploration of CG and RM through disclosure analysis and of CG and RM beyond 
questionnaire analysis, by incorporating correlation analysis and regression analysis 
through the data generated by qualitative research. Thus, in the second layer of the 
research, qualitatively collected data is examined through quantitative methods, as the 
research aims to examine potential correlations, and determining process through the 
relevant methods. This makes this study also a quantitative research methodology 
based research. 
In overall, this research, hence, benefits from both the research methodologies in 
responding to the particular research question developed in relation to this study. 
Thus, triangulation in research methodology constitutes the general research process 
related framework in this study. 
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4.3. RESEARCH STRATEGY  
Research strategy is a theoretical structure tested through empirical examination 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003), which outlines the direction of the study through selecting 
techniques for specific settings. It is an approach that is not particularly specific to any 
research design (Saunders et al., 2007).  
The importance of research strategy lies in whether the strategy can be guided by the 
research questions and its objectives which are supposed to be complemented by the 
extent of existing knowledge, the amount of time and other resources available, and 
its own philosophical underpinnings (Saunders et al., 2009:141).  
There are two types of research strategies: deductive and inductive. The deductive 
approach is when the literature review helps to identify the hypothesis and ideas to be 
tested (Saunders et al., 2007). Thus, the deductive method sees the exploration of data 
to develop theories related to the literature, despite the defined research questions. 
Quantitative research builds reasoning through a deductive approach whilst qualitative 
research builds findings based on inductive reasoning. However, according to Gibbs 
(2007), qualitative research utilises both inductive and deductive approaches in its 
explanations.  
The inductive approach is used when a researcher wishes to create a relevant 
hypothesis from the data, relating to the literature, which may lead to a theory 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Although the research itself is clearly defined with its own 
aims and objectives, it does not begin with any predetermined ideas (Saunders et al., 
2009). Thus, the inductive research strategy involves viewing patterns from the data 
in order to then develop a hypothesis after the data has been examined. 
Despite the fact that inductive research does not require any pre-existing ideas, 
Stangor (2011) asserts prior knowledge of the subject area is important. Since it is 
impossible to review every single piece of literature before collecting data, Saunders 
et al. (2009:61) suggests that the study reviews the most relevant and significant 
research on the topic in its literature review. This research analysis is effective when 
new findings and theories emerge that nobody has ever thought of before (Saunders et 
al., 2009:61).   
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According to Patton (1990:40), the inductive approach is an immersion in the details 
and specifics of data to discover important categories, dimensions and inter-
relationships which begin by exploring open questions rather than testing theoretically 
derived hypotheses. It is an attempt to make sense of the situation without imposing 
pre-existing expectations on the phenomenon, beginning with specific observations 
and building towards a general pattern (Patton, 1990:44). Patton (1990:44) elaborates 
that the inductive strategy is an understanding of program activities and outcomes 
which emerge from experiences with the setting in which he views theories in the 
setting as grounded in direct program experiences rather than imposed on the setting a 
priori through hypotheses or deductive constructions. 
Using an inductive research strategy, this study directly starts with the developments 
in the field and moves on to hypothesis generation and testing. In other words, this 
research, instead of aiming to test a particular theory with the data collected from the 
field, first collects the data from the field to explore the diversity or uniformity of the 
frameworks of CG and RM in IBs. The study analyses corporate governance and risk 
management-related data from the questionnaires obtained from the respondents of 
Islamic banks. The objective is to determine whether there is any relationship between 
CG and RM, of which there is no theoretical or conceptual background per se, to help 
form the basic building blocks of the relationship.  
This study is an attempt to examine relationships between CG and RM as perceived 
by the participants. There have not been any theories to support the existence of 
relationships between the variables. The study applies a hypothetical approach to 
measure relationships. To proceed with, based on scientific and fact observations, as 
well as reviews of literature, the study presumes the existence of a relationship 
between CG and RM. This study uses the research hypothesis approach (through 
hypothesis research design) to examine the relationship between these variables, of 
which the dependent and independent variables are to be ascertained at this point.  
4.4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research design is the structure in which research takes place (Kothari, 1985) and 
represents the guiding force behind the execution of a particular research method or 
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data analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2011). In other words, research design plans how 
research questions are dealt with. 
Research design aims to shed light on problems by first understanding them 
(Zikmund, 1991), as researchers explore the relevant factors affecting the 
phenomenon in order to gain a better understanding on the phenomenon. It is a means 
of finding out ‘what’ happens, to seek new insights, to ask questions, and to assess 
phenomena in a new light (Robson, 2002:59) so as to promote further research for 
more conclusive evidence (Zikmund, 1991). Research design is highly flexible as it 
does not rely upon pre-existing ideas. Its objective is to identify problems by 
clarifying the underlying issues which result from the problem’s unknown nature. As 
it is flexible, the design requires researchers to be equally responsive to new data and 
occurrences. Stangor (2011:69) views research design as different approaches to 
collect, analyse and interpret data, which are used by researchers in behavioural 
research. These approaches are grouped into three basic designs: descriptive, 
correlational, and experimental.  
Descriptive research design provides a snapshot of thoughts, feelings, and behaviours 
at a given place at a given time, which can be based on surveys or naturalistic 
observations (Stangor, 2011:71). It can be used by both qualitative and quantitative 
research (Stangor, 2011). However, descriptive studies are viewed as less prestigious 
(Gummesson, 1991) compared to other designs for the fact that they are usually either 
mere descriptions of observations, reports, or summaries. 
On another note, Gummesson (1991) sees descriptive research as more than just 
description as this design does not just describe the situation, but it also includes 
analysis and interpretation. It should also be noted that descriptive studies also help 
the researcher understand the situation, provide a structured approach to thinking 
about the study, and give impetus for further research thus helps make decision-
making easier. 
Experimental research design, on the other hand, assesses how the participant affects 
the activity, and thus involves measuring how the research influences the participants. 
According to Saunders et al. (2007), experimental design is sourced mainly from the 
natural sciences, although it has a strong presence in social science research 
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particularly psychology. It should be noted that experimental design is aimed at 
studying causal relations between independent and dependant variables, as opposed to 
just explaining the relationship. It is able to make use of quantitative data to get a 
more accurate picture of the relationships and qualitative data to explain the reasons. 
Experiments are also normally used in these types of research to provide answers to 
questions of ‘how’ or ‘why’.   
Similarly, correlational research design is seen as a research investigation which 
measures two or more variables and assesses their relationship (Stangor, 2011). The 
goal of this research design is to uncover variables which demonstrate a systematic 
relationship with one another (Stangor, 2011), and therefore this may be used with 
hypothesis testing (Sekaran and Bougie, 2009). The testing is categorised as causal 
and correlation. This involves causality, when cause of an issue needs to be 
ascertained, and correlation, when the nature of the relationship needs to be elaborated 
upon (Sekaran and Bougie, 2009). However, a problem with correlational research is 
that it cannot identify causality. This has lead researchers to using experimental 
research to determine causality (Stangor, 2011).  
Apart from the descriptive and explanatory approaches, Gummesson (1991) sees 
exploratory approach as another research design. Exploratory research explores ’why’ 
things occur. It is undertaken to investigate the feasibility of undertaking research or 
exploring unknown areas (Sekaran and Bougie, 2009). Exploratory research uses both 
qualitative and quantitative methods to gather data. This allows the data to be 
triangulated, thus improving the findings’ validity and allowing more inferences to be 
drawn (Saunders et al., 2007). Bryman (2006) agrees with this, and adds that, on the 
quantitative side, structured interviews and questionnaires in cross sectional research 
design are more dominant than in the qualitative side. 
As for this study, the main research design is the explorative research design, since 
the study aims to explore the CG and RM disclosure practices in IBs as well as 
exploring the nexus between CG and RM disclosure practices in the case of IBs. This 
study uses questionnaires to find ‘what are’ the frameworks that are observed by the 
banks. Based on respondents’ perceptions from the questionnaires, this study 
examines all the aspects, or rather dimensions, of CG in trying to see the link with 
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RM. On the reverse, all aspects of RM are also studied so as to locate whether there is 
any correlation with the level of practice of CG.  
Thus, this study examines how the CG framework in relation to RM helps to govern 
the IBs from the Islamic perspective. It also analyses how RM frameworks, under the 
purview of Shari’ah impacts the management of the sampled banks. Thus, 
theoretically, this study assumes that there exists at least a relationship between these 
variables.  
In addition to exploratory research, in an attempt to analyse the relationships between 
CG and RM, a correlational research design is also applied to study how CG and RM 
relate to each other. Using the hypotheses approach, the relationship between these 
two variables are examined in three different scenarios: whether it is positive, 
negative, or have no impact on each other. This is conducted through the analysis of 
responses on CG, which explain the type of relationship.  
Furthermore, this study also uses the descriptive research approach to help develop 
some profiling for the explorative research approach. To a certain extent, the study 
undertakes the correlational research design to measure the CG-RM relationship 
through the data generated by disclosure analysis.  
In summation, this study is based on an integrated research design including 
explorative design with the objective of exploring the ‘unknown’ through 
questionnaire survey; descriptive research design through disclosure analysis to reveal 
‘unknown’; and hypothesis testing designs to measure the aspects of ‘unknown’ 
through correlational, and regression analysis. Thus, a number of research designs are 
utilised in conducting this research in an efficient manner in an attempt to respond to 
the comprehensiveness of the study and its research questions. 
4.5. RESEARCH METHOD 
A research method is simply a technique for collecting and analysing data, which 
involves a specific instrument such as a questionnaire (Bryman and Bell, 2011:40). As 
opposed to methodology, which is the underlying theory and analysis of how research 
proceeds, research method is a technique and way of proceeding in gathering evidence 
(Kirsch and Sullivan, 1992:2). However, in quite an elaborated manner, Buchanan and 
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Bryman (2009) interpret research method by contextualising the method. They view 
definitions of research methods which denote the process as the seeking of the right 
tool as out of context as the research method represents more than just a step in 
research and is not just a tool used to explain approaches deployed in a study. 
Buchanan and Bryman (2009) consider research methods an important part of a wider 
process that helps determine the way in which data may be collected, the nature of the 
data collected, as well as how the theory may be developed. 
Being part of the research design (Bryman and Bell, 2011), research method can 
either be mono method or multiple methods. The mono method is when a single data 
collection technique and corresponding analysis procedures are used whilst ‘multiple 
methods’ or triangulation involves more than one data collection techniques and data 
analysis procedures being used (Saunders et al., 2009:151).  
Mono methods could mean either a combination of single quantitative data collection 
techniques (such as questionnaires) with quantitative data analysis procedures, or a 
single qualitative data collection technique (such as interviews) with qualitative data 
analysis procedures (Saunders et al., 2009:151-152).  
Multi-methods refer to such combinations where more than one data collection 
techniques are used. Accordingly, a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
techniques and procedures for both primary and secondary data is employed. 
However, this is restricted within either a quantitative or qualitative world view 
(Saunders et al., 2009:152).  
Saunders et al. (2007) distinguishes the research methods between quantitative and 
qualitative methods, and categorises them into multi-method quantitative studies and 
multi-method qualitative studies. The multi-method quantitative study is used when 
data is collected using, for example, both questionnaires and structured observations 
with data analysis techniques such as statistical (quantitative) procedures (Saunders et 
al., 2009:152). 
A multi-method qualitative study on the other hand, uses qualitative data collection 
techniques, for example an in-depth interviews and diary accounts, and uses data 
analysis techniques, for example in non-numerical (qualitative) procedures (Saunders 
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et al., 2009:152). In essence, a multi-method does not mix quantitative and qualitative 
techniques and procedures.  
In relation to research design, Saunders et al. (2009:151-152) also classifies design 
based on methods. According to him, research design can be classified into two types 
of methods: mixed methods and mixed models. The mixed method is used when both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques and analysis procedures are 
used in the research design. Mixed method research uses quantitative and qualitative 
data collection and techniques and analysis procedures either at the same time 
(parallel) or one after the other (sequential) but does not combine them. This means 
that although mixed method research uses both quantitative and qualitative methods 
of data collection and analysis methods at the research methods stage, quantitative 
data is analysed quantitatively and qualitative data is analysed qualitatively. 
Normally, either a quantitative or qualitative technique will dominate. 
In contrast, mixed model research combines quantitative and qualitative data 
collection techniques and analyses procedures as well as a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches at other phases of the research such as research question 
generation. This means that researchers may take quantitative data and ‘qualitise’ it, 
i.e. convert it into a narrative that can be analysed qualitatively. Alternatively, 
researchers can ‘quantitise’ the qualitative data, i.e. convert it into numerical codes so 
that it can be analysed statistically Saunders et al. (2009:151-152).  
This study in particular uses a mixed method approach for its data collection. The 
primary data is gathered through the quantitative data collection technique of 
questionnaires. Being qualitative in nature, the responses from the sample population 
are quantified for analysis by the statistical data procedures. Primary data for this 
study is collected via the questionnaire technique to gather a snapshot of the 
understanding and perceptions from individuals who have relevant information on 
corporate governance and risk management in IBs. This is to understand the basis of 
the phenomena of the exploratory study, of which, the thought and behaviour of the 
individuals pertaining to corporate governance and risk matters are collated. 
This study also uses secondary data from various sources such as: Annual Reports, 
financial statements, literature reviews, and case studies. It employs a mixed model 
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approach that uses qualitative data from the questionnaires and Annual Reports and 
analyses them using data analysis techniques. Thus, by doing so, qualitative data is 
quantified using their respective analysis procedures to be analysed statistically. The 
study undertakes a mixed model approach  
Through the descriptive design, the study gathers data such as behaviour and 
perceptions of the individuals in IBs through questionnaire. Data is collected via 
questionnaires to gather a ‘snapshot’ of understanding and perceptions from the 
individuals who have relevant information on CG and RM in IBs. This is done to 
understand the basis of the phenomena of the exploratory study, of which the thoughts 
and behaviour of the individuals pertaining to CG and RM matters are collated. The 
descriptive design acts as a preparatory stage for subsequent exploratory design 
purposes. The secondary data obtained from the annual reports is used in the 
hypotheses approach to help identify the relationship between the CG and RM of the 
individual IB. Finally, the design is also employed to use this secondary data from 
various sources to analyse case studies and review the literature. The case studies and 
review of literature provides a content analysis for relationship between CG and RM. 
The following section first focuses on the aspects of the questionnaire survey 
methods, which is followed by a disclosure analysis. 
4.5.1. Data Collection: Questionnaire Survey 
Surveys may include semi-structured interviews and telephone and online 
questionnaires, which are often used in deductive approaches (Saunders et al., 2007). 
It should be noted that, in general, survey data is sometimes limited and subject to the 
willingness of the respondents (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). However, Saunders et 
al. (2007) view that surveys have more control over the research process and 
sampling may allow data collection representative of entire population at a fraction of 
the cost. 
This study uses a questionnaire survey as one of the strategies for data collection, 
which comprises a cross-sectional design in relation to which data is collected 
predominantly by questionnaire or by structured interview (on more than one case and 
at a single point in time) in order to collect a body of quantitative or quantifiable data 
Page 90 
 
(in connection with two or more variables) which is then used to identify patterns in 
the relationship (Bryman and Bell, 2011:54). 
4.5.1.1. Questionnaire 
Questionnaires are a survey technique that is used to collect data in which individuals 
are asked to respond to the same set of questions in a predetermined order Saunders et 
al., 2009:360). It is considered a powerful tool which is able to yield the maximum 
amount of information in the most efficient way (Gummesson, 1991). The advantages 
of a questionnaire include that they need less skill and are less sensitive to administer 
than face-to-face methods of data collection (Saunders et al., 2007).  
Gummesson (1991) suggests that it is enough to use only questionnaires as the data 
collection method although is often better that it be linked to other methods in a 
multiple–method research design. For instance, a questionnaire used alongside a semi-
structured interview to contextualise individual perspectives. Questionnaires need to 
be completed by participants either by themselves or with a guiding hand (Glăveanu, 
2008). Unlike interviews, questions in a questionnaire must not stray from the 
schedule.  
Saunders et al. (2007) views that questionnaires work best when questions are 
standard and are suitable for use in explanatory and descriptive research designs. 
Descriptive research that discovers attitudes and opinions through questionnaires are 
useful for identifying the variability of phenomena while questionnaires in 
explanatory or analytical research are useful for examining correlation relationships. 
According to Saunders et al. (2007), however, questionnaires see limited use in 
exploratory research or when there are large amounts of open-ended questions. He 
consider it as a less useful instrument for the study of processes due to the rendering 
of cross sectional data as happening at one point in time rather than perceiving the 
social reality as a process.  
Since this research is also an exploratory and descriptive research in terms of its 
design, the questionnaire is considered as one of the main research methods in 
collecting the required qualitative data (in the form of opinions and perceptions) to 
respond to the identified research questions. 
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It should be noted that there were difficulties in getting responses from the sampled 
banks’ employees through questionnaires due to reasons such as confidentially, time 
constraints, unwillingness, etc. Apart from this, due to budget constraints, 
convenience, easy access, the method being flexible and hassle-free, and freedom (no 
obligations imposed on respondent) an unobtrusive method of disclosure analysis is 
chosen. 
To ensure that the sample is representative, there are certain techniques to be 
considered such as the when, type, and choice of questionnaire. The type of 
questionnaire will affect the number of people responding to the questionnaire. For 
instance, interviewer-administered questions will usually have a higher response rate 
than self-administered questionnaires. The size of the sample and the way the sample 
is selected affects the credibility or the confidence of the collected data as well as to 
what extent their responses can be generalized. Furthermore, longer questionnaires are 
normally used in a structured interview. In essence, the choice of questions in the 
questionnaire will have to be aligned with the research questions and objectives of the 
study.  
4.5.1.2. Sampling 
Questionnaires need to be precisely designed to be able to provide answers to the 
research question. This is because it almost impossible for a researcher to collect data 
a second time as it may be difficult to find the same respondents again, especially if 
they are anonymous. 
Sampling is used in research to determine the characteristics of a population as it is 
usually impossible to use the whole population as a sample (Stangor, 2011). This 
makes it difficult to determine the true characteristics of the population (Stangor, 
2011). In evaluating research, Black (2002) lists several groups of participants to be 
chosen for participation in a study: a whole population, a randomly selected sample, a 
purposely selected sample from a population, or volunteers and unspecified groups. 
There can also be combinations of groups to select the participants from.  
In exploring the uniformity or diversity of the frameworks adopted by IBs, the study 
utilises a sampling approach to collect data on CG and RM-related matters. It uses a 
combination of randomly selected groups as well as a purposely selected group 
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sample. This is because the random samples are the ones from the operations level 
who can provide data pertaining to the implementation of corporate governance and 
risk management practices. The purposely selected samples, on the other hand, are the 
individuals who are in between the levels of senior management and the board of 
directors as they are expected to be able to provide data specifically on policy matters 
vis-à-vis the ones that deal in the operation aspects.   
Sampling can be done either through probability sampling or non-probability 
sampling. In probability sampling, everyone in the population has a known chance of 
being included (Stangor, 2011). Probability sampling is more likely to be 
representative. However, samples may only become truly representative if two 
conditions are met. Firstly, there must be more sampling frames that list the entire 
population of interest and secondly all the selected individuals must then be sampled 
(Stangor, 2011). If these conditions are not met it will lead to a sample bias (Stangor, 
2011). The probability methods can be classified into: simple random, systematic 
random, stratified, and cluster sampling while non-probability sampling includes 
snowball sampling and convenience sampling (Stangor, 2011). 
In non-probability sampling, the sample frame does not exist. The snowball sampling 
of a non-probability sample is used when it is difficult to reach members of the 
population. Even if a complete sample frame is available, if all members of the 
random sample frame do not participate, it risks creating a sampling bias. Other types 
of non-probability sampling include: quotas, self-selection, convenience, and 
purposive sampling (Saunders et al., 2009:236). However, purposive or judgemental 
sampling requires judgement in selecting cases that can best provide answers to the 
research questions (Saunders et al., 2009:237). Thus, even though this sampling runs 
the risk of not being representative, it benefits by being able to focus on key themes as 
it selects cases depending upon its research questions. It thus allows for homogeneous 
sampling when the survey is focused on a group in which all sample members are 
similar. This provides an in-depth analysis of the issues.  
This study uses the non-probability sample of purposive sampling. Ideally the whole 
population of IBs could best be used to examine the CG-RM relationship. However, 
this is not possible hence the research uses purposive sampling in order to be able to 
reach potential respondents in an efficient manner. In this case the sampling is chosen 
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regardless of its location but fully based on the judgment of whether the sample is a 
financial institution that provides Islamic products and whether the individual 
respondents are well aware of the CG and RM issues in their respective IBs. Thus, 
he/she should be able to provide answers for the research questions. Therefore, 
questionnaires were sent to the relevant departments in a number of IBs who were 
identified through different sources as the best people who were able to respond. 
4.5.1.3. Questionnaire Design: Types of Questions and Level of Measurement  
The layout and presentation of the questionnaires drastically affect the response rate. 
There are two types of questions: Open-ended questions and closed (or forced choice) 
questions. Open-ended questions help with exploratory research, particularly when 
working with an unknown range of respondents (Zikmund, 1991). However, open-
ended questions risk unclear responses, which are too difficult to be analysed. 
Zikmund (1991) claims that open-ended questions are effective since respondents are 
free to answer according to their thinking, thus allowing for the most ‘flavour’ despite 
exposure to interviewer bias. 
Closed-questions allow data collection to be done in a much shorter time as compared 
to opened-questions. It is easier to make specific comparisons between people when 
everyone is asked the same questions and everyone is restricted to a particular set of 
responses (Gomm, 2004). However, Gomm (2004) also states that this forces the 
respondents to agree with at least one of the choices given, which may lead to 
misinterpretation. 
To help respondents form opinions, this research uses closed-ended questions, which 
are constructed using Likert Scales. Except for one, all the questionnaires are guided 
by the scale to form their opinions in stating their responses. The Likert Scale is used 
to provide options for the questions as it assists the respondents to express their 
preference in scales. It comprises a five-point scale which is labelled thusly: ‘strongly 
disagree’, ‘disagree’, neutral’, ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’. For the one dichotomous 
question of the questionnaire, respondents are guided to form their opinions by ticking 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ as a categorical question. 
It should be noted that the design of the questionnaire was specifically deliberated to 
reduce the number of statements in the questionnaire without compromising the 
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comprehensiveness of the framework, which could affect the reliability and credibility 
of the data.   
Appendix 1 presents the questionnaire schedule used in this study to provide an 
understanding of the extent of enquiry conducted in this study. 
4.5.1.4. Design Requirement 
Prior to selecting the appropriate characteristics to obtain answers to the research 
questions in trying to achieve the thesis objectives, a thorough review of literature is 
needed. This is when issues and the gap analysis highlighted in the literature review 
are linked to the research question, i.e. by deliberating upon the questions posed in the 
questionnaire. Questionnaires are designed to narrow down the gap to meet the 
research objectives. There are three types of questionnaire design: ‘structured 
interview’, ‘interview-administered questionnaire’, and ‘self-administered 
questionnaire’.  
The structured interview, also known as the interview schedule, is regarded as another 
type of questionnaire where the interviewer questions the respondents in person. This 
is different to a semi-structured and unstructured interview (in depth) as the 
interviewer must not stray from the predefined set of questions. For the interviewer–
administered questionnaire, responses of the interviewees are recorded by the 
interviewer. The self-administered questionnaire expects the respondents to complete 
the questionnaire. This study uses the self-administered technique of the 
questionnaire. 
Explanatory research needs data to test a theory. This means, according to Saunders et 
al. (2007:361), in addition to the issues highlighted for descriptive research, there is a 
need to define theories that one wishes to test as relationships between variables prior 
to designing the questionnaire. In other words, conceptualising the research prior to 
designing the questionnaire is required, especially in terms of relationships between 
variables, i.e. dependent, independent, and extraneous variables so that the types and 
nature of data needed should be identified before the design of a questionnaire. Thus, 
they suggest that these variables are to be tested through a statistical analysis of the 
data collected by the designed questionnaire of which the details should be reasonably 
clear since the variables will be measured at the design stage. 
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There are three types of variables that can be collected through questionnaires: 
opinion, behaviour, and attribute (Saunders et al., 2007:362). The ‘opinion’ variable 
records how respondents feel about something or what they think or believe is true or 
false. In contrast, data on ‘behaviour’ and ‘attribute’ records details of the 
respondents. The ‘behaviour’ variable contains data on what people do in the past or 
will do in the future, while the ‘attribute’ variable contains data about a respondent’s 
characteristics. Attributes are best thought of as ‘what’ a respondent possesses rather 
than ‘what’ a respondent does (Saunders et al., 2007:362). Variables are used to 
explore ‘how behaviour and opinions differ between respondents’ as well as to check 
that the data collected is representative of its total population.  
This study mainly involves the ‘attribute’ and opinion variables as most of the 
responses gathered from the respondents are based on what the IBs possess or the 
consideration of the respondents on their respective IBs’ positions on identified CG 
and RM issues. However, to a certain extent, the ‘behaviour’ variable is also applied 
when the respondents relate their answers to past experiences. Through the 
questionnaire, the qualitative information gathered is in the form of quantitative data.  
It should be noted that the assembled primary data is used to gauge the level of CG 
and RM practices in Islamic banks through questionnaires. In this approach, the 
selection and development of the questionnaire is underlined by the theoretical 
framework of CG and RM. In other words, the theme, dimensions, and qualifier 
statements are based on CG and RM frameworks. The theme, dimensions, and 
qualifier statements, which act as the checklist, take into account the CG and RM 
principles from the Shari’ah perspective, which also, in one way or another, cover the 
CG and RM principles from the conventional perspective of the financial system. As a 
matter of fact, the CG and RM principles used in this research are based on the 
combinations of guidance spelt out by AAOIFI (2002), IFSB (2006), OECD Report 
(2004), and many others. 
The design of the questions in the questionnaire used in this study is based on the 
conclusions drawn from the literature review. Resources such as articles, journals, 
PhD theses, and books that discuss the topics of CG and RM are used to substantiate 
the conclusion from the literature review. Thus, to fill the gap analysis as highlighted 
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in the literature review, this study designs the questionnaire. It comprises 2 segments, 
CG and RM, of which each segment is designed to gauge its respective area.   
4.5.1.5. Development and Layout 
To uphold the theoretical frameworks of CG and RM, the questionnaire is segmented 
into two parts: CG and RM. CG and RM have 6 and 5 dimensions, respectively. Each 
dimension of CG and RM has a varied number of statements (also known as 
constructs or qualifying statements). The layout of the questionnaire is as summarised 
in Table 4.1, and the entire layout can be found in Appendix 1 with detailed 
constructs. 
Table 4.1: Layout of Questionnaire 
Part Dimension 
Number of 
Statement 
Corporate 
Governance 
Board of Directors 17 
Structure, Committees and Senior Management  15 
Disclosure and Transparency 7 
Audit 7 
Policies and Procedures 12 
Support and Operations  8 
Risk Management 
General 
Risk Management (General) 19 
Credit Risk 11 
Market Risk and Liquidity Risk 15 
Operational Risk 6 
Shari’ah Risk 6 
 Total constructs   123 
In the CG segment, the first part tests whether the board is fit and proper in 
performing their roles and responsibilities while the second part examines the 
appropriateness of the structure and the committees as well as the effectiveness of the 
senior management. The third part examines the disclosure and transparency aspect, 
and the fourth part looks into audit matters while the fifth part tries to gauge the 
adequacy of the policies and procedures. Finally the sixth part examines the 
effectiveness of support and operations of the bank. The RM segment starts by 
examining the general risk management practices. The subsequent parts analyse the 
respective ‘credit risk’, ‘market and liquidity risks’, ‘operational risk’ and ‘Shari’ah 
risk’. 
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4.5.1.6. Administering the Questionnaire 
This research uses a self-administred survey that uses a purposely selected group. In 
the beginning, slightly more than 100 samples were expected to be included for the 
survey.  
Table 4.2: Sample Banks for Questionnaire 
Country 
/Locality 
Number 
of banks 
Bank Name 
Indonesia 11  Not specified (11) 
Malaysia 
  
  
  
8 
  
  
 
AFFIN 
BIMB 
OCBC 
RHB 
Not specified (4) 
Pakistan 1 Meezan 
Qatar 1 QIB 
Turkey 
  
  
  
4 
  
  
  
Albaraka 
Asya 
KuveytTurk 
Turkiye Finans 
UK 3 
BLME 
EIIB 
Gatehouse 
Total  28   
The questionnaires were distributed to people in specific IBs through their emails as 
sampling was done based on the availability of their email addresses obtained from 
the internet. The questionnaires were sent out to the IBs’ employees. In some cases, 
the questionnaires were sent to more than one employee per bank when no response 
was received for the questionnaire that was sent earlier. Initially, when the 
questionnaires were first sent out, the responses were expected to be received within 
two months. However, since the response rate was very poor, the deadline for the 
responses was extended to another two months. It is for the same reason that the 
deadline was extended several times in the duration of a one and a half year period. 
Despite the time flexibility given for the submission of the questionnaires, the 
research finally settled with 28 responses after only about one year.  
In the end, questionnaires were received from the following countries and banks, as 
depicted in Table 4.2. 
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4.5.1.7. Data Evaluation 
Qualitative research often entails a form of cross-sectional design (Bryman and Bell, 
2011:57). Quite often, cross-sectional studies in business and management tend not to 
be clearly divided into those that use either quantitative or qualitative methods 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011:57). As most ideas relating to data quality were developed 
with quantitative research in mind, there are questions as to whether or not it is 
possible to evaluate the quality of qualitative data or whether there are equivalent 
techniques to ensure the quality of data and the quality of qualitative research (Gibbs, 
2008:91). According to Bryman and Bell (2011:41), three of the most prominent 
criteria for the evaluation of business and management research are reliability, 
replication and validity. Flick (2008), however, sees that there is no simple way of 
checking the validity of qualitative research. He also opines that evaluating research 
quality in the context of qualitative analysis is controversial, with respect to the how 
reliable, replicable, and valid the research is, as he states that the qualitative 
researcher cannot claim to be impartial.  
On a similar note, Bryman and Bell (2011:57) view that where research is not 
necessarily preoccupied with such criteria of quantitative research as replicability and 
internal and external validity, considerable care can be taken to ensure the 
representatives of the sample (in relation to the overall population). They view that a 
triangulated approach where attempts are made to cancel out the limitations of one 
method by the use of another in order to cross-check the findings can be used to 
measure up in terms of evaluating the criteria of reliability, replicability, and validity. 
One of the most damaging limitations is that survey by postal questionnaires often 
results in a low response rate (Bryman, 2012:235). This study employs a triangulation 
approach that uses content analysis as another data collection method to strengthen its 
findings. A triangulation approach is used to increase the validity of the research 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011).  
Unobtrusive data collection methods for disclosure analysis through the content 
method are discussed in the following section. To better inform the research process, a 
reliability analysis for the questionnaires through Cronbach's Alpha (α) using SPSS 
was conducted and the results are presented in Table 4.3.  A Cronbach’s Alpha test 
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was run on a sample size of 28 IBs where 122 statements from the questionnaire are 
checked for their reliability and internal consistency. Internal consistency describes 
the extent to which all the items in a test measure the same concept or construct and 
hence it is connected to the inter-relatedness of the items (Tavakol and Dennick, 
2011). The result in Table 4.3 (Reliability Statistics), show that the Cronbach’s Alpha 
is 0.986, indicating there is high level of internal consistency.  
Table 4.3: Reliability Test Analysis 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of Items 
.984 .986 122 
4.5.2. Unobtrusive Data Collection for Disclosure Analysis 
This study was initially designed to collect the entire data set through questionnaire 
survey design. However, the collection of data from IBs proved to be very difficult 
and also due to the fact that only 28 questionnaires could be collected, a change in the 
research methodology, design and method was inevitable to provide a more efficient 
and effective empirical research. For this, reason, disclosure analysis was considered 
to substantiate the questionnaire based analysis. In the disclosure analysis, the 
research utilises secondary data in the form of IBs’ annual reports to gauge how much 
information the banks disclosed in relation to the index created as a best practice. 
Thus, the same research questions were considered to be tested through the data 
collected through a content analysis of the annual reports of Islamic banks for the 
disclosure analysis.  This unobtrusive research method is discussed in this section and 
the method of estimation is presented in Chapter 6. 
It should be noted that content analysis is now a widely used method of analysis in 
financial accounting research (Beattie; 2005). As evidenced in recent years, the use of 
content analysis and its significant issues has been discussed by several studies 
(Beattie, 2005). This study uses secondary data to complement the primary data 
obtained through the questionnaire through content analysis in conducting disclosure 
analysis.  
This research, hence, employs content analysis to examine the strength of the CG-RM 
relationships using the information provided in the annual reports to explore the 
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communication aspect of the IBs. In the disclosure approach, the index for the 
respective CG and RM is constructed in terms of best practice and the information 
that IBs release in their annual reports was sought to provide responses to the 
established best practices dimensions and constructs. 
The dimensions included in the disclosure index for CG and RM are presented in 
Table 4.5 with the number of statements or constructs included in each dimension. 
The detailed indices for both CG and RM with all the constructs can be found in 
Appendix 2. 
A total of 53 IBs are taken as a sample to represent different regions. From the 53 IBs, 
a collection of 181 online versions of annual reports from the years:  2007, 2009, 2011 
and 2012 are included. For banks that do not have ARs of these years, the sample 
banks’ annual reports between the years 2003 and 2012 are examined. The data is 
primarily gathered from online published annual reports of the IBs from their 
individual websites. There are compilations of financial statements and risk 
management reports which are also used to analyse CG and RM as lack of 
standardisation prevents the efficient collection of secondary data. Besides that, data 
from various sources such as Islamic banking magazines, online articles, and web-
pages are also gathered to complement information gathered from the annual reports. 
The sample banks are as shown in Table 4.4.  
In terms of sampling, the annual reports are chosen based on the criteria that: they 
have to be from Islamic financial institutions, they have to be available online, and 
they have to be published in English between certain years of the 2000s.  
To examine disclosure from the annual reports, the data from the reports are tabulated 
based on a specific worksheet. The worksheet comprises 9 themes grouped into 15 
dimensions (8 dimensions for CG and 7 dimensions for RM) and codified into 135 
constructs. The CG index with its 8 dimensions has a total of 75 constructs while RM 
with its 7 dimensions has 60 constructs (please see Table 4.5 for the number of 
constructs for each of the dimension).  
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Table 4.4: Sample Banks’ Annual Reports  
No. Country No. Bank No. Country No. Bank 
1 Bahrain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 ABIB  8 Pakistan 
 
 
28 Al-Falah 
2 Bahrain Islam. 29 Meezan 
3 As-Salam 30 Bujr (Daw.) 
4 Khaleeji 9 Qatar 
 
 
 
31 QIB 
5 Ithmaar 32 Rayan 
6 Eskan 33 IBQ 
7 ABCIB 34 QIIB 
8 Capinnova 10 Saudi 
Arabia 
 
 
35 AlRajhi 
9 KFH 36 AlJazira 
2 Bangladesh 
 
 
10 S.Jalal 37 AlInma 
11 Islami 38 Jadwa 
12 Al-Arafah 11 Sudan 
 
 
39 Al-Shamal 
3 Egypt 
 
13 Faisal 40 Albaraka 
14 Albaraka 41 Faisal 
4 Indonesia 
 
 
15 Muamalat 12 Turkey 
 
 
42 Albaraka 
16 BSM (Sy.M.) 43 Asya 
17 BNI Syariah 44 KuveytTurk 
5 Jordan 
 
 
18 JIB 13 
UAE 
 
 
45 ADIB (A.Dh) 
19 IIAB  46 DIB (Dubai) 
20 JDIB 47 Hilal 
6 Kuwait 
 
21 Boubyan 48 Emirates Isl. 
22 Kuwait Intern. 14 
UK 
 
 
49 Gatehouse 
7 Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
23 BIMB 50 BLME  
24 CIMB 51 IBB 
25 RHB 52 EIIB 
26 Affin 15 Yemen 
 
53 
  
Tadamon 
  27 HLIB 
The themes included are: ‘bank mission’, ‘board effectiveness’, ‘effective committees 
and senior management’, ‘Shari’ah governance and compliance’, ‘ethical business 
conduct’, ‘audit’, ‘risk governance and practices’, ‘reporting and accounting’, and  
‘risk control’. Each theme may comprise of one or more dimensions. 
The 9 themes are extended into the following dimensions: ‘mission’, ‘composition of 
the board of directors’, ‘board leadership’, ‘board meetings’, ‘nomination and 
compensation committee’, ‘Shari’ah governance’, ‘Shari’ah compliance’, ‘ethical 
business conduct’; ‘audit committee’, ‘risk management committee’, ‘risk 
management control and disclosures’, ‘reporting and accounting’, ‘market and 
liquidity risks’, ‘credit risk’, and ‘other risks’. Each dimension is denoted by D1 
through D15.  
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Table 4.5: Dimensions in Disclosure Index for CG and RM 
Part Dimension 
Number of 
Statement 
Corporate Governance 
Mission 7 
Composition of the BOD 9 
Board Leadership 3 
Board Meetings 2 
Nomination Committee or / and Compensation 
Committee 
11 
Shari’ah Governance 12 
Shari’ah Compliance 18 
Ethical Business Conduct & Corporate Responsibility 13 
Risk Management 
Audit Committee 22 
Risk Management Committee or / and Asset Liquidity 
Committee 
6 
Risk Management, Control Items & Risk Disclosures 10 
Reporting - Accounting and Funding 9 
Market and Liquidity Risks 6 
Credit Risks 5 
Other Risks 2 
Total 135 
The theme ‘board mission’ consists of the ‘mission’ dimension (D1); the theme 
‘board effectiveness’ consists of the ‘board composition’ (D2), ‘board leadership’ 
(D3) and ‘board meetings’ (D4) dimensions; the theme on ‘effective committees and 
senior management’ consists of ‘nomination and compensation committee’ (D5); the 
theme on ‘Shari’ah and compliance’ consists of ‘Shari’ah governance’ (D6) and 
‘Shari’ah compliance’ (D7); the theme on ‘ethical business and practices’ consists of 
‘ethical conducts’ (D8); the theme on ‘audit’, consists of ‘audit committee and audits’ 
(D9); the theme on ‘risk governance’ consists of ‘risk committees’ (D10) and ‘risk 
management and control items’ (D11); the theme on ‘reporting and disclosure’ 
consists of ‘audit’ and ‘reporting’ (D12);  and the theme on ‘risk control’ consists of 
‘market and liquidity risk’ (D13), ‘credit risk’ (D14) and ‘other risks’ (D15). 
Each dimension has a varying number of statements, which are also known 
interchangeably as constructs, of which the statements act as qualifiers to identify the 
presence or absence of specific items pertaining to CG and RM. 
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Based on the above worksheet, the CG and RM indices are developed by basing them 
on a weighted average formulated through a series of worksheets. In summary, the 
general layout of the worksheet is shown in Table 4.5. 
As mentioned, the calculation method is presented in Chapter 6, which provides the 
empirical results developed through the disclosure analysis.  In addition, further 
explanations related to the estimation method are provided in the following section. 
4.6. RESEARCH METHOD: DATA ANALYSIS 
This section aims to highlight the methods and tools, which are used for data analysis 
and is separated into two sections that represent the Perceptions Analysis based on 
questionnaire and Disclosure Analysis based on secondary data.  
Table 4.6: Summary of Data Analysis Methods 
Perceptions (Questionnaire) Techniques/Tools/Method Application 
Descriptive / Inferential 
Likert-scales 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
Frequency & Descriptive Tables 
Kruskal Wallis 
Excel 
SPSS 
Statistical 
Correlation 
Spearman's Rho 
Pearson Correlation 
Regression 
ANOVA 
Correlation Coefficient 
Disclosure (Annual Report) Techniques/Tools/Method Application 
Descriptive / Inferential 
Likert-scales 
Mean 
Excel 
Statistical 
Correlation 
Spearman's Rho 
Pearson Correlation 
SPSS 
Regression 
ANOVA  
Correlation Coefficient 
The software applications and tools used to analyse the two sets of data are 
summarised as shown in Table 4.6.  
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4.6.1. Perceptions Analysis 
For the perception analysis, the research first utilised the purposive sampling 
questionnaires to gauge the respondents’ perceptions on various facets of CG and RM, 
which manifested as constructs within the questionnaire. These constructs are 
designed using a Likert Scale which allows respondents to indicate their level of 
agreement/disagreement with the given statements, i.e. their perceptions of their banks 
with regards to matters of CG and RM. The use of the Likert Scale allows the research 
to quantify the data. The quantified data from these questionnaires are then tabulated 
into frequency and descriptive tables (using Microsoft Excel) in which the means for 
the Likert Scale scores are calculated and used to describe the data. The data is also 
checked through Cronbach’s Alpha for reliability. Then the Kruskal-Wallis Test as a 
non-parametric test is used to compare the results in the form of a mean difference 
analysis from the findings using the SPSS software. Next, for the statistical analysis, 
most of tools used are from the SPSS software. To measure correlation between CG 
and RM, the Spearman’s Rho (non-parametric) and Pearson Correlation (parametric) 
tests are used. Then, ANOVA was used to measure the regression of the data in terms 
of how much the dependent variables (CG and RM) are able to be explained by their 
respective dependent variables (dimensions).  
4.6.2. Disclosure Analysis 
In terms of the collected annual reports, the availability of the annual reports from 
each bank ranges from 1 annual report per bank (at minimum) to 4 annual reports per 
bank (at maximum). These annual reports are then analysed to determine if certain 
elements of CG and RM (that would be expected of an IB as spelt out in the 
constructs) are disclosed in the IBs’ respective annual reports. The expected elements 
are recorded in an Excel table as either present or not present and quantitised by 
defining a present element as having the value ‘1’ and a non-present element as 
having the value ‘0’. This is done for at least one up to four years of annual reports for 
each bank. The scores for each year are then calculated using Excel sheet to find the 
means for each bank as well as for the years. These means (weighted) are then used to 
develop an index from which the descriptive portion of the disclosure approach 
derives its analysis.  
Page 105 
 
For the statistical portion of the research, the results from the index are run in the 
SPSS software using various statistical methods. Similar to the perception approach, 
the Spearman’s Rho (non-parametric) and Pearson Correlation (parametric) test are 
used to measure the correlation between CG and RM, followed by ANOVA, which is 
used to measure the regression of the data in terms of how much the dependent 
variables (CG and RM) are able to be explained by their respective dependent 
variables (dimensions).  
4.7. LIMITATIONS AND DIFFICULTIES 
Data collection from IBs appears to be the most challenging issue in this research. 
Insufficient or unavailable data is something that is very much unavoidable. 
According to Dolton et al. (2006:439), “Nonresponse is a commonly encountered 
phenomenon in social surveys. Whether nonresponse affects statistical analysis of the 
survey data depends on the variables one is interested in”.  
The fear of not getting sufficient data was realised in the later part of this research 
process. In light of its time frame, the research painstakingly struggled to obtain the 
responses before the research could proceed further with the data analysis part. 
However, despite all efforts only 28 responses were received for its questionnaires. At 
the onset, this research aimed to get at least 80 responses from the questionnaire 
method. Through emails, more than 120 questionnaires were sent out to IBs in the 
Middle East, Germany, UK, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia. However, only about 
6% of the IFIs responded while most of the responses received were obtained via the 
supervisor and colleagues. Thus, another research strategy was devised.  
On the verge of the approaching timeline, an alternative data collection method, or 
rather an additional research method was considered. The research opted for an 
unobtrusive data collection, i.e. getting secondary data from the IBs’ annual reports 
(see Appendix 2). The research design was slightly changed to cater for the secondary 
data collection which is based on the disclosure approach. Nevertheless, the disclosure 
approach did not proceed without its own problems. As the actual work begun, it 
became clear that the vast majority of banks do not have their annual reports 
published online, especially for the four selective years as required by the research. 
Even though at the beginning the research expected to use 200 IFIs as its sample, this 
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did not materialise since not many banks fulfilled the required criteria. These criteria 
were that the IBs had to have published annual reports online, the IBs had to have an 
English version annual report, and they had to be Islamic financial institutions.  
Hence, it can be said that generally the data gathering process for this research was a 
real challenge. Nevertheless, for most of the parts, the research methodology used was 
deemed suitable to continue on with the study at this juncture.  
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CHAPTER 5 
MAPPING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN ISLAMIC 
BANKING: DISCLOURE ANALYSIS 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most profound traits of Islamic banking (IB), as explained in the earlier 
chapters, is its ethical foundation, and ethicality in contemporary times is not limited 
to the ethical nature of businesses but also the disclosure of activities as stipulated by 
international agencies. As far as ethics is concerned, the Islamic banks (IBs) are 
encouraged to disclose pertinent information to stakeholders when doing business, as 
necessitated by the governance of Islamic principles in the sense of revealing the 
necessary information for stakeholders and shareholders to help in their decision 
making processes. Hence, the disclosure approach is used to validate the information 
they have provided via their communications through mediums such as the annual 
report. When information such as corporate governance and risk management is 
disclosed, this helps improve the stakeholders’ understanding of the bank’s nature of 
business, current state of affairs, and their future plans, thus strengthening the bank's 
credibility.  
This chapter extends the literature on the relationship between corporate governance 
(CG) and risk management (RM) from the disclosure perspective. The aim of the 
chapter is to present the results of the content analysis in order to analyse the 
relationship between CG and RM whereby CG and RM disclosure levels are 
measured. In addition, this chapter also aims to explore IBs’ ethicality in their 
communication via annual reports to investigate the nature of disclosure and to what 
extent this is revealed in their ARs. This chapter, thus, is an attempt to provide some 
observations on CG acceptance and RM practices in Islamic Financial Institutions 
(IFIs).  
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As identified, the relationship between CG and RM in this study is examined based on 
the banks’ disclosure as communicated through their annual reports. As mentioned 
earlier, the disclosure approach uses an index to examine the CG-RM relationship. 
Besides identifying relationships, it is hoped that the most significant components of 
CG and RM can be identified through the index.  
5.2. EMPIRICAL MODELLING 
As mentioned, the data for measuring the relationship between CG and RM through 
disclosure analysis are collected through a content analysis of sampled annual reports 
of IBs for the years 2007, 2009, 2011 and 201239. For banks that do not have any 
annual reports for the four mentioned years, a minimum of one year and maximum of 
4 years annual reports between the years 2003 and 2012 are considered.   
In conducting the coding analysis as part of content analysis, to ensure reliability and 
validity, annual reports are read with emphasis placed on CG and RM-specific 
aspects. The approach to scoring items, as mentioned in the Research Methodology 
chapter, is dichotomous, that is to say the score is either 1 if present or 0 of otherwise. 
The scoring is additive in nature where the index is constructed based on a weighted 
average, as simplified below: 
Indexj = 
n
j∑t=1Xij/nj        (5.1) 
where, 
Indexj is the index, nj is the number of constructs disclosed by j
th IB, nj<= 135
40, and 
xij =1 if i
th construct is disclosed (0 if ith construct is not disclosed), so that 0<=Ij <=1.  
This model is identical to the one developed by Haniffa and Hudaib (2007). 
Generally, an index is derived by taking into account its total score, which is divided 
by 135 i.e. the total number of constructs, as explained in the Research Methodology 
chapter.  
                                                          
39 Different IBs might have different combination of years of annual reports - depending on the 
availability of the annual reports. For example, it could be a combination of years 2007, 2009, 2010, 
2012 etc. 
40 The number 135 represents the total number of constructs in the disclosure worksheet. 
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By using this particular formulation in equation 5.1, each index is constructed 
individually according to IB and country. 
The scores obtained by each IB are recorded in the respective bank’s table, which can 
be seen in Appendix 5 as a template. The table shows scores for each year of the 
annual report (depending on how many annual reports the bank has) where the bank’s 
score for each year is added up to give the individual IB its total score for all the 
years; see Appendix 2. 
Each IB’s total score is calculated based on the above formula and is split according 
to the dimensions. To derive the ‘Dimension Index’ (D), the score of each dimension 
is divided against the total number of statements in that dimension. Then the index is 
tabulated, taking into account the total number of Annual Reports the IB has (see 
Appendix 2).  
Constructing the CG Index 
The construct of CG Index (CGI) is based on the total scores the bank obtains in its 
dimensions from D1 through D8 against the total number of constructs, also referred 
to as qualifying statements (QS), totalling to 75 taking into account the number of 
annual reports’ years. This construct applies to each individual sampled bank in each 
individual sampled country, referred to as the ‘Bank CG Index’. The mean Bank CG 
Index is derived by adding up the CGI for all the banks divided by the number of 
banks.  
The CG index is also constructed for each country, referred to as the ‘Country CG 
Index’. 
The Country CG Index is constructed based on the total scores of each individual 
bank obtained for dimensions D1 through D8, taking into account the number of 
annual reports periods or years. For example, if the bank has a 4-year series of annual 
reports then all the scores for these 4 years should be added up. Then each individual 
bank’s total score is added up giving a country CG score. The country CG score is 
divided by the total number of qualifying statements (which is 75) for x series of 
annual reports. This means that if there are three banks in the country and each bank 
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has 4-year series of annual reports then the denominator will be 75 multiplied by 341 
and then by 442 which results in the denominator being 900.  
The mean Country CG Index is derived by adding up the CGI for all the countries 
divided by the number of countries.   
Constructing RM Index  
Similar rules apply to the RM Index, which can also be referred to as the Bank RM 
Index, except that the total number of QS is 60 instead of 75. The RM Index is 
constructed based on the total scores the bank obtains in its D9 through D15 
dimensions against the total QS in dimensions D9 through D15, which totals to 60, 
taking into account the number of annual reports for the sampled years.  
The RM index is constructed for each bank, which can be referred to as the ‘Bank RM 
Index’. The mean Bank RM Index is derived by adding up the RMI for all the banks 
divided by the number of banks, which is also constructed for each country, referred 
to as Country RM Index. 
Similar constructs apply to the RM Country Index except that the total QS is 60 
instead of 75. The Country RM Index is constructed based on the total scores each 
individual bank obtains in dimensions D9 through D15, taking into account the 
number of years, where if the bank has a 4-year series of annual reports then all the 
scores for these 4 years should be added up. This construct applies to each individual 
bank in the country where each individual bank’s total score is added up to give a 
country RM score. The country RM score is divided by the total QS (which is 60) for 
x series of years. This means that if there are 3 banks in the country and each bank has 
a 4-year series of annual reports then the denominator will be 60 multiplied by 3 (i.e. 
banks) and 4 (i.e. years) which results in the denominator being 720 (CGI and RMI 
for each bank and country are shown in Appendix 5.2 Bank). The mean Country RM 
Index is derived by adding up the RMI for all the countries divided by the number of 
countries.   
                                                          
41 Because in the example, three banks are used.  
42 Because in the example, four years of annual reports are used.   
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The sample mean disclosure (x) for each dimension is derived by summing up the 
index of each individual bank (I) divided by the sample size (N) which is 53. This can 
be simplified as, 
Mean (x) = 
∑𝐼
𝑁
    
where; 
Index = I; and N= Number of banks. 
Scale of Disclosure 
The examination of annual reports, which is based on 15 dimensions compounded by 
the 9 underlying themes, is done thematically. The findings of CG disclosure will be 
discussed based on dimensions represented by D1 through D8, and for RM, the 
dimensions are represented by D9 through D15. The findings on RM disclosure are 
set forth in section 5.4. 
Each index is categorised based on a scale from 1 to 0 (1 being the highest disclosure 
and 0 for otherwise). The scoring method is in line with a study done by (Hasan, 
2011) who develops a scoring method based on under-developed, emerging, 
improved, good, and best practices governance in which he emphasises on Shari’ah 
governance in particular. This should be considered as part of the emerging research 
by expanding the practice of research. The classification for each disclosure index is 
as follows:  
0.90 <= very high <= 1.0;  
0.70 <= high < 0.90; 
0.60 <= moderate < 0.70;  
0.50 <= low < 0.60 and; 
0 <= very low < 0.50. 
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5.3. FINDINGS ON DISCLOSURE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES 
This section presents the disclosure analysis results for CG, initially, through 
dimensions. The results for each dimension are presented at bank level and country 
level. It should be noted that the details of the index constructs can be found in 
Chapter 4, the Research Methodology chapter.  
5.3.1. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Mission’ Dimension 
This section presents the disclosure results for ‘mission’ dimension first at the bank 
level and then at country level. 
Bank Level 
The findings for the bank level disclosure on ‘mission’ dimension are depicted in 
Table 5.1. With the mean being ‘moderate’ at 0.60, it can be deduced that most IBs to 
a certain extent, have awareness on corporate governance and have accepted that 
corporate governance codes can establish the bank’s direction as reflected in their 
mission statements. The ‘moderate’ score is mostly triggered by the following 
constructs: the banks’ vision towards addressing corporate governance codes, an 
assessment on the banks’ current compliance, and effective communication with their 
shareholders. 
Based on Table 5.1, 23% of the IBs scores were ‘very high’, in between 1 to 0.9 in 
their mission disclosure indexes. Al-Baraka Turk, Gatehouse, and JIB are among 
those which scored 100%.  
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Table 5.1: Disclosure Results on ‘Mission’ Dimension at Bank Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
AlBaraka 1.00 RHB 0.93 
Islami 
Bank 
Bangladesh 
0.86 Eskan 0.64 Jadwa 0.29 DIB 0.14 
Gatehouse 1.00 Ithmaar 0.93 Al-Falah 0.86 
Al-
Arafah 
0.64 QIIB 0.29 Emirates IB 0.14 
JIB 1.00 AlInma 0.90 Meezan 0.86 ABCIB 0.61 Capinnova 0.29 Tadamon 0.14 
JDIB 1.00 EIIB 0.86 AlJazira 0.79 AlRajhi 0.57 
Kuveyt 
Turk 
0.25 Al-Shamal 0.14 
CIMB 1.00 BIMB 0.86 BISB 0.79 Bujr 0.57 IIAB 0.21 
AlBaraka 
(Sud) 
0.14 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 
1.00 HLIB 0.86 Khaleeji 0.79 BLME 0.50 Boubyan 0.18 Faisal (Sud) 0.14 
KFH 
(Bah.) 
1.00 
BNI 
Syariah 
0.86 Muamalat 0.75 IBQ 0.50 IBB 0.14 Faisal (Egy) 0.00 
ADIB 
(Abu 
Dhabi IB) 
1.00 
As-
Salam 
0.86 QIB 0.71 
Shah 
Jalal 
0.50 
BSM 
(Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.14 
AlBaraka 
(Egy) 
0.00 
Asya 0.93 Hilal 0.86 Affin 0.71 Rayan 0.43 Kuwait Int. 0.14   
Mean  = 0.60 
As for the rest of the sampled IBs, 28% of them classified as ‘high’, 6% of them as 
‘moderate’, 9% of them as ‘low’ mission disclosures. Banks under these three groups 
(for instance EIIB, Al Rajhi and BLME) do not differ much in terms of the nature of 
their disclosure. They fall into different ranking because of slight difference in their 
levels (i.e. number) of disclosure. So far, no obvious pattern in the sense of a 
particular construct can be seen representing any particular group. In general, 
information in the following constructs: ‘assessment with respect to compliance with 
CG principles’ and ‘communication with the shareholders’ are absent in most of the 
banks in these groups.  
The results imply that the banks have CG awareness as it is observed that there is a 
trend on IBs adopting the ‘mission dimension’ of CG and that their objectives are 
communicated to the public through their ‘mission’ statements. It seems that the 
banks have accepted that CG principles can provide substance to the overall conduct 
of the banks, and hence they provide evidence that CG is incorporated into the 
mission and vision statement of the banks.  
It should, however, be stated that the remaining 34% of the sampled IBs have ’very 
low’ disclosure in the mission dimension. This could be explained by various reasons. 
For instance, the banks were newly established during the year the sample was 
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chosen; Capinnova, Jadwa, and Rayan for example had just commenced their Islamic 
banking operations after the year 2006. This probably explains why their corporate 
governance missions have not been fully implemented yet. However, for Kuveyt 
Turk, QIIB, DIB, Kuwait Int., the absence of corporate governance in their mission 
statements could be due to lack of awareness on corporate governance as well as 
persistent gaps in enforcement towards the code itself.  
Country Level 
The country level results for ‘mission’ dimension can be found in Table 5.2. With a 
mean disclosure index of 0.51, this is not quite unexpected as 40% of the IBs are in 
the ’very low’ group (scores in the range of 0.49 to 0). Only 33% of the countries 
have ‘high’ scores in their mission disclosure index. For Malaysia, Jordan, Bahrain 
and Turkey, their respective scores are in the region of 0.88 and 0.76. These could be 
attributed to the role played by the individual governments that promote CG to portray 
the country’s image as a safe and conducive investment environment through their 
shared values and goals.  
Table 5.2: Disclosure Results on ‘Mission’ Dimension at Country Level 
Country Mission Country Mission Country Mission 
Malaysia 0.880 Bangladesh 0.629 UAE 0.451 
Jordan 0.804 Saudi 0.619 Kuwait 0.163 
Bahrain 0.766 UK 0.571 Yemen 0.143 
Pakistan 0.762 Indonesia 0.558 Sudan 0.143 
Turkey 0.726 Qatar 0.495 Egypt 0.000 
Mean=0.51 
On the other hand, except for UK, the remaining 67% of the countries where the 
sampled banks were drawn indicate that they have not fully adopted corporate 
governance yet. The UK, however, could have achieved a better disclosure index if 
they were not quite affected by the ’very low’ disclosure score of IBB. Bangladesh, 
nonetheless, demonstrates ‘high’ disclosure for the year 2011 only, but this is 
insufficient to push the country disclosure index to the next level. This could partly be 
due to the limitations in the sampled banks’ annual reports. 
As for the findings on Kuwait, it seems that corporate governance awareness has not 
been rooted. It is understandably difficult for them to gauge how much substance CG 
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can contribute towards achieving the banks’ mission. This may imply that acceptance 
on corporate governance has not been instigated. For Sudan, despite being in the IB 
industry for about 30 years, its ‘very low’ mission disclosure could be due to the fact 
that the banks are still weak in terms of their institutional base and CG is perceived as 
too big a concept at this juncture.   
5.3.2. Findings on Disclosures for ‘Board Composition’ Dimension 
Bank Level 
As can be seen in Table 5.3, with a mean disclosure index of 0.44 for the ‘board 
composition’ dimension, this may imply that the independence of the directors is at 
stake. The results show that only 3 IBs have ‘very high’ disclosure on board 
composition; JDIB, BIMB and CIMB are in the ’very high’ disclosure group implying 
that they scored a full disclosure index.  
Table 5.3: Disclosure Results on ‘Board Composition’ Dimension at Bank Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
JDIB 1.00 BNI Syariah 0.78 BLME 0.61 Alinma 0.41 Shah Jalal 0.22 DIB 0.00 
BIMB 1.00 ABIB (Bah.) 0.78 AlJazira 0.61 IIAB 0.39 Meezan 0.22 
Emirates 
IB 0.00 
CIMB 1.00 Ithmaar 0.75 BISB 0.61 
BSM (Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 0.39 Al-Arafah 0.11 Tadamon 0.00 
JIB 0.92 Affin 0.74 Eskan 0.61 Kuveyt Turk 0.33 Rayan 0.08 
Al-
Shamal 0.00 
RHB 0.92 Muamalat 0.69 Capinnova 0.59 AlRajhi 0.33 QIIB 0.07 
AlBaraka 
(Sud) 0.00 
Al Salam 0.92 Hilal 0.67 
KFH 
(Bah.) 0.56 Al-Falah 0.28 IBB 0.06 
Faisal 
(Sud) 0.00 
EIIB 0.89 
Islami Bank 
Bangladesh 0.67 ABCIB 0.50 Jadwa 0.25 IBQ 0.00 
Faisal 
(Egy) 0.00 
HLIB 0.89 Khaleeji 0.64 
ADIB 
(Abu 
Dhabi IB) 0.48 QIB 0.25 Boubyan 0.00 
AlBaraka 
(Egy) 0.00 
Gatehouse 0.83 AlBaraka 0.61 Asya 0.42 Bujr 0.25 Kuwait Int. 0.00   
Mean = 0.44 
It is observed that, in general, the ‘high’ disclosure in board composition highlights 
three points: first, the banks have very qualified people who sit on the board; second, 
the banks have a very highly selective criteria with regards to board appointments; 
and third, the banks might be more transparent in the decision making process when 
there are appropriate numbers of the independent and non-executive directors sitting 
in the board (which might lead to less conflicts of interest).  
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Based on the above, this implies that the banks in the ‘high’ disclosure group 
normally use disclosure as a way to portray their banks’ credentials through their 
boards’ credibility based on their affluent academic qualifications and experiences. 
This could probably explain why JDIB, BIMB, Al Salam, and other banks in the ’very 
high’ and ‘high’ disclosure group perform well in this dimension. A total of 5 IBs 
have ‘high’ scores (in the range of 0.72 and 0.89), which imply that they have 
established some form of benchmark to guide them on board appointment matters. 
Based on observation, almost all banks do not disclose constructs on board 
monitoring, apart from the banks in the ‘very high’ disclosure group. It is noted that a 
number of 27 IBs (the combinations of the ‘low’ and ‘very low’ disclosure groups) 
can be further classified into: the group that does not generally disclose board profiles, 
such as the qualifications or experience; the group that does not generally disclose the 
board composition such as, independent or non-executive status; and the group with a 
total absence of any constructs in this dimension.  
The group that does not generally disclose board profiles is represented by ADIB, Al 
Inma, Jadwa, Al Rajhi, Dawood, Meezan, Al Falah, and Rayan, among others. This 
may imply that IBs in this group may not have many choices in terms of qualified 
persons to allow them to be particularly selective in electing board members. That 
being the case, the IBs may have probably considered using board composition as an 
effective tool to steer the IBs. There may also be cases associated with bank 
ownership when the board’s credentials and board composition criteria are relegated 
and not factored into the board appointment process. 
It should be noted that Asya, Kuveyt Turk, and Shah Jalal are among the IBs that fall 
in the group that generally do not disclose board composition. Information on the 
board qualifications or experience is revealed but disclosure on the board monitoring 
and assessment is absent. In the case of Kuveyt Turk, this could be due to bank policy 
where being a private financial institution means that it is governed by the 
institutional country act (i.e. banking act) on information disclosure.  
The ’very low’ disclosure group is represented by IBQ, Boubyan, Kuwait Int., DIB, 
Emirates, Tadamon and Al Shamal to name a few. These IBs do not provide any 
disclosure on board matters. ADIB for instance, does not have disclosure on the board 
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profiles and composition. In addition, Al Inma does not have constructs on the board 
profile and most of the banks in this group do not have disclosure on the board 
performance monitoring which reflects that they may not have CG awareness. Thus, 
that being the case, the disclosure may only come at a later stage.  
Country Level 
The country level findings for the ‘board composition’ dimension can be found in 
Table 5.4. With a mean of 0.35, which is considered ‘very low’, it can be deduced that 
most countries do not have proper guidelines for the ‘board composition’ dimension.  
As can be seen, Malaysia ranks top, with a score of 0.92 for the disclosure for its 
board composition dimension. This could mainly be attributed to regulatory 
intervention as reflected in the presence of regular board monitoring and assessment 
practices. 
Table 5.4: Disclosure Results on ‘Board Composition’ Dimension at Country 
Level  
Country 
Board 
Composition Country 
Board 
Composition Country 
Board 
Composition 
Malaysia 0.918 Turkey 0.454 Qatar 0.104 
Jordan 0.806 Saudi 0.400 Kuwait 0.000 
Bahrain 0.657 Bangladesh 0.267 Yemen 0.000 
Indonesia 0.606 Pakistan 0.250 Sudan 0.000 
UK 0.563 UAE 0.214 Egypt 0.000 
Mean = 0.35 
As the results in Table 5.4 shows, Jordan attains a ‘high’ score in this dimension, 
mainly attributed to their disclosure in the boards’ profiling and performance 
monitoring while Bahrain and Indonesia show some improvement, especially on the 
board monitoring assessment and board profiling towards the later years of the 2000s.  
It should be noted that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, UAE, Qatar, 
Kuwait and Sudan have yet to develop disclosure practices in this dimension, as 
reflected by the low disclosure on board information, board composition, and board 
assessment practices in most of their constructs. Perhaps this is caused by the absence 
of a regulatory framework with regards to the boards’ appointments. In the case of 
Saudi Arabia, having a family-run business structure and having some private 
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financial institutions respectively, the banks’ board assessment exercise may 
presumably only occur at the discretion of the shareholders.  
5.3.3. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Board Leadership’ Dimension 
Bank Level 
As can be seen in Table 5.5, the mean disclosure index of 0.45 reflects a ‘very low’ 
achievement by the board in terms of the governing of IBs.  The results show that 
26% and 6% of the IBs are in the ’very high’ and ‘high’ groups respectively with their 
scores ranging in between 1 and 0.75. A total of 14 IBs are in the ‘very high’ group, 
12 of which have full disclosure index. This includes EIIB, JIB, IIAB, JDIB and 
BIMB. It is noted that most of these banks have a very clear CG mission. This implies 
that the ‘board leadership’ dimension may be triggered by the adoption of CG 
principles (which some banks mentioned in their mission statements). The boards in 
these groups possess leadership qualities that reaffirm their capabilities. For instance, 
they hold other significant positions elsewhere, they have a proper delineation and 
segregation of roles and responsibilities, and they exercise independent judgement in 
their work. 
Table 5.5: Disclosure Results on ‘Board Leadership’ Dimension at Bank Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
EIIB 1.00 Al Salam 1.00 BIMB 0.67 Gatehouse 0.33 Rayan 0.08 Al-Falah 0.00 
JIB 1.00 Ithmaar 1.00 ABCIB 0.67 Eskan 0.33 
Emirates 
Islamic 
Bank 
0.08 Meezan 0.00 
IIAB 1.00 Capinnova 1.00 KFH (Bah.) 0.67 Bujr 0.25 IBB 0.00 Tadamon 0.00 
JDIB 1.00 AlBaraka 0.92 
ADIB (Abu 
Dhabi IB) 
0.67 Hilal 0.17 AlRajhi 0.00 
Al-
Shamal 
0.00 
BIMB 1.00 Asya 0.92 BLME 0.50 Shah Jalal 0.17 IBQ 0.00 
Albaraka 
(Sud.) 
0.00 
CIMB 1.00 Affin 0.89 Khaleeji 0.50 Al-Arafah 0.17 Boubyan 0.00 
Faisal 
(Sud.) 
0.00 
HLIB 1.00 RHB 0.83 AlJazira 0.42 Alinma 0.11 
Kuwait 
International 
0.00 
Faisal 
(Egy.) 
0.00 
BNI 
Syariah 
1.00 Muamalat 0.75 QIB 0.42 QIIB 0.11 DIB 0.00 
AlBaraka 
(Egy.) 
0.00 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 
1.00 
BSM 
(Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.67 Kuveyt Turk 0.33 Jadwa 0.08 
Islami Bank 
Bangladesh 
0.00   
Mean = 0.45 
As the results in Table 5.5 shows, the ‘moderate’ and ‘low’ groups account for 9% 
and 4% of the IBs with scores between 0.67 and 0.50. Apparently, these banks have 
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quite ‘high’ disclosures but somehow the disclosure index is affected due to an 
absence of constructs in the independent judgement construct. However, in the case of 
Muamalat and Khaleeji for instance, disclosure on how the board exercises 
independent judgement may not necessarily apply to them as the banks’ shares are 
mainly held by private entities.  As such, disclosure may be subjective and at the 
discretion of the banks (based on the ownership structure). Indices are also affected by 
the fact that the banks began their operations only after the mid-2000s. In the case of 
BLME, for instance, full disclosure in this dimension only occurs later in the year 
since the bank had just commenced its operations in 2007.  
The results also show that 55% of the banks are classified as having ‘very low’ 
disclosure with scores in the region of 0.4 and 0. For example, QIB, Kuveyt Turk and 
Gatehouse are among the IBs that do not practice disclosure exercises pertaining to 
the boards’ roles and responsibilities and they do not indicate the way independent 
judgement is exercised. However some of them, such as QIB and Al Jazira, present 
the progress of their CG compliance reports. 
It can be argued that most of the IBs in the ’very low’ disclosure group do not have 
CG awareness; thus disclosure in this dimension probably will not materialise until 
they are ready to adopt its principles. However, in the case of Shah Jalal Bank, its low 
disclosure on the board’s independent judgement construct could also be attributed to 
the banks’ ownership structure which is comprised of very high privately-owned 
shareholding stakes.  
Country Level 
In terms of country level, the mean disclosure score of 0.36 reflects that board 
leadership is still ‘very low’ in most countries. Jordan, however, ranks top, followed 
by Malaysia where both are in the ‘very high’ disclosure category. Indonesia, Bahrain, 
and Turkey’s scores have relatively ‘high’ disclosure; in the range of 0.79 and 0.72. 
To a certain degree, this reflects the persistent intervention by the government to 
ensure leadership competencies among the board, especially with regards to their 
conduct in ensuring the banks’ performances, such as in the case of Jordan and 
Malaysia, which are in the top positions in this dimension. For instance, Jordan made 
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AAOIFI standards mandatory for the IBs in the country while Malaysia imposed 
IFSB rules on Malaysian IBs. 
As can be seen in Table 5.6, 64% of countries fall in the ‘very low’ category for 
disclosure, with the scores ranging in between 0.48 to 0. Qatar and Kuwait for 
instance, seemed to need coherent initiatives from their individual governments to 
improve on the regulatory guidelines, which will at least ensure an appropriate 
delegation of the boards’ roles and responsibilities and disclosure on independent 
judgement and their roles and responsibilities. 
Table 5.6: Disclosure Results on ‘Board Leadership’ Dimension at Country 
Level  
Country 
Board 
Leadership Country 
Board 
Leadership Country 
Board 
Leadership 
Jordan 1.000 UK 0.476 Pakistan 0.083 
Malaysia 0.947 UAE 0.205 Kuwait 0.000 
Indonesia 0.788 Saudi 0.156 Yemen 0.000 
Bahrain 0.737 Qatar 0.156 Sudan 0.000 
Turkey 0.722 Bangladesh 0.133 Egypt 0.000 
Mean = 0.36 
In the case of the UK, the ‘very low’ disclosure can only be the attributed to the UK’s 
regulatory requirements that require IBs to comply with the FSA. As for Bangladesh, 
the low index is attributed to the small sample size, despite the existence of the 
government’s commitment to achieve competitiveness. Pakistan may also need to 
strengthen its reporting, especially towards disclosing more pertinent information with 
regards to how the boards delegate their roles and responsibilities. This implies that 
some government directives are required to streamline the reporting as some banks 
have already shown progress in their communications via their annual reports.    
5.3.4. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Board Meeting’ Dimension 
Bank Level 
The results in Table 5.7 shows that the mean for the board meeting dimension is 
reasonably high, at 0.52%, reflecting quite a good disclosure on board meeting 
attendance. As can be seen, 30% of the IBs have ‘very high’ disclosure on board 
meetings. A total of 16 out of 53 banks score full disclosure indexes in the meeting 
dimension. These include EIIB, Al Rajhi, Al Inma, JDIB, and CIMB. The ‘high’ 
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disclosure reflects that the group has a strong commitment for board meetings, and, as 
such, the details of each meeting in terms of their frequency and attendance are 
recorded. This implies that this is the banks’ strategy to show its accountability by 
demonstrating a strong sense of commitment from the board members through 
disclosure on the meeting dimension. 
Table 5.7: Disclosure Results on ‘Board Meeting’ Dimension at Bank Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
EIIB 1.00 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 
1.00 AlJazira 0.75 Ithmaar 0.50 Eskan 0.25 Boubyan 0.00 
AlRajhi 1.00 
ADIB (Abu 
Dhabi IB) 
1.00 BIMB 0.75 Shah Jalal 0.50 ABCIB 0.25 
Kuwait 
International 
0.00 
Alinma 1.00 
Islami 
Bank 
Bangladesh 
1.00 Muamalat 0.75 Al-Shamal 0.50 Kuveyt Turk 0.13 
Dubai 
Islamic 
0.00 
JDIB 1.00 Al-Arafah 1.00 JIB 0.63 
Faisal 
(Sud.) 
0.50 Gatehouse 0.00 Hilal 0.00 
CIMB 1.00 Al-Falah 1.00 BISB 0.63 
AlBaraka 
(Egy.) 
0.50 IBB 0.00 
Emirates 
Islamic 
Bank 
0.00 
RHB 1.00 Meezan 1.00 AlSalam 0.63 QIB 0.38 Jadwa 0.00 Tadamon 0.00 
Affin 1.00 Bujr 1.00 Khaleeji 0.63 Rayan 0.38 QIIB 0.00 
AlBaraka 
(Sud.) 
0.00 
HLIB 1.00 AlBaraka 0.75 Asya 0.50 Capinnova 0.33 
BSM (Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.00 Faisal (Egy) 0.00 
BNI 
Syariah 
1.00 BLME 0.75 IIAB 0.50 IBQ 0.25 KFH (Bah.) 0.00   
Mean = 0.52 
As the results in Table 5.7 show, 9%, 8%, and 13% of the IBs are classified as ‘high’, 
‘moderate’, and ‘low’ respectively. In most cases, the difference in the bank 
classification among these groups is mainly triggered by inconsistent absences of 
constructs in the meeting dimension in some of the reviewed years.   
The remaining 40% of IBs are classified as ‘very low’ disclosure for the ‘board 
meeting dimension’, in which the group is comprised of 14 banks with 0 index 
disclosure scores. Kuveyt Turk, Gatehouse, IBB, and Jadwa are among the banks that 
do not demonstrate any disclosure on meetings. The reason may simply be that the 
committee meetings are held whenever deemed necessary, as is the case for Kuveyt 
Turk, or there is an absence of the terms of reference43 (TOR) of the board meetings, 
such as for IBs like Gatehouse, IBB, and Jadwa.  
 
                                                          
43 Which sets out formal details such as: frequency and quorum, responsibilities and accountabilities. 
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Country Level 
The results for country-wise comparison of the disclosure index for ‘board meeting’ 
dimension can be seen in Table 5.8, which indicates a mean of 0.47% for the board 
meeting dimension. This, to a certain extent, shows a certain level of commitment by 
the board. As the results show, Pakistan and Malaysia have a ‘very high’ disclosure 
on the meeting dimension. This could be attributed to the existence of board meeting 
guidelines being put in place. In Malaysia’s case, it is part of the regulatory 
requirements that require details of the board meeting to be recorded to ensure the 
legality of the decisions made, taking into consideration the quorum and the frequency 
of the meetings. 
Table 5.8:  Disclosure Results on ‘Board Meeting’ Dimension at Country Level 
Country Meeting Country Meeting Country Meeting 
Pakistan 1.000 Indonesia 0.545 Qatar 0.267 
Malaysia 0.947 UK 0.500 Egypt 0.250 
Bangladesh 0.800 Turkey 0.458 UAE 0.231 
Jordan 0.688 Bahrain 0.439 Kuwait 0.000 
Saudi 0.667 Sudan 0.318 Yemen 0.000 
Mean = 0.47 
As can be seen, the ‘very low’ disclosure in the meeting dimension may imply that 
some countries such as Kuwait, UAE, Sudan, and Qatar are too lax in terms of 
handling board meetings, and this could be due to the absence of a TOR in managing 
the meetings. For countries that have no CG awareness or have not adopted CG, the 
disclosure in details of the board meetings may not be perceived as significant. 
As mentioned above, there may be instances where an absence of disclosure on board 
meetings is partly due to the fact that the meetings in some banks are held when the 
need arises, such as in Turkey. Again, for Kuwait, the absence of disclosure on board 
meetings is probably due to a lack of CG awareness.  
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5.3.5. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Nomination and/or Remuneration Committee’ 
(NR Committee) Dimensions 
Bank Level 
The mean disclosure index in Table 5.9 of 0.33 on the ‘Nomination and/or 
Remuneration Committee’ dimension reflects that the committee is generally not 
quite established among many IBs. As shown, only 15% (8) of the IBs show ‘very 
high’ scores in this dimension, and this includes EIIB, JDIB, and BIMB. This may 
imply that the existence of an appropriate structure is in place as reflected in the 
formations of the compensation and remuneration committees. It is also observed that 
the disclosure level in this dimension is in tandem with the one in the board 
composition dimension, which implies that, structure wise, the banks are 
appropriately set up.  
Table 5.9: Disclosure Results on ‘NR Committee’ Dimensions at Bank Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
EIIB 1.00 Affin 0.76 ABCIB 0.45 JADWA 0.14 Meezan 0.02 Shah Jalal 0.00 
JIB 1.00 BLME 0.75 
ADIB (Abu 
Dhabi IB) 
0.45 Kuveyt Turk 0.11 Asya 0.00 
Islami 
Bank 
Bangladesh 
0.00 
JDIB 1.00 
BNI 
Syariah 
0.67 Eskan 0.43 
BSM (Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.11 IBB 0.00 Al-Arafah 0.00 
BIMB 1.00 Muamalat 0.59 As-Salam 0.32 Faisal (Sud) 0.09 QIIB 0.00 Al-Falah 0.00 
CIMB 1.00 Alinma 0.52 Gatehouse 0.23 
AlBaraka 
(Egy.) 
0.09 IIAB 0.00 Tadamon 0.00 
RHB 1.00 AlJazira 0.50 QIB 0.23 IBQ 0.07 
KFH 
(Bah.) 
0.00 Al-Shamal 0.00 
HLIB 1.00 BISB 0.50 Khaleeji 0.23 Bujr 0.07 Boubyan 0.00 
Albaraka 
(Sud.) 
0.00 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 
0.95 Ithmaar 0.50 Capinnova 0.21 Hilal 0.05 
Dubai 
Islamic 
0.00 
Faisal 
(Egy.) 
0.00 
AlBaraka 0.82 AlRajhi 0.45 Rayan 0.18 
Kuwait 
International 
0.03 
Emirates 
IB 
0.00   
Mean = 0.33 
The other 6%, 2%, and 9% of the IBs are classified in the ‘high’, ‘moderate’, and 
‘low’ disclosure groups respectively. It is noted that BNI Shariah and Muamalat do 
not disclose the boards’ compensation policies. As for Al Inma, Al Jazira, and Al 
Rajhi, these banks do not have disclosure especially in the board profiles, such as the 
boards’ qualification. This could partly be attributed to the policies spelt out by the 
respective IBs.   
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The ‘very low’ disclosure group accounts for 68% of the sampled IBs with their 
disclosure score in the range of 0 to 0.30. Asya, IBB, and KFH Bahrain are among the 
16 IBs with 0 scores. Similar to those banks in the ‘low’ disclosure group, all banks in 
this group do not have constructs on NR committees. 
It is important to note that the classification of ‘low’ or ‘very low’ might be quite 
misleading, as sometimes IBs, for example Boubyan and Kuwait International, use 
other committees such as CG or executive committees to take charge of remuneration 
and nomination matters. Hence, the absence of disclosure on NR committees does not 
necessarily imply the absence of such committees that take care of remuneration 
matters. 
Country Level 
The mean for the ‘nomination and/or remuneration committee’ dimension at Table 
5.10 is low, at 0.27%, indicating the low presence of this committee in many 
countries. As can be seen, Malaysia and Jordan rank as the top two in this dimension 
with index disclosures at 0.96 and 0.75 respectively. This could partly be attributed to 
strong government intervention in supporting the banks to strategically promote the 
recruitment, motivation, and retention of skilled personnel.   
Table 5.10: Disclosure Results on ‘NR Committee’ Dimension at Country Level    
Country 
Nom./Remu 
Committee 
Country 
N/R 
Committee 
Country 
N/R 
Committee 
Malaysia 0.962 Bahrain 0.372 Pakistan 0.030 
Jordan 0.750 Turkey 0.311 Sudan 0.025 
UK 0.532 Qatar 0.127 Kuwait 0.013 
Indonesia 0.438 UAE 0.112 Bangladesh 0.000 
Saudi 0.394 Egypt 0.045 Yemen 0.000 
Mean = 0.27 
Despite the existence of long-established policies and guidelines, the UK’s incredibly 
low ranking in this dimension is quite misleading. Based on observations, the low 
disclosure in this dimension is affected by the absence of disclosure by IBB which 
outweighs the ‘high’ scores of other IBs in the country. 
On the other hand, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sudan, to name a 
few, have ‘very low’ disclosure indexes. Most of the constructs in this dimension do 
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not disclose the profile of the board and its composition. This could partly be due to 
the absence of such requirements from the individual governments or non-standard 
and very minimal reporting requirements for the annual reports.    
5.3.6. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Shari’ah Governance’ Dimension 
Being a specific requirement for IBs, Shari’ah governance is essential to ensure that 
the operations of the products of IBs are in line with Islamic law and ethics. The 
results presented in this section should therefore be considered within this framework. 
Bank Level 
As the findings in Table 5.11 show, at 0.31%, the mean disclosure in the ‘Shari’ah 
governance’ dimension raises concerns in terms of Shari’ah compliancy and 
governance requirements.  
Table 5.11: Disclosure Results on ‘Shari’ah Governance’ Dimension at Bank 
Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
KFH 
(Bah.) 1.00 CIMB 0.54 Faisal (Sud) 0.42 ABCIB 0.23 Shah Jalal 0.17 Tadamon 0.08 
JIB 0.75 Muamalat 0.54 BLME 0.33 Jadwa 0.21 Al-Shamal 0.17 
Faisal 
(Egy) 0.08 
JDIB 0.67 Affin 0.53 QIB 0.33 QIIB 0.19 
AlBaraka 
(Sud) 0.17 Al-Arafah 0.04 
BIMB 0.67 Meezan 0.52 
ADIB (Abu 
Dhabi IB) 0.33 AlJazira 0.19 Alinma 0.14 Asya 0.00 
BNI 
Syariah 0.67 As-Salam 0.50 
Islami Bank 
Bangladesh 0.33 Bujr 0.19 IIAB 0.13 
Kuveyt 
Turk 0.00 
BISB 0.65 RHB 0.42 
AlBaraka 
(Egy) 0.33 EIIB 0.17 IBB 0.10 IBQ 0.00 
Gatehouse 0.58 
BSM 
(Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 0.42 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 0.25 
Kuwait 
International 0.17 Rayan 0.10 Eskan 0.00 
HLIB 0.58 Khaleeji 0.42 Ithmaar 0.25 Dubai Islamic 0.17 AlBaraka 0.08 Al-Falah 0.00 
HILAL 0.58 Capinnova 0.42 AlRajhi 0.23 
Emirates 
Islamic Bank 0.17 Boubyan 0.08   
Mean = 0.31 
As can be seen, most IBs score ‘very low’ in terms of disclosure on ‘Shari’ah’ 
governance despite the fact that disclosure reflects the IB’s transparency, which is 
highly expected in dealing with Shari’ah matters. Table 5.11 shows that KFH 
(Bahrain) attains a full score in this dimension index, where it ranked top in ‘Shari’ah 
governance’ disclosure. This affirms KFH (Bahrain)’s position as the market leader in 
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the Islamic banking industry due to its strict conduct in adherence to ‘Shari’ah 
compliance’. It should be noted that KFH (Bahrain) is the only IB in the ‘very high’ 
disclosure group with a full score, while JIB is the only IB in the ‘high’ disclosure 
group, which demonstrates a ‘high’ index with 0.75.  
As shown in Table 5.11, 23 (12%) IBs are classified as ‘moderate’ and ‘low’ 
disclosure group. It is important to note that almost all IBs do not have constructs on 
policies or procedures on both the Shari’ah board appointment as well as the Shari’ah 
board dismissal. Similarly, most of the IBs do not demonstrate clear reporting of 
Shari’ah supervisory structure except for JIB, JDIB and BISB which have 
demonstrated exceptionally clear reporting lines for the Shari’ah supervisory board. 
Meezan, despite it being in the ‘low’ disclosure index, has clear procedures on the 
Shari’ah supervisory structure.  
In general, most of the banks in these two groups disclose constructs especially in: 
Shari’ah conformity, Shari’ah board size, and the qualifications and experiences of its 
board members. Among the banks, JIB, JDIB and BIMB are no exceptions. However, 
almost all IBs in these two groups do not have constructs on: how Shari’ah board 
facilitates independent judgements; the number of Shari’ah board meetings, and 
records of the board members’ attendance in the board meetings. It is observed that 
BISB scores ‘highly’ in this dimension but only towards the later years i.e. in 2010 
and 2011. This could probably due to the fact that the banks have just adopted CG 
principles in 2009. 
Based on the Table 5.11, 74% of the IBs fall in the ‘very low’ category, and this 
includes RHB, BSM, Khaleeji, and Capinnova. In addition to the above mentioned 
contributing factors for non-disclosure in the ‘moderate’ and ‘low’ groups, the low 
index for the ‘low’ group is mainly contributed by the absence of constructs on: the 
profiling of Shari’ah board members and the board’s assigned roles and 
responsibilities outside the banks. Islami Bank for instance, does not disclose the 
qualifications and experiences of the board. The absence of such constructs on the 
board’s roles and responsibilities outside the organisation may imply that the Shari’ah 
board also have other external commitments, which may trigger a conflict of interest. 
It is interesting to note that despite their ‘very low’ disclosure index, QIB shows a 
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clear Shari’ah board structure in its organisational structure while Al Rajhi 
demonstrates clear procedures pertaining to the Shari’ah supervisory structure. 
Country Level        
The country level results for Shari’ah governance are shown in Table 5.12. At 0.27%, 
the mean disclosure index for the Shari’ah Governance dimension is ‘very low’. As 
can be seen, no countries show ‘very high’ disclosure in their Shari’ah governance, 
which may imply that no countries have disclosure on guidelines on appointment or 
dismissal of their Shari’ah board. 
Jordan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the top three in this disclosure category are barely 
able to push themselves into the ‘moderate’ disclosure group, as their scores were 
relatively ‘low’ in the region of 0.53 and 0.57. For Jordan, its score could have been 
lower if it was not because of the newcomer, JDIB, which demonstrated ‘high’ 
disclosure in the following year after it commenced its IB operations. As for the 
Malaysian sample, it revealed no disclosure on Shari’ah boards being independent or 
on having non-executive members. The fact that most Shari’ah boards are appointed 
by the banks gives the impression that they are not independent, more so when they 
hold executive positions in the bank. On another note, most of the Malaysian sample 
shows no constructs on the details and attendance of the members with regards to 
Shari’ah board meeting; this is quite intriguing as it begs the question as to whether 
they are fully engaged with the banks’ business.   
Table 5.12: Disclosure Results on ‘Shari’ah Governance’ Dimension at Country Level 
Country 
Sharia 
Governance Country 
Sharia 
Governance Country 
Sharia 
Governance 
Jordan 0.573 UK 0.256 Qatar 0.156 
Malaysia 0.548 Pakistan 0.236 Bangladesh 0.150 
Indonesia 0.530 Sudan 0.235 Kuwait 0.119 
Bahrain 0.422 Egypt 0.208 Yemen 0.083 
UAE 0.269 Saudi 0.194 Turkey 0.028 
Mean = 0.27 
The remaining 80% (12) of the countries have ‘very low’ disclosure, mainly due to 
most of the Shari’ah board members information, such as their profiles, roles and 
responsibilities not being disclosed. This could probably due to the absence of 
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directives from the government or regulatory bodies to enforce compliance on 
disclosure. To a certain extent, this may imply the absence of full engagement from 
the Shari’ah Board in the bank’s operations. On another note, the boards may have 
other external commitments outside the banks thus not giving full disclosure may be 
an easy way to avoid revealing the possibility of conflicts of interest occurring.    
5.3.7. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Shari’ah Compliance’ Dimension 
As part of Shari’ah governance, Shari’ah compliance is also essential for Islamic 
banks as it determines whether the operations and products of IBs in accordance with 
Islamic law and ethics. The results presented in this section identify how Shari’ah 
compliance issues are communicated to the larger stakeholders by the sampled IBs. 
Bank Level 
The ‘very low’ mean disclosure index of 0.17% for the ‘Shari’ah Compliance’ 
dimension in Table 5.13 implies that most banks have very poor transparency in 
Shari’ah matters. Similar to the conduct in the Shari’ah governance dimension, KFH 
(Bahrain) once again ranks the top.  
Table 5.13: Disclosure Results on ‘Shari’ah Compliance’ Dimension at Bank 
Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
KFH 
(Bah.) 0.92 Capinnova 0.26 ABCIB 0.15 AlRajhi 0.06 Jadwa 0.03 Boubyan 0.00 
BISB 0.86 
ADIB 
(Abu 
Dhabi IB) 0.26 QIIB 0.15 
Islami Bank 
Bangladesh 0.06 IIAB 0.03 
Shah 
Jalal 0.00 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 0.83 QIB 0.22 EIIB 0.11 Faisal (Egy) 0.06 AlJazira 0.01 
Al-
Arafah 0.00 
BIMB 0.72 Al Salam 0.19 Emirates IB 0.11 
Albaraka 
(Egy) 0.06 AlBaraka 0.00 Al-Falah 0.00 
Khaleeji 0.72 Hilal 0.19 RHB 0.08 Rayan 0.04 Asya 0.00 Meezan 0.00 
Ithmaar 0.53 Affin 0.19 HLIB 0.08 Bujr 0.04 
Kuveyt 
Turk 0.00 Tadamon 0.00 
DIB 0.36 CIMB 0.17 BLME 0.07 Kuwait Int. 0.04 Alinma 0.00 
Al-
Shamal 0.00 
JIB 0.33 
BNI 
Syariah 0.17 Muamalat 0.07 Faisal (Sud) 0.04 
BSM 
(Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 0.00 
Albaraka 
(Sud.) 0.00 
JDIB 0.33 IBQ 0.15 IBB 0.06 Gatehouse 0.03 Eskan 0.00   
Mean = 0.17 
As shown in Table 5.13, KFH (Bahrain) is the only IB with ‘very high’ disclosure in 
this dimension. This reflects its openness in releasing information on how businesses 
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are dealt with, taking Shari’ah principles into consideration. KFH (Bahrain) has been 
clear in disclosing information pertaining to the way the board exercises their 
judgements in carrying out their responsibilities.As the results in Table 5.13 show, 
BISB, ABIB, BIMB and Khaleeji score relatively ‘high’, with indices ranging 
between 0.86 and 0.72. BISB’s disclosure score only picks up in 2010 and 2011 
especially in the constructs of: method of zakah calculation, technique and policies on 
smoothing, and distribution of PER, while Khaleeji shows very encouraging progress 
in 2009 onwards. Malaysia on the other hand, seems to be very cautious on disclosing 
information pertaining to investment account holders as well as zakah. This may 
imply that some of the operations could not be fully disclosed without imposing 
questions that may be too contentious with respect to practices versus Shari’ah 
compliance. There seems to be a debatable grey area which may be seen as sensitive 
since different countries seem to have various interpretations with regards to Shari’ah. 
Table 5.13 shows that 47 or 89% of the IBs have ‘very low’ disclosure in this 
dimension. Despite being mandated as institutions that uphold Islamic principles, 
most of them choose not to disclose information on their Shari’ah practices. This may 
imply that they may not fully adopt Islamic practices as they pledge and would rather 
hide under the Islamic name to gain confidence from the niche market. Long-
established Islamic banks such as DIB for instance should be the role models in 
demonstrating Shari’ah compliance traits instead. This dimension should be 
encouraged through awareness since disclosure is equally important as being 
transparent as prescribed by Islam. Banks such as JIB, JDIB, and IIAB have ‘very 
low’ disclosure possibly due to constraints in the regulatory bodies in overseeing 
Shari’ah matters.  
Out of 47 IBs, a number of 14 IBs do not have Shari’ah compliance constructs. Quite 
similar to the Jordanian banks mentioned above, Al BarakaTurk, Asya and Kuveyt 
Turk also do not communicate any information regarding Shari’ah compliancy 
disclosure. Similarly, Al Inma and Boubyan are among the banks in this group that 
have no disclosure in any constructs. This could also imply that for most banks, what 
they practice is more significant than revealing it as good deeds are all about God’s 
judgement. As such, they may perceive that whatever is performed does not 
necessarily need to be announced.  
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Country Level        
Similar to bank level analysis, the mean for the ‘Shari’ah compliance’ dimension is 
‘very low’, at 0.11% country-wise, as depicted in Table 5.14. As can be seen, no 
countries show ‘very high’ disclosure in Shari’ah compliance dimension. It is hard to 
generalise the reasons as to why the countries have very low scores because disclosure 
on this dimension is quite country-specific in nature. Bahrain, the home of policy and 
guideline issuers for Islamic banks, is not doing well in this area either, most probably 
due to banks such as Eskan and ABC Islamic Bank which do not perform well in 
disclosure on Shari’ah compliance. 
Table 5.14: Disclosure Results on ‘Shari’ah Compliance’ Dimension at Country 
Level 
Country 
Shari’ah 
Compliance Country 
Shari’ah 
Compliance Country 
Shari’ah 
Compliance 
Bahrain 0.483 UK 0.071 Pakistan 0.014 
Jordan 0.257 Indonesia 0.071 Bangladesh 0.011 
Malaysia 0.251 Egypt 0.056 Sudan 0.010 
UAE 0.235 Saudi 0.026 Turkey 0.000 
Qatar 0.141 Kuwait 0.016 Yemen 0.000 
Mean: 0.11  
Similarly, as can be seen, Jordan has very poor disclosure in most of its IBs. Despite 
some improvements in IIAB as well as JDIB, which start to pick up after its 
establishment in 2010, disclosure is still ‘very low’. It is perceived that Shari’ah non-
compliance is ruled out by the regulators, as there is no such body to take care of the 
matter. The absence of Shari’ah regulatory bodies is also reflected by the variations of 
Shari’ah interpretations, especially in the matter of compliance issues. In other words, 
low disclosure could be due to the absence of specific regulatory bodies that could 
legislate Shari’ah matters.  
As for Malaysia, it is observed that the main factor that contributes to its poor 
disclosure can be explained by the fact that most of the constructs pertaining to 
investment account holders and profit allocation are not disclosed by most Malaysian 
banks. Quite contrary to Jordan, despite the existence of the regulatory bodies that 
deal with Shari’ah matters, Malaysia’s disclosure is still ‘very low’. Perhaps this is 
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due to the multitude of interpretations from various Shari’ah bodies making non-
disclosure the safest way to avoid conflicts, as far as IBs are concerned, 
It is interesting to note that non-disclosure in the Shari’ah theme is anticipated in most 
countries. The absence of awareness in disclosing Shari’ah matters among most of the 
banks is quite obvious, as reflected by the mean disclosure of 0.17. In most cases, 
banks do not have information communicated on the constructs such as: how they 
handle the customers’ account, profit calculation, asset allocation, and investment 
account holders’ rights. 
Quite differently, IBs in Turkey have to apply specific codes according to their 
banking act that they have to adhere to, and this may not necessarily reveal the banks 
as being Shari’ah-compliant banks. The non-disclosure on matters pertaining to 
Shari’ah compliance gives the impression that, as far as the regulatory bodies are 
concerned, they do not have to abide by Shari’ah law. This poses some questions such 
as: “are IBs fully supported by the regulators?" and; “Do these IBs exist to uphold 
Islamic principles or are they merely to capture a market segment as far as Islamic 
funds are concerned?”. 
5.3.8. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Ethical Businesses’ Dimension 
Bank Level 
The findings in Table 5.15 for ‘ethical business’ dimension shows that the mean is 
‘very low’, at 0.21%, reflecting that there are still many banks which do not regard 
ethics as an important dimension for disclosure.  KFH (Bahrain) ranks the top with 
ABIB being the second best scorer in disclosure on the ethical business index. While 
Ithmaar, RHB, CIMB and Al Baraka are classified as having ‘high’ disclosure, others 
fall short where 40% of the IBs show ‘very low’ ethics and business practices. Big 
market players like Al Baraka and CIMB are able to score comparatively higher than 
most IBs as they may have the adequate resources to do so. This may also be one way 
of taking care of their reputations. This is reflected in the annual reports. For instance, 
in the case of CIMB, the bank is described as doing charity programmes, which seem 
to be socially-responsible in nature.     
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Table 5.15: Disclosure Results on ‘Ethical Businesses’ Dimension at Bank Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank 
Index 
KFH 
(Bah.) 
1.00 
ABCIB (Arab 
Banking 
Corp. Islamic 
Bank) 
0.46 Muamalat 0.25 EIIB 0.08 IBB 0.00 
Shah 
Jalal 0.00 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 
0.92 Asya 0.44 IIAB 0.23 Alrajhi 0.08 Jadwa 0.00 
Al-
Arafah 
0.00 
Ithmaar 0.73 Gatehouse 0.38 
Islamibank 
Bangladesh 
0.23 
Abu 
Dhabi 
Islamic 
Bank 
(ADIB) 
0.08 IBQ 0.00 Tadamon 
0.00 
RHB 0.69 BNI Syariah 0.38 
Dawood 
(Bujr) 
0.17 Al-Falah 0.08 QIIB 0.00 
Al-
Shamal 
0.00 
CIMB 0.65 Al Salam 0.37 
Kuveyt 
Turk 
0.15 Meezan 0.08 JIB 0.00 
Albaraka 
(Sudan) 
0.00 
Albaraka 0.62 BISB 0.35 Rayan(Mar) 0.12 Aljazira 0.06 Affin 0.00 
Faisal 
(Sudan) 
0.00 
Khaleeji 0.54 Eskan 0.31 JDIB 0.12 Alinma 0.05 Boubyan 0.00 
Faisal 
(Egypt) 
0.00 
Hilal 0.54 HLIB 0.27 
BSM(Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.12 
Dubai 
Islamic 
0.02 
Kuwait 
International 
0.00 
Albaraka 
(Egypt) 
0.00 
BIMB 0.46 QIB 0.25 
Capinnova 
(Subs.Of 
BBK) 
0.10 BLME 0.00 
Emirates 
Islamic Bank 
0.00   
Mean = 0.21 
Overall, IBs have yet to disclose their ethical traits in running the operations of the 
banks as per Shari’ah prescription. The mean index of 0.21 for disclosure on ethical 
business indicates that most of the IBs have very poor commitments in disclosing 
their ethics value in their business conducts. This may imply that ethics, even in the 
banking business, is an area that has not fully developed. On another note, it is hard to 
set the boundary as to what actions are considered ethical. However as far as Islamic 
principles go, transparency should be the gist of ethics.  
Country Level       
The disclosure results for ‘ethical business’ dimension at the country level is depicted 
in Table 5.16, which shows that at 0.14%, the mean disclosure index for the ‘ethical 
business’ dimension is ‘very low’. As can be seen, Bahrain ranks the top while other 
countries are yet to show any indication towards ethics disclosure. This gives the 
impression that main market players such as Bahrain are trying to set a precedence 
that demonstrate that business practices should be based on ethical values, which 
encompass honesty and integrity apart from transparency in conducting their business 
affairs.   
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Table 5.16: Disclosure Results on ‘Ethical Businesses’ Dimension at Country 
Level 
Country 
Ethic 
Conduct 
Country 
Ethic 
Conduct 
Country 
Ethic 
Conduct 
Bahrain 0.520 UAE 0.107 Bangladesh 0.046 
Malaysia 0.437 Qatar 0.097 Kuwait 0.000 
Turkey 0.404 Jordan 0.087 Yemen 0.000 
Indonesia 0.238 UK 0.077 Sudan 0.000 
Pakistan 0.109 Saudi 0.046 Egypt 0.000 
Mean = 0.14 
5.3.9. Overall Results for CGI  
After presenting the findings for disclosure index for bank level and country level for 
each dimension in the preceding sections, this section aims to provide bank and 
country level overall results. 
Bank Level 
The overall findings of the CGI for dimensions at bank level are depicted in Table 
5.17, which shows that the mean disclosure for overall CGI is 0.25%, which is 
unjustifiably low considering that CG is the key aspect of the bank’s strategic 
direction which encompasses the overall mission and operations. This is explained 
somewhat by the fact that CG may have not be widely adopted by IBs, and thus 
disclosure in relation to its principles may not occur in a short period of time.  In 
addition, the political economies of the countries where Islamic banks operate have 
not essentialised CG as an important structural matter. 
As presented in Table 5.17, 3 IBs have ‘high’ scores on CGI disclosure. These are 
ABIB, BIMB and KFH, which score in between 0.79 to 0.74. It may imply the 
existence of a CG structure being put in place and adhered to by these banks. ABIB 
and BIMB score very highly under the board theme, while KFH demonstrates very 
high disclosure under the Shari’ah theme. 
As can be seen, CIMB, JDIB, and BISB are among the 6 IBs that are classified as 
having ‘moderate’ disclosure with a score in the range of 0.66 and 0.60. Despite the 
‘very high’ disclosure under the board theme, CIMB and JDIB’s performances in 
overall CGI are just moderate due to their very poor scores in Shari’ah compliance 
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and ethics respectively. As for BISB, it is consistently moderate in all dimensions and 
performs comparatively high in Shari’ah governance, except for in the audit and 
ethics dimensions. Ithmaar’s performance in disclosure is quite consistent throughout 
the dimensions except for its relatively low disclosure under Shari’ah governance. 
Table 5.17: Overall Bank Level Results for all the Dimensions 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 
0.793 HLIB 0.560 Hilal 0.407 Eskan 0.270 DIB 0.130 
Emirates 
IB 
0.070 
BIMB 0.767 Khaleeji 0.553 
ADIB 
(Abu 
Dhabi IB) 
0.400 Asya 0.263 
Kuveyt 
Turk 
0.123 Kuwait Int. 0.053 
KFH 
(Bah.) 
0.740 
BNI 
Syariah 
0.551 ABCIB 0.370 AlRajhi 0.250 Jadwa 0.120 Al-Shamal 0.053 
CIMB 0.667 As-Salam 0.483 BLME 0.340 Meezan 0.233 Shah Jalal 0.120 IBB 0.050 
JDIB 0.633 EIIB 0.467 Capinnova 0.324 Bujr 0.200 Faisal(Sud.) 0.116 
AlBaraka 
(Sud) 
0.040 
Bahrain 
Isl. 
0.633 AlBaraka 0.463 QIB 0.307 
BSM 
(Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.190 Al-Arafah 0.113 Boubyan 0.030 
RHB 0.610 Affin 0.458 AlJazira 0.300 IIAB 0.187 QIIB 0.107 Tadamon 0.027 
JIB 0.607 Muamalat 0.437 
Islami 
Bank 
Bangladesh 
0.293 Al-Falah 0.153 IBQ 0.100 Faisal(Egy) 0.027 
Ithmaar 0.597 Gatehouse 0.407 Alinma 0.271 Rayan 0.137 
AlBaraka 
(Egy) 
0.093   
Mean = 0.32 
HLIB, Khaleeji, and BNI Shari’ah are the 3 IBs that have ‘low’ disclosure indices. 
HLIB’s performances in disclosure are high and quite consistent throughout the 
dimensions except for disclosure under the Shari’ah theme where they are doing very 
poor. This is quite similar to Khaleeji. As in the case of BNI Shari’ah, its low 
disclosure results from Shari’ah compliance.   
Banks from the ‘very low’ disclosure index group such as EIIB and Al Baraka 
demonstrate very poor disclosure on Shari’ah compliance. This is not unexpected, as 
EIIB has to adhere to FSA guidelines on top of its compliance list despite being an 
Islamic institution. Al Baraka Turk on the other hand, does not reveal any disclosure 
in the Shari’ah dimension. Quite interestingly, it is noted that, despite the fact that Al 
Baraka Turk does not reveal its Islamic practices in view of it being imposed upon by 
tentative social pressure, this could also imply that observing Islamic practices may 
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possibly act as a detriment that induces negative perception towards religiosity in 
Turkish’s society, hence evidencing very poor disclosure on Shari’ah compliance. 
Country Level 
Similar to the bank-wise disclosure, having the mean index disclosure for the overall-
country index at 0.25% for all the dimensions is very low. As presented in Table 5.18, 
there are no countries with ‘very high’ disclosure in CGI dimension. Being in the 
‘high’ disclosure group in the overall CGI, Malaysia’s top position is contributed by 
its high scores especially in board leadership, board composition, and board meeting 
dimensions. This reflects very high government intervention in the bank’s regulations.  
This could be reflected in the form of strict regulatory framework enforced by the 
government on board-related matters.  
Table 5.18: Overall Country Level Results for all the Dimensions   
Country Overall CGI Country Overall CGI Country Overall CGI 
Malaysia 0.620 Turkey 0.283 Bangladesh 0.152 
Bahrain 0.520 Saudi 0.233 Sudan 0.065 
Jordan 0.508 UAE 0.216 Egypt 0.060 
Indonesia 0.378 Pakistan 0.196 Kuwait 0.040 
UK 0.303 Qatar 0.166 Yemen 0.027 
Mean: 0.25  
The remaining 10 sampled IB countries or 79% of the sampled countries are 
considered as scoring ‘very low’ in the overall CGI dimension, the scores ranging 
between 0.45 and 0.05. The sample shows that the countries’ mean CGI disclosure is 
0.28, which is quite low despite many discussions in the literature of its significance. 
The low CG disclosure is mainly affected by 3 dimensions: Shari’ah compliance, 
ethics, and Shari’ah governance, all of which demonstrate ‘very low’ mean scores of 
0.12, 0.17 and 0.28, respectively. The ‘low’ disclosure of these dimensions is mainly 
contributed to by countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, apart from 
Bangladesh and Turkey. This could possibly indicate quite a lax commitment by the 
governments and the IBs themselves.  
Countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Pakistan demonstrate 
‘very low’ disclosure in their overall CGIs with the sampled IBs drawn from these 
countries. In general, the banks do not have strict regulatory guidelines that enforce 
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them to work towards CG compliance. Saudi Arabia for instance, might not have 
streamlined directives between the regulators thus an implementation of corporate 
governance best practices may be hard to achieve. As for the UK, the disclosure level 
seems to be quite encouraging despite its strong commitment to comply with 
regulatory bodies such as the FSA first.  
5.4. FINDINGS ON DISCLOSURE ON RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
The previous sections focus on the communicated information performance of IBs in 
CG practices in the bank and country level. This part shifts the focus on the risk 
management practices of the sampled IBs in measuring their performance in relation 
to the communicated information in their annual reports on the years identified by 
developing the results for risk management index or RMI. The results are initially 
presented at the bank and country level for each of the identified dimensions (see: 
Research Methodology Chapter for the details).  
5.4.1 Findings on Disclosure on ‘Risk Management Committee’ Dimension 
Bank Level 
The findings for disclosure on ‘risk management committee’ dimension can be found 
in Table 5.19, which shows a relatively ‘low’ RMI at 0.53, implying that most IBs 
have average risk management practices in relations to ‘risk management committee’. 
As can be seem, 28% of the IBs have ‘very high’ disclosure on the RM Committee, 
while 15 IBs have full disclosure index in this dimension in which Al Baraka, IBB 
and EIIB are part of them. It is observed that generally most banks in this group 
appoint board members to be in the risk management committees. Hence risk 
management oversight is under the purview of the board. It is also noted that the 
group disclosed the board’s full accountability on the overall risk. ‘High’ disclosure in 
this dimension implies that banks try to portray that the board takes full accountability 
on the overall risk. 
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Table 5.19: Disclosure Results on ‘Risk Management Committee’ Dimension at 
Bank Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
AlBaraka 1.00 As-Salam 1.00 BISB 0.79 Bujr 0.58 Kuwait Int. 0.22 Boubyan 0.00 
IBB 1.00 
KFH 
(Bah.) 
1.00 Gatehouse 0.67 Khaleeji 0.54 Al-Falah 0.17 Shah Jalal 0.00 
EIIB 1.00 
ADIB 
(Abu 
Dhabi 
IB)) 
1.00 AlRajhi 0.67 JDIB 0.50 
BSM (Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.08 
Islami 
Bank 
Bangladesh 
0.00 
Alinma 1.00 Hilal 1.00 AlJazira 0.67 Eskan 0.50 Al-Arafah 0.08 Al-Shamal 0.00 
QIB 1.00 BLME 0.92 QIIB 0.67 IBQ 0.46 Jadwa 0.04 
AlBaraka 
(Sud.) 
0.00 
BIMB 1.00 Asya 0.83 CIMB 0.67 Muamalat 0.42 Tadamon 0.04 
Faisal 
(Sud.) 
0.00 
Affin 1.00 
Kuveyt 
Turk 
0.83 ABCIB 0.67 DIB 0.38 JIB 0.00 
Faisal 
(Egy) 
0.00 
HLIB 1.00 RHB 0.83 
Emirates 
IB 
0.67 Rayan 0.33 IIAB 0.00 
AlBaraka 
(Egy) 
0.00 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 
1.00 Capinnova 0.83 Ithmaar 0.58 Meezan 0.33 BNI Syariah 0.00   
Mean = 0.53 
As shown in Table 5.19, about 9% and 13% of the IBs are classified as ‘high’ and 
‘moderate’ disclosing institutions for this dimension, respectively. These include 
Asya, RHB, Kuveyt Turk, BISB, and Capinnova in the ‘high’ group, whilst 
Gatehouse, Al Rajhi, Al Jazira, QIIB, CIMB, ABCIB, and Emirates Islamic are in the 
‘moderate’ group. Generally, there is not much significance in the disclosure pattern 
between these two groups. Most of them have an absence of information on the 
following constructs: board providing risk oversight and audit responsibility for risk. 
As for BISB and QIIB, their indexes are affected by the fact that they just started to 
pick up after the years 2009 and 2010 respectively.  
About 9% and 26% of the sampled IBs are classified in the ‘low’ and ‘very low’ risk 
governance disclosure group; scoring between 0.58 to 0.5 and 0.46 to 0 respectively. 
For example, Ithmaar, Dawood, Khaleeji, JDIB, and Eskan are grouped as having 
‘low’ disclosure, while Shah Jalal, Islami Bank and Al Shamal are among the banks in 
the ‘very low’ disclosure group with indexes of 0. In general, a few banks in the ‘low’ 
group for instance, Dawood (Bujr), do not have disclosure on board being responsible 
for the overall risk. The absence of information communication on this construct may 
imply the absence of board representatives in the risk management committee or the 
banks do not have a dedicated board risk management committee. 
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There might be cases that the risk management function is carried out by other 
committees such as the executive committee. Boubyan for instance, establishes an 
executive committee to take care of its risk management. The absence of boards with 
adequate knowledge and experience in risk management could also contribute to 
absence of disclosure in this dimension.     
Country Level  
In the case of country-wise findings for the ‘risk management committee’ disclosures, 
the level of risk management in IBs is ‘very low’, at 0.41. This may reflect that some 
of the countries do not have adequate structures to support risk management. Based 
on Table 5.20, the UK ranks top in the risk governance disclosure. The ‘high’ index, 
0.93 is triggered by the ‘very high’ disclosure in its sample banks (as reflected in IBB 
and EIIB). This can be explained by the fact of the UK government’s intensified 
intervention and prudent regulation on risk management.  
Table 5.20: Disclosure Results on ‘Risk Management Committee’ Dimension at 
Country Level  
Country Rmgtcom Country Rmgtcom Country Rmgtcom 
UK 0.929 Qatar 0.611 Kuwait 0.095 
Malaysia 0.895 Saudi 0.567 Yemen 0.042 
Turkey 0.889 Pakistan 0.361 Bangladesh 0.033 
Bahrain 0.753 Indonesia 0.182 Sudan 0.000 
UAE 0.705 Jordan 0.125 Egypt 0.000 
 Mean = 0.41 
As can be seen in Table 5.20, Malaysia, Turkey, Bahrain, and UAE demonstrate 
‘high’ disclosure index, mostly contributed to by their government policies and 
legislative actions. As the home to regulatory bodies such as IFSA, AAOIFI and 
LMC, Malaysia and Bahrain is in the best position to be able to provide policies and 
guidelines in managing risks. Thus in principle, disclosure should not be an issue for 
these countries.  
Kuwait and Bangladesh are among the 33% countries that have ‘very low’ risk 
management committee disclosure in relation to the sampled IBs, with scores 0.10 
and 0.02 respectively. This may imply the absence of board representatives to provide 
risk management oversight.    
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5.4.2. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Risk Management and Controls’ Dimension 
Bank Level 
Table 5.21 depicts the communicated information on the constructs related to ‘risk 
management and controls’ dimensions at bank level. As the results indicate, at 0.70 
the mean disclosure on ‘risk management and controls’ dimension is comparatively 
‘high’, reflecting that most IBs have proper controls on risk management. This 
implies a relatively high transparency in risk management and controls dimension.  
Table 5.21: Disclosure Results on ‘Risk Management and Controls’ Dimension at 
Bank Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank 
Index 
AlBaraka 1.00 BIMB 1.00 
ADIB 
(Abu 
Dhabi 
IB) 
1.00 BISB 0.85 Muamalat 0.53 
Faisal 
(Sud) 0.20 
Asya 1.00 CIMB 1.00 Hilal 1.00 Ithmaar 0.85 Kuwait Int. 0.47 
Albaraka 
(Egy) 
0.20 
Gatehouse 1.00 RHB 1.00 
Shah 
Jalal 
1.00 
Faisal 
(Egy) 
0.80 Boubyan 0.45 Jadwa 
0.13 
EIIB 1.00 Affin 1.00 
Al-
Arafah 
1.00 IBB 0.73 Rayan 0.43 
Islami 
Bank 
Bangladesh 
0.10 
AlRajhi 1.00 HLIB 1.00 Al-Falah 1.00 Eskan 0.68 IIAB 0.40 
BSM 
(Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri)) 
0.00 
AlJazira 1.00 
ABIB 
(BAH.) 
1.00 
Kuveyt 
Turk 
0.98 QIIB 0.67 Meezan 0.40 
BNI 
Syariah 
0.00 
Alinma 1.00 Khaleeji 1.00 BLME 0.98 Capinnova 0.67 Tadamon 0.35 Al-Shamal 
0.00 
QIB 1.00 ABCIB 1.00 
Emirates 
IB 
0.90 As-Salam 0.60 JDIB 0.30 
Albaraka 
(Sud) 
0.00 
IBQ 1.00 
KFH 
(Bah.) 
1.00 Bujr 0.88 DIB 0.58 JIB 0.20  
 
Mean = 0.70 
As shown in Table 5.21, 49% of the IBs have ‘very high’ disclosure in risk 
management and controls dimension. As can be seen, Al Baraka, Gatehouse and EIIB, 
to name a few, are among the 23 IBs that score full indices. This implies that some 
banks regard risk management and controls as one of the strategies that show strong 
commitment in managing risks. They disclose relevant risk information in most of the 
following constructs: the management roles and responsibilities, their risk appetites, 
and the type of risk measures they have in place. The banks could probably try to 
increase their credibility through disclosure, because, at the very minimum, disclosure 
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provides a comfort zone to the investors and stakeholders to gauge the bank’s 
exposure and vulnerabilities.   
The remaining 51% of IBs are classified into four groups: ‘high’, ‘moderate’, ‘low’ 
and ‘very low’ groups, whose scores range between 0.88 and 0. However, based on 
observation, IBs across these four groups can be divided further into two sub-groups: 
banks that are newly established and banks with non-elaborate standard annual 
reporting. It is interesting to note that apparently these two are the main factors that 
affect the disclosure index; the disclosure indices of these banks are not poor, but 
somehow, the indices are low due to the fact that most of these banks are relatively 
new. 
In general, newly established IBs like Boubyan, Eskan, QIIB, Capinnova, Al Salam 
and Rayan (which began their operations in 2011, 2009, and 2010 respectively) have 
published annual reports for two years only. As such, their disclosure index is very 
much affected by the small sample size. As for the other group of banks like Al 
Shamal, observation through disclosure via annual report is not that helpful as these 
banks have very minimal annual reporting. The RM could be reasonably ‘high’ but 
this has not been elaborated well in the annual reports, which could be due to the 
absence of standards set to regulate communications and reporting. 
It could also be the case that newly-established IBs, such as Kuwait International, 
JDIB, and Rayan have ‘very low’ disclosure in this dimension due to the fact that the 
risk management structure has not been fully set up and developed, thus full 
disclosure in this dimension may not take place until the later years of 2000s.  
Additionally, a low index could imply that inadequate mandates are given to the 
management to support the risk management function. Al Salam, for instance, has no 
disclosure for constructs on: senior management’s commitment, risk management 
framework, risk appetite, and etc. DIB on the other hand, may have only developed a 
RM structure in later years, i.e. in 2010 and 2011 despite being in the industry for 
many years (no disclosure is reflected prior to 2010). 
 
 
Page 141 
 
Country Level  
As shown in Table 5.22, the sample mean disclosure index of 0.64 is quite ‘moderate’ 
for the ‘risk management and committee’ dimension. Perhaps this is due to initiatives 
to manage risk being put in place by their respective governments. Based on Table 
5.22, Malaysia, Turkey and UK have ‘very high’ disclosures in the risk management 
and controls dimension; implying the countries’ have good RM set up and that the 
structure is in place.  
Table 5.22: Disclosure Results on ‘Risk Management and Controls’ Dimension at 
Country Level       
Country 
RMgt. 
Disclosure 
Country 
RMgt. 
Disclosure 
Country 
RMgt. 
Disclosure 
Malaysia 1.000 Bangladesh 0.820 Kuwait 0.457 
Turkey 0.992 Qatar 0.780 Yemen 0.350 
UK 0.914 Saudi 0.767 Jordan 0.275 
Bahrain 0.845 Pakistan 0.758 Indonesia 0.191 
UAE 0.838 Egypt 0.500 Sudan 0.055 
Mean = 0.64 
As much as regulators pose regulatory intervention on how IBs should respond to 
shocks, maintain liquidity, etc., the banks also need to address their capital adequacy, 
liquidity issues, and etc. In the case of Malaysia, IBs are instructed to disclose 
information on risks to show their readiness with accepting certain levels of risks; for 
example by providing appropriate and adequate information to show their comfort 
level to investors.  
While 50% of the countries under this dimension are classified as having ‘high’ 
disclosure index, countries such as Kuwait, Jordan, Indonesia, and Sudan show ‘very 
low’ scores in the risk management dimension. In the case of Kuwait and Jordan, a 
number of their banks are quite newly-established, thus not much disclosure can be 
observed in their risk management and control dimension.     
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5.4.3. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Audit’ Dimension 
Bank Level 
As the results in Table 5.23 show, no banks have ‘very high’ disclosure in the audit 
dimension. The mean disclosure for audit dimension being 0.3 can be mainly 
attributed to the ‘very low’ disclosure scored by more than 80% of the IBs. This 
strongly implies that the audit dimension is undermined by other dimensions in most 
IBs operations. 
Table 5.23: Disclosure Results on ‘Audit’ Dimension at Bank Level  
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
CIMB 0.84 IIAB 0.48 
BNI 
Syariah 
0.36 Alinma 0.26 Jadwa 0.17 Tadamon 0.05 
BIMB 0.69 JDIB 0.48 Hilal 0.36 Shah Jalal 0.25 Al-Arafah 0.16 Al-Shamal 0.05 
EIIB 0.68 BLME 0.45 AlRajhi 0.35 Aljazira 0.24 IBB 0.14 
AlBaraka 
(Sud) 
0.05 
HLIB 0.68 
ADIB (Abu 
Dhabi IB) 
0.45 JIB 0.32 
KFH 
(Bah.) 
0.24 
Faisal 
(Sud) 
0.14 Faisal (Egy) 0.05 
RHB 0.64 Ithmaar 0.44 Bujr 0.32 Gatehouse 0.23 Rayan 0.13 IBQ 0.03 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 
0.61 Affin 0.44 Meezan 0.31 BISB 0.22 Boubyan 0.11 QIIB 0.03 
Asya 0.56 Muamalat 0.43 Eskan 0.28 As-Salam 0.20 
Albaraka 
(Egy) 
0.09 
BSM (Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.01 
AlBaraka 0.55 
Islami Bank 
Bangladesh 
0.41 
Kuveyt 
Turk 
0.27 QIB 0.18 DIB 0.07 Kuwait Int. 0.00 
ABCIB 0.52 Khaleeji 0.40 Al-Falah 0.27 Capinnova 0.18 
Emirates 
IB 
0.05   
Mean = 0.30 
As shown in Table 5.23, CIMB attained the highest disclosure, scoring 0.84, which is 
classified as ‘high’. The other 9% and 6% of IBs are classified as ‘moderate’ and 
‘low’ disclosure, respectively, while the remaining majority of the banks (83%) are 
classified in the ‘very low’ disclosure group. Based on observation, it is noted that no 
single bank discloses constructs on board undertakings, i.e. whether they are confident 
of the independence and integrity of the external auditors.  
It should be noted that absence of disclosure is observed in most of the following 
constructs: the audit committee’s profiles and composition, the appointment process, 
external audit matters, and the terms of reference of audit and its scope of work. 
However, in general, the audit dimension constructs can be grouped into three main 
areas: ‘board profile-related’, ‘external audit related’, and ‘internal audit’ related. 
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Based on observation, there seems to be a pattern that signifies the bank’s disclosure 
level. 
IBs in ‘high’ disclosure groups, such as CIMB, and almost all the banks in the 
‘moderate’ group do not disclose most of the information on external audit-related 
constructs such as: ‘duration of current external audit engagement’, ‘rotation of audit 
partners’, and ‘proportion of audit fees’. 
Considering the fact that external auditors are appointed by the bank, this raises 
questions on the independence of external auditors where the audit assessment itself 
could be quite subjective. The transparency on how the banks are audited and 
assessed is quite bleak, especially with regards to external audit engagement and this 
is reflected in low disclosure. For instance, except for BIMB and EIIB, it is noted that 
not many banks disclose audit fee charges. 
In general, most banks in the ‘low’ and ‘very low’ group do not disclose much 
information especially on board-related constructs. It is observed that the absence of 
constructs on the status (independent or non-executive) and profiles (qualification and 
background) of the audit chairman and other members of the audit committee in IBs 
are quite obvious in most IBs in these groups. Asya and AlBaraka Turk for instance 
do not have constructs on status and profiles. The non-disclosure on the membership 
status may imply that there may be a conflict of interest issues, i.e. the audit board 
might hold other roles or is also a member of other committees. As for the absence on 
the audit committee profile, this gives the impression that audit members may not 
have the proper skill sets to be in such a committee and hence less disclosure occurs.        
Country Level        
Generally, almost all countries’ IBs do not disclose whether their audit committee is 
involved in providing the risk management oversight function, as audit disclosure has 
been very low in IBs in most countries, evidenced through its mean index disclosure 
of 0.26. Generally, this could probably be due to the inappropriate composition of the 
audit committee or a lack of audit resources to provide oversight.  
As shown in the Table 5.24, no countries are classified in either the ‘very high’ or 
‘high’ audit disclosure category and most of the countries (86%) fall in the ‘very low’ 
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category. The top disclosure ranking of 0.67 is claimed by Malaysia. The relatively 
low disclosure results from poor disclosure on: ‘external audit’, ‘the appointment 
process of the audit committee’, and ‘the audit committees’ profiles are not disclosed 
by most banks’. By referring to the results, it should be noted that IBs need strong 
directives to enforce disclosure, specifically in audit areas, as the gist of doing Islamic 
finance is to ensure Shari’ah compliance vis-à-vis transparency. 
Table 5.24: Disclosure Results on ‘Audit’ Dimension at Country Level 
Country 
Audit 
Committee Country 
Audit 
Committee Country 
Audit 
Committee 
Malaysia 0.670 Pakistan 0.299 Qatar 0.097 
Turkey 0.458 Indonesia 0.260 Sudan 0.070 
Jordan 0.398 Saudi 0.255 Egypt 0.068 
UK 0.396 Bangladesh 0.245 Kuwait 0.065 
Bahrain 0.333 UAE 0.196 Yemen 0.045 
Mean = 0.26 
5.4.4. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Reporting-Accounting and Disclosure’ 
Bank Level 
The mean index for the ‘reporting and accounting’ dimension is 0.74, reflecting that 
most banks have their own benchmarks in terms of reporting for accounting and 
disclosure. As presented in Table 5.25, 46% of the IBs are in the ‘very high’ 
disclosure group. IBB, EIIB, QIB, IIAB are among the 28% of IBs that score full 
indexes in this dimension as reflected by disclosures in all the constructs under this 
dimension. As evidenced through the ‘high’ disclosure index, nearly half of the IBs 
have some credentials in their official reporting and communications.  
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Table 5.25: Disclosure Results on ‘Reporting-Accounting and Disclosure’ 
Dimension at Bank Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
IBB 1.00 Ithmaar 1.00 BLME 0.94 Alinma 0.85 
AlBaraka 
(Sud) 
0.67 Kuwait Int. 0.30 
EIIB 1.00 Capinnova 1.00 Rayan 0.94 Hilal 0.83 Jadwa 0.64 DIB 0.28 
QIB 1.00 
ADIB 
(Abu 
Dhabi IB) 
1.00 Eskan 0.94 Kuveyturk 0.81 Meezan 0.61 Al-Shamal 0.25 
IIAB 1.00 Al-Arafah 1.00 As-Salam 0.92 IBQ 0.78 
Islami 
Bank 
Bangladesh 
0.56 Faisal (Sud) 0.22 
BIMB 1.00 Al-Falah 1.00 AlBaraka 0.89 
KFH 
(Bah.) 
0.78 
Faisal 
(Egy) 
0.56 Shah Jalal 0.11 
CIMB 1.00 AlRajhi 0.97 Asya 0.89 
Emirates 
IB 
0.78 Bujr 0.53 
AlBaraka 
(Egy) 
0.11 
RHB 1.00 QIIB 0.96 AlJazira 0.89 BISB 0.75 JIB 0.50 
BSM (Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.00 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 
1.00 Affin 0.96 HLIB 0.89 Boubyan 0.75 JDIB 0.44 BNI Syariah 0.00 
Khaleeji 1.00 Gatehouse 0.94 ABCIB 0.86 Tadamon 0.69 Muamalat 0.33   
Mean = 0.74 
As can be seen, 16% of the IBs score ‘very low’ on disclosure in this dimension. 
JDIB, Kuwait Int., and DIB are among the IBs that score very poorly in the reporting 
dimension. This is mainly triggered by the absence of constructs such as: statement on 
transparency and disclosure, the board’s accountability of the financial statements, 
and absence of statement of accounting in accordance with internationally accepted 
standards. 
Country Level    
The country level findings on the reporting and accounting disclosure dimension are 
depicted in Table 5.26. As can be seen, the sample mean disclosure index of 0.68 
indicates that most countries adhere to certain rules in terms of reporting with regards 
to accounting and disclosure. As presented in Table 5.26, the country disclosure in 
this dimension is quite ‘high’ at 72 % with the UK ranking the top followed by 
Malaysia, Qatar, and Bahrain which are all active players in gaining competitive 
advantages in order to capture Islamic niche markets. This indicates a relatively ‘high’ 
reporting and accounting standard adhered to by countries with regards to providing 
Islamic products. However, Sudan, Egypt, and Indonesia fall in the ‘very low’ 
category, lagging behind at 0.39, 0.33, and 0.12 respectively on account of 
understated constructs. This is particularly attributed to an absence of disclosure on 
statements such as ‘adherence to international accounting standard’, ‘undisclosed 
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statement on transparency and disclosure’, as well as statements on the 
‘comprehensiveness of policies and procedures’. 
Table 5.26: Disclosure Results on ‘Reporting-Accounting and Disclosure’ 
Dimension at Country Level 
Country Reporting Country Reporting Country Reporting 
UK 0.976 Saudi 0.837 Kuwait 0.556 
Malaysia 0.971 Pakistan 0.713 Bangladesh 0.556 
Qatar 0.919 Yemen 0.694 Sudan 0.394 
Bahrain 0.909 UAE 0.684 Egypt 0.333 
Turkey 0.861 Jordan 0.611 Indonesia 0.121 
Mean = 0.68 
 
5.4.5. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Market and Liquidity Risk’ Dimension 
Bank Level 
The disclosure findings on ‘market and liquidity risk’ dimension are depicted in Table 
5.27. At 0.76, the sample mean disclosure index for ‘market and liquidity risk’ is 
‘high’. This is not unexpected as market and liquidity risk is always one of the key 
risk areas that banks have to take care off. As presented in Table 5.27, 66% of the IBs 
show very ‘high’ disclosures in this dimension, where 32 out of 33 IBs have a full 
index score. This reflects the fact that banks have an appropriate market and liquidity 
risk structure in place to meet present and future financial obligations. The ‘high’ 
disclosure reflects that the banks have, to a certain extent, ascertained liquidity to 
address risk exposures. Through disclosure, the banks try to portray their strong 
commitment in undertaking accountability in market and liquidity risks. As these are 
banks with strong credentials, a full disclosure on their risk undertaking helps to 
strengthen market confidence, as acquiring investments from the niche markets is 
equally as important as restoring trust in the banking system. 
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Table 5.27: Disclosure Results on ‘Market and Liquidity Risk’ Dimension at 
Bank Level       
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
AlBaraka 1.00 Alinma 1.00 BISB 1.00 Emirates IB 1.00 Bujr 0.54 
AlBaraka 
(Sud) 
0.25 
Asya 1.00 QIB 1.00 As-Salam 1.00 Al-Arafah 1.00 Jadwa 0.50 Kuwait Int. 0.22 
Kuveyt 
Turk 
1.00 Rayan 1.00 Khaleeji 1.00 Al-Falah 1.00 JIB 0.50 Muamalat 0.17 
Gatehouse 1.00 QIIB 1.00 Ithmaar 1.00 Tadamon 1.00 IIAB 0.50 
Islami 
Bank 
Bangladesh 
0.17 
BLME 1.00 BIMB 1.00 Eskan 1.00 Faisal (Egy) 1.00 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 
0.50 JDIB 0.00 
IBB 1.00 CIMB 1.00 Capinnova 1.00 
AlBaraka 
(Egy) 
1.00 DIB 0.50 
BSM 
(Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.00 
EIIB 1.00 RHB 1.00 
KFH 
(Bah.) 
1.00 ABCIB 0.92 Hilal 0.50 
BNI 
Syariah 
0.00 
AlRajhi 1.00 Affin 1.00 Boubyan 1.00 IBQ 0.71 Meezan 0.38 Al-Shamal 0.00 
AlJazira 1.00 HLIB 1.00 
ADIB 
(Abu 
Dhabi IB) 
1.00 Faisal (Sud) 0.67 
Shah 
Jalal 
0.33   
Mean = 0.76 
As Table 5.27 depicts, the remaining 34% of IBs fall into both the categories of ‘high’ 
and ‘moderate’. This implies that banks such as IBQ, Dawood, and Jadwa, for 
instance, do not profoundly disclose the technical aspects of the risk. An absence of 
disclosures on ‘risk qualification’, ‘risk appetite’, ‘risk assumptions’ and ‘risk models’ 
could partly be attributed to inadequate resources in this risk area.  
With respect to the IBs in the ‘very low’ disclosure group, Meezan, Shah Jalal, and 
Kuwait Int. are among the 18% of IBs that do not show much information on market 
and liquidity risks. The banks do not communicate information on constructs such as: 
‘risk quantification that describes the risk appetite’, ‘risk measures’, and ‘risk 
assumptions’. This could be due to a lack of standards in reporting and 
communication as well as inadequate risk experts in this area. Nevertheless, it is noted 
that the reporting seems to be more comprehensive in nature towards the later years of 
the 2000s.  
Country Level  
As shown in Table 5.28, the sample mean disclosure index of 0.68 may reflect that 
most countries have stringent risk management practices. As shown, 43% of the IBs 
score ‘very high’ in disclosure in this dimension. Turkey ranks top followed by the 
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UK and Malaysia. ‘High’ indexes observed in Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE 
could also imply that they have been proactive in this risk area in strengthening their 
efforts to capture the Islamic niche markets. The high disclosure could also be 
triggered by regulatory requirements, which require IBs to comply with certain 
reporting rules by furnishing qualitative and quantitative risk information. 
Table 5.28: Disclosure Results on ‘Market and Liquidity Risk’ Dimension at 
Country Level         
Country Mkt/Liq.Risk Country Mkt/Liq.Risk Country Mkt/Liq.Risk 
Turkey 1.000 Bahrain 0.990 Pakistan 0.639 
UK 1.000 Qatar 0.922 Bangladesh 0.567 
Malaysia 1.000 Saudi 0.867 Jordan 0.500 
Yemen 1.000 UAE 0.846 Sudan 0.273 
Egypt 1.000 Kuwait 0.667 Indonesia 0.061 
Mean = 0.76 
5.4.6. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Credit Risk’ Dimension 
Bank Level 
The relatively ‘high’ disclosure with mean index 0.82 in Table 5.29 implies that most 
IBs, especially those which are mainly involved in retail banking, strongly prioritise 
credit risk disclosure as most banks want to portray their transparent credit risk 
management to keep up with their stakeholders’ expectations. Based on Table 5.29, 
78% of IBs score a disclosure index of 0.75 and above. Out of this percentage, Al 
Baraka, Asya, Kuveyturk are among the 37 IBs, which score ‘very high’ disclosure 
index in this dimension.  
This indicates that credit risk plays a significant role in the IBs: the way credit risk is 
managed is very important as it reveals the financial health of the banks; especially to 
stakeholders and shareholders alike and hence this demands adequate disclosure.  
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Table 5.29: Disclosure Results on ‘Credit Risk’ Dimension at Bank Level 
Mean = 0.82 
Country Level    
The findings on credit risk dimension disclosure are depicted in Table 5.30, which 
shows that the sample countries have a mean disclosure of 0.78 on the ‘credit risk’ 
dimension. This may imply that releasing information on credit risk has been accepted 
by many countries as one of the ways to obtain market confidence.  
Table 5.30: Disclosure Results on ‘Credit Risk’ Dimension at Country Level               
Country Credit Risk Country Credit Risk Country Credit Risk 
Turkey 1.000 Yemen 1.000 Pakistan 0.750 
UK 1.000 Egypt 1.000 Bangladesh 0.480 
Qatar 1.000 Saudi 0.947 Jordan 0.350 
Malaysia 1.000 UAE 0.846 Indonesia 0.291 
Bahrain 1.000 Kuwait 0.771 Sudan 0.273 
Mean=0.78 
The sampled IBs from Turkey, UK, Malaysia, Qatar, and Bahrain in particular are 
among the IBs, which score ‘very high’ on the disclosure index in the credit 
dimension. This can be explained by the fact that the regulators of the countries in the 
'very high’ disclosure group are more prescriptive towards improving credit risk 
disclosure. It is implied that credit risk disclosure could build up their countries’ 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
AlBaraka 1.00 Alinma 1.00 Affin 1.00 Capinnova 1.00 Faisal (Egy) 1.00 
BNI 
Syariah 
0.40 
Asya 1.00 QIB 1.00 HLIB 1.00 
KFH 
(Bah.) 
1.00 
Albaraka 
(Egy) 
1.00 
AlBaraka 
(Sudan) 
0.25 
Kuveyturk 1.00 Rayan 1.00 ABIB (Bah.) 1.00 Boubyan 1.00 Jadwa 0.80 JIB 0.20 
Gatehouse 1.00 IBQ 1.00 BISB 1.00 
ADIB 
(Abu 
Dhabi IB) 
1.00 Meezan 0.75 Shah Jalal 0.20 
BLME 1.00 QIIB 1.00 As-Salam 1.00 Hilal 1.00 Faisal (Sud) 0.67 JDIB 0.00 
IBB 1.00 IIAB 1.00 Khaleeji 1.00 
Emirates 
IB 
1.00 Muamalat 0.50 
BSM 
(Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.00 
EIIB 1.00 BIMB 1.00 Ithmaar 1.00 Al-Arafah 1.00 DIB 0.50 
Islami 
Bank 
Bangladesh 
0.00 
AlRajhi 1.00 CIMB 1.00 Eskan 1.00 Al-Falah 1.00 Bujr 0.50 Al-Shamal 0.00 
AlJazira 1.00 RHB 1.00 ABCIB 1.00 Tadamon 1.00 Kuwait Int. 0.47   
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financial credibility, as it is viewed that consistency in credit risk disclosure is one of 
the strategies and competitive ways in trying to attract investments.   
However, it is important to note that countries with low credit risk disclosures such as 
Jordan and Bangladesh are not necessarily doing badly if not because of their small 
sample sizes that have affected their index scores. Jordan may need a few more years 
to strengthen their banking position after a few years in debt restructuring and hence 
disclosure will probably occur after that. 
5.4.7. Findings on Disclosure on ‘Other Risks’ Dimension 
Bank Level 
As can be seen in Table 5.31, the mean index disclosure score of 0.87 on the ‘other 
risks’ dimension implies good risk management on other risks (apart from the primary 
risks mentioned above), despite the fact that the mean is quite distorted due to the 
minimal constructs in this dimension. However, it is viewed that disclosure on this 
dimension is justifiably significant. The inclusion of this dimension is to set the 
precedence on examining disclosure on other risks apart from market, liquidity and 
credit risks to ensure that banks give comprehensive risk reporting. Through this 
transparent communication, the credibility of risk reporting will be higher as no risk is 
obscured from the public and stakeholders etc.  
Table 5.31: Disclosure Results on ‘Other Risks’ Dimension at Bank Level 
Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index Bank Index 
Asya 1.00 Jadwa 1.00 Affin 1.00 ABCIB 1.00 Tadamon 1.00 Bujr 0.50 
Kuveyt 
Turk 
1.00 QIB 1.00 HLIB 1.00 Capinnova 1.00 
Faisal 
(Egy) 
1.00 Kuwait Int. 0.33 
Gatehouse 1.00 Rayan 1.00 
BNI 
Syariah 
1.00 
KFH 
(Bah.) 
1.00 
AlBaraka 
(Egypt) 
1.00 
AlBaraka 
(Sud) 
0.25 
BLME 1.00 IBQ 1.00 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 
1.00 Boubyan 1.00 QIIB 0.83 JDIB 0.00 
IBB 1.00 JIB 1.00 BISB 1.00 
ADIB 
(Abu 
Dhabi IB) 
1.00 Muamalat 0.75 
BSM 
(Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 
0.00 
EIIB 1.00 IIAB 1.00 
As-
Salam 
1.00 Hilal 1.00 
Shah 
Jalal 
0.75 
Islami 
Bank 
Bangladesh 
0.00 
AlRajhi 1.00 BIMB 1.00 Khaleeji 1.00 
Emirates 
IB 
1.00 Meezan 0.75 Al-Shamal 0.00 
AlJazira 1.00 CIMB 1.00 Ithmaar 1.00 Al-Arafah 1.00 
Faisal 
(Sud) 
0.67   
Mean = 0.86 
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Country Level    
As can be seen in Table 5.32, the sample countries have a mean disclosure index of 
0.84 indicating that most countries have already disclosed other types of risks in their 
communications. As shown in Table 5.32, 50% of the countries show ‘very high’ 
index disclosure on other risks. Turkey, UK, SA, Malaysia, Bahrain and Oman have 
full index scores while other countries in the sample also show relatively ‘high’ 
disclosure in this dimension. Most banks in these countries cover other risks, as these 
are part of their identified key risk areas that need to be communicated to the 
stakeholders and investors etc.    
Table 5.32: Disclosure Results on ‘Other Risks’ Dimension at Country Level 
Country Other Risk Country Other Risk Country Other Risk 
Turkey 1.000 Yemen 1.000 Pakistan 0.750 
UK 1.000 Egypt 1.000 Kuwait 0.714 
Saudi 1.000 Qatar 0.967 Bangladesh 0.700 
Malaysia 1.000 UAE 0.846 Indonesia 0.545 
Bahrain 1.000 Jordan 0.750 Sudan 0.273 
Mean: 0.84 
 
5.4.8. Overall Results (RMI) 
After presenting the individual risk management disclosure dimensions on bank and 
country level for the sampled banks and countries, this section presents overall results 
for the risk management disclosure practices. 
Bank Level   
As shown in Table 5.33, the modest mean disclosure of 0.57 for overall risk 
management disclosure performance is very much affected by the scores from the 
banks in the ‘very low’ disclosure group. Boubyan, Meezan, Shah Jalal, JDIB, Jadwa, 
JIB, DIB, Islami Bank, Kuwait Int, amd BNI Shari’ah are among the 28% (13) of the 
banks in the ‘very low’ group whose scores are in the range 0.45 to 0.01. 
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Table 5.33: Overall Bank Level Results for all the Dimensions 
Bank 
Ov.RMI 
Bank 
Ov.RMI 
Bank 
Ov.RMI 
Bank 
Ov.RMI 
Bank 
Ov.RMI 
Bank 
Ov.RMI 
CIMB 0.908 Affin 0.789 
KFH 
(Bah.) 0.688 Eskan 0.625 Boubyan 0.446 
AlBaraka 
(Egy) 0.300 
BIMB 0.888 BLME 0.779 
Kuveyt 
Turk 0.683 IIAB 0.608 Meezan 0.429 
Islami 
Bank 
Bangladesh 0.267 
EIIB 0.883 ABCIB 0.763 Gatehouse 0.675 Al-Arafah 0.600 Muamalat 0.421 
Faisal 
(Sud) 0.261 
HLIB 0.867 Hilal 0.742 AlJazira 0.671 Emirates IB 0.567 Tadamon 0.400 Kuwait Int. 0.217 
ABIB 
(Bah.) 0.858 Khaleeji 0.733 Al-Falah 0.650 QIIB 0.544 Shah Jalal 0.350 
BNI 
Syariah 0.200 
RHB 0.850 Ithmaar 0.729 IBB 0.638 IBQ 0.529 JDIB 0.342 
AlBaraka 
(Sud) 0.171 
Al 
Baraka 0.817 AlRajhi 0.725 BISB 0.629 Bujr 0.513 Jadwa 0.333 Al-Shamal 0.054 
Asya 0.804 Alinma 0.706 As-Salam 0.629 Rayan 0.508 JIB 0.325 
BSM 
(Bank 
Shariah 
Mandiri) 0.013 
ADIB 
(Abu 
Dhabi 
IB) 0.800 QIB 0.700 Capinnova 0.628 Faisal (Egy) 0.450 DIB 0.308   
Mean = 0.57 
Table 5.33 shows that only one bank scores ‘very high’ while 17 banks are classified 
as ‘high’. A total of 12 banks have ‘moderate’ scores and the remaining 5 banks 
indicate ‘low’ scores in overall risk management disclosure. Looking at the ‘high’ 
disclosure index of 0.91, this may imply that CIMB and other banks with ‘high’ 
disclosure, such as BIMB, EIIB, HLIB, ABIB, and RHB use disclosure as one of their 
strategies to increase the banks’ access to capital markets. To a certain extent, this 
may imply that these banks have very strong market discipline, hence ‘high’ risk 
management disclosure is observed in this group. Theoretically, disclosure enhances 
the attractiveness of the banks’ shares to current and prospective investors. Beyond 
this, the investors can reduce their costs of information seeking pertaining to the 
banks.  
Banks being categorised in the ‘moderate’, ‘low’, and ‘very low’ risk management 
disclosure groups, whose scores are in the range of 0.69 to 0.60, 0.57 to 0.51, and 0.45 
to 0.01 respectively, may reflect that they are still struggling with the RM structure. 
The disclosure level hinges on the banks’ safety net, as they have to weigh the 
repercussions of revealing proprietary and strategic information to competitors and 
potential new entrants. This could probably be the reason why banks like DIB and JIB 
have to reform to sustain their strength. 
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Country Level  
As far as the banking system is concerned, risk management has always been relevant. 
However, on a country basis, the mean disclosure index of 0.51 in the overall risk 
management is considerably unimpressive considering the pervasive impact risk 
management can impose on the robustness of the financial system. Nevertheless, as 
frequently mentioned, the low mean risk management disclosure index could probably 
be due to technical distortions resulting from the small sample size as well as the 
limited number of published annual reports. 
Table 5.34: Overall Country Level Results for all the Dimensions 
Country 
Overall 
RMI Country 
Overall 
RMI Country 
Overall 
RMI 
Malaysia 0.864 Qatar 0.572 Yemen 0.400 
Turkey 0.768 UAE 0.568 Egypt 0.375 
UK 0.754 Pakistan 0.531 Kuwait 0.348 
Bahrain 0.690 Bangladesh 0.433 Indonesia 0.212 
Saudi 0.602 Jordan 0.400 Sudan 0.153 
Mean: 0.51 
As far as disclosure is concerned, the extent and nature of RM disclosure relates to 
how ‘high’ the risk management structure is put in place. This may imply that 
countries like Malaysia, UK, Bahrain and Turkey have ‘high’ disclosure as the 
country has a long-established risk management infrastructure in supporting the 
banks’ operations. On another note, the ‘high’ disclosure demonstrated by these 
banks, to a certain extent, implies that these banks undertake rigorous efforts in 
promoting their banks’ market value as well as improving returns, as it is perceived 
that disclosure has the probability of influencing the banks’ share price and their 
expected stock return. 
It is noted that the banks that score better in risk management disclosure have 
supportive government in terms of safeguarding the banks’ financial health. Countries 
like UK and Malaysia for instance, have government safety nets such as deposit 
insurance in place to improve the banks’ risk management. As for countries with 
‘moderate’ risk management disclosures like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the risk 
management initiatives started sometime later, hence, it does not reflect quite well as 
of yet. Qatar, UAE and Pakistan score quite ‘moderate’ in the overall disclosure while 
Bangladesh, Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan and Indonesia fall in the ‘very low’ disclosure 
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group in the overall RMI dimension, with scores ranging from 0.12 to 0.42. This may 
imply that these banks need to play more persistent roles in undertaking risk 
management apart from their government’s supportive role to complement their 
efforts. 
From another perspective, the disclosure level is very much affected by its own 
repercussions after the disclosure exercise takes place. It is noted that disclosure 
affects the risk taking incentives, since the banks will have informed depositors 
instead who monitor the bank’s balance sheet. In a way, this is considered positively 
because the banks can control its asset volatility and bank failures can be avoided.   
However, to a certain extent, the presence of informed markets may have effects on 
the banks’ sustainability as disclosure may impinge on the banks’ strategic advantage 
to potential competitors. This could possibly be the reason as to why in some 
countries banks have yet to achieve a certain level of institutional base, as Sudan, 
Pakistan and Bangladeshi banks seem to be adamant in not disclosing very much 
information. 
5.5. REFLECTING ON THE DISCLOURSE FINDINGS FOR CGI AND RMI 
After individually presenting the results for CGI and RMI and discussing the overall 
performance in both the indices, this section aims to provide a comparative 
perspective between the performances of RMI and CGI. 
It should be noted that the disclosure result from the overall CGI is less encouraging 
than its RMI counterpart. As shown in Table 5.35 below, the overall CGI disclosure 
bank-wise and country wise is lower than the overall RMI disclosure. This could 
possibly be due to the following factors: 
In general, it can be argued that the CG area is more revealing and human-related, 
which makes disclosure harder as compared to the RM side. The difficulty level in 
disclosing CG could be due to the fact that the CG construct is more comprehensive 
and detailed, since it covers a wider spectrum of the banking operations, i.e. from the 
selected individual board’s profiles to the banks’ mission, operations, supports, 
structures, and many other dimensions. As such, disclosure may require higher 
commitment and co-operation from more diverse parties.  
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As far as reporting is concerned, non-standardisation in terms of CG framework itself 
could also affect the disclosure level. The CGI is more affected than the RMI because 
CG has more dimensions for which to work out the average. In addition, poor CG 
disclosures can be also attributed to the quality of reporting itself, which relates to the 
ability to report and communicate well. However, this depends on the banks’ policies 
too with regards to how transparent they want the banks to be.  Furthermore, the 
regulative environment should also be considered in terms of the amount of disclosure 
required from the Islamic banks as it seems that, in particular, GCC regulative bodies 
do not impose high disclosure expectations for either of the disclosure areas. 
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Table 5.35: Comparing CGI and RMI Results 
 CGI RMI 
Performance 
Classification 
 
COUNTRY BANK COUNTRY BANK 
Very High - - - 1. CIMB 
     
High - 1. ABIB 1. Malaysia 1. BIMB 
 2. BIMB 2. Turkey 2. EIIB 
 3. KFH 3. UK 3. HLIB 
   4. ABIB 
   5. RHB 
   6. AlBaraka 
   7. Asya 
   8. ADIB 
   9. Affin 
   10. BLME 
   11. ABCIB 
   12. Hilal 
   13. Khaleeji 
   14. Ithmaar 
   15. AlRajhi 
   16. Al Inma 
   17. QIB 
     
Moderate 1. Malaysia 1. CIMB 1. Bahrain 1. KFH (Bah.) 
 
2. JDIB 2. S.Arabia 2. Kuveyt Turk 
3. BISB  3. Gatehouse 
4. RHB  4. Al Baraka 
5. JIB  5. Al Falah 
  6. JBB 
  7. BISB 
  8. As-Salam 
  9. Al-Arafah 
  10. IIAB 
  11. Capinnova 
  12. ESKAN 
     
Low 1. Bahrain 1. Ithmaar 1. Qatar 1. Emirates 
2. Jordan 2. Khaleeji 2. UAE 2. QIIB 
 3. BNI Sharia 3. Pakistan 3. IBQ 
 4. HLIB  4. Bujr 
   5. Rayan 
     
Very Low 1. Indonesia 1. Salam 1. Bangladsh 1. Faisal(Eg) 
2. UK 2. EIIB 2. Jordan 2. Boubyan 
3. Turkey 3. Al Baraka 3. Yemen 3. Meezan 
4. S.Arabia 4. Affin 4. Egypt 4. Muamalat 
5. UAE 5. Muamalat 5. Kuwait 5. Tadamon 
6. Pakistan 6. Gate Hse 6. Indonesia 6. S.Jalal 
7. Qatar 7. Hilal 7. Sudan 7. JDIB 
8. B’ladesh 8. ADIB  8. Jadwa 
9. Sudan 9. ABCIB  9. JIB 
10. Egypt 10. BLME  10. DIB 
11. Kuwait 11. Capinnova  11. Albara(E 
12. Yemen 12. QIB  12. Islami 
 13. Aljazira  13. Faisal(Su) 
 14. Islami  14. KuwaitInt 
 15. Al Inma  15. BNISya 
 16. Eskan  16. Albara(S) 
 17. Asya  17. AlShamal 
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 CGI RMI 
Performance 
Classification 
 
COUNTRY BANK COUNTRY BANK 
 18. Al Rajhi  18. BSM 
 19. Meezan   
 20. BIMB   
 21. Dawood   
 22. BSM   
 23. IIAB   
 24. Al Falah   
 25. Rayan   
 26. DIB   
 27. KuveyT   
 28. Jadwa   
 29. Shah Jalal   
 30. Al Arafah   
 31. QIIB   
 32. IBQ   
 33. AlBarakaE   
 34. EmiratesIs.   
 35. Kuw.Int.   
 36. Al Shamal   
 37. IBB   
 38. Albarak(S)   
 39. Boubyan   
 40. Tadamon   
 41. Faisal(E   
 
As for RMI, the information in the financial statements is rather standard, and thus 
much easier to develop an understanding of regarding RMI. In addition, banks have 
the international accounting standard to comply with in relation to risk management, 
as it can have immediate effects on the robustness of the bank. In other words, the 
finance-related information used in the reporting seems to be more mandatory in 
nature. However, unless required, banks do not necessarily have to go for full CG 
compliance in terms of the type of information to disclose. Thus, risk management, in 
fact, is part of the financial statement, which is the main focus of annual reports. As 
far as financial statements are concerned, the standards have been long established, 
and therefore, they always have the same principles to follow. However, this might 
not be the case for CG because is no mandatory or universal standard that requires 
banks to use in the disclosure of their annual reports for CG. 
As the results show, in terms of compliance, most countries do not have a ‘higher’ 
compliance in CG as opposed to RM. This may imply the lack or absence of CG 
awareness. Nonetheless, more regulatory intervention could be seen to play a major 
role in providing directives to promote best practices through CG. On another note, 
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the banks themselves may place less of a priority on CG compliance and hence less on 
CG disclosure. Banks may disclose better in RM as it has direct impacts on 
investment so that they can be more competitive. As for CG, some banks may not 
choose to go for best practices yet because they would rather focus on how to survive 
and sustain their presence in the business. Thus, communicating CG related 
information, which stresses on best practices, is somehow considered secondary after 
RM. However, as the recent financial crisis has shown, developing an efficient CG 
and disclosing the necessary information is an essential factor for the robust 
development and functioning of the financial system. 
5.5.1. Reflecting on the Ranking at Bank Level  
This section aims to provide further reflections on the results by classifying and 
ranking the banks in terms of their CGI and RMI level. 
Very High or Best Disclosure Practice  
As shown in Table 5.35, no banks managed to score ‘very high’ disclosure in the 
overall CGI. This could possibly due to the nature of CG: banks may choose not to 
disclose information such as the boards’ profile because of the perception that 
disclosing such information is unnecessary and that it seems to be more voluntary in 
nature instead of mandatory. However, individually there are many banks with ‘very 
high’ CGI disclosures but this is offset in the mean calculation by a few banks with 
‘very low’ ones. 
Table 5.35 shows that ‘very high’ RMI disclosure is accounted by CIMB, whose RMI 
performance can be attributed to the bank’s ambitious mission to be the premier 
global market leader. Being an example of best practice, CIMB may have used 
disclosure to demonstrate its good risk management practices and diligent risk 
oversight. In a way, it tries to harness transparency to capture the niche market by 
showing that a good risk management structure is in place in order to get market 
confidence in the global market in order to strengthen their business and growth. 
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High Disclosure Practice 
As for ‘high’ disclosure level, it is noted that banks are still struggling towards 
disclosure in CGI as opposed to RMI. There are only 3 banks with ‘high’ CGI 
namely: ABIB, BIMB and KFH. ABIB has always been at the forefront, when it 
comes to maintaining the highest international standards of corporate governance, 
consistent with its presence in the country that is responsible for issuing IB guidelines. 
As for BIMB, which has been in the banking field for about three decades, its 
disclosure reflects the bank’s maturity, which is highlighted through bank objectives 
and reputation that are based on the underlying principles of CG. The disclosure is 
also implied in its mission statement. KFH on the other hand, portrays ‘very high’ 
disclosure to support its strong presence internationally. Based on the disclosure level, 
this gives the impression that banks with ‘high’ disclosure should be able to meet 
demands from the market through their maturity and oversight.  
Unlike the overall CGI, the overall RMI is more representative as reflected in Table 
5.35. A total of 17 banks show ‘high’ disclosure in RMI and this includes: BIMB, 
EIIB, HLIB, ABIB, RHB, and AlBarakaTurk. The ownership structure may carry 
some weight towards disclosure. Occasionally, public-owned banks may demonstrate 
higher disclosure than privately-owned banks. However, this is not always the case as 
privately owned banks such as Kuveyt Turk place a high importance on risk 
management disclosure as it moves into new business strategies in Islamic retail and 
in corporate banking. 
Moderate Disclosure Practice 
For the overall CGI disclosure, ‘moderate’ is the highest ranking classification 
attained. Factors such as coverage of annual reports and the government policies 
could be some of the contributing factors. The quality of the information 
communicated in annual reporting influences the disclosure level, for instance in the 
form of its coverage, presentation and attestation, and the availability of information 
and its relevancy for disclosure. As shown in Table 5.35, there are 6 banks: CIMB, 
DJDIM, BISM, RHB, JIB, and Ithmaar that score ‘moderate’ in the overall CGI 
disclosure. It is observed that these banks have something in common, as they are 
market players in the IB industry. As for RM, the ‘moderate’ overall RMI disclosure 
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is represented by 3 banks: KFH (Bah.), Kuveyt Turk, and Gatehouse. These banks 
have different settings in terms of corporate structure and economic background and 
this affects the disclosure levels. However, they all have something in common. That 
is that they have to abide by their countries’ laws. Kuveyt Turk adopts its own 
country’s CG code, while Gatehouse is in the same situation in which it has to abide 
by UK law, i.e. to adhere to the FSA despite it being an Islamic institution.  Thus, the 
nature of law, in each jurisdiction, has a direct impact on the results, which implies 
also that political economy determines the nature and the quantity of information 
communicated  
Low Disclosure Practice 
As shown in Table 5.35, 8% of the sampled IBs have ‘low’ overall CGI disclosure 
score. This includes Ithmaar, HLIB, Khaleeji, and BNI Shariah. The ‘low’ disclosure 
may have been explained by the restructuring exercise which took place prior to 2011 
in the case of Ithmaar, while for others it is more to do with low disclosure in certain 
dimensions in certain years.  
For the overall RMI performance, 5 IBs demonstrate ‘low’ disclosure and this 
includes: Emirates Islamic, QIIB, IBQ, Bujr and Rayan. As for Emirates Islamic this 
could probably due to it being new in the IB industry, as it has just converted to an IB 
in the year 2004. Presumably, it needs more time to develop its practices. As for Bujr, 
this could be attributed to less comprehensive coverage in the annual reports in its 
earlier years, mainly prior to the year 2010.    
Very Low Practice 
The overall CGI disclosure is ‘very low’ for the remaining 41 banks, which 
constitutes 77% of the sampled banks. Such a score should cause some consideration 
and worry. Among the ‘very low’ disclosure of banks are: Al Salam, EIIB, AlBaraka 
(Turk), and Affin. In general, it is perceived that most of the banks in this group have 
not been doing very well in the Shari’ah theme and this really affects the disclosure 
level for the overall CGI. The ‘very low’ disclosure group for the overall RMI is 
represented by 18 banks, which include Faisal (Egypt), Boubyan, and Meezan. It is 
noted that Faisal (Egypt), Boubyan, Meezan and a few more banks have not been 
doing very well in terms of their annual reporting of which pertinent information is 
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not presented adequately, especially on the structure of the bank. To a certain extent, 
this may imply the shortcomings in the CG awareness in these banks. 
5.5.2. Reflecting on the Ranking by Country 
In providing further meaning to the results, this section aims to provide further 
reflections on the results by classifying and ranking the sampled countries in terms of 
their CGI and RMI level. 
As shown in Table 5.35, no countries have a ‘very high’ disclosure in either CGI or 
RMI performance, as the CGI and RMI mean scores are low, at 0.25 and 0.51 
respectively as reflected in Table 5.35. The discussion in this section is based on the 
performance level of the sampled countries in terms of CGI and RMI. 
Very High or Best Practice 
As shown in Table 5.35, no country shows a ‘very high’ disclosure in the overall CGI. 
Even though there are a number of banks in each country with ‘very high’ CGI, this is 
offset by some banks in the same countries which have ‘very low’ CGI. This is 
attributed to the ‘very low’ disclosure in certain dimensions such as Shari'ah and 
ethics. For example, there is no doubt that some banks have shown very good 
progress on CG compliance dimensions (as observed in the later stage of the year 
2000s); however, this was not the case before the banks adopted CG principles. As for 
RMI, no country demonstrates ‘very high’ disclosure on RMI. This could be 
attributed to a few factors.  
Similar to CGI, there is always the case that some banks in the countries have ‘very 
high’ disclosure but this is offset by the banks with ‘very low’ scores. Annual 
reporting also contributes towards disclosure, as some banks do not have an adequate 
coverage of RM area in the ARs. 
High Performance 
Similarly, none of the countries show ‘high’ disclosure in CGI.  There are also cases 
that some countries do not even have a score for any of the CG statement, and this 
gives the impression that they have not adopted a CG code. Perhaps this is due to the 
absence of CG awareness or the failures of the regulative bodies, since CG is not 
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mentioned anywhere in the annual reports and this could be one of the reasons why no 
countries indicate ‘high’ CGI disclosure. 
On the other hand, Malaysia, Turkey, and the UK show ‘high’ RMI disclosure. This 
could be attributed to regulative intervention. In addition, the socio-economic status of 
the host countries itself may influence the disclosure level. For this, Malaysia, Turkey, 
and UK have reached certain socio-economic levels that require best practises to be in 
place in IBs to be able to compete in their respective countries. As far as these 
countries are concerned, they have strict policies in the form of regulatory directives 
that ensure compliance on RM.  
In reflecting on the sampled countries through their particular economic progress and 
democratic consolidation level, there is a possibility of country-specific factors that 
affect RMI and also of CGI disclosure. For example, developed countries, such as the 
UK, are more open in terms of disclosing information. This reflects that some 
initiatives must have been put in place to push these 3 countries towards current 
disclosure levels. Malaysia for instance has been very committed in its initiatives to 
ensure high standards in its IB operations.  
As far as the overall RMI is concerned, improving disclosure should be one of the 
strategies of the countries in question to be competitive in trying to attract Islamic 
investment funds. Malaysia has come up with series of financial master plans for the 
financial sector. As for Turkey, the banks have moved some steps ahead, following 
their adoption of a CG code. They have implemented their own corporate governance 
code, a framework that has to be adhered at bank levels in the country. Similarly, the 
UK has been very serious in maintaining transparency and thus disclosure is in one of 
the agendas to deal with.  
Moderate Practice 
The ranking ‘moderate’ is the best classification attained by the overall CGI 
disclosure. This is represented by Malaysia with its ‘moderate’ score in the overall 
CGI. To a certain extent, from the CG viewpoint, this somehow shows that Malaysia 
is comparatively more transparent than any other country. This is partly due to 
government initiatives to help support banking operations. The regulator has been 
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persistent and consistent in ensuring the adequacy of guidelines and directives for the 
banks to adhere to.  
As the results show, the ‘moderate’ classification for the overall RMI is represented 
by two countries: Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. This is anticipated as Bahrain is the 
home for guidelines while Saudi Arabia’s ‘high’ disclosure is because of ownership 
structure. This may imply that for countries with banks that have high privately-held 
shareholding, the level of disclosure is determined by the discretion of the main 
shareholders.   
Low Practice 
Bahrain and Jordan show ‘low’ disclosures in CGI. Bahrain is quite unexpected as 
this is the country from which IB standards and guidelines are issued through the 
AAOIFI. In addition, AAOIFI standards are mandatory for Bahraini Islamic banks. 
Nevertheless, there are some banks with no CG awareness, which brings down the 
country’s disclosure level. Similar cases occur with Jordan when one sampled bank 
under-performed in CGI disclosure. The ‘low’ classification for the overall RMI is 
represented by Qatar, UAE, and Pakistan. Qatar also has the same problem as some 
banks in the country do not have good disclosure in risk management. 
Very Low Performance 
The overall CGI score is ‘very low’ for 12 countries. This includes: Indonesia, UK, 
Turkey, SA, and UAE. The reason could be due to lack of political will and regulative 
efficiency in the form of directives towards attaining best practices. In general, almost 
all banks in this disclosure group are from the countries that have not established their 
corporate governance code. As for RM, the overall RMI disclosure is ‘very low’ for 7 
countries including: Bangladesh, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan and Indonesia, and Egypt and 
Yemen. This could be due to similar reasons as CGI, i.e. some banks with ‘very low’ 
disclosure in these countries may affect the individual country’s level of disclosure. It 
could be that for some banks, the necessity to improve their communications is not so 
pressing, which may be justified by the modesty and simplicity of its AR reporting.  
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5.6. SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
Having presented and discussed the empirical results by undertaking bank and country 
comparisons on the relationships between CG and RM, it is found that the 
performance of CGI is comparatively lower than that of the RMI performance, both 
bank-wise as well as country-wise. It is also found that the overall CGI mean and 
RMI mean country-wise is slightly lower compared to the ones bank-wise. 
Since one of the objectives of this research is also to explore how CGI performance 
could relate to RMI performance and vice versa, the next section will deal with their 
relationship. 
5.7. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT DISCLOSURES 
This chapter so far has focused on presenting the descriptive findings through an 
explorative motive and providing further meaning to the results through interpretation. 
This section aims to examine the strength of the relationship between the two 
variables; CG and RM. In other words, while individually the results are presented, 
this study at the same time, aims to locate whether there is any relationship between 
CGI disclosure and RMI disclosure; because it is hypothesised that a better CG 
environment should result in a better RM practice. In doing so, this chapter also 
provides the strength of the relationship between all the dimensions of CG and RM.  
It should be mentioned that the correlation method is employed to measure the 
strength of the relationships, which is a technique used to examine the relationship 
between two variables (Pallant, 2010). A correlation exists when knowing scores for 
one variable helps to predict scores for the other. In order to establish the nature of the 
relationships, SPSS is employed of which the Spearman Rho tool is used on the same 
data (sample of 153 annual reports) to examine the correlations. It should be noted 
that proxies are used to represent each CG and RM. 
The correlation tests in this section are run in both the bank and country comparison 
cases. Thus, the following findings are the outcomes of the tests on two sets of data: 
bank-wise and country-wise for CGI and RMI.  The following sub-section proceeds 
with the results of the findings of the correlation. 
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5.7.1. Correlation between CGI and RMI at Bank-Level and Country-Level 
Based on the correlation tests conducted in the bank comparison analysis, there is a 
modest relationship between CGI and RMI as depicted by the disclosure indices. As 
can be seen from the results, the coefficients are slightly above average; 0.587 using 
the Spearman Rho based analysis in Table 5.36 and 0.522 in the Pearson based 
estimation in Table 5.37. The results evidence that the relation between the two 
variables, CG and RM, are not incredibly strong as had been expected, despite the fact 
that the relationship seems to be significant.  Thus, there is a statistically significant 
relationship as produced by both the estimation period, but the strength of the 
relationship stayed at medium level. 
Table 5.36: Bank-Level Spearman’s Rho Correlationb between CG and RM 
Scores 
  CG RM 
Spearman's rho CG Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .587** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 
RM Correlation 
Coefficient 
.587** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); b. Listwise N = 53 
Table 5.37: Bank-Level Pearson Correlationb between CG and RM Scores 
  CG RM 
CG 
Pearson Correlation 1 .522** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 
N 53 53 
RM 
Pearson Correlation .522** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   
N 53 53 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Similarly, based on the test done on country comparison analysis using the disclosure 
indices developed, there is also a slightly above average correlation between CGI and 
RMI. Quite similar to the results of the bank’s comparison, the country’s result shows 
a correlation coefficient of 0.576 and 0.529 using Spearman Rho (Table 5.38) and 
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Pearson (Table 5.39) respectively. As before, despite having a significant relationship, 
these coefficients do not indicate any strong relationship. 
Table 5.38: Country Level Spearman’s Rho Correlationb between CG and RM 
Scores 
  CG RM 
Spearman's rho CG Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .576* 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .025 
RM Correlation 
Coefficient 
.576* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .025   
Notes: *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); b. Listwise N = 15 
 
Table 5. 39: Country-Level Pearson Correlationb between CG and RM Scores 
  CG RM 
CG Pearson Correlation 1 .529* 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .042 
RM Pearson Correlation .529* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .042   
Notes: *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); b. Listwise N=15 
5.7.2. Correlations between CGI Dimensions  
This section proceeds with the results of the findings of the correlation estimation 
between CGI and its dimensions and also between the CGI dimensions. The results 
are depicted in Table 5.40 and Table 5.41.  
5.7.2.1. Correlations between CGI and its dimensions at bank-level  
Table 5.40 shows the correlation between CGI and its dimensions. The CGI, which is 
a proxy of corporate governance, has relatively strong correlations with ‘Board 
composition’ (r = .794, p = 0.000); ‘Mission’ (r = .696, p = 0.003); ‘Board leadership’ 
(r = .686, p = 0.000); ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .674, p = 0.000); ‘Ethical business’ 
(r = .647, p = 0.000); ‘Nomination committee’ (r = .632, p = 0.000). However, CG 
has quite moderate relationships between ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .591, p = 0.000) 
and ‘Board meeting’ (r = .477, p = 0.000). 
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Table 5.40 also depicts the findings of the test between all other dimensions of CG. 
As seen from results, the correlation between the CG dimensions varies in strength. 
The ‘Mission’ has a correlation with ‘Board composition’ (r = .799, p = 0.000); 
‘Ethics’ (r = .671, p = 0.000); ‘Board leadership’ (r = .625, p = 0.000); ‘Nomination 
committee’ (r = .586, p = 0.000); ‘Board meeting’ (r = .581, p = 0.000); ‘Shari’ah 
governance’ (r = .444, p = 0.001) and ‘Shari'ah Compliance’ (r = . 353, p = 0.000). 
As indicated in Table 5.40, ‘Board composition’ has a correlation with ‘board 
leadership’(r = .831, p = 0.000); ‘Nomination committee’ (r = .784, p = 0.000); 
‘Ethical business’ (r = .682, p = 0.000); ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .621, p = 0.000); 
‘Board meeting’ (r = .538, p = 0.000) and ‘Shari'ah Compliance’ (r = .471, p = 
0.000). 
It is noted that ‘Board leadership’ is correlated with ‘Nomination committee’ (r = 
.697, p = 0.000); ‘Ethical business’ (r = .623, p = 0.000); ‘Shari’ah Compliance’ (r = 
.485, p = 0.000); ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .484, p = 0.000) and ‘Board meeting’ (r 
= .398, p = 0.003). 
As for ‘board meeting’, it is only correlated with only one dimension i.e. the 
‘Nomination committee’ (r = .566, p = 0.000). Based on Table 5.40, ‘Nomination 
committee’ is correlated with ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .517, p = 0.000); ‘Ethical 
business’ (r = .430, p = 0.001) and ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .425, p = 0.002).  
Table 5.40 also shows that ‘Shari’ah governance’ has slightly above average 
correlation with ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .632, p = 0.000) but very poor 
relationship with ‘Ethical business’ (r = .382, p = 0.005). The dimension ‘Shari’ah 
compliance’ seems to have a very weak correlation with ‘Ethical business’ (r = .377, p 
= 0.005). 
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Table 5.40: Correlation Estimations between CGI and Dimensions and between 
Dimensions at Bank-Level 
 CG Mission Board 
composition 
Board 
leadership 
Board 
meeting 
Nomination 
committee 
Shari’ah 
governance 
Shari’ah 
compliance 
Ethical 
business 
Spearman's 
rho 
CG Cor.Coef 1.000 .696** .794** .686** .477** .632** .674** .591** .647** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Mission Cor.Coef .696** 1.000 .799** .625** .581** .586** .444** .353** .671** 
Sig. .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .010 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Board 
composition 
Cor.Coef .794** .799** 1.000 .831** .538** .784** .621** .471** .682** 
Sig. .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Board 
leadership 
Cor.Coef .686** .625** .831** 1.000 .398** .697** .484** .485** .623** 
Sig. .000 .000 .000  .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Board 
meeting 
Cor.Coef .477** .581** .538** .398** 1.000 .566** .260 .120 .259 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .003  .000 .060 .391 .061 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Nomination 
committee 
Cor.Coef .632** .586** .784** .697** .566** 1.000 .517** .425** .430** 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .002 .001 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Shari’ah 
governance 
Cor.Coef .674** .444** .621** .484** .260 .517** 1.000 .632** .382** 
Sig. .000 .001 .000 .000 .060 .000  .000 .005 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Shari’ah 
compliance 
Cor.Coef .591** .353** .471** .485** .120 .425** .632** 1.000 .377** 
Sig. .000 .010 .000 .000 .391 .002 .000  .005 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Ethical 
business 
Cor.Coef .647** .671** .682** .623** .259 .430** .382** .377** 1.000 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .061 .001 .005 .005  
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
5.7.2.2. Correlations between CGI and its dimensions at country-level 
Table 5.41 shows the correlation estimations country-wise. As can be seen, there are 
slightly weaker correlations between corporate governance and its dimensions as 
compared to the results of the bank-wise dataset. The CG has a strong correlation with 
‘Board composition’ (r = .962, p = 0.000); ‘Board leadership’ (r = .950, p = 0.000); 
‘Nomination committee’ (r = .897, p = 0.000); ‘Ethical business’ (r = .822, p = 0.000) 
and ‘Mission’ (r = .806, p = 0.000). CG also has a correlation with ‘Shari’ah 
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governance’ (r = .732, p = 0.002); ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .680, p = 0.005) and 
‘Board meeting’ (r = .595, p = 0.019). 
Apart from the above relationships, as shown in Table 5.41, relationships between the 
CG dimensions are also observed. It seems that ‘Mission’ is highly correlated with 
‘Board composition’ (r = .873, p = 0.000); ‘Board meeting’ (r = .793, p = 0.000); 
‘Board leadership’ (r = .760, p = 0.001); and ‘Ethical business’ (r = .742, p = 0.002). 
There are also correlations with the ‘Nomination committee’ (r = .597, p = 0.019); 
‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .461, p = 0.002); and ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .420, p = 
0.005). 
Table 5.41 also shows that ‘Board composition’ is highly correlated with ‘Board 
leadership’ (r = .943, p = 0.000); ‘Nomination committee’ (r = .838, p = 0.000); and 
‘Ethical business’ (r = .759, p = 0.001) while its correlations are slightly above 
average with  ‘Board meeting’ (r = .691, p = 0.004); ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .656, 
p = 0.008); and ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .588, p = 0.021). 
As indicated in Table 5.41, the ‘Board leadership’ is highly correlated with the 
‘Nomination committee’ (r = .869, p = 0.000) and ‘Ethical business’ (r = .790, p = 
0.000). The ‘Board leadership’ relationships are above average with ‘Shari’ah 
governance’ (r = .669, p = 0.006); ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r = .669, p = 0.006) and 
‘Board meeting’ (r = .507, p = 0.054). 
It is also observed that the variable ‘Nomination committee’ is quite strongly 
correlated with ‘Shari’ah governance’ (r = .697, p = 0.004); ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (r 
= .688, p = 0.005) and slightly above average with ‘Ethical business’ (r = .599, p = 
0.018), 
As shown in Table 5.41, ‘Shari’ah governance’ is highly correlated with ‘Shari’ah 
compliance’ (r = .798, p = 0.000). The table below also indicates very modest 
relationship between ‘Shari’ah compliance’ and ‘Ethical business’ (r = .505, p = 
0.055).  
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Table 5.41: Correlation Estimations between CGI and Dimensions and between 
Dimensions at Country-Level 
 CG Mission Board 
composition 
Board 
leadership 
Board 
meeting 
Nomination 
committee 
Shari’ah 
governance 
Shari’ah 
compliance 
Ethical 
business 
Spearman's 
rho 
CG Cor. 
Coef 
1.000 .806** .962** .950** .595* .897** .732** .680** .822** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .019 .000 .002 .005 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Mission Cor. 
Coef 
.806** 1.000 .873** .760** .793** .597* .461 .420 .742** 
Sig. .000  .000 .001 .000 .019 .084 .119 .002 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Board 
composition 
Cor. 
Coef 
.962** .873** 1.000 .943** .691** .838** .656** .588* .759** 
Sig. .000 .000  .000 .004 .000 .008 .021 .001 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Board 
leadership 
Cor. 
Coef 
.950** .760** .943** 1.000 .507 .869** .669** .669** .790** 
Sig. .000 .001 .000  .054 .000 .006 .006 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Board 
meeting 
Cor. 
Coef 
.595* .793** .691** .507 1.000 .459 .438 .157 .464 
Sig. .019 .000 .004 .054  .085 .103 .577 .082 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Nomination 
committee 
Cor. 
Coef 
.897** .597* .838** .869** .459 1.000 .697** .688** .599* 
Sig. .000 .019 .000 .000 .085  .004 .005 .018 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Shari’ah 
governance 
Cor. 
Coef 
.732** .461 .656** .669** .438 .697** 1.000 .798** .483 
Sig. .002 .084 .008 .006 .103 .004  .000 .068 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Shari’ah 
compliance 
Cor. 
Coef 
.680** .420 .588* .669** .157 .688** .798** 1.000 .505 
Sig. .005 .119 .021 .006 .577 .005 .000  .055 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ethical 
business 
Cor. 
Coef 
.822** .742** .759** .790** .464 .599* .483 .505 1.000 
Sig. .000 .002 .001 .000 .082 .018 .068 .055  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
5.7.3. Correlations between Risk Management and its Dimensions 
This section proceeds with the results of the findings of RM correlation as depicted in 
Table 5.42 and Table 5.43. 
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5.7.3.1. Correlations between RMI and dimensions at bank-level  
The results in Table 5.42 show that there are positive correlations between RMI and 
its dimensions. The proxy of RMI has slightly above average correlations with ‘Risk 
management control’ (r = .684, p = 0.000); ‘Risk management committee’ (r = .676, p 
= 0.000) and ‘Reporting’ (r = .654, p = 0.000). However, it is observed that the 
correlation is just about moderate between RM and ‘Credit risk’ (r = .544, p = 0.000); 
‘Audit’ (r = .540, p = 0.000); ‘Market and liquidity risk’ (r = .461, p = 0.001) and 
‘Other risk’ (r = .421, p = 0.002). 
Table 5.42 also shows the strength of the relationships between dimensions in the RM 
group. There are positive correlations between various RM dimensions. Based on the 
table, modest relationships are observed between RM and its dimensions. ‘Audit’ is 
not strongly correlated with ‘Risk management control’ (r = .465, p = 0.000); ‘Risk 
management committee’ (r = .449, p = 0.001); ‘Reporting’ (r = .434, p = 0.001) and 
‘Other risk’ (r = .289, p = 0.036). As for the variable ‘Risk management committee’, 
Table 5.42 also indicates that it is correlated with ‘Risk management control’ (r = 
.688, p = 0.000); ‘Reporting’ (r = .590, p = 0.000); ‘Credit risk’ (r = .585, p = 0.000); 
‘Market & liquidity risk’ (r = .522, p = 0.000) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .444, p = 0.001).  
The table also indicates that ‘ Risk management control’ has correlations with ‘Credit 
risk’ (r = .646, p = 0.000); ‘Reporting’ (r = .616, p = 0.000); ‘Market & liquidity risk’ 
(r = .558, p = 0.000) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .533, p = 0.000). As for ‘Reporting’, it has 
quite strong correlation with ‘Credit risk’ (r = .741, p = 0.000), ‘Market & liquidity 
risk’ (r = .650, p = 0.000) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .608, p = 0.000).  
This is quite similar to ‘Market & liquidity risk’ which has strong, positive 
correlations with ‘Credit risk’ (r = .875, p = 0.000) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .729, p = 
0.000). Table 5.42 also shows that ‘Credit risk’ has a strong, positive correlation with 
‘Other risk’ (r = .842, p = 0.000). 
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Table 5.42: Correlation Estimations between RMI and Dimensions and between 
Dimensions at Bank-Level 
 RM Audit Risk 
management 
committee 
Risk 
management 
control 
Reporting Market & 
liquidity 
risk 
Credit 
risk 
Other 
risks 
Spearman's 
rho 
RM Cor.Coef 1.000 .540** .676** .684** .654** .461** .544** .421** 
Sig.  .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .002 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Audit Cor.Coef .540** 1.000 .449** .465** .434** .105 .200 .289* 
Sig. .000  .001 .000 .001 .454 .151 .036 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Risk 
management 
committee 
Cor.Coef .676** .449** 1.000 .688** .590** .522** .585** .444** 
Sig. .000 .001  .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Risk 
management 
control 
Cor.Coef .684** .465** .688** 1.000 .616** .558** .646** .533** 
Sig. .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Reporting Cor.Coef .654** .434** .590** .616** 1.000 .650** .741** .608** 
Sig. .000 .001 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Market & 
liquidity risk 
Cor.Coef .461** .105 .522** .558** .650** 1.000 .875** .729** 
Sig. .001 .454 .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Credit risk Cor.Coef .544** .200 .585** .646** .741** .875** 1.000 .842** 
Sig. .000 .151 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Other risks Cor.Coef .421** .289* .444** .533** .608** .729** .842** 1.000 
Sig. .002 .036 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
5.7.3.2. Correlations between RMI and dimensions at country-level  
The correlation estimates in Table 5.43 show positive correlations between risk 
management and its dimensions. The RM has strong, positive correlations with ‘Risk 
management control’ (r = .928, p = 0.000); ‘Reporting’ (r = .905, p = 0.000); ‘Risk 
management committee’ (r = .878, p = 0.000) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .714, p = 0.003). 
The RM also has slightly above average correlations with ‘Credit risk’ (r = .680, p = 
0.005); ‘Audit’ (r = .668, p = 0.006) and ‘Market & liquidity risk’ (r = .644, p = 
0.010).  
Table 5.43 also shows the relationships between the RMI dimensions. It is noted that 
‘Audit’ has positive correlations with ‘Risk management committee’ (r = .710, p = 
Page 173 
 
0.003); ‘Risk management control’ (r = .561, p = 0.030) and ‘Reporting’ (r = .524, p 
= 0.045). Based on Table 5.43, the variable ‘Risk management committee’ is 
correlated with ‘Reporting’ (r = .843, p = 0.000); ‘Risk management control’ (r = 
.799, p = 0.000); ‘Other risk’ (r = .530, p = 0.042) and ‘Credit risk’ (r = .522, p = 
0.046).  
Table 5.43: Correlation Estimations between RMI and Dimensions and between 
Dimensions at Country Level 
 RM Audit Risk 
management 
committee 
Risk 
management 
control 
Reporting Market & 
Liquidity 
risk 
Credit 
risk 
Other 
risks 
Spearman's 
rho 
RM Cor.Coef 1.000 .668** .878** .928** .905** .644** .680** .714** 
Sig.  .006 .000 .000 .000 .010 .005 .003 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Audit Cor.Coef .668** 1.000 .710** .561* .524* .116 .109 .254 
Sig. .006  .003 .030 .045 .680 .699 .360 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Risk 
management 
committee 
Cor.Coef .878** .710** 1.000 .799** .843** .460 .522* .530* 
Sig. .000 .003  .000 .000 .084 .046 .042 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Risk 
management 
control 
Cor.Coef .928** .561* .799** 1.000 .767** .640* .663** .614* 
Sig. .000 .030 .000  .001 .010 .007 .015 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Reporting Cor.Coef .905** .524* .843** .767** 1.000 .622* .686** .664** 
Sig. .000 .045 .000 .001  .013 .005 .007 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Market & 
Liquidityrisk 
Cor.Coef .644** .116 .460 .640* .622* 1.000 .962** .925** 
Sig. .010 .680 .084 .010 .013  .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Credit risk Cor.Coef .680** .109 .522* .663** .686** .962** 1.000 .914** 
Sig. .005 .699 .046 .007 .005 .000  .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Other risks Cor.Coef .714** .254 .530* .614* .664** .925** .914** 1.000 
Sig. .003 .360 .042 .015 .007 .000 .000  
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 5.43 also shows that ‘Risk management control’ has positive correlations with 
‘Reporting’ (r = .767, p = 0.001); ‘Credit risk’ (r = .663, p = 0.007); ‘Market & 
liquidity risk’ (r = .640, p = 0.010) and ‘Other risk’ (r = .614, p = 0.015). The variable 
‘Reporting’ has moderate positive correlations with ‘Credit risk’ (r = .686, p = 0.005); 
‘Other risk’ (r = .664, p = 0.007) and ‘Market & liquidity risk’(r = .622, p = 0.013). 
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As indicated in Table 5.43, ‘Market & liquidity risk’ has very strong positive 
correlations with ‘Credit risk’ (r = .962, p = 0.000) as well as ‘Other risk’ (r = .925, p 
= 0.000). As for the ‘Credit risk’, it has a very strong positive correlation with ‘other 
risk’ (r = .914, p = 0.000). 
5.7.4. Summary of the Relationship between CGI and RMI 
The analysis in this section shows all the possible relationships between CGI and RMI 
based on correlation analysis that is employed on data for both bank and country 
comparisons. It is observed that the strength of the relationship between CG and RM 
is just slightly above average. It is also noted that some of the dimensions of CG and 
RM have very strong relationships with each other. Perhaps this could be the reason 
why in many instances, CG and RM seem to be discussed interchangeably.  
The correlation analysis in this section is aimed at examining the relationships among 
the dimensions (i.e. two dimensions at a time), based on the respective CG and RM 
frameworks. The analysis is pursued to further investigate the inter-relationship 
between CG and RM. This is carried out through a regression analysis in the 
following section. 
5.8. EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF DIMENSIONS ON CGI AND RMI: 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
In identifying which variables have a greater effect on the dependent variable with the 
objective of both substantiating the findings from descriptive and correlation analyses 
so far present, a further investigation of the inter-relationship between CG and RM is 
carried out through regression analysis. It should be noted that regression analysis as a 
statistical method is about describing and evaluating the relationship between a given 
variable and one (or more) variables to explain movements in a variable by reference 
to movements in other variables (Gravetter and Wallnau, 2008).  
This section aims to find out the effect of each dimension of CGI through regression 
analysis. Similarly, the same approach applies in finding the effects on RMI. The 
findings are based on the test conducted on the banks comparison. 
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The following regression model is formulated by taking the dimensions of CG as the 
independent variables to explain the dependent variable, CGI. 
CG = α1 + β1mission + β2boardcomposition + β3boardleadership + β4boardmeeting 
+ β5nominationcommittee + β6shariahgov + β7shariahcompliance + 
β8ethicalbusiness + ε1          (1) 
Based on the proposed model, there are 8 dimensions that determine the CGI score. 
Similarly, a regression model is formulated where RMI is regressed against its 
dimensions as shown in the regression equation 2: 
RM = α2 + β1riskmgtcommittee + β2riskmgtpractice + β3riskmtdisclosure + 
β4reporting + β5marketliqrisk + β6creditrisk + β7otherrisks + β8ethicalbusiness + ε2
           (2) 
where CG: corporate governance; RM: risk management; α1 and α2 are constants; ε1 
and ε2 = error terms.  
The models use CGI and RMI as the respective dependent variables, while their 
respective dimensions are the independent variables. Based on the equation 1, CG is a 
function of CG’s dimensions (which are the explanatory variables). 
5.8.1. Regression Results for CGI 
This section employs a multiple regression analysis to measure the determinants of 
CGI through the secondary data obtained from the annual reports.  
Table 5.44: Model Summary of the Regression Analysis for CG for IBs 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
1 .883a .780 .740 .113608 
Notes: a. Predictors: (Constant), ethicalbusiness, boardmeeting, Shari’ahgovernance, 
Shari’ahcompliance, boardleadership, nominationcommittee, mission, boardcomposition 
Based on the model summary (Table 5.44), the adjusted R-Square or the coefficient of 
determination is quite close to the perfect model with about 74%. Thus, the model 
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presented in this study explains about 74% of the variations observed in the dependent 
variable, which is quite highly satisfactory.  
The result of the adjusted R2 is verified by the results provided through ANOVA 
(Table 5.45), as dividing the regression sum of squares by the total sum of squares, 
the same adjusted R result is obtained. 
Table 5.45: ANOVAa for CG for IBs 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.010 8 .251 19.471 .000b 
Residual .568 44 .013     
Total 2.578 52       
Notes: a. Dependent Variable: cg; b. Predictors: (Constant), ethicalbusiness, boardmeeting, 
Shari’ahgovernance, Shari’ahcompliance, boardleadership, nominationcommittee, mission, 
boardcomposition 
Table 5.45 also indicates that ANOVA analysis produced highly significant results as 
the models were fully significant. 
Table 5.46: Regression Coefficient for CG for IBs  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .026 .036  .725 .472 
Mission .060 .101 .091 .596 .555 
Boardcomposition .188 .141 .285 1.332 .190 
Boardleadership -.002 .075 -.003 -.022 .983 
Boardmeeting .075 .061 .133 1.220 .229 
Nominationcommittee .032 .083 .053 .385 .702 
Shari’ahgovernance .167 .099 .174 1.691 .098 
Shariahcompliance .335 .094 .360 3.559 .001 
ethicalbusiness .067 .100 .079 .673 .504 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: CG 
Table 5.46 provides the coefficient estimates for the models mentioned through the 
path analysis by using the multiple linear regression method. As depicted, the model 
has only one dimension, ‘Shari’ah compliance’ with a coefficient value of 36.0 and p-
value of 0.001, which is found to be statistically significant. Indeed ‘Shari’ah 
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governance’ is also found to be statistically significant at the 10% level of 
significance. The remaining dimensions: ‘mission’, ‘board composition’, ‘board 
leadership’, ‘board meeting’, ‘nomination and remuneration committee’ and ‘ethical 
business’ were found to be not statistically significant based on the analysis. Having 
‘Shari’ah governance’ statistically significant is indeed an important conclusion for 
IBs. 
5.8.2. Regression Results for RM 
Similarly, the study measured determining variables of RMI through the same set of 
secondary data by employing the multiple regression analysis. Table 5.47 provides a 
model summary where the adjusted R2 or the coefficient of determination was quite 
close to the perfect model with about 69%. Thus, the model presented in this study 
explains about 69% of the variation observed in the dependent variable, which is quite 
highly satisfactory.  
Table 5.47: Model Summary of the regression analysis for RM for IBs 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
1 .855a .731 .689 .127805 
Notes: a. Predictors: (Constant), otherrisks, audit, riskmgtcommittee, reporting, riskmgtcontrol, 
marketliqrisk, creditrisk 
The result of the adjusted R2 is verified by the results provided through ANOVA as 
shown in Table 5.48, as by dividing the regression sum of squares by the total sum of 
squares, the same adjusted R result is obtained. The table indicates that ANOVA 
analysis produced highly significant results as the models were fully significant. 
Table 5.48: ANOVAa for RM for IBs 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.993 7 .285 17.431 .000b 
Residual .735 45 .016     
Total 2.728 52       
Notes: a. Dependent Variable: rm; b. Predictors: (Constant), otherrisks, audit, riskmgtcommittee, 
reporting, riskmgtcontrol, marketliqrisk, creditrisk 
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Table 5.49 provides the coefficient estimates for the models mentioned through the 
path analysis by using the multiple linear regression method. As depicted, the model 
has only two dimensions: ‘reporting’ and ‘risk management control’ with both 
variables being statically significant with a coefficient value of 0.52 with p-value of 
0.001, and 0.31 with p-value of 0.027. The remaining dimensions: ‘audit’, ‘risk 
management committee’, ‘risk management control’, market and liquidity risk’, 
‘credit risk’ and ‘other risks’ are not significant based on the analysis. It should be 
noted that ‘market and liquidity risks’ and ‘credit risk’ variables are not statistically 
significant but they do have a negative relationship with the dependent variable. As 
the results show, ‘reporting’ and ‘risk management control’, being significant among 
other variables, makes sense considering the importance of such variables in the RM 
process. 
Table 5.49: Regression Coefficient for RM for IBs  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 (Constant) .097 .058   1.667 .102 -.020 .214 
audit .142 .110 .130 1.299 .201 -.078 .363 
riskmgtcommittee .071 .073 .120 .962 .341 -.077 .219 
riskmgtcontrol .203 .088 .312 2.291 .027 .025 .381 
reporting .396 .108 .520 3.668 .001 .179 .614 
marketliqrisk -.059 .118 -.090 -.504 .617 -.296 .178 
creditrisk -.018 .168 -.025 -.105 .917 -.356 .321 
otherrisks .016 .130 .021 .121 .904 -.247 .278 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: rm 
5.9. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented extensive analysis in various levels and through various 
methods in determining CGI and RMI and also the correlation within and between 
themselves. The analysis is concluded with a regression analysis in an attempt to 
determine the most effective dimension having impact on CGI and RMI respectively. 
The findings in this chapter show that all the CG dimensions have positive effects on 
CG apart from board leadership, which has a negative effect. However, only two 
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variables have significant effects on CGI: Shari’ah governance’ (at the 10% 
significance level) and ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (at the 5% significance level). As for 
RM, all their dimensions have a positive effect on RM apart from ‘market risk’ and 
‘credit risk’, which have a negative effect. Similar to CGI, only two variables have 
significant effects on RMI: ‘reporting’ and ‘risk management control’, at the 5% 
significance level. The findings confirm the hypotheses which state that ‘Shari’ah 
compliance’ and ‘Shari’ah governance’ are the key determinants of CGI while 
‘reporting’ and ‘risk management control’ are the key factors in risk management. 
Further reflections on the descriptive analysis showing low CGI and RMI are also 
provided in this chapter, which should be a cause of concern for the robust and 
consolidated development of the IBs. 
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CHAPTER 6 
UNDERSTANDING PERCEPTIONS ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT: DESCRIPTIVE 
FINDINGS FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter presents the findings from a questionnaire survey conducted on corporate 
governance and risk management with managers from Islamic banks in a number of 
countries. In undertaking the survey, questionnaires were used as a medium to reach 
the Islamic Banks’ (IBs) employees. The information obtained from the respondents 
is used to gauge their perceptions on corporate governance frameworks and risk 
management aspects in IBs through developed categories in an attempt to explore the 
relationship between Corporate Governance (CG) and Risk Management (RM).  
As explained in research methodology chapter, this study assumes that CG and RM 
are two separate frameworks. Thus, the questionnaire is divided into two main parts: 
‘corporate governance’ and ‘risk management’, each part has 66 and 57 constructs 
respectively. The CG and RM segment is separated into six and five dimensions 
respectively. The six corporate governance dimensions are: ‘board’, ‘structure, 
committee and senior management’, ‘disclosure and transparency’, ‘audit’, ‘policies 
and procedures’ and ‘supports and operations’. The 5 dimensions of RM are: ‘risk 
management (general)’, ‘credit risk’, ‘market and liquidity risks’, ‘operational risk’, 
and ‘Shari’ah risk’.  
Each statement of CG and RM is a construct (also known as a variable) that is 
measured individually. Subsequently, the related constructs are measured collectively 
through their respective dimensions.  
SPSS is employed to analyse each construct by running a frequency test. The results 
are in the form of statistically empirical evidence which display the mean score of 
each dimension obtained based on the level of perception indicated by the 
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respondents. Using the SPSS generated output, the results are presented in a series of 
simplified tables below. 
One of the ways this research provides information about the data is through a 
descriptive analysis, which aims to describe the main features of the data 
quantitatively. As its preliminary findings, this chapter provides a descriptive analysis 
using SPSS44. In addition, inferential statistical analyses in the form of parametric 
tests are also presented. 
This chapter is comprised of seven sections: the first section covers the demographic 
profiles of the respondents and provides a descriptive analysis of the profiles. In line 
with the format of the questionnaire, the second and third sections deal with CG-
related and RM-related constructs respectively. The fourth section presents a 
summary of the descriptive analysis while the fifth section highlights the criteria that 
influences the perceptions. Section six and seven both present the statistical analysis 
before the chapter concludes with the findings of its perception approach. 
6.2. THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
This section presents the demographic profiles of the participants of the survey. The 
questionnaire is aimed at getting responses from Islamic banks (IB) from all over the 
world. To maintain confidentiality, the questionnaire only requires four types of 
details from the respondents, which are the: locality of the IB, position of the 
respondent, nature of the IB, and the inception year of the IB. 
The findings of the demographic profile provided through the SPSS-based analysis 
are presented in the simplified Table 6.1. As can be seen from the table, 39.3% of the 
responses obtained are from Indonesia, while 28.6% are from Malaysia, 14.3% are 
from Turkey, and 10.7% are from the UK. Qatar and Pakistan provide 3.6% of the 
responses, respectively. Questionnaires were initially targeted to reach Islamic banks 
in any part of the world. However, this was not achieved as getting responses from 
IBs was the biggest hurdle in the research process, and therefore the sampled IBs 
remained limited with six countries and 28 IBs. 
                                                          
44 SPSS is used to provide the characteristics of the variables in the data file as it provides a quick 
summary of the data (Pallant, 2010) in which details such as frequencies and mean values are ranked to 
be used for further analysis. 
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As depicted in Table 6.1, 42.9% of the responses obtained are from risk-related 
officers while 50% are from non-risk-related officers. The remaining 7.1% of the 
respondents did not specify their positions. Perhaps this suggests a preference for 
confidentiality, and may be associated with the poor response rate for the 
questionnaire. 
Table 6.1: Demographic Profile of the Sampled Institutions 
Variable 
Group 
Variable Valid 
Frequency 
Percentage 
Valid 
Location 
Indonesia 11 39.3 
Malaysia 8 28.6 
Pakistan 1 3.6 
Qatar 1 3.6 
Turkey 4 14.3 
UK 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
Position 
Risk Officer 12 42.9 
Non-risk officer 14 50.0 
Not specified 2 7.1 
Total 28 100.0 
Type 
Full-fledged Islamic Bank 22 78.6 
Islamic window of conventional 
domestic bank 
4 14.3 
Islamic financial institution 1 3.6 
Islamic window of conventional 
foreign bank  
1 3.6 
Total 28 100.0 
Year 
Before 1990s 4 14.3 
1990s 5 17.9 
Between 2000 to 2006 10 35.7 
2007-2012 8 28.6 
Not specified 1 3.6 
Total 28 100.0 
Despite its aims to reach IBs from five categories, based on Table 6.1, only four 
categories of IBs responded to the survey. About 78.6% of the responses are from 
‘full-fledged Islamic bank’, while 14.3% are from ‘Islamic window of domestic 
conventional bank’. The responses from the ‘Islamic financial institution’ and 
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‘Islamic window of foreign conventional bank’ account for 3.6% each. As the results 
show, no responses from any of the ‘foreign Islamic bank’ could be gathered. 
In examining the relationship between Corporate Governance (CG) and Risk 
Management (RM) practices in IBs, the developments of CG and RM in IBs are 
associated with the duration or longevity of their presence in the industry. Thus, based 
on their inception or establishment years, the IBs are grouped into four phases: 
‘before 1990s’, ‘during 1990s’, ‘between 2000 to 2006’ and ‘between 2007 to 2012’. 
As shown in Table 6.1, 35.7% of the responses are from IBs established ‘between 
2000 to 2006’ and 28.6% are from the banks established ‘between 2007 to 2012’. 
Responses from the IBs established ‘during 1990s’ and ‘before 1990s’ account for 
17.9% and 14.3% respectively. The remaining 3.6% of the responses (1) come from 
IBs, which did not state their inception year.  
6.3. PERCEPTIONS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
This section presents the findings on CG-related issues as covered in the 
questionnaire. It constitutes all the essential parts (dimensions) of CG which are 
presented on each individual construct of the CG dimensions based on the perceptions 
of the respondents.  
6.3.1. Perceptions on Board’s Effectiveness 
Table 6.2 presents the results on ‘board effectiveness’ based on perceptions through 
16 constructs as well as from the fact-finding gathered from the first construct of this 
dimension. 
Unlike the rest of the constructs, the first construct is aimed at fact finding and is not 
about perception. This statement establishes whether ‘the roles of the chairman and 
CEO are split’. Quite often, the functions of the Chairman and CEO are normally held 
by two different individuals. 
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Table 6.2: Perceptions on Board Effectiveness 
Construct  
Frequency 
(valid) 
Valid 
% 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
Roles of Chairman 
and CEO split 
Yes 24 88.9 
1.11 17 0.32 No 3 11.1 
Total 27 100 
The bank has 
appropriate number 
of independent 
DIRs 
Strongly Disagree 2 7.1 
3.96 12 1.20 
Disagree 2 7.1 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 11 39.3 
Strongly Agree 11 39.3 
Total 28 100 
The Board is not 
over-powered by 
the Chairman 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
3.64 15 1.13 
Disagree 5 17.9 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 13 46.4 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100 
The Board provides 
adequate oversight 
Disagree 1 3.6 
4.00 10 0.82 
Neutral 6 21.4 
Agree 13 46.4 
Strongly Agree 8 28.6 
Total 28 100 
The Board has clear 
mission and vision 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
4.04 7 0.92 
Disagree 1 3.6 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 16 57.1 
Strongly Agree 8 28.6 
Total 28 100 
The Board has 
diverse background 
and expertise 
 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 1 3.6 
4.07 5 0.66 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 19 67.9 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100 
The Board has 
strong credentials 
Disagree 3 10.7 
4.04 7 0.88 Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 16 57.1 
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Construct  
Frequency 
(valid) 
Valid 
% 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
Strongly Agree 8 28.6 
Total 28 100 
The Board is 
ethical and 
transparent 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
4.07 5 0.94 
Disagree 1 3.6 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly Agree 9 32.1 
Total 28 100 
The Board oversees 
strategic planning 
process 
Disagree 1 3.6 
4.14 4 0.71 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 8 28.6 
Total 28 100 
The Board 
monitors 
management's 
execution plan 
Neutral 1 3.6 
4.39 1 0.57 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly Agree 12 42.9 
Total 28 100 
The Board reviews 
management code 
of conduct 
Disagree 1 3.6 
4.00 10 0.72 
Neutral 4 14.3 
Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100 
The Board assess 
resources and 
prioritises key 
operational matters 
Disagree 3 10.7 
3.75 13 0.89 
Neutral 6 21.4 
Agree 14 50.0 
Strongly Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100 
The Board 
ascertains no 
misleading 
financial statements 
Disagree 1 3.7 
4.19 3 0.68 
Neutral 1 3.7 
Agree 17 63.0 
Strongly Agree 8 29.6 
Total 27 100 
The Board has 
effective succession 
planning 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
3.43 16 1.00 
Disagree 4 14.3 
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Construct  
Frequency 
(valid) 
Valid 
% 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
Neutral 8 28.6 
Agree 12 42.9 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100 
The Board 
convenes effective 
meeting 
Disagree 2 7.1 
4.29 2 0.85 
Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 12 42.9 
Strongly Agree 13 46.4 
Total 28 100 
The Board adopts 
effective approvals 
on decision-making 
Disagree 1 3.6 
4.04 7 0.79 
Neutral 5 17.9 
Agree 14 50.0 
Strongly Agree 8 28.6 
Total 28 100 
The Board 
recognises the 
needs in light of 
technological 
change 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
3.75 13 0.97 
Disagree 1 3.6 
Neutral 8 28.6 
Agree 12 42.9 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100 
 
According to the responses obtained in Table 6.2, 88.9% of the IBs have split roles for 
the Chairman and CEO, signifying the IBs’ preferences for having two individuals for 
the two separate positions. This may indicate that this structure is probably preferred 
because it is assumed that it is more effective and works better for addressing issues 
on transparency, conflict of interest, and control, at the very least. On the other hand, 
11.1% of the IBs show that the Chairman and the CEO have dual functions (i.e. the 
position is held by the same individual), and one bank does not reveal whether it has 
separate roles and functions for its Chairman and CEO positions.  
As shown in Table 6.2, 39.3% of the respondents agree that their banks have an 
‘appropriate number of independent directors’ sitting on the board. Similar 
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percentages account for the ones who strongly agree with the statement. This implies 
that the boards of the IBs have adequate independence in decision making. Having the 
right number of independent directors sitting in the board accentuates the assurance of 
board independence in the decision making process. Nevertheless, a small percentage 
of the respondents perceive the issue differently. Those who disagree, strongly 
disagree, and are neutral with this statement each represent 7.1% of the respondents 
respectively.  
Despite many general claims that banks are always overpowered by their Chairman, 
67.8% of the respondents agree that ‘the board is not over-powered by the chairman’. 
In fact, 21.4% of the respondents strongly assert this point. This may suggest that the 
board bench has the strength and additional power to challenge the CEO. However, 
21.5% feel that the banks are over-powered by the Chairman and another 3.6% 
strongly agree with this. The remaining 10.7% of the respondents remain indifferent.  
Boards that help to formulate and develop plans could help strategise the banks better. 
Based on the findings presented in Table 6.2, 75% of the respondents agree that their 
boards ‘provide adequate oversight function’ while 28.6% of them strongly believe 
that the board has the oversight capability attributed to their holistic view. However 
3.6% of the respondents disagree with that statement while 21.4% of the respondents 
do not indicate their views on this.   
As seen in Table 6.2, 57.1% of the respondents agree that the board has ‘clear 
missions and vision’ for the bank and another 28.6% of them strongly agree with this 
point. This implies that the bank is effectively transparent and it communicates well 
across the board. This could be reflected in the projects or any initiatives undertaken 
by the bank. While 7.1% of the respondents are indifferent, the group that disagree 
and strongly disagree pertaining to the board having a clear mission and vision make 
up 3.6% of respondents.  
The board may have diverse backgrounds and skill sets which help to weigh and 
challenge the CEO’s opinion. In exploring such issues, Table 6.2 shows that 67.9% 
and 21.4% of the respondents agree and strongly agree respectively that their ‘board 
have the diverse background and expertise to steer the bank’. This implies that the 
banks have a prudent nomination committee that is capable of bringing in good talent 
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and highly competent people to sit in the board to lead the bank. However 3.6% of the 
respondents disagree with this point while another 7.1% of the respondents remain 
neutral.  
Based on Table 6.2, 57.1% and 28.6% of the respondents agree and strongly agree 
that the board ‘have strong credentials’ in their IBs, which implies that the board has a 
strong presence in the bank where their experiences and past successes have 
contributed towards the bank’s performance. About 10.7% of the respondents 
disagreeing with this perception may be because of inadequate directions being given 
to management. Another 3.6% however, are indifferent on this issue.  
Boards are always held responsible in ensuring that all aspects of work are undertaken 
in a credible manner worthy of public trust and confidence. This is reflected in the 
bank survey as, based on Table 6.2, 53.6% of the respondents assert that the board is 
‘ethical and transparent’ and another 32.1% strongly share this view. This may imply 
that the banks contain a board that has a high regard for their duty of care and 
obligation. However those who disagree and strongly disagree make up 3.6% of the 
respondents each, and this could be due to unfavourable changes in the banks’ 
policies that the banks implement. Another 7.1% of them are neutral.  
As shown in Table 6.2, 60.7% of the respondents think that the board ‘oversee the 
strategic planning process’ of the bank and another 28.6% strongly agree on this. The 
results suggest that the banks have a competent board that has a clear sense of 
direction with holistic views and varying perspectives. Nevertheless, 3.6% of the 
respondents do not agree that their board is involved in strategic planning while 
another 7.1% of the respondents are indifferent with the statement. 
As indicated in Table 6.2, 53.6% of the respondents agree that the board ‘monitor the 
management's execution of the corporate and business plan’, while another 42.9% 
strongly agree with this point. This may imply that the board addresses issues in the 
bank by being observant with the developments in the bank and how the management 
functions while segregating their workloads to ensure timely and consistent decision 
making at the appropriate level. To a certain extent, the monitoring is reflected via 
board meetings. About 3.6% of the respondents are neutral on this point. There is no 
perceived disagreement on this statement. 
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Based on the findings presented in Table 6.2, 60.7% of respondents agree that the 
board ‘reviews the codes of conduct and ethics that are incorporated into the bank’s 
strategy and business operations with the management’ and another 21.4% of the 
respondents strongly agree with this point. This implies that the bank ascertains work 
ethics from the top to ensure credibility and its worthiness of using resources 
efficiently and effectively to avoid improper use of public funds. Those who disagree 
with this statement make up 3.6% of the respondents while the remaining 14.3% of 
them are indifferent. 
As shown in Table 6.2, 50% of the respondents agree that the board ‘assess resources 
and prioritises key operational matters of the bank’ and another 17.9% of the 
respondents strongly agree with this point. This suggests that the banks have a smooth 
implementation in their undertaken projects as the board themselves are involved by 
making sure that the bank has adequate resources and uses them objectively. However 
10.7% of the respondents disagree that the board is involved in the assessment of the 
operational process at all. The remaining 21.4% of the respondents indicate their 
neutral perception.  
As depicted in Table 6.2, 63% and 29.6% of the respondents agree and strongly agree 
respectively that the board ‘ascertains that there are no misleading financial 
statements’. This implies that the banks have no issues with complying with the laws 
and regulations, while none of the respondents have very strong disagreements with 
this, and 3.7% of the respondents indicate disagreement. This could be due to the 
absence of a statement which shows that the board undertakes the validity of the 
financial statement.  It should be noted that 3.7% of the respondents remain neutral. 
Monitoring and assessing performance is part of the board’s responsibilities. Based on 
Table 6.2, 42.9% of the respondents agree that ‘the board has effective succession 
planning with well-articulated assessment and benchmarking strategy to help decide 
on the future leader’. Another 10.7% strongly agree with this view.  This implies that 
the sampled banks have good training programmes to support succession planning. 
However, 14.3% of the respondents disagree that the board has effective succession 
planning in place and another 3.6% strongly disagree on this point. This could be 
triggered by many factors such as: too many independent board members sitting in the 
board and not being fully engaged with the bank or inadequate information being fed 
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to the board. Unsuitable structures or committees in charge of succession planning can 
also contribute to disagreement on this construct. The remaining 28.6% of the 
respondents are neutral.  
As shown in Table 6.2, 46.4% of the respondents strongly agree that the ‘board 
convenes its regular meetings effectively’ and 42.9% agree with this. This suggests 
that the banks have proper monitoring and documentation processes as far as board 
meetings are concerned. The agenda and minutes of the board meetings reveal the 
effectiveness of the meeting through an adequate record of the details. However, 7.1% 
of the respondents disagree with the board meetings’ effectiveness, while another 
3.6% of the respondents remain neutral. None of the respondents show strong 
disapproval on this point.  
When the banks are well acquainted with the dynamics of the decision-making 
process and are receptive to challenges and new models in the environment, it implies 
that an effective system is in place. Based on Table 6.2, 50% of the respondents agree 
that ‘the board adopts an effective system on their approvals on decision-making’ 
process. In addition, about 28.6% of the respondents strongly agree with the 
statement. However 3.6% of the respondents disagree that the board adopts an 
effective system and the remaining 17.9% of the respondents are indifferent.  
Despite technology being woven into every aspect of the banking business, some still 
view that understanding IT is primarily the job of the IT officers. However, as the 
findings demonstrated in Table 6.2 show, 42.9% of the respondents assert that ‘the 
board recognises the need to develop and strengthen their governance skills in light of 
technological developments and changing environments to become better leaders and 
change agents’, while 21.4% strongly agree with this. It should be added that those 
who disagree and have very strong disagreement on the board recognising such a need 
make up 3.6% of the respondents each. Another 28.6% of the respondents remain 
neutral. 
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6.3.2. Perceptions on the Appropriateness of the Structure and Committees and 
Effectiveness of the Senior Management  
Table 6.3 presents the results on the constructs of the second dimension, namely on 
the appropriateness and effectiveness of the structure, committees, and the senior 
management of the IBs based on the 15 constructs from the sampled respondents. 
Based on Table 6.3, 60.7% of the respondents agree that the bank has ‘an appropriate 
structure in place to assist in discharging its functions’, while the remaining 39.3% are 
in strong agreement with this. There are no disagreements or neutral opinions on the 
statement, which implies that the banks have appropriate and adequate structures and 
committees as well as good senior management support to share insights with the 
board in addressing governance challenges. This eases the job towards complying 
with the regulations and achieving the bank’s expectations. 
As regards to the construct that ‘the bank has clear reporting line as reflected in the 
organisational chart’, as the findings in Table 6.3 shows, 67.9% of the respondents 
agree and 28.6% of them strongly agree with the reporting. This implies that the 
banks under survey have a very transparent organisational structure. Another 3.6% of 
the respondents remain neutral and no disagreements were recorded.    
Table 6.3 also indicates that the respondents who agree and strongly agree on the 
statement that ‘Shari’ah advisors are impartial and independent of the bank’ account 
for 42.9% each. This suggests that the banks have a proper and clear mandate with 
regards to their expectations of the appointed Shari’ah advisors. However, 10.7% of 
them disagree with this while 3.6% of the respondents remain neutral. None of the 
respondents indicate strong disagreement on this statement.  
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Table 6.3: Perceptions on the Appropriateness of the Structure and Committees 
and Effectiveness of the Senior Management 
Construct 
 Frequency 
(valid) 
Percent 
(valid) Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
Appropriate structure to 
assist Board 
discharging its function 
is in place 
Agree 17 60.7 
4.39 1 0.50 
Strongly 
Agree 11 39.3 
Total              28 100 
The bank has clear 
reporting line 
Neutral 1 3.6 
4.25 4 
 
0.52 
Agree 19 67.9 
Strongly 
Agree 8 28.6 
Total 28 100 
Shari’ah advisors are 
impartial 
Disagree                3           10.7 
4.18 6 0.94 
Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 12 42.9 
Strongly 
Agree 12 42.9 
Total 28 100 
Shari’ah advisors are 
resourceful and 
efficient 
Disagree 1 3.6 
3.86 11 
 
0.80 
Neutral 8 28.6 
Agree 13 46.4 
Strongly 
Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100 
Shari’ah advisors are 
easily accessible 
Disagree 2 7.1 
3.93 10 
 
0.86 
Neutral 5 17.9 
Agree 14 50 
Strongly 
Agree 7 25 
Total 28 100 
Shari’ah advisors have 
appropriate skill sets 
and experience 
Neutral 4 14.8 
4.26 3 
 
0.71 
Agree 12 44.4 
Strongly 
Agree 11 40.7 
Total 27 100 
Shari’ah advisor ensure 
contracts, fatwa, 
executions and policies 
comply with Shari’ah 
Neutral 1 3.6 
4.32 2 0.55 Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly 
Agree 10 35.7 
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Construct 
 Frequency 
(valid) 
Percent 
(valid) Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total 28 100 
Shari’ah advisors 
monitor business to 
safeguard shareholders’ 
interests 
Strongly 
Disagree 1 3.6 
3.54 13 1.10 
Disagree 4 14.3 
Neutral 8 28.6 
Agree 9 32.1 
Strongly 
Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100 
Shari’ah advisors 
ascertain internal 
controls and operations 
of bank’s conduct 
Strongly 
Disagree 2 7.1 
3.43 15 1.20 
Disagree 5 17.9 
Neutral 5 17.9 
Agree 11 39.3 
Strongly 
Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100 
Shari’ah advisors 
ensure adequacy of 
compliance with legal 
and regulatory 
requirements 
Strongly 
Disagree 2 7.1 
3.54 13 1.07 
Disagree 3 10.7 
Neutral 4 14.3 
Agree 16 57.1 
Strongly 
Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100 
Shari’ah advisors 
perform product 
approval 
Strongly 
Disagree 1 3.6 
3.96 9 
1.04 
 
Disagree 2 7.1 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 13 46.4 
Strongly 
Agree 9 32.1 
Total 28 100 
Bank has competent 
senior management 
Disagree 2 7.1 
4.11 7 0.83 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly 
Agree 9 32.1 
Total 28 100 
The senior management 
develops strategic plans 
Disagree 3 10.7 
4.07 8 0.90 
Neutral 1 3.6 
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Construct 
 Frequency 
(valid) 
Percent 
(valid) Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
for board review 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly 
Agree 9 32.1 
Total 28 100 
The senior management 
oversees enforcement 
on policy 
implementation 
Disagree 1 3.6 
4.21 5 0.74 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly 
Agree 10 35.7 
Total 28 100 
The senior management 
articulates the bank’s 
missions and vision 
effectively to all staff 
Disagree 2 7.1 
3.82 12 0.90 
Neutral 8 28.6 
Agree 11 39.3 
Strongly 
Agree 7 25 
Total 28 100 
It should be noted that the string agreement in favour of the statement that ‘Shari’ah 
advisors are impartial and independent of the bank’ should be interpreted with caution 
as it is the interest of the IBs to portray such a picture. However, while the Shari’ah 
scholars are selected and paid directly by the IBs, it is difficult to talk about their 
impartiality and independence. 
Regarding the construct that ‘Shari’ah advisors are resourceful and efficient’, as the 
results in Table 6.3 depicts, about 46.4% of the respondents indicate their agreement, 
while 21.4% of the respondents strongly agree on the statement, implying that the 
banks have full commitment from the Shari’ah advisors. Their full engagement with 
the banks may be attributed to many factors such the advisors willingness to uphold 
the trust bestowed upon them or that clear roles and responsibilities are spelt out by 
the banks. However, 3.6% of them disagree that the Shari’ah advisors are resourceful 
and efficient while another 28.6% of the respondents remain neutral.  
Table 6.3 shows that 50% of the respondents agree that the ‘Shari’ah advisors are 
easily accessible’ and 25% of the respondents strongly agree on that. This implies that 
the banks have committed and dedicated Shari’ah advisors to ensure continuous 
support to the banks. However, 7.1% of the respondents disagree that the Shari’ah 
advisors can be easily reached while another 17.9% of the respondents remain neutral.  
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Based on Table 6.3, 44.4% and 40.7% of the respondents agree and strongly agree 
respectively that ‘Shari’ah advisors have appropriate skill sets and experience’. This 
may be inferred through the way they professionally address and resolve Shari’ah 
issues. Another 14.8% of the respondents remain neutral, while none of the 
respondents indicate their disagreement on Shari’ah advisors having appropriate skill 
sets.  
As reflected in Table 6.3, 60.7% of the respondents agree on the point that ‘the role of 
Shari’ah advisors is to ensure that policies, procedures, fatwa adopted by the banks 
are in accordance with Shari’ah principle’, while another 35.7% of them strongly with 
this point. This indicates that the banks have adequate policies, procedures, and fatwas 
in place before the Shari’ah compliance matter is put the under the purview of the 
Shari’ah Advisors. None of the respondents indicate any disagreement on this 
statement. However, the remaining 3.6% of the respondents are indifferent.    
As shown in Table 6.3, 32.1% of the respondents assert that ‘the role of Shari’ah 
advisors includes to actively monitor the business to safeguard shareholders’ interests’ 
and 21.4% of the respondents strongly agree with this point. This may imply that the 
banks have appointed dedicated Shari’ah advisors to safeguard the shareholders’ 
interests. 14.3% of them however, disagree that Shari’ah advisors are involved in the 
monitoring at all and another 3.6% strongly disagree with this. This being the case, 
maqasid al-Shari’ah may not be achieved as shareholders’ rights may be neglected 
due to an absence or lack of monitoring by the Shari’ah advisors. As the results 
indicate, 28.6% of the respondents remain neutral.  
Being part of the internal control structure, it is quite apparent that Shari’ah advisors 
have to have some knowledge on internal controls relating to the banks’ operations. 
As such, based on Table 6.3, 39.3% of the respondents agree that the ‘Shari’ah 
advisors ascertain internal controls and operations of bank’s conduct’. This suggests 
that the banks have highly skilled Shari’ah advisors who are well-versed with the 
control aspect in the banking operations, while 17.9% of the respondents strongly 
agree, a similar percentage of the respondents disagree on this. Another 7.1% of them 
strongly disagree that Shari’ah advisors ascertain the internal controls while the 
remaining 17.9% of the respondents remain neutral.   
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To a certain extent, knowledge of the Shari’ah advisors on legal and regulatory issues 
is crucial in the development of the Islamic finance industry to accommodate to the 
continuous assessment of the regulator. Based on the results depicted in Table 6.3, 
57.1% of the respondents agree that the ‘Shari’ah advisors ensure adequacy of 
compliance with legal and regulatory requirements’. This reflects that the advisors are 
fully engaged with their responsibilities to ensure full regulatory compliance, while 
10.7% of the respondents strongly agree with the statement, a similar percentage of 
the respondents disagree that the Shari’ah advisors are involved in this matter. In fact, 
7.1% of them strongly disagree on this whereas 14.3% of the respondents indicate 
their neutral perceptions.  
In line with the Shari’ah precept that products have to conform to Shari’ah rules, 
46.4% of the respondents agree that the ‘Shari’ah advisors perform product approval’ 
and 32.1% of the respondents strongly agree with this. This implies that the banks 
may have put in place adequate structures to support Shari’ah advisors in performing 
their duties. About 7.1% of them disagree with this and 3.6% strongly disagree, while 
another 10.7% of the respondents remain neutral.  
As shown in Table 6.3, 53.6% of the respondents agree that the ‘bank has competent 
senior management to oversee business implementation’, while 32.1% of the 
respondent strongly agree on that. This suggests that the banks have provided a clear 
mandate to the senior management to undertake their roles and responsibilities. 
However, about 7.1% of them disagree with this and the same percentage of 
respondents remains neutral. It should be noted that none of the respondents indicate 
strong disagreement on the statement. 
Table 6.3 indicates that 53.6% of the respondents agree that their ‘senior management 
develops strategic plans for board review’, while another 32.1% of them strongly 
agree with this statement. This is reflected through the smooth undertaking of projects 
going on in the banks, and this may be due to the boards’ involvement in reviewing 
the feasibility of its projects. However, 10.7% of the respondents do not agree that the 
senior management develops strategic plans for board review and the remaining 3.6% 
of the respondents are neutral. 
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As regards to the perceptions on the construct that ‘the senior management oversees 
enforcement on policy implementation’, the findings in Table 6.3 indicate that 53.6% 
of the respondents agree, while 35.7% of them strongly agree on this point. This may 
imply that the banks have a good system to support the senior management in their 
monitoring tasks, especially in the development stage. About 3.6% of them disagree 
with this and another 7.1% of the respondents remain neutral. None of the respondents 
indicate strong disagreement on this statement.  
As the results in Table 6.3 show, 39.3% of the respondents assert that ‘the senior 
management articulates the bank’s missions and vision effectively to all staff’ and 
25% of the respondents strongly agree. This indicates that the banks have an adequate 
infrastructure to support effective communication. However, 7.1% of respondents 
disagree with this, perhaps due to a lack of transparency in communication while 
another 28.6% of the respondents remain neutral.   
6.3.3. Perceptions on Regulatory Disclosure and Transparency   
Table 6.4 presents the results with regards to the perceptions on the dimension of 
‘regulatory disclosure and transparency’ based on the seven constructs.   
As can be seen from the results in Table 6.4, 60.7% of the respondents agree that ‘the 
bank conforms to the highest international standard and practices for financial and 
non-financial reporting and disclosure’, and 21.4% of the respondents strongly agree 
with this. This may imply that the banks have a very good reputation with their 
credential reporting to the public and media as reported by the participants. The 
remaining 17.9% of them remain neutral, while none of the respondents indicate any 
disagreement on this statement. 
The banks assert that their ‘accounting standards are harmonised with the prudential 
standards’. This is evidenced through the survey findings reported in Table 6.4, as 
64.3% of the respondents agree with the statement and another 21.4% strongly agree. 
To a certain extent, this may imply that the banks are complying with the regulatory 
requirements as well. As the results in Table 6.4 shows, none of the respondents 
indicate any disagreement on this statement. However, the remaining 14.3% of the 
respondents remain neutral. 
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Table 6.4: Perceptions on Regulatory Disclosure and Transparency   
Construct  Frequency Valid 
(%) 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
The bank conforms to the highest 
international standard & practices 
for financial and non-financial 
reporting and disclosure. 
Neutral 5 17.9 
4.04 
3 Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0  
Bank accounting standards are 
harmonised with prudential 
standards. 
Neutral 4 14.3 
4.07 2 
Agree 18 64.3 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
The accounting processes produce 
reliable information (e.g. for 
investors and strategic decision 
making). 
Neutral 2 7.1 
4.21 1 
Agree 18 64.3 
Strongly Agree 8 28.6 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank discloses methods to 
calculate profits 
Disagree 5 17.9 
3.71 5 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank discloses the weaknesses 
of the products. 
Disagree 
 
14 50.0 
2.79 7 
Neutral 7  25.0 
Agree 6 21. 
Strongly Agree 1 3.6 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has no unresolved 
Shari’ah issues on its lack of 
standard. 
Disagree 6 21.4 
3.50 6 
Neutral 5 17.9 
Agree 14 50.0 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
Information disclosure and 
transparency is appropriately done 
(timely and adequate). 
Neutral 8 28.6 
3.93 4 
Agree 14 50.0 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
As regards to the construct that ‘the accounting processes produce reliable 
information (e.g. for investors and strategic decision making)’, the results in Table 6.4 
depict that 64.3% of the respondents agree and 28.6% strongly agreeing with this. 
This suggests that according to the perceptions of the participants, the sampled IBs 
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have good infrastructure in place to support the process. While none of the 
respondents indicate any disagreement on this statement, the remaining 7.1% of them 
remain neutral.  
As profit sharing is one of the essential elements in IB, the disclosure of the 
calculation method adopted by the IBs, for instance in terms of profit calculation, is 
crucial to the stakeholders. Based on the findings reported in Table 6.4, 53.6% of the 
respondents agree that ‘the bank discloses the methods to calculate profit’. At 17.9%, 
the percentage of the respondents who strongly agree is the same as the ones which 
disagree that the bank discloses its calculation methods. This, to a certain extent, 
implies that banks have different views on the aspect of compliance with Shari’ah. 
The remaining 10.7% of the respondents however, remain neutral. 
Although IBs are expected to disclose the weaknesses of the products they offer, 50% 
of the respondents assert that banks do not ‘disclose the weaknesses of the products’. 
Meanwhile, 25% of the respondents are indifferent, and 21.4% and 3.6% of them 
agree and strongly agree respectively that the banks disclose their products’ 
weaknesses. This implies that the IBs have different views on disclosure which could 
be subject to the individual banks’ business strategies.  
As can be seen from Table 6.4, 50% of the respondents agree that ‘the bank has no 
unresolved Shari’ah issues on its lack of standard’ with 10.7% respondents who 
strongly agree with this. However, 21.4% of them disagree with the statement that the 
banks have no unresolved Shari’ah issues. This may imply that, to a certain extent, it 
portrays the assertiveness of the IBs’ Shari’ah advisor with regards to upholding his 
principles. As can be seen, the remaining 17.9% of the banks’ respondent are neutral 
on this case. 
Table 6.4 reveals that 50% of the respondents agree on the statement that ‘information 
disclosure and transparency is appropriately done or is timely and adequate, while 
21.4% of the respondents strongly assert the point. This appropriateness and adequacy 
of information may imply that the banks have adequate resources to provide such 
disclosure. The remaining 28.6% of them remain neutral and none of the respondents 
indicate any disagreement on this construct. 
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6.3.4. Perceptions on the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Audit  
Table 6.5 shows the perceptions on the effectiveness and efficiency of Audit in FIs 
based on the 7 constructs. 
Table 6.5: Perceptions on the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Audit  
Construct  Frequency 
Valid 
Percent 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Audit and/or review are done by 
independent auditors. 
Neutral 2 7.1 
4.36       2 
Agree 14 50.0 
Strongly Agree 12 42.9 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank appoints a qualified 
external auditor. 
Neutral 1 3.6 
4.43       1 
Agree 14 50.0 
Strongly Agree 13 46.4 
Total 28 100.0 
The board reviews the scope of audit. 
Disagree 1 3.6 
 
         
4.04 
      6 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 18 64.3 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
The board are aware of the 
highlighted audit findings. 
Disagree 1 3.6 
 
4.21 
      5 
Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 9 32.1 
Total 28 100.0 
The board ensures external auditors 
have adequate expertise to conduct 
Shari’ah audit. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 3.6 
 
3.39 
      7 
Disagree 5 17.9 
Neutral 7 25.0 
Agree 12 42.9 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
Auditors ensure the truth and fairness 
of the financial statements. 
Neutral 1 3.6 
 4.29       4 
Agree 18 64.3 
Strongly Agree 9 32.1 
Total 28 100.0 
Regular audit and compliance 
assessments continuously take place. 
Neutral 2 7.1 
4.32       3 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly Agree 11 39.3 
Total 28 100.0 
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As shown in Table 6.5, 50% of the respondents agree that ‘audit and review are done 
by independent auditors’, while 42.9% of the respondents strongly agree with this. 
This implies that the banks are receptive in accepting comments. It also suggests that 
according to the perceptions of the participants, the banks agree with the appointment 
of high credential auditors and ensure that check and balance tasks are professionally 
performed. As the results show, no responses indicate otherwise, except that the 
remaining 7.1% of them remain neutral.  
It is possible that IBs consider the independence of external auditors as crucial in 
maintaining and enhancing the credibility of the bank. Based on Table 6.5, 50% of the 
respondents agree that their ‘banks appoint qualified external auditors’ and 46.4% 
strongly agree with that. This suggests that the banks are prudent with regards to the 
auditors’ appointment as only auditors of certain qualities are chosen to perform audit. 
The remaining 3.6% of them, however, remain neutral.  
Since 64.3% of the respondents assert that the ‘board reviews the scope of audit’ and 
21.4% strongly agree with that, it could imply that the board is hands on with audit 
issues. It also suggests that the board always ensures that critical areas are examined 
and any issues are addressed comprehensively. However, 10.7% of them remain 
neutral, 3.6% of the respondents disagreeing with this could probably be due to 
inadequate hands-on experience with respect to audit.  
It is shown in Table 6.5 that 60.7% of the respondents agree that ‘the board are aware 
of the highlighted audit findings’ with 32.1% strongly asserting this. Hence, this could 
imply that according to the perceptions of the participants, the board is fully aware of 
the repercussions triggered by the issues and are thus are in a better position to 
address any forthcoming problems highlighted by the auditors. However, the 
respondents who do not agree with this construct and those who are indifferent 
account for 3.6% each.  
Based on Table 6.5, 42.9% of the respondents agree that ‘the board ensures external 
auditors have adequate expertise to conduct Shari’ah audit’ and another 10.7% 
strongly agree with construct. However, 17.9% disagree and 3.6% strongly disagree 
that the board ensures the adequacy of external auditors’ expertise. In addition, the 
remaining 25% of them remain neutral. This suggests the need for further 
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development in Shari’ah audit areas as auditors on Shari’ah knowledge are still not 
well-developed.  
As the results in Table 6.5 show, 64.3% of the respondents agree that ‘auditors ensure 
the truth and fairness of the financial statements’ with 32.1% strongly agreeing with 
this construct. This implies that according to the perceptions of the participants, IBs 
have very strong faith in the auditors’ integrity. To a certain extent, this implies that, 
for the participants, most auditors have very strong dignity and ethicality in 
performing their jobs, especially as far as IBs are concerned. The results show that the 
remaining 3.6% of them remain neutral, while none of the respondents indicate any 
disagreement on this statement.  
Based on the survey findings presented in Table 6.5, 53.6% of the respondents agree 
that ‘regular audit and compliance assessments continuously take place’ with 39.3% 
strongly agreeing with this. This suggests that banks seriously emphasise audit with 
regards to compliance although audit is perceived as utilising too much of the bank’s 
resources. Thus, none of the respondents disagree that the banks are not doing regular 
audit. The remaining 7.1% of the respondents, however, remain neutral.  
6.3.5. Perceptions on Appropriateness and Comprehensiveness of Policies and 
Procedures 
Table 6.6 shows the result of perceptions on the dimension ‘appropriateness and 
comprehensiveness of the banks’ policies and procedures’ based on 7 constructs. 
As the Table 6.6 show, 50% of the respondents agree that ‘Shari’ah governance 
framework is comprehensive’ and 21.4% of them strongly agree with this. This 
implies that the banks have policies and procedures in place to ensure the continuity 
of the operations while maintaining a uniform and standardised way of carrying out 
tasks. In addition, the respondents who disagree and those who are indifferent account 
for 14.3% each, while none of the respondents indicate any strong disagreement on 
this statement.  
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Table 6.6: Perceptions on Appropriateness and Comprehensiveness of Policies 
and Procedures 
Construct  Frequency Valid 
(%) 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
Shari’ah governance 
framework is 
comprehensive. 
Disagree 4 14.3 
3.79 11  0.96 
Neutral 4 14.3 
Agree 14 50.0 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
Shari’ah-related strategies 
and principles are approved 
by Shari’ah advisors 
Disagree 1 3.6 
4.18 1  0.72 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 16 57.1 
Strongly Agree 9 32.1 
Total 28 100.0 
Shari’ah-related strategies 
and principles are 
incorporated in the business 
strategy 
Disagree 2 7.1 
3.96 6  0.79 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
The business strategies 
define the eligible 
counterparties 
Disagree 1 3.6 
4.00 4  0.61 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 21 75.0 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
The business strategies 
define the nature of 
approved Shari’ah 
compliant financing 
Disagree 1 3.6 
3.93 7  0.60 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 21 75.0 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has 
comprehensive policies and 
procedures to support 
compliance with board 
policy. 
Neutral 4 14.3 
4.07 3  0.60 
Agree 18 64.3 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
The policies and procedures 
address Shari’ah matter 
Neutral 3 10.7 
4.11 2  0.57 
Agree 19 67.9 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
The policies and procedures 
address legal matter 
Disagree 1 3.6 
3.93 7  0.60 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 21 75.0 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The policies and procedures 
ensure guidance on details 
of the bank’s business 
Disagree 1 3.6 
4.00 4  0.67 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 19 67.9 
Strongly Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100.0 
The policies and procedures 
are effective 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 2 7.1 
3.86 10  0.76 
Neutral 4 14.3 
Agree 18 64.3 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
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Construct  Frequency Valid 
(%) 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
The policies and procedures 
are regularly revised. 
Disagree 1 3.6 
3.79 11  0.74 
Neutral 8 28.6 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
The policies and procedures 
are communicated across 
the board. 
Neutral 8 28.6 
3.93 7  0.72 
Agree 14 50.0 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
As regards to the construct ‘Shari’ah-related strategies and principles are approved by 
Shari’ah advisors’, the results in Table 6.6 show that 57.1% of the respondents 
expressed agreement, while 32.1% strongly agree with the statement. This suggests 
that, according to the perceptions of the participants, the IBs’ strategies and principles 
are in conformance with Shari’ah principles. However, 3.6% disagree and the 
remaining 7.1% of them remain neutral. While Shari’ah related strategies and 
principles should be approved by Shari’ah advisors, it is important that the former is 
clearly spelt out to ease interpretation.   
Since IBs are expected to uphold Islamic principles in their business conduct, its 
strategy should be in conformance with the Shari’ah. In relation to this, about 60.7% 
of the respondents agree that ‘Shari’ah-related strategies and principles are 
incorporated into the business strategy’ and 21.4% strongly agree with this. This 
implies that according to the participants, Shari’ah advisors’ inputs are taken into 
account in outlining the business strategies. However, 7.1% disagree, while 10.7% of 
them remain neutral in relation to this construct. As the Table 6.6 shows, none of the 
respondents indicate any strong disagreement on this statement. 
One of the ways of doing Islamic business is to ascertain that each business conduct is 
performed in a permissible manner. For example, the counterparties for the business 
have to undertake business in accordance with Islamic principles. In relation to this, 
Table 6.6 shows that 75% of the respondents agree that ‘the business strategies define 
the eligible counterparties’ with 14.3% strongly agreeing with this. However, 3.6% 
disagree while 7.1% of them remain neutral.  
As can be seen from the findings demonstrated in Table 6.6, 75% of the respondents 
agree that ‘the bank’s business strategies define the nature of approved Shari’ah 
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compliant financing’ and 10.7% of the respondents strongly agree with this statement. 
This implies that the banks are being, to a certain extent, transparent with regards to 
describing their nature of financing. However, 3.6% disagree while 10.7% of them 
remain neutral. 
As regards to the construct the bank has comprehensive policies and procedures to 
support compliance with board policy’, about 64.3% of the respondents expressed 
agreement with 21.4% strongly agreeing with this.  As can be seen, the remaining 
14.3% of them are neutral, while none of the respondents indicate any strong 
disagreement on this statement. This implies that, according to the participants, most 
banks agree that policies and procedures should not conflict with compliance in any 
circumstances, otherwise this could be the loophole that leads towards discrepancies 
and other such things.   
As depicted in Table 6.6, about 67.9% of the respondents agree that ‘the policies and 
procedures address Shari’ah matter’, while 21.4% of the respondents strongly agree 
with this. However for banks which operate a dual system, it may suggest that they 
have separate documentation for conventional and Islamic banking. The remaining 
10.7% of the respondents, however, are indifferent in this matter.   
As regards to the construct that ‘the policies and procedures address legal matter’, as 
the results in Table 6.6 show, 75% of the respondents expressed agreement, while 
10.7% of the respondents strongly agree with this. This implies that banks’ banking 
practices are in line with the laws and regulations as the policies and procedures 
adopted by the bank are in conformance with the regulatory aspect. However, 3.6% of 
the respondents disagree and 10.7% of them remain neutral, and none of the 
respondents indicate any strong disagreement on this statement. 
Since 67.9% of the respondents agree that ‘the policies and procedures ensure 
guidance on details of the bank’s business’ and another 17.9% of them strongly agree 
with the statement, this suggests that the respondents have the opinion that IBs’ 
policies and procedures are comprehensive and appropriate to guide banking 
operations. About 3.6% of the respondents, however, disagree, while 10.7% of them 
remain neutral. This could be because some banks may not have adequate policies and 
Page 206 
 
procedures in place as sometimes not everything can be spelt out, depending on 
circumstances.  
It is generally accepted that policies and procedures are important, as they need to be 
cohesive and practical to be used in day-to-day banking operations. As such, 64.3% of 
the respondents agree that the ‘policies and procedures are effective’ in IBs with 
14.3% strongly agreeing with this. This indicates that, according to the participants, 
the banks have appropriate structures in place and the adequate manpower to take care 
of the documentation aspect. However, 7.1% disagree while 14.3% of them remain 
neutral.  
The survey results in Table 6.6 indicate that 53.6% of the respondents agree that ‘the 
policies and procedures are regularly revised’ and another 14.3% of them strongly 
agree with this. This suggests that banks are aware that policies and procedures are 
vital in addressing the banking business’s evolving needs. However, 3.6% disagree 
while 28.6% of them remain neutral.  
As shown in Table 6.6, 50% of the respondents agree that ‘the policies and procedures 
are communicated across the board’ and another 21.4% of them strongly agree with 
this. This implies that according to the participants, the sampled banks have effective 
communication channels. The remaining 28.6% of the respondents are neutral, and 
this could be due to the absence of appropriate policies and procedures or a lack of 
infrastructure to support effective communication. None of the respondents indicate 
any strong disagreement on this statement.  
6.3.6. Perceptions on the Efficiency of Support and Operations   
Table 6.7 depicts the general perceptions of the bank with respect to the ‘efficiency of 
the banks in terms of support and operations’ based on 12 constructs.  
As indicated by Table 6.7, 57.1% of the respondents agree that ‘the bank’s control 
processes are adequate’ to support the bank’s operations with 10.7% strongly agreeing 
with this. This suggests that the banks have adequate and relevant resources in place 
to implement controls in the banks’ operations. However, 10.7% of the respondents 
disagreeing with this presumably could be due to a lack of security awareness or 
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inadequate infrastructure to put controls in place. The remaining 21.4% of the 
respondents are neutral. 
Table 6.7: Perceptions on the Efficiency of Support and Operations   
Construct  Frequency Valid 
(%) Mean 
Mean 
Rank
ing 
Standard 
Deviation 
Control processes are 
adequate 
Disagree 3 10.7 
3.68 1  0.82 
Neutral 6 21.4 
Agree 16 57.1 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
Control processes are 
effective. 
Disagree 4 14.3 
3.54 2  0.88 
Neutral 8 28.6 
Agree 13 46.4 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has adequate 
resources to support the 
bank’s operations. 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
3.54 2  0.96 
Disagree 3 10.7 
Neutral 7 25.0 
Agree 14 50.0 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has an efficient 
system to support key 
business operation. 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
3.36 8  0.95 
Disagree 5 17.9 
Neutral 6 21.4 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly Agree 1 3.6 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has appropriate 
systems to help with 
complying to Shari’ah in 
terms of products and 
services. 
Disagree 6 21.4 
3.50 5  0.96 
Neutral 5 17.9 
Agree 14 50.0 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has a good 
reporting, documentation, 
and records management 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 4 14.3 
3.54 2  0.84 
Neutral 7 25.0 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly Agree 2 7.1 
Total 28 100.0 
Page 208 
 
Construct  Frequency Valid 
(%) Mean 
Mean 
Rank
ing 
Standard 
Deviation 
The bank has effective 
information & comm. 
technology to ensure the 
dissemination of info. to the 
mgt. 
Disagree 4 14.3 
3.50 5  0.79 
Neutral 7 25.0 
Agree 16 57.1 
Strongly Agree 1 3.6 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has put in place 
adequate and appropriate 
trainings for senior 
management and all 
employees. 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
3.46 7  1.04 
Disagree 5 17.9 
Neutral 5 17.9 
Agree 14 50.0 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The findings in Table 6.7 show that 46.4% of the respondents agree with the construct 
that ‘the control processes are effective’, while 10.7% of them strongly agree with 
this. Presumably, this reflects, according to the respondents, that the banks have 
robust systems that can accommodate to business needs. Another 14.3%, however, 
disagree with this while the remaining 28.6% of the respondents are neutral. 
As can be seen from the results, 50% of the respondents agree that ‘the bank has 
adequate resources to support the banks’ operations’ and 10.7% of them strongly 
agree with the statement. This may imply participants are in the opinion that the banks 
have a low staff turnover and thus can retain highly qualified personnel. However, 
10.7% of the respondents disagree with this and another 3.6% indicate very strong 
disagreement apart from the remaining 25% of the respondents who remain neutral. 
Table 6.7 shows that 53.6% of the respondents agree that ‘the bank has an efficient 
system to support key business operations’ with 3.6% strongly agreeing with this. 
Perhaps the banks have an IT-literate board and top management who are inclined 
towards the latest in technology to cater for a highly demanding market segment. 
About 17.9% of the respondents disagree with this with 3.6% strongly disagreeing 
with this. The remaining 21.4% are neutral. 
Based on the survey results in Table 6.7, 50% of the respondents agree that ‘the bank 
has appropriate systems to help with complying with Shari’ah in terms of products 
and services’ and another 10.7% of them strongly agree with this. About 21.4% of the 
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respondents disagree with this. The remaining 17.9% are neutral. None of the 
respondents indicate any strong disagreement on this statement. 
53.6% of the respondents agree that  ‘the bank has a good reporting, documentation, 
and records management system’ and 7.1% of them strongly agree with the statement 
This implies that according to the participants, these banks emphasise good reporting 
and highly regard documentation and good record management systems. The 14.3% 
of the respondents disagreeing with this could be due to a lack of resources to support 
adequate documentation. The remaining 25% are neutral.  
Table 6.7 reveals that 57.1% of the respondents agree that ‘the bank has effective 
information and communication technology to ensure the dissemination is effective’ 
and another 3.6% of the respondents strongly agree with this. This implies that most 
banks are equipped with adequate infrastructure with regards to ICT to support the 
business. About 14.3% of the respondents disagree with this though and this may be 
one of the best practices to instil awareness among the staff. Perhaps this is due to the 
banks not having the adequate infrastructure to support it. The remaining 25% are 
neutral with respect to information to the management. None of the respondents 
indicate any strong disagreement on this statement.  
As the results in Table 6.7 depict, 50% of the respondents agree that ‘the bank has put 
in place adequate and appropriate training for senior management and all employees’ 
while 10.7% of the respondents strongly agree with this. This should be considered as 
IBs place emphasis on staff development. Despite training possibly being highly 
regarded by banks, it still may be perceived as irrelevant by 17.9% of the respondents 
who disagree and another 3.6% of them who strongly disagree on the statement. 
Perhaps this is due to budget constraints and resource utilisation. The remaining 
17.9% are neutral.  
6.4. PERCEPTIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT 
The preceding section presented the findings developed from the perceptions and 
opinions of the participants on CG related issues. This section focuses on risk 
management practices as related by the participants. It should be noted that the 
perceptions on CG and RM in this section represents the views of the supply side 
namely the management of the IBs. 
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As above, this section presents the findings in relation to RM dimensions and clusters.  
6.4.1. Perceptions on General Risk Management Practice     
Table 6.8 shows the respondents’ perceptions on the general risk management 
practices of the banks based on the 19 constructs. The details below indicate that, in 
general, perceptions on risk management are highly encouraging. This may imply that 
the banks under survey have adequate resources to support them in managing risk.    
Table 6.8: Perceptions on General Risk Management Practice     
Construct  Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Mean Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
There is adequate 
board risk oversight 
function. 
 
Disagree 1 3.6 4.00 
 
8 0.82 
Neutral 6 21.4 
Agree 13 46.4 
Strongly Agree 8 28.6 
Total 28 100.0 
There is a robust risk 
management 
framework that is 
aligned with 
Shari’ah principles 
in place. 
 
 
 
Disagree 2 7.1 3.86 16 0.80 
Neutral 5 17.9 
Agree 16 57.1 
Strongly Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100.0 
Risk assessment is 
incorporated into all 
business decision 
making. 
Disagree 1 3.6 3.96 10 0.58 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 22 78.6 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The board 
understands risk 
management as the 
key drivers of 
success in corporate 
strategies. 
 
 
 
Disagree 1 3.6 4.00 8 0.72 
Neutral 4 14.3 
Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
The board ascertains 
CEO and senior 
management are 
fully engaged with 
risk management. 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 7 25.0 3.96 10 0.69 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
Page 211 
 
Construct  Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Mean Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
The board ensures 
independent risk 
management and 
business functions. 
 
Disagree 1 3.6 4.07 4 0.72 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 7 25.0 
Total 28 100.0 
The board ensures 
policies and 
procedures in 
relation to risk 
adopted by the 
management are 
appropriate and 
comprehensive. 
Disagree 1 3.6 3.96 10 0.64 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 20 71.4 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
The board oversees 
the management’s 
implementation of 
policies and 
procedures of risk 
are followed and 
effective. 
Neutral 5 17.9 4.07 4 0.66 
Agree 16 57.1 
Strongly Agree 7 25.0 
Total 28 100.0 
The board knows 
whether the 
management has 
appropriately 
responded to risks. 
Disagree 1 3.6 4.04 7 0.64 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 20 71.4 
Strongly Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100.0 
The board monitors 
the potential risk in 
the bank’s culture 
and incentive system. 
Disagree 4 14.3 3.79 17 0.88 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 18 64.3 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
The board reviews 
with the management 
risk appetite and 
other risk-related 
matters. 
Disagree 1 3.6 3.89 15 0.69 
Neutral 5 17.9 
Agree 18 64.3 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
The board reviews 
with the management 
risk management 
policies and 
procedures. 
Neutral 4 14.3 4.11 2 0.63 
Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 7 25.0 
Total 28 100.0 
The board reviews 
with the management 
reports on risk-matter 
from the audit, legal 
departments and 
regulators. 
 
Neutral 4 14.3 4.11 2 0.63 
Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 7 25.0 
Total 28 100.0 
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Construct  Frequency Valid 
Percent 
Mean Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
Shari’ah advisors are 
aware of the risk 
exposure that arises 
from different 
jurisdictions in 
different locations. 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 3.46 18 1.00 
Disagree 3 10.7 
Neutral 10 35.7 
Agree 10 35.7 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has a 
dedicated unit to 
undertake the risk 
management process 
to manage each type 
of risk. 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 4.07 4 0.94 
Disagree 1 3.6 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly Agree 9 32.1 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has 
competent and well-
trained personnel to 
undertake risk 
management 
functions 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 3.96 10 0.88 
Neutral 5 17.9 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly Agree 7 25.0 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has strong 
MIS to support the 
risk management 
system. 
Strongly Disagree 3 10.7 3.39 19 1.26 
Disagree 4 14.3 
Neutral 5 17.9 
Agree 11 39.3 
Strongly Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100.0 
The controls take 
into account the 
integrity of the risk 
management process. 
Disagree 3 10.7 3.96 10 0.84 
Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 18 64.3 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
The controls comply 
with the regulatory 
and internal policies 
and procedures. 
Disagree 1 3.6 4.18 1 0.61 
Agree 20 71.4 
Strongly Agree 7 25.0 
Total 28 100.0 
As can be seen in Table 6.8, according to the participants, the board is aware of the 
banks’ strategies and is well-versed in the banks’ risk management aspects, as 46.4% 
of the respondents agree that there is ‘adequate board risk oversight function’ and 
another 28.6% of the respondents assert this strongly. Hence, these findings indicate 
that boards are aware of the bank’s risk appetite and to a certain degree are involved 
in the risk management process in an appropriate and transparent manner with the 
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presence of independent risk management through the CEO to manage the succession 
process. As can be seen, 21.4% of the respondents remain neutral, while the 
remaining 3.6% of them disagree that the board provides oversight.  
The survey results in Table 6.8 indicate that 57.1% of the respondents agree that a 
‘robust risk management framework aligned with Shari’ah principles’ is in place, 
while 17.9% of the respondents strongly agree with this. This could be attributed to 
the regulatory requirements imposed by the government to ascertain adequate 
Shari’ah governance through its risk management function. 7.1% of the respondents 
disagree and another 17.9% of the respondents remain neutral.  
It is well known that risk assessment provides a basis for selecting alternatives and 
acts as a measure as to why alternatives are chosen. As such, 78.6% respondents agree 
that ‘risk assessment is incorporated into all business decision-making’, while another 
10.7% of them strongly agree with this. As can be seen in Table 6.8, none of the 
respondents indicate strong disagreement on this statement except for a small 
percentage making up 3.6% of the respondents. This could be due to the complexity 
of the task or some other constraints such as system limitations, and etc. Another 
7.1% of the respondents remain neutral.  
As an important aspect of RM, boards need to understand risk to help them make 
better decisions on the need for action, to identify critical success factors, and to 
gauge aspects of resource allocation among other things. In relation to this, the results 
in Table 6.8 show that about 60.7% of the respondents agree that their ‘board 
understands risk management as the key drivers of success in corporate strategies’ and 
21.4% of them strongly agree with this. However, those who disagree make up 3.6% 
of the respondents, while another 14.3% of the respondents remain neutral. None of 
the respondents indicate strong disagreement on this statement.   
The succession of the banks depends on the ability of the CEO to steer the banks with 
full commitment from the senior management team. Based on the survey results in 
Table 6.8, 53.6% of the respondents agree that their ‘board ascertains that CEO and 
senior management are fully engaged with risk management’, while another 21.4% 
strongly assert this point. This could be reflected through regular board risk meetings 
in which the CEO and top management continuously feed the board with relevant and 
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appropriate input. It should be noted that the remaining 25% of the respondents 
remain neutral. This implies that the participants are in the view that despite some 
commitment from the CEO and top management, their output is still trivial as they are 
comparatively highly compensated by the banks. Nonetheless, none of the 
respondents indicate any disagreement on this statement.  
In practice, the business and risk management sides are always segregated. This is in 
line with the response as 60.7% of the respondents agree that ‘the board ensures 
independent risk management and business functions’ and another 25% of them 
strongly agree with this. This implies that according to the participants, adequate 
controls are in place as there is a certain level of security awareness among the board 
members and top management. However, those who disagree make up 3.6% of the 
respondents while the remaining 10.7% of the respondents remain neutral. None of 
the respondents indicate strong disagreement on this statement.  
As an important aspect of RM, policies and procedures are normally developed by the 
relevant department but reviewed and endorsed by the board. As can be seen in Table 
6.8, about 71.4% of the respondents agree that ‘the board ensures policies and 
procedures in relation to risk adopted by the management are appropriate and 
comprehensive’, and another 14.3% of them strongly agree with this. However, those 
who disagree make up 3.6% of the respondents, while the remaining 10.7% of the 
respondents remain neutral. It should be noted that none of the respondents indicate 
strong disagreement on this statement. This implies that according to the participants, 
the board is aware of the banks policies and procedures and ensures that they are 
appropriate and up-to-date. 
Table 6.8 shows that 57.1% of the respondents agree that ‘the board oversees the 
management’s implementation of policies and procedures of risk are followed and 
effective’ with 25% of them strongly agreeing with this. The remaining 17.9% of the 
respondents remain neutral. None of the respondents indicate strong disagreement on 
this statement. Thus, according to the participants, the banks’ policies and procedures 
are up-to-date and adequate to ensure that implementation can be strictly and 
effectively followed.  
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The survey results in Table 6.8 reveal that 71.4% of the respondents agree that ‘the 
board knows whether the management has appropriately responded to risks’ with 
17.9% of them strongly agreeing with this. This implies that, according to the 
participants, the management has been given an adequate mandate to respond to risk 
matters. This may be reflected through their timely responses in addressing risk 
issues. However those who disagree make up 3.6% of the respondents. The remaining 
7.1% of the respondents remain neutral.   
As regards to the RM construct that ‘the board monitors the potential risk in the 
bank’s culture and incentive system’, the findings in Table 6.8 evidence that 64.3% 
and 14.3% of the respondents agree and strongly agree respectively. Thus, according 
to the participants, the banks have appropriate structures and committees in place to 
support the board on risk matters. This further suggests that the board is able to 
monitor potential risk in the bank’s culture and incentive system based on the 
information brought to them. It should be noted that 14.3% disagree with the 
statement, while 7.1% of them are neutral on this.  
With adequate information brought to the board, the board can ‘review risk-related 
matter with the management’. In relation to this, the findings in Table 6.8 indicate that 
64.3% of the respondents agree that the board works with the management on risk 
appetite, risk exposure, and other such issues and 14.3% of the respondents strongly 
agree with this. This implies that the boards are not side-lined by the management but 
are well-informed on risk matters. While 17.9% of the respondents are being neutral, 
the remaining 3.6% of them disagree on the statement that board reviews risks 
matters. 
The results in Table 6.8 show that 60.7% of the respondents agree that the ‘board 
reviews the risk management policies and procedures with the risk management’ and 
another 25% of them strongly agree on this. This suggests that the banks have sound 
and coherent risk management policies and procedures, as the documents are assessed 
by the board. The remaining 14.3% of the respondents are neutral on this policies and 
procedures matter. 
Based on the survey results in Table 6.8, 60.7% and 25% of the respondents agree and 
strongly agree that the ‘board reviews reports on risk-matter from the audit, legal 
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departments and regulators with the management’. Thus, as identified by the 
participants, the board being involved in reviewing those reports reflects that they are 
fully engaged with day-to-day operations. The remaining 14.3% of the respondents 
show that they are neutral on this matter.   
The survey results reveal that 35.7% of the respondents agree that ‘Shari’ah advisors 
are aware of the risk exposure that arises from different jurisdictions in different 
locations’. In addition, 14.3% of them strongly agree with the statement. To a certain 
extent, according to the participants this indicates that the banks’ level of Shari’ah 
compliance may vary according to their risk appetite. This may also be influenced by 
the Shari’ah advisors of the banks. While 10.7% and 3.6% disagree and strongly 
disagree, the remaining 35.7% of the respondents are neutral.  
As regards to the RM construct of ‘bank has a dedicated unit to undertake the risk 
management process to manage each type of risk’, the survey reveals that 53.6% 
agree and another 32.1% of them strongly agree with the statement. This implies that 
the banks have good organisational structures and appropriate reporting lines. 
However, 3.6% of them strongly disagree and disagree with the statements 
respectively, presumably due to inadequate resources or skill sets for such a dedicated 
unit for each type of risk. The remaining 7.1% of the respondents are neutral.  
It is evidenced from the findings depicted in Table 6.8 that 53.6% of the respondents 
agree that ‘the bank has competent and well-trained personnel to undertake risk 
management functions’ and another 25.0% of them strongly agree with this. This 
suggests that, according to the participants, the banks have good remuneration and 
nomination committees to take care of staff welfare. However, 3.6% of the 
respondents strongly disagree on the statement and another 17.9% of the respondents 
are indifferent. 
Based on the findings presented in Table 6.8, 39.3% of the respondents agree that ‘the 
bank has strong MIS to support the risk management system’. This, according to the 
participants, suggests that the banks have adequate personnel with high technical 
knowledge to ensure the reliability and continuity of the IT system to support the 
business. About 17.9% of the respondents strongly agree. However, 14.3% of them 
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disagree and 10.7% of the respondents indicate strong disagreement on the statement, 
while another 17.9% of the respondents remain neutral.  
It is shown in Table 6.8 that 64.3% of the respondents agree that ‘the controls take 
into account the integrity of the risk management process’ and another 21.4% of the 
respondents strongly agree with the statement. Thus according to the respondents the 
sampled IBs have robust security awareness. It should, however, be noted that 10.7% 
of the respondents disagree and the remaining 3.6% of them are neutral with regards 
to the integrity of the process.  
The finding depicted in Table 6.8 show that 71.4% of the respondents agree that ‘the 
bank comply with the regulatory and internal policies and procedures’, while another 
25% of the respondents strongly agree. This, according to the respondents’ view, 
suggests that the banks have sound governance in the banking systems. However, 
3.6% of the respondents disagree with the statement while no respondents remain 
neutral. 
6.4.2. Perceptions on Credit Risk    
This section focuses on the results developed from the RM dimension of ‘perceptions 
on credit risk’ with 11 constructs referring to various aspects of credit and market risk 
management. The results are Table 6.9 show the perceptions of the respondent on the 
market and credit risk of the banks. 
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Table 6.9: Perceptions on Credit Risk    
Construct  Frequency 
Valid 
(%) 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
The financing strategies for 
various instruments comply 
with Shari’ah. 
Disagree 3 10.7 
4.04 4  0.96 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 12 42.9 
Strongly Agree 10 35.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank financing strategies 
include formal exclusions of 
any engagement that deals with 
haram or unlawful goods and 
services. 
Agree 16 57.1 
4.43 1  0.50 
Strongly Agree 12 42.9 
Total 28 100.0 
The credit guidelines address 
credit risk associated with the 
specific features of Islamic 
financing contracts. 
Disagree 1 3.6 
4.04 4  0.58 
Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 22 78.6 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
The list of all allowable types 
of transaction are kept up-to-
date and communicated to the 
relevant staff. 
Disagree 3 10.7 
3.86 10  0.85 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100.0 
The credit policies and 
procedures guide towards 
proper credit assessments.0.51 
Neutral 1 3.6 
4.18 2  0.48 
Agree 21 75.0 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
The credit policies and 
procedures address loan charge-
offs and recoveries. 
Neutral 4 14.3 
3.96 7  0.51 
Agree 21 75.0 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The credit policies and 
procedures consider current  
 
collateral values where 
applicable in the recovery 
process. 
 
 
 
Neutral 2 7.1 
4.04 4  0.43 
Agree 23 82.1 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank is able to recognize 
potential credit exposure at 
different stages of financing. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 3.6 
3.96 7  0.74 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 21 75.0 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
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Construct  Frequency 
Valid 
(%) 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
The bank is aware of the 
relevant internal and external 
factors that may affect loan 
collectability. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 3.6 
4.07 3  0.77 
Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 20 71.4 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has specific methods 
used to validate models for 
credit risk assessment and 
credit risk management tools 
(e.g. stress tests and back tests). 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 3.6 
3.93 9  0.90 
Disagree 1 3.6 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 6 21.4 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has appropriate tools, 
procedures and data used to 
improve the impairment of 
loans. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 3.6 
3.82 11  0.82 
Disagree 1 3.6 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 20 71.4 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
 
The findings in Table 6.9 indicate that 42.9% of the respondents agree that ‘the 
financing strategies for various instruments comply with Shari’ah’ and 35.7% of the 
respondents strongly agree with the statement. Thus, according to the participants, IBs 
have the proper structure and adequate resources to help support the banking business. 
It should be noted that 10.7% disagree, while the same percentage of the respondents 
remains neutral. 
The survey results in Table 6.9 reveal that 57.1% of the respondents agree that ‘the 
bank financing strategies include formal exclusions of any engagement that deals with 
haram or unlawful goods and services’, while 42.9% of the respondents strongly agree 
on this point. No respondents have disagreements or are neutral on this statement. 
This implies that according to the participants the IBs, to a certain extent, will reveal 
any elements of unlawful arrangements so as to ascertain the integrity of Islamic 
banks.  
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Based on the findings depicted in Table 6.9, 78.6% of the respondents agree ‘the 
credit guidelines address credit risk associated with the specific features of Islamic 
financing contracts’, while another 14.3% of them strongly agree with the point. The 
respondents who disagree and those who are indifferent with the statement each 
represent 3.6% of the respondents. This may infer that the banks have in place some 
arrangement which could be in terms of policies or any documentation that helps both 
parties in trying to avoid a misunderstanding so as to abide by Islamic principles.  
In examining the responses from the survey, it is found that 60.7% of the respondents 
agree that ‘the list of all allowable types of transaction are kept up-to-date and 
communicated to the relevant staff’. In addition, 17.9% of the respondents strongly 
agree on the point. This implies according to the respondents that the IBs have good 
documentation systems and they ascertain effective and efficient communications 
across the board.  As can be seen, those who disagree and are indifferent on this point 
account for 10.7% of the respondents respectively. 
Table 6.9 indicates that 75% of the respondents agree that ‘the credit policies and 
procedures guide towards proper credit assessments’, while 21.4% of the respondents 
strongly agree. While another 3.6% respondents remain neutral, there is no 
disagreement on this statement. This implies that banks have proper documentation to 
ensure standardisation and continuity. With high staff turnover, and merger and 
acquisition exercises for instance, the banks may consistently update their credit 
policies and procedures where relevant to cater for the changes. 
The survey results in Table 6.9 reveal that 75% of the respondents agree that ‘the 
credit policies and procedures address loan charge-offs and recoveries’ and another 
10.7% of the respondents strongly agree. Thus, according to the participants, their IBs 
have transparent policies and procedures in place. However this does not mean that 
the policies are clearly communicated to the counterparties. The results show that 
14.3% of the respondents remain neutral and there is no disagreement on this 
statement. 
As regards to the RM construct that ‘the bank considers current collateral values 
where applicable, in the recovery processes’, the results in Table 6.9 show that 82.1% 
of the respondents expressed agreement, while 10.7% of the respondents opted for the 
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strongly agree position. The fact that the banks’ systems can accommodate details 
such as current collateral value implies that the banks have the adequate technical 
expertise to accommodate to the complex financial requirements. As can be seen, 
7.1% of the respondents remain neutral and no respondents disagree with this 
statement.  
Table 6.9 demonstrates that 75% of the respondents agree that the bank is ‘able to 
recognize potential credit exposure at different stages of financing’, while 14.3% of 
the respondents strongly agree on this. Thus, according to the participants the banks 
have very experienced staff to manage credit risk as this requires people with very 
high financial technical knowledge to be able to recognise the potential exposure. 
However, 3.6% strongly disagree and another 7.1% respondents remain neutral. 
Based on findings presented in Table 6.9, 71.4% of the respondents agree that ‘the 
bank is aware of the relevant internal and external factors that may affect loan 
collectability’, while 21.4% strongly agree on this point. This implies that participants 
are in the view that their respective IBs have good and experienced staff to manage 
the loan recovery process which needs to be supported by an adequate legal structure. 
It should be noted that even though there is no disagreement, 3.6% of the respondents 
posed strong disagreement with the statement. The remaining 3.6% of respondents are 
neutral.  
According to survey results presented in Table 6.9, 60.7% of the respondents agree 
that ‘the bank has specific methods used to validate models for credit risk assessment 
and credit risk management tools (e.g. stress tests and back tests)’. In addition, 21.4 % 
of the respondents strongly agree with the statement. The percentage of respondents 
who disagree and strongly disagree are similar, both at 3.6%, while 10.7% of the 
respondents are neutral. This is quite a controversial as not many are willing to 
explain the models apart from claiming that the bank operates in accordance with the 
Shari’ah. 
As regards to the construct that ‘the banks have appropriate tools, procedures and data 
used to improve the impairment of loans’, the results in Table 6.9 show that 71.4% of 
the respondents agree, while 10.7% of them strongly agree with this. However, the 
respondents who disagree and strongly disagree that the banks have appropriate tools, 
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procedures and data each represent 3.6% of the respondents. The remaining 10.7% 
respondents are neutral. This could be due to the technical difficulties faced by the 
banks as some of them are still struggling with changes and adjustments to 
accommodate to Islamic principles due to the complexity of the system. 
6.4.3. Perceptions on Market and Liquidity Risk    
As part of the perceptions analysis on RM practices in Islamic banks, this section aims 
to present the findings on market and liquidity risk with 16 constructs. The results are 
presented in Table 6.10. 
Table 6.10: Perceptions on Market and Liquidity Risk    
Construct  Frequency 
Valid 
(%) 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
The framework for market risk 
can accommodate all assets 
held (such as Sukuk, Salam etc.) 
Disagree 2 7.1 
3.82 10  0.77 
Neutral 5 17.9 
Agree 17 60.7 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank sets the objectives 
and defines criteria for each 
investment type of profit-
sharing instruments (e.g. 
Mudarabah, Musharakah etc.) 
Disagree 6 21.4 
3.50 13  1.04 
Neutral 7 25.0 
Agree 10 35.7 
Strongly Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100.0 
Assessment on overall market 
risk is based on integrated 
views taking into account all 
products and business lines. 
Disagree 3 10.7 
3.86 8  0.76 
Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 21 75.0 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
Effective internal controls are 
in place (e.g. adherence to lines 
of authority and responsibility) 
to manage market risk. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 3.6 
4.04 1  0.88 
Disagree 1 3.6 
Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 18 64.3 
Strongly Agree 7 25.0 
Total 28 100.0 
IT implementation and 
maintenance is adequate. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 3.6 
3.39 14  0.96 
Disagree 6 21.4 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 19 67.9 
Total 28 100.0 
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Construct  Frequency 
Valid 
(%) 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
Procedural guidelines and 
policy documents are aligned 
with the board’s directions. 
Disagree 2 7.1 
3.96 4  0.69 
Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 21 75.0 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank employs appropriate 
risk measurement techniques 
that suit the nature, size, and 
complexity of the business and 
the availability of data. 
Disagree 2 7.1 
4.00 2  0.67 
Agree 22 78.6 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank ensures that accurate 
and timely measurements of 
market risk are performed. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 3.6 
3.93 6  0.81 
Disagree 1 3.6 
Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 21 75.0 
Strongly Agree 4 14.3 
Total 28 100.0 
The risk measurement system is 
responsive and sensitive to the 
market 
Disagree 1 3.6 
3.86 8  0.52 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 23 82.1 
Strongly Agree 1 3.6 
Total 28 100.0 
The risk measurement system 
assesses all material risk factors 
associated with a bank’s assets, 
liabilities and off balance sheet 
positions. 
Disagree 2 7.1 
3.89 7  0.69 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 21 75.0 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The risk measurement system 
has well-documented 
assumptions and parameters. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 3.6 
3.75 12  0.80 
Disagree 1 3.6 
Neutral 4 14.3 
Agree 20 71.4 
Strongly Agree 2 7.1 
Total 28 100.0 
There is a mutual agreement 
with the bank and Mudarib 
/Musharakah partners prior to 
using the valuation 
methodologies (to assess the 
impact of their methods used to 
calculate and allocate profit). 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 2 7.1 
3.32 15  0.67 
Neutral 16 57.1 
Agree 9 32.1 
Strongly Agree 1 3.6 
Total 28 100.0 
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Construct  Frequency 
Valid 
(%) 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
The bank ensures its liquidity 
risk commensurate with the 
abilities to have sufficient 
recourse to Shari’ah compliant 
funds to mitigate risks. 
Disagree 3 10.7 
3.79 11  0.79 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 19 67.9 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank examines all assets 
and liabilities simultaneously 
on a continuous basis to ensure 
a proper balance between funds 
mobilization and their 
deployment with respect to 
yield, risk exposure, etc. 
Disagree 2 7.1 
4.00 2  0.72 
Neutral 1 3.6 
Agree 20 71.4 
Strongly Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank ensures its tolerance 
levels on mismatches are timely 
fixed (for various maturities 
depending on asset liability 
profile etc.). 
Disagree 2 7.1 
3.96 4  0.64 
Agree 23 82.1 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
As shown in Table 6.10, 60.7% of the respondents agree that ‘the framework for 
market risk can accommodate all assets held (such as sukuk, salam etc.)’ and 14.3% of 
the respondents strongly agree with this. However, 7.1% of the respondents disagree 
that the banks have appropriate tools, procedures and data. This implies that the banks 
have an adequate structure to cater for all assets held with regards to managing market 
risk. However, for those banks that do not accommodate all assets, this could be due 
to certain structural limitations or due to shortcomings in infrastructure or resources. 
The remaining 17.9% respondents are neutral.   
Even though it is important to define objectives and criteria for each financial 
instrument, only 35.7% of the respondents agree that ‘the bank sets the objectives and 
defines criteria for each investment type of profit-sharing instruments (e.g. 
mudarabah, musharakah)’, while 17.9% of the respondents strongly agree with this. 
25% of the respondents are neutral and another 21.4% of the respondents disagree 
with the statement. This is probably due to a lack of directives from the board, which 
leads to ambiguous and vague policies and procedures spelt out by the management.  
Based on the survey results presented in Table 6.10, 75% of the respondents agree 
that the ‘assessment on the overall market risk is based on integrated views taking into 
account all products and business lines’ and 10.7% of the respondents strongly agree 
with this. In addition, 10.7% of the respondents disagree on this statement. The ability 
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to assess the overall market risk, which is based on integrated views, might depend on 
the structure and resources. This might suggest that the banks do not have an adequate 
structure to help manage the process, especially when it involves high technical 
expertise. The remaining 3.6% of the respondents are neutral on the statement.   
According to the survey results, 64.3% of the respondents agree that ‘effective 
internal controls are in place (e.g. adherence to lines of authority and responsibility) to 
manage market risk lines’, while 25% of the respondents strongly agree with this. 
This implies that, according to the participants, their respective IBs place priority on 
controls especially with regards to market risks. This is evidenced when the auditor’s 
issue opinions on the effective internal control of the banks. With this statement, the  
IBs seem to be perceived to be more credible. However, 3.6% of the respondents 
disagree and strongly disagree, perhaps due to the lack of appropriate tools, 
procedures and data. The remaining 3.6% respondents are neutral.  
As regards to the RM construct, ‘IT implementation and maintenance is adequate’, as 
the Table 6.10 shows, 67.9% of the respondents agree with this statement. This 
indicates that the banks may have adequate technical staff to handle the technology. 
However, 21.4% and 3.6% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree 
respectively that the banks have adequate IT implementations, and this could probably 
be due to budget constraints or the banks’ inability to manage the IT aspect. The 
remaining 7.1% of respondents are neutral.  
As can be seen in Table 6.10, 75% of the respondents agree that ‘the procedural 
guidelines and policy documents are aligned with the board’s reporting lines’, while 
14.3% of the respondents strongly agree with this. This may suggest that the boards, 
according to the participants, to a certain extent, review the banks’ procedural 
guidelines and policy documents and endorse them. However, 7.1% of the 
respondents disagree with this construct being effective in their respective IB, while 
there is no strong disagreement and the remaining 3.6% respondents are neutral with 
the point. 
Based on the findings demonstrated in Table 6.10, 78.6% of the respondents agree 
that ‘the bank employs appropriate risk measurement techniques that suit the nature, 
size, and complexity of the business and the availability of data’ and another 14.3% of 
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the respondents strongly assert the point. This suggests that the banks have adequate 
expertise in terms of resources and appropriate structures to accommodate their 
banking needs. The remaining 7.1% of the respondents however disagree with the 
statement. 
Table 6.10 reveals that 75% of the respondents agree that their ‘bank ensures that 
accurate and timely measurements of market risk are performed’ and 14.3% of the 
respondents strongly agree with this construct. Thus, according to the participants, the 
banks have adequate resources and skilled staff such as risk experts to perform 
appropriate and comprehensive risk measurements. However, 3.6% of the respondents 
each disagree and strongly disagree on the statement, while the remaining 3.6% of the 
respondents are neutral.  
Regarding the ‘the risk measurement system is responsive and sensitive to the market’ 
construct, it is shown in Table 6.10 that 82.1% of the respondents expressed 
agreement and 3.6% of the respondents strongly agreed with this. Perhaps this 
indicates that the banks have very prudent risk management guidelines and adequate 
resources to address risk issues timely and appropriately. In addition, 3.6% of the 
respondents disagree with this construct being effective in their respective IBs, while 
the remaining 10.7% of the respondents are neutral. 
Table 6.10 reveals that 75% of the respondents agree that ‘the risk measurement 
system assesses all material risk factors associated with a bank’s assets, liabilities and 
off balance sheet positions’ and 10.7% of the respondents strongly agree with this. 
This suggests that the banks have comprehensive systems that can accommodate to 
manage the overall risk types, which integrate well with the accounting aspect. 
However 7.1% of the respondents disagree on this. The remaining 7.1% respondents 
are neutral.  
As the findings in Table 6.10 show, 71.4% of the respondents agree that ‘the risk 
measurement system has well-documented assumptions and parameters’ in their 
respective IBs, and 7.1% of the respondents strongly agree with the point. This 
implies that, according to the respondents, their respective IBs place a high priority on 
measuring risk by putting in place good and comprehensive risk systems. This also 
suggests that they have proper day-to-day documentation where policies and 
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procedures are always kept up-to-date to support operations. However both 3.6% of 
the respondents disagree and strongly disagree, while the remaining 14.3% 
respondents are neutral.  
Table 6.10 indicates that 32.1% of the respondents agree that ‘there is a mutual 
agreement with the bank and mudarib/musharakah partners prior to using the 
valuation methodologies (to assess the impact of their methods used to calculate and 
allocate profit)’ in their respective IB, and 3.6% of the respondents strongly agree 
with this. This gives the indication that the banks perform transactions in accordance 
with Shari’ah principles, where they ensure that contracts need to specify other 
financial details besides profit and loss (such as percentage of ownership, roles and 
responsibilities, and controls among other matters) details to obtain mutual 
understanding and consent before the transaction takes place. However, 7.1% of the 
respondents disagree though there is no strong disagreement on this statement, while 
the remaining 57.1% respondents are neutral. This may imply, according to the 
respondents, the banks are not being transparent in dealing with their business 
transactions.  
As the results in Table 6.10 depict, 67.9% of the respondents agree that ‘the bank 
ensures its liquidity risk commensurate with the abilities to have sufficient recourse to 
Shari’ah compliant funds to mitigate risks’, while 10.7% of the respondents strongly 
agree with this. To a certain extent, this is always the case considering the IBs nature 
of operations, which has limited room to manoeuvre and is more susceptible to 
Shari’ah risk. Hence, the banks are perceived to be relatively prudent with regards to 
managing their liquidity. As the results indicate, 10.7% of the respondents disagree, 
and the remaining 10.7% respondents are neutral. 
According to the results presented in Table 6.10, 71.4% of the respondents agree that 
‘the bank examines all assets and liabilities simultaneously on a continuous basis to 
ensure a proper balance between funds mobilization and their deployment with 
respect to yield, risk exposure, etc.’ and 17.9% of the respondents strongly agree with 
this. Besides having prudent risk management in place, according to the respondents 
this also implies that the banks have a very robust system that is able to accommodate 
to the complexity of the risk management aspect. However, 7.1% of the respondents 
disagree, while the remaining 3.6% respondents are neutral. 
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Based on Table 6.10, 82.1% of the respondents agree that their respective IB ‘ensures 
its tolerance levels on mismatches are timely fixed (for various maturities depending 
on asset liability profile etc.)’ and 10.7% of the respondents strongly agree with this. 
Apart from having full engagement from the top management, this may imply that the 
banks have adequate and highly skilled risk management experts on board. However 
the remaining 7.1% of the respondents disagree that the bank ensures its tolerance 
levels on mismatches are timely fixed. 
6.4.4. Perceptions on Operational Risk   
This section focuses on the findings established through the questionnaire survey on 
the perceptions of the participants on their perspective on ‘operational risk 
management’ practices dimension in their respective IB with 7 constructs. Table 6.11 
shows perceptions of the respondents on the operational risk of the banks. 
As can be seen in Table 6.11, 85.2% of the respondents agree that the ‘key risk 
indicators (KRIs) are reviewed regularly’ where 18.5% of the respondents assert this 
strongly. This implies that, according to the participants, their respective banks are 
very pro-active with regards to managing risks, hence evidencing a strong awareness 
on risk management. Presumably, this is achieved by updating their staff on changes 
to risk exposure. However, 7.4% of the respondents disagree that the KRIs are 
regularly reviewed, but there is no strong disagreement on this statement. The 
remaining 7.4% respondents are neutral.  
The survey results in Table 6.11 reveal that 67.9% of the respondents agree that their 
respective IBs ‘has an IT system to accommodate to the bank’s business operations’ 
and 17.9% of the respondents strongly agree with this. As far as IT is concerned, 
according to the respondents, most banks (especially newly established banks) seem 
to have IT readiness as their systems comply with the bank requirements.  However 
3.6% of the respondents strongly disagree with IT adequacy instead. The remaining 
10.7% respondents are neutral. Perhaps this is not a concern as the banks have other 
alternatives, such as having vendors to resort to. 
 
 
Page 229 
 
6.11: Perceptions on Operational Risk   
Construct  Frequency 
Valid 
(%) 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
Standard 
Deviation 
Key risk indicators 
(KRIs) are reviewed 
regularly. 
Disagree 2 7.4 
3.96 2  0.76 
Neutral 2 7.4 
Agree 18 66.7 
Strongly Agree 5 18.5 
Total 27 100.0 
The bank has an IT 
system to accommodate 
to the bank’s business 
operations. 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
3.96 1  0.79 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 19 67.9 
Strongly Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has an IT 
system to provide 
adequate check and 
balance to ensure that 
controls are in place. 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
3.93 3  0.86 
Disagree 1 3.6 
Neutral 2 7.1 
Agree 19 67.9 
Strongly Agree 5 17.9 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank has an IT 
system to cater for 
internal risk reporting 
and decision making. 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
3.64 5  0.83 
Disagree 2 7.1 
Neutral 4 14.3 
Agree 20 71.4 
Strongly Agree 1 3.6 
Total 28 100.0 
The bank reduces 
operational risks by 
identifying potential 
negative events and 
developing appropriate 
responses. 
Disagree 1 3.6 
3.93 3  0.60 
Neutral 3 10.7 
Agree 21 75.0 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
Human resources in risk 
department are adequate 
and well-trained. 
Strongly Disagree 1 3.6 
3.50 6  1.04 
Disagree 5 17.9 
Neutral 4 14.3 
Agree 15 53.6 
Strongly Agree 3 10.7 
Total 28 100.0 
Based on the findings presented in Table 6.11, 67.9% of the respondents agree that 
‘the bank has an IT system to provide adequate check and balance to ensure that 
controls are in place’ and 17.9% of the respondents strongly agree with this. Thus, 
according to the participants, this indicates that the banks have a reliable system in 
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place that allows straight thorough processing without human intervention. However, 
both the respondents who disagree and strongly disagree make up 3.6% of the 
respondents each, while the remaining 7.1% respondents are neutral. 
As regards to the construct ‘the bank has an IT system to cater for internal risk 
reporting and decision making’, the results in Table 6.11 indicate that 71.4% of the 
respondents expressed agreement, while 3.6% of the respondents strongly agree with 
this. Thus, according to the participants, to a certain extent, their respective IBs have 
some internal controls in place especially when most tasks are automated. However, 
7.1% of the respondents disagree and 3.6% of the respondents strongly disagree with 
this. The remaining 14.3% respondents are neutral. 
The findings in Table 6.11 reveals that 75% of the respondents agree that their 
respective bank ‘reduces operational risks by identifying potential negative events and 
developing appropriate responses’ and 10.7 % of the respondents strongly agree with 
this. This may imply that the banks have a business continuity plan in place to 
accommodate to business needs in the event of a failure in bank operations. However, 
3.6% of the respondents disagree on this point and the remaining 10.7% of 
respondents are neutral. . 
The survey results in Table 6.11 reveal that 53.6% of the respondents agree that the 
‘human resources in risk department are adequate and well-trained’ and 10.7% of the 
respondents strongly agree with this. Thus, according to the participants the banks 
have very effective training programs besides good recruitment policies. However, 
17.9 % of the respondents disagree and 3.6% of the respondents strongly disagree on 
this. The remaining 14.3% respondents are neutral. 
6.4.5. Perceptions on Shari’ah Risks   
This section focuses on perceptions on Shari’ah risk dimensions with 6 statements or 
constructs, the findings for which are presented in Table 6.12.  
As can be seen in Table 6.12, 64.3% and another 10.7% of the respondents agree and 
strongly agree respectively that their respective IB ‘is aware of the potential 
associated risks to society and the environment especially with regards to the impacts 
on environment, society, financial conditions and operations’. This implies that the 
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banks understand that Shari’ah risk is detrimental to banking operations hence there is 
no disagreement on this statement. The remaining 25.1% of the respondents are 
neutral, perhaps due to a lack of awareness on Shari’ah risk exposure. 
6.12 Perceptions on Shari’ah Risks   
Construct  
Frequency 
(valid) 
Mean 
Mean 
Ranking 
The bank is aware of the potential associated 
risk to society and the environment (such as its 
impact on environment, society, financial 
conditions and operations). 
Neutral 7 
3.86 5 
Agree 18 
Strongly Agree 3 
Total 28 
The bank takes appropriate steps to address the 
above-mentioned risks (include disclosure of 
information) before underwriting deals. 
Disagree 1 
3.71 6 
Neutral 10 
Agree 13 
Strongly Agree 4 
Total 28 
The bank assesses the potential impacts of its 
methods with regards to profit (i.e. in terms of 
its calculations allocations.) 
Disagree 1 
3.93 4 
Neutral 5 
Agree 17 
Strongly Agree 5 
Total 28 
The bank ensures fund providers’ interests are 
taken care off. 
Neutral 3 
4.04 2 
Agree 21 
Strongly Agree 4 
Total 28 
The methods used are mutually agreed between 
the bank and other stakeholders. 
Neutral 5 
3.96 3 
Agree 19 
Strongly Agree 4 
Total 28 
The bank donates the penalty charges to charity 
to comply with Shari’ah. 
Neutral 2 
4.18 1 
Agree 19 
Strongly Agree 7 
Total 28 
Based on the survey results in Table 6.12, 46.4% of the respondents agree that their 
respective IB ‘takes appropriate steps to address the above-mentioned risks (include 
disclosure of information) before underwriting deals’ and 14.3% of the respondents 
strongly agree with this. This suggests that the banks have Shari’ah governance 
policies in place to guide them before they act on any deals. However, 3.6% of the 
respondents disagree with this point, while another 35.7% respondents are neutral.  
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It is evidenced in Table 6.12 that 60.7% of the respondents agree that their respective 
‘bank assesses the potential impacts of its methods with regards to profit (i.e. in terms 
of its calculations allocations)’ and 17.9% of the respondents strongly agree with this. 
However, 3.6% of the respondents disagree with that. The remaining 17.9% 
respondents are neutral. There is no strong disagreement on this statement. 
As regards to the construct that ‘bank ensures fund providers’ interests are taken care 
off’, the survey results in Table 6.12 indicate that 75% of the respondents expressed 
agreement, while 14.3% of the respondents strongly agree with this. Thus, according 
to the participants the banks take care of the interest of the stakeholders. However, 
whether the interests of the minority are taken care off is another issue. It should be 
noted that the remaining 10.7% of respondents have neutral views. The fact that there 
is no disagreement on this statement is not unusual, especially when prominent 
shareholders are involved as, most of the time, their interests are highly taken care off 
as opposed to other minority stakeholders. 
Table 6.12 shows that 67.9% of the respondents agree with the statement that ‘the 
methods used to calculate profit are mutually agreed between the bank and other 
stakeholders’ and another 14.3% of the respondents indicate this very strongly.  This 
may imply that banks conduct their operations in accordance with Shari’ah principles, 
assuming that the banks define the investment methods. As the results indicate, the 
remaining 17.9% respondents do not commit to this claim. On a similar note, despite 
the mutual agreement of methods of calculation, sometimes stakeholders are not given 
the freedom to opt for alternative choices, especially when the banks have limited 
products to offer. As the results show there is no disagreement on this statement. 
Based on the responses depicted in Table 6.12, 67.9% of the respondents assert that 
‘the bank donates the penalty charges to charity to comply with Shari’ah’ and 25% of 
the respondents strongly stress this. Although this may seem like a continuation of the 
banks public relations strategy, it implies that by donating, banks are actually doing 
the things that they ought to be doing in their normal course of affairs as part of CSR 
practice and not just by developing donations as a trend. Giving donations is not only 
done by IBs but also non-IBs. Meanwhile, 7.1% respondents are neutral and there is 
no disagreement on the statement. 
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6.5. SUMMARISING THE FINDINGS OF DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
This section aims to provide further analysis by examining the mean rankings of the 
constructs for CG and RM dimensions and then also provides mean score rankings of 
CG and RM dimensions. Thus, this section initially highlights the construct with the 
highest mean as well as the lowest mean obtained by the constructs from each 
dimension of CG. Then in the second part of this section, similar highlights are done 
on RM.  Please refer to Table 6.13. 
As the presentation of findings in this section on the CG dimension reveal through the 
constructs, ‘the bank appoints a qualified external auditor’ shows the highest mean 
score (mean value of 4.43). The lowest mean score in the ‘audit’ dimension is 
indicated by ‘the board ensures external auditors have adequate expertise to conduct 
Shari’ah audit’ (mean value of 0.339). The rest of the mean ranking for each construct 
in this dimension can be found in Table 6.5.  
With respect to the board, their effectiveness is perceived to be very important as 
reflected by ‘the board monitors management's execution plan’ with its highest mean 
score (mean value of 4.39) in the ‘board effectiveness’ dimension. The construct ‘the 
roles of Chairman and CEO split’ are considered to be the least important by the 
participants (mean value of 1.11). The rest of the mean ranking for each construct 
under this dimension can be found in Table 6.2.  
The organisational structure, committees and senior management that hold the entities 
together seem to be seen as the main element that supports the board. The construct 
‘appropriate structure to assist board in discharging its function is in place’ indicates 
the highest mean (mean value of 4.39) in the ‘structure, committees and senior 
management’ dimension while the construct ‘Shari’ah advisors ascertain internal 
controls and operations of bank’s conduct’ seems to be considered the least important 
construct (mean value of 3.43) by the participants. The mean ranking for the rest of 
the constructs under this dimension can be found in Table 6.3.  
In the ‘regulatory disclosure and transparency’ dimension, financial credibility is 
crucial in terms of sustaining businesses, hence accounting process are highly 
regarded by the respondents, as reflected through the construct ‘the accounting 
processes produce reliable information’ (mean value of 4.21). The construct ‘the bank 
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discloses the weaknesses of the products’ (mean value of 2.79) shows the lowest 
mean in this dimension. The rest of the mean ranking for each construct under this 
dimension can be found in Table 6.4. 
With respect to policies and procedures, the construct ‘Shari’ah-related strategies and 
principles are approved by Shari’ah advisors’ reveals the highest mean score (mean 
value of 4.18). The lowest mean (mean value of 3.79) was shown by the constructs 
‘Shari’ah governance framework is comprehensive’ and ‘the policies and procedures 
are regularly revised’ respectively. The rest of the mean ranking for each construct 
under this dimension can be found in Table 6.6.  
In terms of support and operations, it is also evidenced that the banks are highly 
dependent on adequate and efficient support and operations as the participants highly 
regard the construct ‘control processes are adequate’ (mean value of 3.68). The 
construct ‘the bank has an efficient system to support key business operation’ (mean 
value of 3.36) shows the lowest mean. The rest of the mean ranking for each construct 
under this dimension can be found in Table 6.7. 
Similarly, the construct with the highest mean in each RM dimension is highlighted. 
In aligning with Shari’ah principles, the respondent highly regards that banks comply 
with Shari’ah. This is reflected through the construct ‘the bank financing strategies 
include formal exclusions of any engagement that deals with haram or unlawful goods 
and services’ (mean value of 4.43). The construct ‘the bank has appropriate tools, 
procedures and data used to improve the impairment of loans’ shows the lowest mean 
(mean value of 3.82) in the ‘credit risk’ dimension. The rest of the mean ranking for 
each construct under this dimension can be found in Table 6.9.  
The construct with the highest mean in general risk management practice dimension 
‘the controls comply with the regulatory and internal policies and procedures’ (mean 
value of 4.18) reveals that policies and procedures are most important elements in 
ensuring controls are in place. The construct ‘the bank has strong MIS to support the 
risk management system’ shows the lowest mean (mean value of 3.39). The rest of the 
mean ranking for each construct under this dimension can be found in Table 6.8. 
As banks are perceived to be highly ethical, the respondents regard the construct ‘the 
bank donates the penalty charges to charity to comply with Shari’ah (4.18) to be 
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comparatively important among all other constructs in the Shari’ah dimension. The 
construct ‘the bank takes appropriate steps to address the above-mentioned45 risks 
(include disclosure of information) before underwriting deals’ shows the lowest mean 
(mean value of 3.71). The rest of the mean ranking for each construct under this 
dimension can be found in Table 6.12. 
In ensuring the business, it is also viewed that the respondents highly regard adequate 
controls to be in place as evidenced through the construct ‘effective internal controls 
are in place (e.g. adherence to lines of authority and responsibility) to manage market 
risk’ (mean value of 4.04). The construct ‘there is a mutual agreement with the bank 
and Mudarib / Musharakah partners prior to using the valuation methodologies (to 
assess the impact of their methods used to calculate and allocate profit)’ shows the 
lowest mean (mean value of 3.32). The rest of the mean ranking for each construct 
under this dimension can be found in Table 6.10. 
Table 6.13: Mean Scoring of CG and RM Dimensions 
CG Dimensions Mean Score RM Dimensions 
Mean 
Score 
Effectiveness and efficiency of audit 4.15 Credit risk 4.03 
Appropriateness of the structure and 
committees and effectiveness of the 
senior management 
3.99 Shari’ah risk 3.95 
Appropriateness and 
comprehensiveness of  policies and 
procedures 
3.96 
General risk management 
practices 
3.94 
Board effectiveness 3.82 Operational risk 3.82 
Regulatory disclosure and 
transparency 
3.75 Market and liquidity risk 3.81 
Efficient support and operations 3.51  
With respect to operational risk, the constructs ‘the bank has an IT system to 
accommodate to the bank’s business operations’ (mean value of 3.96) score the 
highest in the operational risk dimension. The construct ‘human resources in risk 
department are adequate and well-trained’ shows the lowest mean (mean value of 
                                                          
45 Potential associated risk to society and the environment (such as its impact on environment, society, 
financial conditions and operations). 
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3.50). The rest of the mean ranking for each construct under this dimension can be 
found in Table 6.11. 
After presenting the highest and lowest mean scored constructs under each CG and 
RM dimensions, the following provides the mean score ranking for CG and RM 
through dimensions to identify the ranking of dimensions as identified by the 
responses given by the participants. 
6.6. DETERMINING FACTORS OF THE OBSERVED PERCEPTIONS: 
INFERENTIONAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
This section aims at identifying the factors determining the expressed perceptions of 
the participants on their views on CG and RM practices in their respective IBs by 
comparing the responses based on different groups of samples through non-parametric 
test of mean comparison. This is based on the assumption that the responses are 
affected by four factors: ‘location (country)’, ‘positions’ held by the respondent, 
‘type’ and, ‘inception year’ or the longevity of the IBs. The analysis presented in the 
following sections describes the perceptions on each construct based on these 
identified factors by means of the Kruskal-Wallis test, a non-parametric test.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test results in Table 6.14 to 6.17 reveal that there is a significant 
difference in constructs across the ‘location’, ‘positions’ held by the respondents, 
‘nature’ and, ‘inception year’ of the IBs as indicated by the p-value or the statistically 
significant level below a 0.5% significance level. 
It should be noted that due to length related limitations, only the statistically 
significant (at 5% statistically significant level) constructs in relation to any of the 
identified four factors are presented in the following sections. 
6.6.1. Searching for the Impact of Country of Origion on Perceptions Related 
CG and RM Constructs 
The Kruskal-Wallis results in Table 6.14 reveal that three constructs are statistically 
significant across locations. Although the participants come from six location groups 
or countries; namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Turkey and UK; only four 
Page 237 
 
location groups are taken into consideration, as Pakistan and Qatar do not have an 
adequate sample size to represent their respective countries.   
Table 6.14: KW Test for the Impact of Location on their Perceptions 
Construct 
Location N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
Rank 
Asymto 
tic. Sig 
Procedural guidelines and 
policy documents are aligned 
with the board’s directions. 
Turkey 4 20.25 12.207 5 0.032 
UK 3 18.17 
Malaysia 8 14.00 
Indonesia 11 10.73 
The risk measurement system 
assesses all material risk 
factors associated with a 
bank’s assets, liabilities and 
off balance sheet positions. 
 
 
Turkey 4 21.00 13.020 5 0.023 
Malaysia 8 15.00 
UK 3 15.00 
Indonesia 11 10.45 
Total 28   
The bank examines all assets 
and liabilities simultaneously 
on a continuous basis to 
ensure a proper balance 
between funds mobilization 
and their deployment with 
respect to yield, risk exposure, 
etc. 
UK 3 21.83 13.107 5 0.022 
Turkey 4 19.75 
Malaysia 8 12.19 
Indonesia 11 11.32 
Total 28   
As can be seen in Table 6.14, the three CG and RM constructs that are statistically 
significant across the four location groups are: ‘procedural guidelines and policy 
documents are aligned with the board’s directions’, ‘the risk measurement system 
assesses all material risk factors associated with a bank’s assets, liabilities and off 
balance sheet positions’ and, ‘the bank examines all assets and liabilities 
simultaneously on a continuous basis to ensure a proper balance between funds 
mobilization and their deployment with respect to yield, risk exposure, etc.’.  
For the statement ‘procedural guidelines and policy documents are aligned with the 
board’s directions’, the results show a p-value (asymptotic value) of 0.032, which is 
less than the tabular value of 0.05 with Chi-square = 12.207. Turkey shows the 
highest mean rank with a score of 20.25 followed by the UK at 18.17, Malaysia at 
14.00 and Indonesia at 10.73. Thus, according to the participants from Turkey, 
Turkish IBs attach higher importance to this construct. 
As for the statement ‘the risk measurement system assesses all material risk factors 
associated with a bank’s assets, liabilities and off balance sheet positions’, the results 
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show a p-value = 0.023 and Chi-square = 13.020. Again, Turkey ranks top with the 
highest mean score of 21.00 followed by the UK and Malaysia with a similar mean 
rank of 15.00 each and Indonesia at 10.45. 
In relation to the above constructs, the results in Table 6.14 show that Turkey has the 
highest mean rank; suggesting that the country has better procedural guidelines 
compared to other countries with good risk measurement system to assess all material 
risk factors. Perhaps this could be explained by events evidenced through recent 
developments in local banks in Turkey which began offering Islamic products to 
rigorously capture the international market. Hence with this mission to achieve, 
obviously guidelines and policies are one of the priorities that have been taken into 
consideration in order to ensure that they are aligned with, and conform to, regulatory 
guidelines.   
For the statement on ‘the bank examines all assets and liabilities simultaneously on a 
continuous basis to ensure a proper balance between fund mobilization and their 
deployment with respect to yield, risk exposure, etc.’, the test reveals a p-value = 
0.022, Chi-square = 13.107 with UK obtaining the highest score mean of 21.83 
followed by Turkey at 19.75 while Malaysia and Indonesia at 12.19 and 11.32 
respectively.  
Obviously banks have to ensure that their financial exposure is contained and 
manageable. With regards to UK, its banks are perceived to have prudent risk 
management besides strict regulatory directives, especially in terms of the deployment 
of funds. On a similar note, the UK seems to be taking the lead in coming up with 
guidelines and is always at the forefront in terms of establishing procedures, rules and 
regulation on risk management.  
Thus, the countries in which the IBs are located, as a control variable, only have a  
statistically significant impact on these three statements; implying that ‘the locality of 
the IBs’ influence the answers given by the respondents only in these cases. 
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6.6.2. Searching for the Impact of Participants’ Position on Perceptions Related 
CG and RM Constructs 
Table 6.15 reveals that six statements or constructs are statistically significant across 
the two position groups. The position groups are: ‘risk officer’ and ‘non-risk officer’, 
with some positions being unspecified. The Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the 
unspecified group appears to demonstrate the highest mean rank score. However, as 
the ‘position’ level cannot be gauged, this group is excluded in the analysis.  
Table 6.15: KW Test for the Impact of Participations’ Position on their 
Perceptions 
Construct Positions N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Squar
e 
Ran
k 
Asym
totic. 
Sig 
The bank has clear reporting line Risk Officer 12 17.75 6.572 2 0.037 
Non-risk 
officer 
14 11.25 
      
Not specified 2 17.75       
Total 28         
Shari’ah advisors ensure adequacy of 
compliance with legal and regulatory 
requirements 
Risk Officer 12 10.38 7.435 2 0.024 
Non-risk 
officer 
14 16.93       
Not specified 2 22.25       
Total 28         
The credit guidelines address credit risk 
associated with the specific features of 
Islamic financing contracts. 
Risk Officer 12 16.75 6.469 2 0.039 
Non-risk 
officer 
14 11.79       
Not specified 2 20.00       
Total 28         
The credit policies and procedures guide 
towards proper credit assessments. 
Risk Officer 12 17.63 7.908 2 0.019 
Non-risk 
officer 
14 11.21       
Not specified 2 18.75       
Total 28         
The risk measurement system is 
responsive and sensitive to the market 
Risk Officer 12 15.75 9.559 2 0.008 
Non-risk 
officer 
14 15.07 
      
Not specified 2 3.00       
Total 28         
The risk measurement system assesses 
all material risk factors associated with a 
bank’s assets, liabilities and off balance 
sheet positions. 
Risk Officer 12 16.88 8.010 2 0.018 
Non-risk 
officer 
14 14.04       
Not specified 2 3.50       
Total 28         
As can be seen in Table 6.15, statement that ‘the bank has a clear reporting line’ is 
statistically significant (p = 0.037, Chi-square = 6.572). The group ‘risk officer’ 
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shows a mean rank of 17.75 while ‘non-risk officer’ records a mean of 11.25. This 
could be due to the nature of jobs in risk management which is highly involved in 
control and authority levels, and hence the ‘risk-officer’ is in a better position to 
assess this. 
The statement ‘Shari’ah advisors ensure adequacy of compliance with legal and 
regulatory requirements’ is statistically significant (p = 0.024, Chi-square = 7.435). 
The group ‘non-risk officer’ records a mean of 16.93 while the group ‘risk officer’ has 
a mean rank of 10.38. Presumably the high mean rank by ‘non-risk officer’ may mean 
that Shari’ah advisors are well-versed in all areas and not specifically on Shari’ah 
matters only. As for the ‘risk-officer’, their experiences may have comparatively 
sound contributions in making better judgements with regards to how they see 
Shari’ah advisors practically do their work.  
As can be seen in the results presented in Table 6.15, ‘The credit guidelines address 
credit risk associated with the specific features of Islamic financing contracts’ is 
statistically significant (p = 0.039, Chi-square = 7.908). The group ‘risk officer’ and 
‘non-risk officer’ score mean values of 16.75 and 11.79 respectively. Apparently, it is 
quite generic for personnel in the risk area to emphasise that their credit guidelines are 
adequate and appropriate to support the Shari’ah banking business.  
‘The credit policies and procedures guide towards proper credit assessments’ is 
statistically significant (p=0.019; Chi-square = 7.908). The ‘risk officer’ group ranks 
the top with a mean of 17.63 while the ‘non-risk officer’ records a mean of 11.21. 
This indicates that proper credit assessment is crucial in day-to-day operations. As 
such, to ensure business viability, its importance is highly regarded by the ‘risk-
related officer’ group as compared to the ‘non-risk officer’ group. In fact, the ‘risk-
officer’ themselves are accountable towards the substance of the credit policies. 
The statement ‘the risk measurement system is responsive and sensitive to the market’ 
is statistically significant where the test results reveal: p = 0.008 and Chi-square = 
9.559. Both the ‘risk officer’ and its counter-part show quite a similar mean rank 
(15.75 and 15.07). Both groups have similar levels of perceptions on this construct as 
the IT system is one of the main pieces of infrastructure required to support the 
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banking business. Although to a certain extent, the ‘risk-officer’ is more hands-on 
than the capability of the system.  
The construct on ‘the risk measurement system assesses all material risk factors 
associated with a bank’s assets, liabilities and off balance sheet positions’ is 
statistically significant (p = 0.018, Chi-square = 8.010). The mean rank score of group 
‘risk officer’ is slightly higher as compared to the mean score of ‘non-risk officer’ 
(16.88, 14.04). Obviously, the ‘risk officer’ group is in a better position to know 
whether the system is capable of assessing all the risk factors, failing any of which 
may put the bank’s financial position at stake.  
Thus, the position of the respondents, as a control variable, only has statistically 
significant impact on these six statements; implying that the ‘position of the 
respondents’ makes a difference in the answers given by the respondents only in these 
cases. 
6.6.3. Searching for the Impact of Type of IBs on Perceptions Related CG and 
RM Constructs  
As shown in Table 6.16, the Kruskal-Wallis test result reveals that three statements 
are statistically significant across the different nature of the IBs. The 5 natures (or 
types) of IBs are: ‘full-fledge Islamic Bank’, ‘Islamic window of domestic 
conventional bank’, ‘Islamic financial institution’, ‘foreign Islamic bank’, and 
‘Islamic window of foreign conventional bank’.    
The results show that the statement ‘roles of the Chairman and CEO is split’ is 
statistically significant (p = 0.031, Chi-square = 6.943) in which the group ‘Islamic 
window of domestic conventional bank’ ranks the top with a mean score = 19.25. The 
groups of ‘full-fledge Islamic bank’ and ‘foreign Islamic bank’ record mean values of 
13.11 and 12.50 respectively. The highest mean score obtained by ‘Islamic window of 
domestic conventional bank’ could presumably be attributed to the fact that more 
stringent regulatory requirements are enforced by the authorities on domestic banks 
that require the Chairman and CEO to have separate functions. Perhaps this could 
avoid the exertion of power, authority and control by specific individuals.  
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Table 6.16: KW Test for the Impact of Bank Type on their Perceptions  
    
N Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
Rank Asymto 
tic. Sig 
Roles of 
Chairman and 
CEO split 
 
 
 
 
 
Islamic Window of 
Domestic Conventional 
Bank 
4 19.25 6.943 2 0.031 
Full-fledge Islamic Bank 22 13.11 
Foreign Islamic Bank 1 12.5 
Total 27   
The bank has no 
unresolved 
Shari’ah issues on 
its lack of 
standard. 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign Islamic Bank 1 18.50 8.289 3 0.040 
Full-fledge Islamic Bank 22 16.32 
Islamic Window of 
Domestic Conventional 
Bank 
4 6.25 
Islamic Finance Institution 1 3.50 
Total 28   
The credit 
guidelines address 
credit risk 
associated with 
the specific 
features of Islamic 
financing 
contracts. 
Islamic Finance Institution 1 26.50 8.798 3 0.032 
Full-fledge Islamic Bank 22 14.70 
Islamic Window of 
Domestic Conventional 
Bank 
4 13.50 
Foreign Islamic Bank 1 2.00 
Total 28   
The statement that ‘the bank has no unresolved Shari’ah issues on its lack of 
standard’ is statistically significant (p = 0.040, Chi-square = 8.289). The ‘foreign 
Islamic bank’ ranks top with a mean of 18.50 while the ‘full-fledge Islamic bank’ 
records a mean of 16.32 followed by ‘Islamic window of domestic conventional bank’ 
(6.25). This may imply that, as far as foreign banks are concerned, they have to be 
more diligent in complying with the host country’s regulations as this may cause 
licences to be revoked. Hence, being foreign banks, they are more vigilant in keeping 
the operations effectively flawless.   
The statement on ‘the credit guidelines address credit risk associated with the specific 
features of Islamic financing contracts’ is statistically significant with p-value = 0.032 
and Chi-square = 8.798. The group ‘Islamic finance institution’ ranks top with a mean 
= 26.50. This is followed by ‘full-fledge Islamic bank’ with a mean of 14.70 while the 
group ‘Islamic window of domestic conventional bank’ records a mean of 13.50 
followed by foreign financial institution with mean 2.00.  
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Thus, the bank type, as a control variable, only has statistically significant impact on 
these three statements; implying that ‘type of IBs’ makes a difference in the answers 
given by the respondents only in these cases. 
6.6.4. Searching for the Impact of Longevity of IB on Perceptions Related CG 
and RM Constructs  
According to Table 6.17, seven statements are significantly different across IBs with 
four ranges of periods of inception years of the IBs. The IBs are grouped by the 
inception years: ‘before 1990s’, ‘1990s’, ‘between 2000 to 2006’ and, ‘between 2007 
to 2012’. It seems that group ‘1990s’ always scores the highest mean rank. This could 
probably be due to it having been long established in the industry thus most of the 
relevant requirements have already been adhered to.  The group ‘between 2000 to 
2006’ always takes the lead, presumably due to the fact that they entered the industry 
in the period that Islamic finance is more developed, hence a lot of initiatives have 
already taken place and issues have been addressed.  
The statement on ‘The bank appoints a qualified external auditor’ is statistically 
significant with p-value = 0.040 and Chi-square = 10.046. The group ‘before 1990s’ 
ranks at the top with a mean of 22.00 while the group ‘1990s’ shows a mean of 16.60 
followed by the groups ‘between 2000 to 2006’ (13.90) and ‘between 2007 to 2012’ 
(9.25). 
The construct that ‘Shari’ah governance framework is comprehensive’ is statistically 
significant with a p-value = 0.046 and Chi-square = 9.707. Again, the group ‘before 
1990s’ ranks top with a mean of 20.75 followed by groups ‘between 2000 to 2006’ 
(16.50), 1990s (11.10) and ‘between 2007 to 2012’ (9.63).  
As for the construct that ‘The business strategies define the eligible counterparties’, it 
is statistically significant with p-value = 0.044 and Chi-square = 9.774. It seems that 
group ‘before 1990s’ always ranks the top with a mean of 20.25. This is followed by 
the group ‘between 2000 to 2006’ (14.10), ‘1990s’ (14.00) and ‘between 2007 to 
2012’ (10.94).  
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Table 6.17: KW Test for the Longevity of Banks on their Perceptions  
Construct 
Inception Year 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
Rank Asymt 
otic. Sig 
The bank appoints a qualified 
external auditor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before 1990s 4 22.00 10.046 4 0.040 
1990s 5 16.60 
Before 2007 10 13.90 
2007-2012 8 9.25 
Not specified 1 22.00 
Total 28   
Shari'ah governance 
framework is comprehensive. 
Before 1990s 4 20.75 9.707 4 0.046 
1990s 5 11.10 
Before 2007 10 16.50 
2007-2012 8 9.63 
Not specified 1 25.50 
Total 28   
The business strategies define 
the eligible counterparties 
Before 1990s 4 20.25 9.774 4 0.044 
1990s 5 14.00 
Before 2007 10 14.10 
2007-2012 8 10.94 
Not specified 1 26.50 
Total 28   
The bank financing strategies 
include formal exclusions of 
any engagement that deals 
with haram or unlawful goods 
and services. 
Before 1990s 4 19.00 9.872 4 0.043 
1990s 5 14.10 
Before 2007 10 16.90 
2007-2012 8 8.50 
Not specified 1 22.50 
Total 28   
The credit guidelines address 
credit risk associated with the 
specific features of Islamic 
financing contracts. 
Before 1990s 4 20.00 11.501 4 0.021 
1990s 5 13.50 
Before 2007 10 14.80 
2007-2012 8 10.50 
Not specified 1 26.50 
Total 28   
The risk measurement system 
assesses all material risk 
factors associated with a 
bank’s assets, liabilities and 
off balance sheet positions. 
 
 
 
 
Before 1990s 4 18.00 9.550 4 0.049 
1990s 5 19.80 
Before 2007 10 13.65 
2007-2012 8 11.88 
Not specified 1 3.50 
Total 28   
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Construct 
Inception Year 
N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi-
Square 
Rank Asymt 
otic. Sig 
The bank is aware of the 
potential associated risk to 
society and the environment 
(such as its impact on 
environment, society, financial 
conditions and operations). 
Before 1990s 4 13.38 11.274 4 0.024 
1990s 5 18.60 
Before 2007 10 16.30 
2007-2012 8 8.69 
Not specified 1 27.00 
Total 28   
‘The bank financing strategies include formal exclusions of any engagement that deals 
with haram or unlawful goods and services’ is statistically significant with p-value = 
0.043 and Chi-square = 9.872. The group ‘before 1990s ranks top with a mean of 
19.00, followed by ‘between 2000 to 2006’ (16.90), ‘1990s’ (14.10) and ‘between 
2007 to 2012’ (8.50). 
Regarding the statement that ‘the credit guidelines address credit risk associated with 
the specific features of Islamic financing contracts’ is statistically significant with p-
value = 0.021 and Chi-square = 11.501. The group ‘before 1990s’ ranks top with a 
mean of 20.00, followed by the group ‘between 2000 to 2006’ (14.80), ‘1990s’ 
(13.50) and the group ‘between 2007 to 2012’ (10.50).  
‘The risk measurement system assesses all material risk factors associated with bank’s 
assets, liabilities and off balance sheet positions’ is statistically significant with p-
value = 0.049 and Chi-square = 9.550. The group ‘1990s’ scores the highest mean, 
19.80, followed by ‘before 1990s’ with a mean of 18.00 and the group ‘between 2000 
to 2006’ with a mean of 13.65. This reflects that banks that operate Islamic banking in 
the 1990s accommodate better in terms of risk assessment and accounting systems. 
This may imply that they have fully customised systems, to a certain extent, to cater 
for their business’s needs.  
As for the construct that ‘the bank is aware of the potential associated risk to society 
and the environment (such as its impact on environment, society, financial conditions 
and operations)’ is statistically significant with p-value = 0.024 and Chi-square = 
11.274. The group ‘1990s’ score the highest mean (18.60) followed by ‘between 2000 
to 2006’ (16.30), ‘before 1990s’ (13.38), and ‘between 2007 to 2012’ (8.69). 
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Thus, the longevity of the IBs, as a control variable, only has statistically significant 
impact on these seven statements; implying that ‘year of establishment of the IB’ 
makes a difference in the answers given by the respondents only in these cases. 
6.7. EXPLORING THE NEXUS BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR IBs THROUGH THE EXPRESSED 
PERCEPTIONS  
After providing descriptive and inferential statistical analyses, this section attempts to 
present further inferential analysis to identify potential correlation between CG and 
RM results. As this section aims to respond to the research question as to whether 
there is a correlation between these two, which is based on the assumption that better 
CG performance should result in reduced risk exposure and hence an effective RM. In 
doing so, statistical methods such as Spearman’s Rank and Simple Linear Regression 
using SPSS was employed. Correlation is used to examine the relationship between 
two variables (Pallant, 2010). In doing so, proxies are used to represent each CG and 
RM. 
Prior to using the Spearman’s Rank correlation analysis technique, the sample is 
tested to ensure no violations of assumptions of normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity.  
Spearman’s rho is employed to run the test using responses from questionnaires 
assembled by 28 IB banks. It is felt that this correlation technique suits the analysis 
best considering the fact that the study is done on a relatively small sample as data 
accessibility is a major problem encountered during this research process. A 
correlation is run to establish whether there is a relationship between CG and its 
dimensions. 
This section, hence, comprises four main parts: The first section presents an overall 
correlation analysis between CG and RM. The second section presents the internal 
correlation analysis of the CG dimensions which covers: ‘board effectiveness’; 
‘structure, committee and senior management’; ‘disclosure and transparency’; ‘audit’; 
‘policies and procedures’ and ‘support and operations’. The third part analyses the 
following RM dimensions to provide internal correlation for RM dimensions: ‘risk 
management (general)’; ‘credit risk’; ‘market and liquidity risks’; ‘operational risk’ 
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and ‘Shari’ah risk’. Then the fourth part presents the findings using multiple 
regression techniques. Finally, the section will present a summary of the analysis to 
conclude this chapter. 
6.7.1. Correlation between CG and RM 
As depicted in Table 6.18, the correlation analysis is conducted with Sperman’s Rho 
and Pearson Correlation, both of which indicate that there is a positive correlation 
between CG and RM. The correlation coefficients are above average which is 0.891 
using Spearman’s Rank correlation and 0.734 using Pearson’s moment-product 
correlation, evidencing that the relation between the two variables, CG and RM are 
relatively strong as expected. Table 6.18 also shows that the identified relationship is 
statistically significant between the variables. This provides evidence for the 
hypothesis that there should be a positive relationship between CG and RM practices.  
Table 6.18: Correlation between CG and RM  
  
Corp 
govern Riskmgt 
Spearman's rho Corpgover
n 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .891** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 
N 28 28 
Riskmgt Correlation Coefficient .891** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   
N 28 28 
Note: (**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  Corp govern Riskmgt 
corpgovern Pearson Correlation 1 .734** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 
N 28 28 
riskmgt Pearson Correlation .734** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   
N 28 28 
Note: (**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
It should be noted that while the analysis in this section provides evidence for the 
correlation, it is also important to identify the direction of the relationship, as it is 
assumed that effective CG practice results in efficient RM practices; and hence the 
direction of the relationship is expected to be from CG to RM. This is explored in the 
next chapter. 
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6.7.2. Correlation between Corporate Governance and its Dimensions 
Corporate governance, as widely discussed in the literature, is always associated with 
financial failures. It is felt in this study, however, that some efforts are needed to 
identify which dimensions of CG have a significant impact on the latter. In searching 
for a technique to identify dimensions, a correlation analysis is considered. 
The first part explores the correlation based on the perceptions of the respondents on 
CG and RM in the banks by examining their various dimensions using the analysis 
tool Spearman’s Rank. The following sub-section proceeds with the results of the 
findings of each dimension, as depicted in Table 6.19; however, only the statistically 
significant ones are reported. 
As can be seen from Table 6.19, there are strong and positive correlations between 
corporate governance and its dimensions. ‘Corpgovern’ which is a proxy of corporate 
governance has a strong correlation with ‘support and operations’ (r = .809, p = 
0.000); ‘policies and procedures’ (r = .797, p = 0.000), ‘audit’ (r = .780, p = 0.000), 
‘board’ (r = .751, p = 0.000), ‘disclosure and transparency’ (r = .548, p = 0.003) and 
‘structure, committee and senior management’ (r = .491, p = 0.008). 
Apart from the relationships between ‘Corpgovern’ and other dimensions, 
relationships among the dimensions are also observed. As the findings in Table 6.19 
show the ‘board’ is highly correlated with ‘support and operations’ (r = .706, p = 
0.000), ‘policies and procedures’ (r = .664, p = 0.000) and ‘audit’ (r = .619, p = 
0.000) dimensions. This indicates that board effectiveness requires good support for 
efficient operations of the bank. There is also a positive correlation between ‘board’ 
and ‘disclosure and transparency’ (r = .573, p = 0.001) as well as between ‘board’ and 
‘structure, committee and senior management’ (r = .496, p = 0.007).  
The internal correlation in Table 6.19 for CG also reveals the relationship between 
‘structure, committee and senior management’ and ‘policies and procedures’ (r = 
.685, p = 0.000) indicating that structure is very much responsible for policy 
comprehensiveness. Similarly, there is a quite a strong correlation between ‘structure’ 
and ‘audit’ (r = .528, p = 0.004) as effective structure is associated with high levels of 
audit effectiveness. This may imply that management and committees have influence 
on audit effectiveness. There is also a correlation between ‘structure’ and ‘support and 
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operations’ (r = .413, p = 0.029) and ‘structure’ and ‘disclosure and transparency’ (r = 
.367, p = 0.054). 
Table 6.19: Internal Correlation between CG Dimensions  
Correlationsc 
  Corpg
ovn 
Boar
d 
Str.,co.& 
mgt 
Disclo.& 
Tran. 
Audi
t 
Pol. & 
Proce. 
Supp. & 
Op. 
Spearma
n's rho 
Corpgover
n 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .751
** 
.491** .548** .780*
* 
.797** .809** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 .008 .003 .000 .000 .000 
Board Correlation 
Coefficient 
.751** 1.00
0 
.496** .573** .619*
* 
.664** .706** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   .007 .001 .000 .000 .000 
Structure, 
committee 
& manage. 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.491** .496
** 
1.000 .367 .528*
* 
.685** .413* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .007   .054 .004 .000 .029 
Disclosure 
& 
Transparen 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.548** .573
** 
.367 1.000 .474* .544** .506** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .001 .054   .011 .003 .006 
Audit Correlation 
Coefficient 
.780** .619
** 
.528** .474* 1.00
0 
.684** .687** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .004 .011   .000 .000 
Policies & 
Procedures 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.797** .664
** 
.685** .544** .684*
* 
1.000 .702** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .003 .000   .000 
Support & 
Operation 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.809** .706
** 
.413* .506** .687*
* 
.702** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .029 .006 .000 .000   
Notes: (**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); (*) Correlation is significant at the 
0.05 level (2-tailed); Listwise N = 28 
The relationship between ‘disclosure and transparency’ and ‘policies and procedures’ 
(r = .544, p = 0.003) indicate a positive and significant medium strength relationship. 
Table 6.19 also reveals the relationship between ‘disclosure and transparency’ and 
‘support and operations’ (r = .506, p = 0.006) and the relationship between ‘disclosure 
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and transparency’ and ‘audit’ (r = .474, p = 0.011), each respectively indicating 
medium level strong positive and significant correlations. 
The relationship between ‘audit’ and ‘support and operations’ (r = .687, p = 0.000) 
and ‘audit’ and ‘policies and procedures’ (r = .684, p = 0.000) gives the indication 
that reasonably strong support and operations are reflected in audit. Perhaps high 
levels of audit are also complemented by comprehensive policies and procedures. The 
results in Table 6.19 also reveals relationship between ‘policies and procedures’ and 
‘support and operations’ (r = .702, p = 0.000) which to a certain extent, reflect 
effective policies and procedures facilitate good support and operations of the banks.   
6.7.3. Internal Correlations between Risk Management Dimensions 
This section focuses on the relationships between dimensions in the RM group. As the 
results in Table 6.20 shows, there exists strong and positive correlation between risk 
management and each of its dimensions. 
Table 6.20: Internal Correlation between RM Dimensions  
  
riskmg
t 
Risk 
Manag
ement 
(Gener
al) 
Credit 
Risk 
Market 
& 
Liquidity 
Risk 
Operati
onal 
Risk 
Shari’ah 
Risk 
Spearm
an's rho 
riskmgt Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .868** .804** .685** .794** .605** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
Risk 
Managemen
t (General) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.868** 1.000 .830** .643** .837** .639** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000   .000 .000 .000 .000 
Credit Risk Correlation 
Coefficient 
.804** .830** 1.000 .756** .727** .733** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
Market & 
Liquidity 
Risk 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.685** .643** .756** 1.000 .653** .679** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000   .000 .000 
Operational 
Risk 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.794** .837** .727** .653** 1.000 .553** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000   .002 
Shari’ah 
Risk 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.605** .639** .733** .679** .553** 1.000 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .002   
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As can be seen from Table 6.20, there are strong and positive statistically significant 
correlations between risk management and its dimensions. The proxy of risk 
management, ‘riskmgt’ has a strong, positive correlation with ‘Risk Management 
(General)’(r = .868, p = 0.000); ‘Credit Risk (r = .804, p = 0.000), Operational Risk (r 
= .794, p = 0.000), ‘Market & Liquidity Risk’ (r = .685, p = 0.000), ‘Shari’ah Risk (r 
= .605, p = 0.001).  
Apart from relationships between ‘riskmgt’ and other dimensions, Table 6.20 also 
indicates relationships among the RM dimensions, which reveals that ‘Risk 
Management (General)’ is highly correlated with ‘Operational Risk’ (r = .837, p = 
0.000), ‘Credit Risk’ (r = .830, p = 0.000) and ‘Market and Liquidity Risk’ (r = .643, 
p = 0.000) dimensions. There is also a correlation between ‘Risk Management 
(General)’ and ‘Shari’ah Risk’ (r = .639, p = 0.000).  
Table 6.20 also depicts the relationship between ‘Credit Risk’ and ‘Market and 
Liquidity Risk (r = .756, p = 0.000, ‘Credit Risk’ and ‘Shari’ah Risk’ (r = .733, p = 
0.000), ‘Credit Risk’ and ‘Operational Risk (r = .727, p = 0.000), Market and 
Liquidity Risk’ and ‘Shari’ah Risk’ (r = .679, p = 0.000) and ‘Market and Liquidity 
Risk’, ‘Operational Risk’ (r = .653, p = 0.000) and ‘Operational Risk’ and ‘Shari’ah 
Risk’ (r = .553, p = 0.002). As can be seen, in each of these cases the correlation is 
statistically significant, and in most of the cases, they show a relatively strong 
relationship. 
The correlation analysis in this section, hence, provides the relationships among the 
dimensions (i.e. two dimensions at a time) in the respective CG and RM frameworks. 
An investigation of inter-relationship between CG and RM is carried out through a 
regression analysis in the following section. 
6.7.4. Exploring the Impact of Dimensions of CG and RM through Regression 
Analysis  
This part explores each of the dimensions of CG and RM using a regression 
technique. Since one of the aims of this study is to gauge the extent of the impact of 
its dimensions on corporate governance, this research aims to identify which of the 
variables have effects on CG and RM (being the dependent variable) and thus a 
further regression analysis is employed. However, before continuing with the 
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regression analysis, some tests are undertaken to ensure that all the non-parametric 
assumptions are fulfilled as the sample is tested for data normality using Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk. 
6.7.4.1 Determinants of Corporate Governance: Regression Analysis 
The analysis in this section uses data obtained from the banks’ employees through 
their responses from the questionnaires. The questionnaires comprises two parts; CG 
and RM with six and five dimensions respectively. There are 123 constructs in a total 
of 11 dimensions where each dimension varies in the number of constructs in its set. 
Each construct is classified under a specific dimension.  
The dimension ‘board’ is made up of 17 constructs; ‘structure, committee and senior 
management’ comprises 15 constructs; ‘disclosure and transparency’, ‘audit’, 
‘policies and procedures’ and ‘support and operations’ have 7, 7, 12, and 8 constructs 
respectively. As such, in the analysis, the CG model comprises seven variables with 
CG being the dependent variable (DV) and there being six independent variables 
based on the dimensions. 
The second section analyses the five dimensions of RM. Hence, the model comprises 
six variables which are: ‘risk management (in general)’; ‘credit risk’; ‘market and 
liquidity risks’; ‘operational risk’; and ‘Shari’ah risk’ being the independent variables 
(IV) with RM being the DV. 
In order to see whether all these dimensions influence CG and RM respectively, this 
section proceeds with an analysis of simultaneous multiple regression models. All the 
independent and dependent variables are continuous where the independent variables 
(IV) are based on Likert Scales. It should be mentioned that for multiple regression 
analysis, a non-parametric test is used as the probability of the distribution is not 
known, the sample is not normally distributed, and there is non-linearity. 
The respective regression model for CG and RM is presented as follow: 
CG = α1+β1Board+β2Structure+β3Disclosure+β4Audit+β5Policies+β6Support+ ε1  (6.1)    
RM = α2+β7rg+β8cr β9mr+β10or+β11sr ε2                           (6.2) 
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Corpgov = α3+β12cg+β13rm+β14disclosure+β15audit+β16policies+β17support+ 
β19rmgen+β20cr+β21r+β22or+β23sr+ ε3                 (6.3) 
where αi: constant; εi: error term 
Based on the three equations, the estimated CG, RM and the overall Corpgov are 
obtained. The first equation uses CG as the endogenous variable. It represents the 
main proxy for CG. The second equation uses RM as the endogenous variable, which 
represents the main proxy for risk management. The third equation uses Corpgov as 
the endogenous variable representing the main proxy for overall corporate 
governance. 
Based on the first equation, the estimated CG is obtained. The proposed CG model is 
based on a framework of corporate governance with 6 dimensions. The dimensions 
are continuous variables while its constructs are comprised of ordinal variables of 
Likert Scales and one dichotomous variable (nominal). It should be mentioned that 
CG is a continuous variable (scale).  
Similar constructs apply for risk management and also the same sample is used to 
check for RM which is the proxy for risk management. Its proposed model is based on 
a framework with five dimensions, which comprise 56 constructs in total. Similar to 
CG, each dimension is made up of a set of specific constructs, which vary in number. 
The dimensions of risk management (general) are made up of 19 constructs; credit 
risk comprises 11 constructs; and market risk, operational risk, and Shari’ah have 15, 
6, and 6 constructs respectively. All these constructs comprise ordinal variables of 
Likert Scales.  
Hence based on the proposed model (6.3), there are at least 11 items that might affect 
the overall corporate governance (Corpgov). The following model is regressed to see 
to what extent they affect CG. This could be explained by the Table 6.21 (simplified 
regression table). 
Equation (6.1) estimates 6 coefficients of parameters of CG variables. As can be seen 
in Table 6.21, the results provide a better estimation of the coefficients of parameters 
and a relatively high goodness of fit with the adjusted R2 and the coefficient of 
determination is quite close to the perfect model at about 78%. Thus, the model 
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presented in this study explains about 78% of the variation observed in the dependent 
variable, which is quite highly satisfactory. 
Table 6.21: Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .908a .825 .775 .23927 
Note: a. Predictors: (Constant), board, audit, disclosure and transparency, Structure, committee and 
management, support and operation, policies and procedures 
The results of the adjusted R2 are verified by the results provided through ANOVA as 
shown in Table 6.22. By dividing the regression sum of squares by the total sum of 
squares, the same adjusted R result is obtained. 
Table 6.22: ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 5.664 6 .944 16.489 .000b 
Residual 1.202 21 .057   
Total 6.866 27    
Notes: a. Dependent Variable: corpgovern; b. Predictors: (Constant), Board, Audit, Disclosure & 
Transparency, Structure, Committee and Management, Support and Operation, Policies and 
Procedures 
The Table 6.22 also indicates that ANOVA analysis produced highly significant 
results as the model was fully significant. 
 
Table 6.23: Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardi
zed Coef. 
t Sig. 95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta LowerB Upper B 
1 
(Constant) 1.539 .464  3.316 .003 .574 2.504 
Structure, com. 
& Mgt 
-.376 .149 -.353 
-
2.531 
.019 -.685 -.067 
Disclosure & 
Transparency 
.020 .119 .023 .170 .867 -.227 .267 
Audit .237 .149 .238 1.585 .128 -.074 .547 
Policies & proc. .328 .158 .327 2.083 .050 .001 .656 
Support & 
Operation 
.407 .099 .623 4.103 .001 .201 .613 
Board .022 .129 .024 .168 .868 -.246 .289 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: corpgovern 
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Table 6.23 provides the coefficient estimates for the model mentioned through the 
path analysis by using the multiple linear regression method. As depicted, the model 
has three dimensions that are statistically significant: ‘support and operations’ with a 
coefficient value of 0.623 and p-value of 0.001; ‘policies and processes’ with a 
coefficient value of 0.327 and p = 0.05; ‘structure, committee and management’ with 
a 0.353 coefficient value and p = 0.019. It is also noted that ‘structure, committee and 
management’ variable has a negative sign which indicates that when this variable 
increases, CG will decline. The remaining dimensions: ‘board’, ‘disclosure and 
transparency’ and ‘audit’ are not significant based on the analysis. Thus, these three 
statistically significant variables or constructs should be considered in defining the 
determinants of CG level. 
As for the regression analysis for the determinants factors of R, the results in Table 
6.24 for equation (6.2), identified above, estimates five coefficients of parameters of 
risk management variables. In general, the results provide a relatively high estimation 
of coefficients of parameters and a relatively high goodness of fit with the adjusted R-
Square or the coefficient of determination being quite close to the perfect model with 
about 67%. Thus the model presented in this study explains about 67% of the 
variation observed, which is quite highly satisfactory. 
Table 6.24: Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
1 .855a .732 .671 .26201 
Notes: a. Predictors: (Constant), Shari’ah Risk, Operational Risk, Market & Liquidity Risk, Risk 
Management (General), Credit Risk 
The result of the adjusted R2 in Table 6.25 is verified by the results provided through 
ANOVA as shown in the table below. By dividing the regression sum of squares by 
the total sum of squares, the same adjusted R result is obtained. 
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Table 6.25: ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 4.118 5 .824 11.997 .000b 
Residual 1.510 22 .069   
Total 5.628 27    
Notes: a. Dependent Variable: riskmgt; b. Predictors: (Constant), Shari’ah Risk, Operational Risk, Market & 
Liquidity Risk, Risk Management (General), Credit Risk 
The above ANOVAa table also indicates that ANOVA analysis produced highly 
significant results as the model was fully significant. 
 
Table 6.26: Coefficients  
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 95.0% 
Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 
(Constant) .813 .507  1.604 .123 -.238 1.865 
Risk Management 
(General) 
.721 .207 .893 3.483 .002 .292 1.150 
Credit Risk .091 .294 .091 .310 .759 -.518 .700 
Market & Liquidity 
Risk 
-.230 .174 -.311 -1.325 .199 -.590 .130 
Operational Risk -.060 .169 -.083 -.353 .728 -.410 .291 
Shari’ah Risk .243 .169 .233 1.434 .166 -.108 .594 
Note: a. Dependent Variable: riskmgt 
 
Table 6.26 provides the coefficient estimates for the model mentioned through the 
path analysis by using the multiple linear regression method. As depicted, the model 
has only one dimension, ‘risk management (general)’, with a coefficient value of 89.3 
and p-value of 0.002, which was statistically significant. The remaining dimensions: 
‘credit risk’, ‘market and liquidity risks’, ‘operational risk’, ‘Shari’ah risk’ are not 
statically significant based on the analysis. It is, however, important to state that 
‘operational risk’ and ‘market risk’ variables have negative signs; indicating that 
when the disclosure index increases in this case, the global RM disclosure index 
declines, namely a negative yet insignificant relationship exists. 
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6.8. CONCLUSION 
CG is more often perceived as very high level, thus, in terms of impact and as can be 
seen from liberal studies, it does not have much to directly influence the banking 
business operations as opposed to RM. However, based on the empirical results, 
higher importance is placed on CG than in RM as indicated through the CG 
dimensions. It is revealed that the effectiveness of audit is paramount to strengthen the 
framework. However, this could be seen as being highly supported by the appropriate 
structure, committees and senior management as well as comprehensive policies and 
procedures, that need to be in place. In fact, the rest of the dimensions such as ‘board 
effectiveness’, ‘disclosure and transparency’, as well as ‘support and operations’ also 
affect the CG framework as they do not differ much from ‘audit’, ‘structure, 
committees and top management’ and ‘policies and procedures’ dimensions in terms 
of their mean scores.  
As for the RM practices, although it seems to be much more regarded as the key 
aspect in the banking system compared to CG, through its direct impact on banking 
businesses and operations, the empirical reveals otherwise. Quite similar to CG, all 
RM dimensions are about the same level in terms of their mean scores. The top three 
mean scores are indicated by ‘credit risk’, ‘Shari’ah risk’ and ‘general risk 
management practices’. However, it is noted that the results indicate that addressing 
‘credit risk’ is perceived to be the highest priority for the banks as opposed to taking 
care of Shari’ah risk, although upholding Shari’ah principles is a distinct mandate as 
far as IBs are concerned.    
Based on statistical analysis, from the perspective of the relationship between CG and 
RM, these two aspects are perceived as highly correlated. With regards to their 
respective components, CG and RM are very much dependent on their main 
components. In the case of CG, it is the ‘Support and Operations’ dimension that 
affect CG the most. As for RM, the RM dimension ‘risk management (general)’ plays 
a very important role that affects the overall RM.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONTEXTUALISING THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a great deal of discussion on corporate governance (CG) and risk 
management (RM) following a series of failures of the financial institutions. 
Institutions, especially banks, are said to be seriously vulnerable when CG procedures 
and RM are not observed properly.  
CG, considered the cause of such crises (Solomon, 2010), and RM, to a certain extent, 
are always seen as playing similar roles in the system. Boards of directors are blamed 
(Dionne and Triki, 2005) for their inability to comprehend banking issues and are 
accused of ignorance, with opponents claiming that their conduct, or lack thereof, is 
directly responsible for the issues that arise during such crises. However, in a recent 
study, Adams (2012) disagrees that board is to be blamed, as she sees the problem as 
more of a regulations and policies issues. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2005) on the other 
hand, view that it is the legislative and regulatory side that makes for a good 
governance system and that the culprit for the corporate failures could be 
‘overregulation’. 
To an extent, corporate failure is also associated with RM (Kirkpatrick, 2009), which 
is usually brought to the public attention as its oversight is claimed to not be 
adequately performed. RM significantly affects the degree of firms affected by 
financial crises (Erkens et al., 2012). In addition, weak policies and procedures also 
contribute to failures (Meltzer, 1985) apart from weakness in controls and operations 
and disclosure and transparency in relation to risk management, which are all brought 
into the limelight.  
Despite the blame that has been placed on CG and RM, initiatives and focuses on 
these issues have always been of interest in the literature, and matters of how CG and 
RM can help avoid future crises are widely discussed, such as in Kirkpatrick (2009). 
Based on their conceptual frameworks, CG and RM have very wide dimensions 
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respectively. They are similar in the sense that they both comprise of several 
dimensions (such as the board, the committees, and the senior management) and are 
supported by their individual operational managements with the resources and 
infrastructure necessary to undertake operations where transparency and disclosure 
are observed and regulated through regulatory requirements and audit. Putting this 
into perspective, these are the dimensions that comprise the respective overall CG and 
RM. 
Some clarity is, therefore, needed to assess the right dimension to improve CG and 
RM areas in both the banking industry in general and the financial system 
specifically. This requires the wide aspects of CG to be examined in order to identify 
which dimensions have significant influence on the overall CG. A similar approach 
applies to RM, which has been the main agenda in banking practices and has always 
been highly emphasised due to being perceived as being directly associated with 
profit.  
By narrowing down analysis on the components, i.e. on the individual dimensions in 
CG and RM, this research helps to focus on specific and relevant aspects. In light of 
this, it is felt that there may be some components, or perhaps just a single aspect, 
which acts as the main triggering factor that causes financial and corporate failure. 
Thus, this research aims to identify ‘what’ in CG and RM are the most influential 
dimensions that could be given more attention to, instead of the ‘how’ of addressing 
the issue. In doing so, this study aimed at exploring CG and RM practices in Islamic 
banks and also aimed at identifying correlation between the two. 
As identified in Chapter 1, this study is an attempt to establish the principles of the 
CG and RM frameworks. It is important to note that the results may not have high 
bearings on the overall banking practices considering its limitations. However, 
“concepts such as risk and corporate governance are social constructs shaped by the 
contexts they inhibit. As dimensions of the organisational realm, they become 
operationalised and actionable because they can be formalised and rendered. As such, 
making risk and corporate governance concepts procedural and analytical enhances 
their capacity to be managerially actionable” (Bhimani, 2009:3).   
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Thus, in this vein, in light of providing IBs with a view to develop clearer CG and 
RM frameworks for the banks, each dimension of CG and RM is examined in detail. 
It should be noted that CG and RM frameworks used in the study may have 
duplications and redundancies in their respective dimensions. In practice, this 
occasionally happens in banks. Thus besides trying to identify the specific areas in 
CG and RM and their disclosures that affect the overall CG and RM, this research, in 
view of a lack of clear delineations between dimensions, helps to highlight the areas 
of concern that are the result of grey areas or unclear lines between CG and RM. 
As resources are channelled towards all dimensions, this sometimes creates 
redundancies in work. As much as the dimensions from these two aspects are 
concerned, the duplications and redundancies could cause overlaps in CG and RM 
areas. At some points, the overlapped work may be attributed to the absence of a clear 
demarcation between the scope of work, which CG and RM fall into. Certain 
constructs may be better placed under CG, while others may be better under RM.  
At some points, an unclear demarcation may even cause conflicts of interest if 
reporting lines are not carefully taken care off. As stated by Edwards and Clough 
(2005) in their study on governance and management, clarity on different 
responsibilities and functions of each roles and, achieving equilibrium between the 
two, will contribute making the organisation run smoothly. On the other hand, as 
mentioned by Clark and Urwin (2009:6), in the context of decision making, the 
overlap in interaction with one another in practice often blurs the boundaries in poorly 
governed institution such that the issue will accumulate and overlap with one another.    
CG and RM are always associated with each other and they are often used 
interchangeably in discussions (Bhimani, 2009). In retrospect, with regards to issues 
of financial crises, this has motivated and led this research into exploring the CG-RM 
relationship. The research uses a conceptual and foundational framework of CG and 
RM in trying to understand the issues behind their constructs and practical constructs. 
In general, the research has shown quite an unexpected outcome from what is 
generally perceived in the literature, as it reveals that initial perceptions are not the 
same as empirical evidence.  
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In trying to support IBs to be on par with the conventional banking, this research 
embarks to establish CG framework and RM practices from their relationship 
perspective. The findings show that CG and RM are two variables that are correlated 
with each other and this is how they are generally perceived to be with regards to their 
relationship. Quite unexpectedly, the findings fail to locate any strong relationship 
between them, especially from the disclosure approach. The study found that only 
some dimensions in CG and RM have a high influence on the overall CG and RM 
while others do not.  
Using both the conceptual and empirical components, the study has provided a 
holistic perspective on the research area by highlighting insights towards 
improvements in Islamic banking in particular with regards to adopting CG and 
managing risk. Given the strength of the relationship between CG and RM, this helps 
to correctly identify the dimension that could increase the effectiveness of CG and 
RM, hence could empower the focus on what really matters most. 
The findings of this study contribute to the literature through its exploration in 
systemising the disclosed information on CG and RM in Islamic banks and also for 
establishing the relationship between CG and RM. The study presents empirical 
evidence based on two approaches: the disclosure approach and the perception 
approach using primary and secondary data respectively. The primary data is obtained 
through questionnaires from 28 banks from 6 countries, while the secondary data 
comprises of 181 annual reports from 57 banks from 15 countries.  
The findings empirically evidence that CG is associated with RM: low CG implies 
poor RM, and vice versa. The findings also reveal that the overall CG is always lower 
than the overall RM. In general, the relationship between CG and RM is quite 
moderate, at 0.588 based on the disclosure results, but significantly higher, at 0.891 
using the perceptions approach. Thus, IB staff articulates a more efficient CG and RM 
practice as opposed to disclosure; the gap may be explained by the shortcomings in 
regulations in relation to disclosure as well as cultural norms not enforcing such 
practices. 
In trying to identify the main dimensions in CG and RM that affect them the most, the 
results between the two approaches are quite dissimilar. The findings from the 
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disclosure approach, using regression analysis, found that ‘Shari’ah compliance’ and 
‘Shari’ah governance’ dimensions affect CG the most. Based on the questionnaire 
approach, however, it is revealed that the ‘support and operations’, ‘structure, 
committees and senior management’ and ‘policies and procedures’ dimensions 
influence CG with high impact. Hence, the divergence between the primary and 
secondary data analysis has to be identified in terms of the perceived and disclosed 
nature of the practices in relation to CG and RM in this aspect of the study also. 
As for RM, based on the analysis from the disclosure approach, the study found that 
‘reporting and disclosure’ and ‘risk management (control)’ dimensions affect RM the 
most as opposed to the perception approach which reveals that the only dimension 
that influences RM is ‘risk management (general)’. As in the case of CG, the 
distinctions in the results produced by two different data sets should be stated. 
However, it is important to note that based on the study undertaken in a specific 
period, not all dimensions have a positive effect on CG and RM. Based on the 
disclosure approach, ‘board leadership’ has a negative significant impact on CG. This 
is quite in line with a study by Erkens et al. (2012) who highlights how CG may be 
linked to performance through board conduct. As for RM, the ‘market and liquidity 
risk’, and ‘credit risk’ dimensions have negative effects on RM but these are not 
significant. 
Based on the results presented in the empirical analysis chapters (5 and 6), and as 
summarised above, the following section aims to provide a critical analysis in further 
meaning making. The study shows that, with regards to practices, CG is not too far off 
from expectations, as it seems that CG has been taken quite seriously by the banks, 
especially by the main market players in the banking industry. In fact, due to its role 
as being more supervisory in nature, a relatively favourable observation is perceived 
on the acceptance of CG code recently.  
7.2. REFLECTING ON THE FINDINGS OF CG AND RM RELATIONSHIP  
This section discusses the findings from both the disclosure and the perception 
approaches. On the discussion on the former approach, results are based on the level 
of disclosure of CG and RM that are communicated through the IBs’ annual reports, 
while the discussion on the latter is related to the results that are based on the 
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respondents’ perception as in how the latter view CG and RM in their IBs. Eventually, 
an attempt is made to establish CG-RM relationship from the findings of both the 
section, while trying to identify which dimension influences CG and RM the most.  
7.2.1. Reflecting on the Findings from Disclosure Analysis 
The findings are based on the analysis conducted in Chapter 5, which uses bank and 
country comparisons. The results indicate that a high CG index attained by the banks 
or countries does not necessarily mean they attain high RM as well. This is not quite 
consistent with a study by Drew et al. (2005), which views a good CG structure 
supports RM development. Their study, in elaborating the CG comprehensive 
structure, comments that with good CG, through areas such as board leadership, 
structure and support dimensions help to strategize risk management. 
Bhat (2008:4), agreeing with Drew et al. (2005), mentions that good CG and RM 
provide the tools and data to help the management better monitor and measure risk, as 
he says that it will be difficult to obtain risk management without corporate 
governance.  
The findings of the disclosure analysis also reveal that in most cases the overall mean 
disclosure for CG is comparatively lower than the one for RM irrespective of the type 
of comparison (i.e. either bank-wise or country-wise). Generally, this is triggered by 
low disclosure in board-related as well as Shari’ah-related dimensions for CG.  The 
findings also show that the overall means for CG and RM are higher in bank 
comparison compared to the country comparison. The overall mean CG disclosure is 
0.32 bank-wise compared to 0.25 country-wise and the overall mean RM disclosure is 
slightly higher at 0.57 bank-wise compared to 0.51 country-wise. In many cases, the 
disclosures for CG and RM in the bank comparison are higher as opposed to the ones 
in the country comparison, primarily due to the disparate level of acceptance of CG 
code and different level of RM practices among the banks themselves thus this affect 
the overall disclosure for their countries. 
7.2.1.1. Reflecting on the findings from bank level comparison 
As reported in Chapter 5, no banks managed to score ‘very high’ CG disclosure, while 
there is at least one bank, which attained ‘very high’ RM disclosure. CIMB’s ‘very 
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high’ RM disclosure is attributed to its key risk management area, perhaps triggered 
by its very ambitious profit-oriented business, which requires the bank to manage risk 
prudently in its attempt to ensure high profitability and a good track record for 
business expansion.  
As far as CG is concerned, ‘high’ is the highest ranking attained by the banks. Three 
banks are identified to be in the ‘high’ CG disclosure group while there are 17 banks 
classified in the ‘high’ RM disclosure group. The ‘high’ CG disclosure is accounted 
for by ABIB (Bahrain), BIMB and KFH, all of which, except for KFH, have a very 
high score on board-related dimensions46. This is attributed to their high score in 
‘board leadership’; but they score quite low in the ‘Shari’ah compliance’ dimension. 
Quite interestingly, KFH’s ‘high’ CG disclosure is significantly attributed to its 
impressive Shari’ah theme47 contributed by its ‘Shari’ah compliance’ and ‘ethics’ 
disclosure. 
With respect to RM, the IBs in the ‘high’ RM disclosure group include: EIIB, HLIB, 
RHB, Al Baraka, Asya, ADIB, Affin, BLME, ABCID, Hilal, Khaleeji, Ithmaar, Al 
Rajhi, Al Inma, and QIB. Most of the banks are main market players and perhaps this 
explains the high emphasis on RM. However, based on a study by Perignon and Smith 
(2010), both investors and creditors may not necessarily benefit from increased 
information disclosure, as their study on market risk disclosure shows that VaR 
forecasts were debatable as its quality was excessively conservative. In general, these 
banks seem to have good disclosure on RM structure too. However, it is worth to 
mention that the main difference between these banks is also mainly contributed by 
their disclosure in the ‘audit’ and ‘risk management (committee)’ dimensions.  
The ‘moderate’ CG disclosure is accounted for by CIMB, RHB, BISB, JDIB, and JIB 
while the ‘moderate’ RM disclosure group is represented by Gatehouse, Al Jazira, Al 
Falah, BISB, As Salam, Capinnova, Eskan, IIAB, IBB, Al Arafah, KuveytTurk and 
JIB. Most of the banks in the ‘moderate’ CG index disclosure group achieve almost 
full scores in the ‘board theme’ but scored very low in the ‘Shari’ah theme’, 
especially in ‘Shari’ah compliance’. This contradicts with a study by Hassan (2009), 
                                                          
46 Which comprise of ‘board composition’, ‘board leadership’ and ‘board meetings’ dimensions. 
47 Shari’ah-related dimensions which comprise of ‘Shari’ah governance’ and ‘Shari’ah compliance’ 
dimensions.  
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who claims that IBs offer products that are not in violation of any Shari’ah principles. 
JDIB and JIB however, score quite modest in ‘board-related dimensions’, while 
CIMB scores very low in ‘Shari’ah compliance’. Banks in the ‘moderate’ RM 
disclosure on the other hand, attain a low score in ‘audit’. KFH and KuveytTurk for 
instance, despite having very impressive scores in all other dimensions of RM, only 
manage to have ‘moderate’ RM disclosure, as those scores are highly affected by their 
low score in ‘audit’ dimension.   
The ‘low’ CG disclosure is accounted by Ithmaar, Khaleeji, BNI Sharia and HLIB 
while the ‘low’ RM disclosure is accounted for by Emirates, QIIB, IBQ, Bujr and 
Rayan. The findings reveal that the ‘low’ CG disclosure group, like most banks in 
other groups, is contributed by the ‘very low’ Shari’ah disclosure. HLIB and Ithmaar, 
for instance, attain very low scores in ‘Shari’ah compliance’ and ‘Shari’ah 
governance’ respectively, as opposed to their ‘very high’ disclosure in board-related 
dimensions, while Khaleeji scores ‘very low’ in the ‘nomination and remuneration 
(NR) committee’ dimension.  
Banks in the ‘low’ RM disclosure group also attain ‘very low’ in ‘audit’ disclosure. 
Emirates, IBQ, Bujr, Rayan and Kuwait International do not have any disclosure in 
‘audit’, and this could probably be due to the audit areas not being fully developed 
yet. In the case of QIIB and QIB, the ‘low’ audit disclosure could be attributed to high 
staff turnover as well as inadequate skilled resources as reflected in the board 
composition.  
The ‘very low’ CG disclosure is accounted for by 41 IBs within the sampled IBs, in 
which As Salam, EIIB, Al Baraka, Affin are among them, while the ‘very low’ RM 
disclosure group is represented by 18 banks. In general, banks in the ‘very low’ CG 
disclosure group such as Al Baraka (Turk), Asya, As Salam, Affin, ADIB, and BLME 
have ‘very low’ disclosure in the board-related dimensions. QIIB for instance, reveals 
a very little amount on board matter. Asya, Al Baraka (Turk) and KuveytTurk on the 
other hand, do not have Shari’ah disclosure at all. This, to a certain degree, seems to 
agree with a statement by MIFC (2010) that sees the banks’ action as trying to avoid 
offending secularist sensibilities. 
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For banks in the ‘very low’ RM disclosure group, such as Faisal (Egypt), Boubyan, 
Meezan, Muamalat, Tadamon, Shah Jalal, JDIB, Jadwa, JIB, DIB, Al Baraka, AI 
Islami, Faisal, Kuwait International, Al Baraka (Sudan), BNI, Al Shamal, and BSM, 
their ‘very low’ RM disclosure is highly affected by their low score in ‘audit’ 
disclosure (between 0.11 and 0.31). In the case of Al Baraka (Sudan) and Al Shamal, 
disclosure on the overall RM (committee and control) dimensions is as good as 
absent. Perhaps this is also attributed to their inadequate resources. On another note, 
the ‘very low’ RM disclosure could also relate to performance as Williams (2001), in 
his study, mentions that competition encourages firms to reduce disclosure as 
performance reaches a certain level. 
7.2.1.2. Reflecting on the findings from country level comparison  
As the results demonstrated, No countries are grouped in the ‘very high’ or ‘high’ CG 
disclosure group as ‘moderate’ is the highest ranking disclosure attained in CG. As for 
RM, the highest classification attained is ‘high’, accounted for by Malaysia, Turkey 
and UK. 
Perhaps Malaysia’s ‘high’ RM disclosure is consistent with its efforts to strengthen its 
Islamic banking position globally. According to Dusuki and Abdullah (2006), Islamic 
banks in dual systems often must compete with conventional banks that are 
established and must thus increase customer perceptions. However, this position is 
quite controversial as Malaysian IBs are often viewed as offering Islamic deposits that 
are not free of interests and pegged to conventional deposits, while at the same time 
offering very limited products based on profit-loss sharing (Beck et al., 2013).   
As a hub for Islamic finance; Malaysia is able to harness its position to tap Middle 
Eastern market segments through prudent risk management. Perhaps, this is also 
triggered by its concerns for higher financial gain. By utilising transparency, this 
could help attract bigger market segments. This is reflected in its risk-averse banking 
policies spelt out comprehensively through its annual report.  
As for UK and Turkey, their ‘high’ RM disclosure is mainly attributed to their high 
score in the key risk management area. The UK, undoubtedly, for many obvious 
reasons, has insurmountable privileges in terms of managing risk, and reporting and 
disclosure. Turkey on the other hand, has adopted stringent strategies in providing IB 
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products through which limited the expansion so that control can be possible. This 
could be due to the recent initiatives and incentives to promote Islamic banking.  
For the ‘moderate’ classification, Malaysia is the only country in this CG disclosure 
group, while Bahrain and Saudi Arabia account for the ‘moderate’ RM disclosure. 
Malaysia’s CG disclosure score (0.62), however, is quite modest despite achieving 
almost a full score in the board-related dimensions. The full score in the dimensions 
could be due to the country’s political culture, through which IBs, similar to their 
conventional counterpart, are highly regulated through measures and government 
intervention. This is supported by Wilson (2009), as he sees that Islamic finance is 
encouraged in Malaysia through legislation.  This is consistent with the opinion 
developed by Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), who see CG as shaped by the laws of the 
place where it operates. Specifically, the powers and rights of the shareholders and 
managers are all defined through local laws (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005). In other 
words, the political economy and political culture of a country shapes CG through the 
banking guidelines. In fact, in their study to examine disclosure, Karamanou and 
Vafeas (2005) agree that policy makers may be able to improve the system by using 
legislation to allow for good corporate governance.  
Nevertheless, Malaysia’s CG disclosure is adversely affected by dimensions such as 
Shari’ah-related and ethics. The country does not fare well in Shari’ah compliance 
but comparatively better in Shari’ah governance. The weak Shari’ah compliance for 
Malaysia seems to be in line with a study by Chong and Liu (2007), which claim that 
IBs in Malaysia are almost the same as conventional banking. In their study 
examining IBs on Shari’ah compliance, they claim that IBs are often perceived as 
merely pegging their products to interest rates rather than offering actual interest-free 
products. Perhaps one of the factors affecting this could be explained by the absence 
of mandatory Shari’ah audit. This has been highlighted by Shafii et al. (2010) who 
state that Shari’ah compliance audit is needed so that Shari’ah practice is undertaken 
properly.    
For RM, to a certain extent, Bahrain has provided necessary risk management-related 
structures reasonably well in a detailed manner consistent in an effort to strengthen 
Islamic banking’s presence in their country. However, other reasons that may pull the 
score down could be the inadequate or inappropriate resources or infrastructures that 
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are not in place. Together with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain scores very high in key risk 
areas. As for Saudi Arabia, its aims to penetrate the niche market might take longer. 
Perhaps this is due to lack of transparency triggered by the ownership structure that 
does not allow banks to impose certain rules in risk management. 
Unexpectedly, findings also show that Bahrain and Jordan account for the ‘low’ CG 
disclosure group, while Qatar, UAE and Pakistan account for the ‘low’ RM disclosure 
group. The ‘low’ CG disclosure attained by Bahrain is affected by the ‘nomination 
and remuneration committee’ dimension and other dimensions such as ‘Shari’ah 
governance’, ‘board meeting’ and ‘Shari’ah compliance’. Although Bahrain is seen as 
the main player in establishing guidelines and procedures, its initiatives in improving 
CG may need more time, and perhaps this could be attributed to inherent or structural 
issues, such as the political structure, the business model adopted by the banks, or the 
internal governance issue. Most countries with the ‘low’ CG disclosure do not have 
good board-related disclosure.  
The disclosure performance of Jordan and Bahrain could also be influenced by other 
factors such as the banks’ ownership structure and the type of investments that the 
banks are involved in. Jordan has been very serious in trying to prioritise CG by 
placing the task to improve CG in the national agenda. However, it might need more 
time to improve, especially in areas such as documentation and reporting, as it has just 
adopted the CG mission quite recently. This is consistent with the view from 
Tapanjeh (2006) who specifically mentions in his study the government’s initiatives 
in enhancing CG and performance. Despite all this, the low disclosure could be 
attributed to Shari’ah-related issues, such as lacking in initiatives to streamline 
Shari’ah guidelines. 
As far as RM is concerned, the RM disclosure scores for Qatar, UAE and Pakistan are 
very much affected by their ‘low’ audit disclosure. In addition, the ‘low’ RM 
disclosure of these countries is also accounted for by ‘low’ disclosures in both the 
‘risk management practices’ and ‘reporting and transparency’ dimensions. Perhaps 
this could be associated with qualifications and experience, as based on a study by 
Dionne and Triki (2005) having a director with tertiary education is an important 
determinant in risk assessment. 
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As the results show, the majority of the countries are in the ‘very low’ disclosure 
group. In general, this is attributed to inadequate regulatory framework to enforce 
disclosure or absence of legal framework to support IBs. This could also due to 
political or social sensitivities. For most of the ‘very low’ CG disclosure group, the 
countries’ poor CG score can be generalised as having a ‘very low’ Shari’ah-related 
disclosure. Other reasons include low disclosure in ‘mission’ and ‘board 
composition’. As far as CG is concerned, Qatar, Pakistan and UAE have very poor 
score in board-related dimensions. To a certain extent, board independence is affected 
by board composition (John and Senbet, 1998). Specifically, as there are more 
external directors, the board may be seen as more independent (John and Senbet, 
1998). The ‘board composition’, ‘board leadership’ and ‘structure, committee and 
senior management’, as well as ‘ethics’ dimensions are just around 0.01. However, 
Qatar recently, is seen as adopting the CG code very diligently as reflected in its 
mission statements.  
As for Indonesia, UK, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, their ‘very low’ disclosure 
performances are mainly contributed by ‘Shari’ah compliance’ and to a certain extent 
owe much to the ‘very low’ disclosure in the ‘ethics’ dimension. In addition, for 
Kuwait, disclosure on ethics could not be observed. 
There are seven countries in the ‘very low’ RM disclosure group and Bangladesh, 
Jordan, Yemen, Egypt, Kuwait, Indonesia are among them. Similar to the result for 
bank comparison, most of these countries have a very high disclosure in their key risk 
areas, but not quite in the audit dimension. For countries such as Bangladesh, Sudan, 
and Egypt, the low disclosure could be due to problems of ‘low’ scores in the 
‘reporting and documentation’ dimension. This could also be the case for some 
Middle Eastern countries such as Kuwait. For Yemen and Sudan, the reporting on 
disclosure could be attributed to having inadequate skilled manpower. Williams 
(2001) supports this statement, as he says that as more intellectual resources actually 
coincides with there being less disclosure. Kuwait on the other hand, is not relatively 
ambitious in providing disclosure and reporting area. Perhaps, this only occurs at the 
discretion of the majority of the shareholder (to disclose). In other words, it depends 
on the nature of the ownership structure of banks, as some banks have a family-
ownership structure.  
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7.2.1.3. Summary of disclosure analysis on banks and country level comparisons  
The preceding section reveals that most banks do not have the same level of 
disclosure for both their CG and RM. In general banks’ CG level is always lower than 
their RM’s disclosure level. However, there are cases when some banks do attain 
higher disclosure in CG than in RM. This could probably be due to the IBs’ lack of 
professional skill in risk management practices (Hassan and Dicle, 2005).    
In general, the CG disclosures for banks are highly influenced by board-related areas 
such as ‘board composition’ and ‘board leadership. In a similar vein, viewing CG as a 
crucial task for strategic management of the bank, Maingot and Zeghal (2008) 
perceive disclosure of CG as highly dependent on bank size. From their analysis, 
larger banks have higher disclosure. In addition to that, Pathan (2009) posits limited 
boards positively affect bank risk-taking.   
Generally most of the banks in the ‘low’ and ‘very low’ CG disclosure groups have 
‘very low’ disclosure in the ‘board’ dimension. This is consistent with Eng and Mak 
(2003), who view that disclosure is influenced by the board as ownership structure 
and board composition all affect disclosure levels.  
In general, irrespective of their disclosure groups, the banks have a poor score in 
Shari’ah-related and ‘ethics’ dimensions. Quite often, the ‘high’ RM disclosure is 
attributed to the key risk management area. It is also noted that most banks in the 
‘moderate’, ‘low’ and ‘very low’ RM disclosure groups have comparatively low 
scores in ‘audit’ dimension as opposed to the key risk management area.  
The findings also reveal that even if the bank’s CG and RM are in the same disclosure 
group, the mean for CG tends to be lower than the mean for RM48. In terms of number 
of banks, the ‘low’ and ‘very low’ CG disclosure groups have more banks as 
compared to the similar disclosure groups of RM. Similarly, there are fewer banks in 
the ‘high’ and ‘moderate’ CG disclosure groups compared to their RM counterparts, 
of which, the latter has quite a balanced number in each disclosure category49.  
                                                          
48 For example, ABIB and BIMB have both their CG and RM in the ‘high’ disclosure group but the 
mean for their CG (0.793 and 0.767 respectively) are lower than the RM’s (0.858 and 0.888 
respectively). 
49 The findings show that CG has only 3 banks in the ‘high’ disclosure group as compared to RM 
which has 17 banks in the same disclosure classification. There are 5 banks in the ‘moderate’ CG 
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Based on the country comparison, it is found that the majority of the countries under 
survey are still weak in terms of their CG. As such, ‘moderate50’ is the highest CG 
disclosure obtained despite the Islamic moral economy’s essentialisation of ‘good 
Islamic governance’ based on Islamic norms. 
In concluding, it is important to note that as theory and evidence suggest, disclosure 
facilitates opening up a company’s access to capital markets their shares more 
attractive to current and prospective investors by reducing information-gathering costs 
(Bhimani, 2009). Thus, not only Islamic CG principles are not essentualised, the 
financial values of these institutions may have affected by their low disclosure scores. 
To expand on this, RM disclosure helps reveal how effective their RM is, while CG 
plays a subtler role (Bhat, 2008). 
7.2.2. Reflecting on the Findings from Perception based Analysis 
The findings from perception analysis are based on the ‘mean scores’ achieved by the 
RM constructs in all the CG and RM dimensions. Based on the findings from the 
perception analysis in Chapter 6, the highest mean among all the CG dimensions is 
mainly obtained from the ‘audit’ dimension. This is followed by the ‘board 
effectiveness’, ‘structure, committees and senior management’, ‘policies and 
procedures’, ‘disclosure & transparency’ and ‘support and operations’ dimensions 
(ranked by means of the constructs in the individual dimension). 
As can be seen in the results, the perception on the construct that ‘the bank appoints a 
qualified external auditor’ records the highest mean. As a matter of fact, almost all the 
constructs in this dimension obtain equally high means (shown in Chapter 6, Table 
6.5); reflecting that audit is the basis and, is an essential process of corporate 
governance. This is supported by other literature such as a study by Cohen et al. 
(2002:1) that tries to relate the effects of CG on the audit processes. Audit is viewed 
as forming a part of the corporate governance structure of which, it acts as the 
monitoring device (Cohen et al., 2002).  
                                                                                                                                                                      
disclosure group as compared to 12 banks in the same level of disclosure for RM. The findings reveal 
that the majority of the banks (41) are in the ‘very low’ CG disclosure group as opposed to only 18 
banks in the same levels of disclosure for RM.  
50 Only one country obtains ‘moderate’ disclosure. The remaining 14 countries have ‘low’ disclosure of 
which 12 of them have very ‘low’ disclosure. As opposed to RM, 3 countries have ‘high’ disclosure, 
followed by 2 countries which account for ‘moderate’ while 10 countries are in the ‘low’ disclosure 
group of which 7 of them have ‘very low’ disclosure. 
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The findings also illustrate the importance of board effectiveness. As shown in the 
perceptions on the ‘board’s effectiveness’ dimension, the board’s high involvement is 
highly anticipated, as nearly 50% of the respondents indicate their strong agreement 
with the construct ‘the board monitors management's execution plan’. This signifies 
high expectation on the board being hands-on in strategic planning (Chapter 6, Table 
6.2).  
Nonetheless, ‘structure, committees and senior management’ undoubtedly play an 
important role in the institutions, as reflected in the perceptions on the dimension ‘the 
appropriateness of the structure and committees and effectiveness of the senior 
management’ (Chapter 6, Table 6.3). The construct ‘appropriate structure to assist 
board discharge its function is in place’ is highly regarded as 100% of the responses 
agree with this construct. For the constructs such as ‘Shari’ah advisor ensure 
contracts, fatwa, executions and policies comply with Shari’ah’ and ‘Shari’ah 
advisors have appropriate skill sets and experience’ and ‘the bank has clear reporting 
line’ are also perceived to be highly important.  
The perceptions on ‘the appropriateness and comprehensiveness of policies and 
procedures’ dimension reveals the importance of documentation and standardisation 
(Chapter 6, Table 6.6). Nearly 90% of the responses agree with ‘Shari’ah-related 
strategies and principles approved by Shari’ah advisors’ construct. Similarly, the 
perceptions on ‘regulatory disclosure & transparency’ dimension is highly regarded 
(Chapter 6, Table 6.4), as more than 92% of the respondents agree with the construct 
‘the accounting processes produce reliable information (e.g. for investors and strategic 
decision making)’. This could be supported by the perception on the dimension 
‘efficiency of support and operations’ when it reveals that infrastructure plays a 
relatively important role in supporting CG, as evidenced in the construct ‘control 
processes are adequate’ which denotes that 67% of the respondents agree with this 
statement (Chapter 6, Table 6.7). Nonetheless quite a significant percentage of the 
respondents do not agree with this construct, which can be attributed to inadequate 
resources to support the bank. 
With regards to the risk management aspect, the findings show that perceptions on 
‘credit risk’ dimension attain the highest means, which is followed by the perceptions 
on ‘general risk management practice’, ‘Shari’ah risk’, ‘market and liquidity risk’ and 
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perceptions on ‘operational risk’ dimensions (ranked by means of the constructs in the 
individual dimension). 
Based on the perceptions on ‘credit risk’ dimension, 100% of the respondents agree 
with the construct that ‘the bank financing strategies include formal exclusions of any 
engagement that deals with haram or unlawful goods and services’ (see Chapter 6, 
Table 6.9). As far as IBs are concerned, perhaps this pushes the fact that Shari’ah 
compliance is highly regarded. In supporting Shari’ah principles, policies and 
procedures also play a significant role to ensure the take-off. It is also revealed that 
the ‘general risk management practice’ is important. As such, more than 96% of the 
respondents agree with the construct that ‘the controls comply with the regulatory and 
internal policies and procedures’ (Chapter 6, Table 6.8). 
Being the institutions that offer Islamic products, it is highly expected that the general 
rules of Shari’ah are fully complied with. The findings also illustrate that more than 
92% of the respondents agree with the construct ‘the bank donates the penalty charges 
to charity to comply with Shari’ah’, as indicated by the perceptions on the ‘Shari’ah 
risk’ dimension (Chapter 6, Table 6.12). This however, contrasts with a study by 
Vinnicombe (2010), in which some countries actually have relatively low compliance 
with Shari’ah requirements as he claims that IBs do not follow the AAOIFI's 
requirements, such as upholding Islamic principles like ‘zakah’, very well. In fact, to a 
certain extent, zakah is regarded a tax burden (Ghoul, 2011).  
With regards to the ‘market and liquidity risk’ dimension, it is shown that nearly 90% 
of the respondents agree that ‘effective internal controls are in place (e.g. adherence to 
lines of authority and responsibility) to manage market risk’ (Chapter 6, Table 6.10). 
However, about 10% do not agree with this construct, which could be attributed to 
inadequate resources to ensure internal controls. This could also be related to the 
perceptions on ‘operational risk’ dimension, as the findings indicate that about 85% of 
the respondents agree that ‘the bank has IT systems to accommodate to the bank’s 
business operations’ but the remaining 15% do not agree with the construct (Chapter 
6, Table 6.11). This could be triggered by the absence of an appropriate infrastructure 
to support the business. In short, RM hinges on adequate resources to support the 
operations. 
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It is noted that the results of the perception approach may be influenced by several 
factors. The following section proceeds according to the empirical results from 
Chapter 6. It further identifies the constructs that are significant to CG and RM. 
7.2.2.1. Reflecting on the findings by Kruskal-Waliss test 
It is noted that, although the findings from the perception anaylysis are generally 
consistent with the literature, this study reveals that the responses could be biased as 
they may be influenced by at least four factors such as locality (country), position of 
the respondents, and the nature and inception date of the IBs. In contextualising the 
results from the perception approach, the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test is employed to 
compare the results from many groups of samples which are independent from each 
other. In this case, the samples are grouped by location (countries), position, and type 
and inception year of the IBs. It is revealed that some constructs are perceived 
differently by the respondents as they are influenced by the above mentioned criteria.  
As evidenced from the results, Turkey ranks top followed by UK, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia in the following constructs: ‘procedural guidelines and policy documents 
are aligned with the board’s directions’ and ‘the risk measurement system assesses all 
material risk factors associated with a bank’s assets, liabilities and off balance sheet 
positions’. The highest means obtained by Turkey in the above constructs reflect that 
this could possibly be due to the country’s strategy to broaden its investor base and 
diversify financing resources, especially in Islamic finance. As usual, procedures and 
guidelines, as well as comprehensive risk management systems, have been the pre-
requisites prior to the implementation of banking operations.      
When the samples are grouped based on the respondents’ positions, the findings show 
that responses from ‘non-risk officers’ are slightly different to ones from the risk 
officers. In general, the responses from the ‘risk officers’ show higher means in the 
following six constructs: ‘the bank has a clear reporting line’, ‘Shari’ah advisors 
ensure adequacy of compliance with legal and regulatory requirements’, ‘The credit 
guidelines address credit risk associated with the specific features of Islamic financing 
contracts’, ‘The credit policies and procedures guide towards proper credit 
assessments’, ‘the risk measurement system is responsive and sensitive to the market’ 
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and ‘the risk measurement system assesses all material risk factors associated with a 
bank’s assets, liabilities and off balance sheet positions’.  
Generally, personnel in the risk-related portfolios are well-versed than those who are 
not in the risk-related portfolio. Thus sometimes, the former seems to be more risk 
averse than the latter. The findings, however, show that ‘risk officers’ reveal higher 
mean scores, as opposed to ‘non-risk officers’. Perhaps the former’s own experience 
in the bank overrules the norm as their responses are based on their very own working 
experiences in the bank. Hence a high perception on the above constructs could have 
been triggered by their good working experience in the bank. 
With regards to the other sample groups, the findings, which are based on the sample 
group ‘type of institution’ highlight three significant constructs. It is revealed that the 
‘Islamic window of domestic conventional bank’ prefers to have a ‘split role between 
the chairman and the CEO’ based on their highest mean score (19.25) as opposed to 
other institution types. It is viewed that separating the two roles allows for a check 
and balance system to be in place (Blackburn, 1994). Conversely, Alam and Shah 
(2013) see that duality is actually beneficial to risk as directors may be able to make 
decisions in the best interest of the banks while simultaneously being the CEO and 
being able to such decision making.  
As for the ‘foreign Islamic banks’, they seem to be more efficient with regards to 
following standards. This is reflected through the highest mean obtained in the 
construct ‘they do not indicate any unresolved Shari’ah issues’. With regards to 
unresolved issues, IBs, similar to the conventional banks, are very closely linked to 
credits. In this respect, the findings show that ‘Islamic financial institutions’ and ‘full-
fledged Islamic Bank’ have very good credit guidelines that feature Shari’ah 
financing contracts as indicated by their highest mean scores in this construct. On this 
note, the findings may be supported by Hassan (2009) who mentions that a difference 
exists between national banks and foreign banks when referring to risk assessment 
and analysis.  
This study highlights seven significant constructs with regards to IBs’ establishments. 
The result from the sample group that is grouped according to the ‘inception year’ 
show that banks that were established ‘before 1990s’ have better setup in place thus 
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they are better in terms of readiness. This is evidenced from the high mean scores in 
the following constructs: ‘the bank appoints a qualified external auditor’, ‘Shari’ah 
governance framework is comprehensive’, ‘the business strategies define the eligible 
counterparties’, ‘the bank financing strategies include formal exclusions of any 
engagement that deals with unlawful goods and services’ and ‘the credit guidelines 
address credit risk associated with the specific features of Islamic financing 
contracts’.  
The above implies that long established banks could have prepared them to operate in 
Islamic banking environments, as they have progressed through longer milestones. 
Perhaps newer banks may need more time to be able to be at the current position of 
the old banks (‘before 1990s’). In fact, as far as risk management is concerned, banks 
that were established in ‘1990s’ have better risk management practices, which can be 
explained by Power (2004) opines that risk management became a more prominent 
issue in organizations following the mid-1990s. This is evidenced through the 
significance of the following constructs: ‘the risk measurement system assesses all 
material risk factors associated with a bank’s assets, liabilities and off balance sheet 
positions’ and ‘the bank is aware of the potential associated risk to society and the 
environment (such as its impact on environment, society, financial conditions and 
operations)’.  
Maybe these banks are better because they have the appropriate systems in place, 
which are already customised to accommodate with the IBs operations. Perhaps the 
much older banks are still using old infrastructure and thus cannot cope with the new 
banking requirements. On the other hands, the newer banks might need more time to 
set up the infrastructure. Hence, the older and newer banks are not quite ready to cater 
for the banking requirements, vis-à-vis its resources, apart from the structure, policies 
and procedure, and other infrastructure.   
7.3. REFLECTING ON CORRELATIONS BETWEEN CG AND RM  
The findings from both disclosure and perception analyses were subjected to further 
analysis through correlation and regression analyses. A correlation analysis is 
performed to examine the CG and RM relationship, while a regression analysis is 
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performed to analyse further the results to identify how much CG and RM can be 
explained by each of their dimensions.  
7.3.1. Reflecting on the Correlation Results in Disclosure Analysis  
Based on the analysis using the bank comparison data, it is found that not all 
dimensions have a high effect on CG and RM. The correlation between the dimension 
‘board composition’ has the highest correlation (0.794) with CG. The dimension 
‘mission’ (0.696), ‘board leadership’ (0.686), ‘Shari’ah governance’ (0.676), the 
‘ethical business’ (0.647) and ‘nomination committee (0.632) dimensions also denote 
high correlations with CG. ‘Shari’ah compliance’ (0.591) and ‘board meeting’ (0.477) 
however, do not seem to impose a great impact on CG. 
The findings reflect that board composition is very crucial as it helps IBs to 
effectively steer the banks; their effectiveness has a high influence on CG (John and 
Senbet, 1998). This is to ensure a mix of skills and expertise to govern effectively 
(Edwards and Clough, 2005). The dimension ‘mission’, ‘board leadership’, ‘Shari’ah 
governance’, ‘ethical business’ and ‘nomination committee’ dimensions are also 
perceived as important. The ‘mission’ is seen as very significant as it represents the 
starting point from which banks collectively agree on the organisations goals and 
objectives (Cohen et al., 2010). This is in contrast with a study by Aebi et al. (2011, 
5), which claims that a shared understanding of CG generally does not have to be in 
the shareholders’ best interests. As for the dimensions ‘Shari’ah compliance’ and 
‘Board meeting’, they do not seem to have a great impact on CG.  
With correlation is employed to analyse risk management’s dimensions, the findings 
reveal that the dimension ‘risk management control’ (0.684), ‘risk management 
committee’ (0.676), and ‘reporting’ (0.654) have a great impact on RM. As for other 
dimensions such as ‘credit risk’ (0.544), audit’ (0.540), ‘market liquidity risk’ (0.461) 
and ‘other risks’ (0.421), they have about an average impact on RM. 
The findings reflect that respondents highly perceive ‘risk management control’, ‘risk 
management committee’ and ‘reporting’ as crucial for RM. Perhaps the high score on 
‘risk management control’ can be explained by a study on the determinant of bank 
risk-taking by Anderson and Fraser’s (1999), which examines managerial ownership’s 
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impact on risk-taking, states that the management, rather than the shareholders. are the 
ones responsible for setting the bank’s risk structure.    
The dimension ‘Credit risk’, surprisingly, is not highly correlated with CG. This is 
quite in contrast with Switzer and Wang’s (2013) study, which mentions that CG and 
‘credit risk’ are significantly associated. ‘Audit’, ‘market and liquidity risk’ and ‘other 
risks’ are perceived to have mild effects on RM. 
It is found that not all dimensions have a high effect on CG and RM. Using regression 
analysis ‘Shari’ah compliance’ dimension is able to explain 36% of corporate 
governance in IBs while ‘Shari’ah governance’ dimension explains 17.4%. the 
‘reporting’ dimension explains 52% of RM. The dimension ‘risk management control’ 
explains 31.2%  
7.3.2. Reflecting on the Correlation Results on Perception Analysis  
It is found that not all dimensions have a high effect on CG and RM. Based on the 
perception analysis using correlation, the dimension ‘supports and operations’ has the 
highest correlation (0.809) with CG, followed by ‘policies and procedures’ (0.797), 
‘audit’ (0.780), ‘board’ (0.751), ‘disclosure and transparency’ (0.548) and ‘structure, 
committee and senior management’ (0.491) dimensions. 
These findings reflect that respondents highly regard that resources and infrastructure 
support the IBs’ operations. This dependency, nevertheless, is also highly dependent 
on the adequacy and comprehensiveness of the banks’ policies and procedures. To 
ensure the check and balance, audit is expected to play its role and this has to be 
mandated by the board as the latter was assumed to be effectively steering the bank. 
The responses, however, do not view that disclosure and transparency, especially in 
terms of reporting, as highly important (as reflected in their correlation to CG). 
Similarly, the findings indicate that the ‘structure, committees and senior 
management’ do not play a key role in IBs.  
With regards to risk management, the same tool is used to examine which of its 
dimension influence RM the most. The findings reveal that the dimension ‘risk 
management (general)’ has the highest correlation (0.868) with RM, followed by 
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‘credit risk’ (0.804), ‘operational risk’ (0.794), ‘market and liquidity risks’ (0.685) 
and ‘Shari’ah risk’ (0.605) dimensions.  
The findings reflect that respondents perceive that risk management practice, in 
general, plays a key role in managing risk. The practice seems to be highly dependent 
on credit risk as well as operational risk. However, it seems that ‘market and liquidity 
risks’ is quite moderate in terms of influencing RM. As for ‘Shari’ah risk’, its effect 
on RM does not seem to be that influential on RM. 
7.3.3. Summary of Correlations Results  
The results from both the disclosure and perception analysis on correlation are found 
to be quite different. Based on the means shown in the results, the disclosure approach 
highlights that the board-related dimensions are the most important element in CG. 
This is evidenced both in banks as well as in country comparisons, as shown in Table 
8.1, which summarises the findings. Maybe this could be explained by the fact that 
good board composition and effective leadership provide the strength to charter the 
direction of the IBs. The dimensions ‘risk management (control), ‘risk management 
committee’ and ‘reporting’ seem to be comparatively more important than other 
dimensions of risk management, both from the disclosure as well as from the 
perception approaches.  
As shown in Table 8.2, the results based on the perception analysis indicate that the 
construct ‘supports and operations’ is one that affects CG level the most, followed by 
‘policies and procedures’. Perhaps this may have an element of bias as the responses 
are influenced by factors such as locality, position of the respondents, types and 
inception year of the IBs. However, these results also signify that good CG is mainly 
attributed to ‘adequate resources and infrastructure in place’. In fact, the respondents 
also perceive that IBs that have good CG are always accompanied by ‘sound and 
comprehensive policies and procedures in place to support the operations’. As far as 
respondents’ perceptions are concerned, ‘structure, committees and senior 
management’ does not play significant role in CG. Similar perception is evidenced in 
‘disclosure and transparency’ dimension.   
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Table 7.1: Correlations Results Based on Disclosure Approach 
 Bank Comparison Significant Level 
(Standard 
coefficient) 
Country Comparison Significant Level 
(Standard 
coefficient) 
CG Board composition .794 (0.000) Board composition .962(0.000) 
 Mission .696 (0.003) Board leadership .950 (0.000) 
 Board leadership .686 (0.000) Nomination & 
remuneration 
committee   
.897 (0.000) 
 Shari’ah governance .674 (0.000) Ethics .822 (0.000) 
 Ethics .647 (0.000) Mission .806 (0.000) 
 Nomination & 
remuneration 
committee 
.632 (0.000) Shari’ah governance .732 (0.002) 
 Shari’ah compliance .591 (0.000) Shari’ah compliance .680 (0.005) 
 Board meeting .477 (0.000) Board meeting .595 (0.019) 
RM Risk management 
control 
.684 (0.000) Risk management 
control 
.928 (0.000) 
 Risk management 
committee 
.676 (0.000) Reporting .905 (0.000) 
 Reporting .654 (0.000) Risk management 
committee 
.878 (0.000) 
 Credit risk .544 (0.000) Other risk .714 (0.003) 
 Audit .540 (0.000) Credit risk .680 (0.005) 
 Market & liquidity risk .461 (0.001) Audit .668 (0.006) 
 Other risk .421 (0.002) Market & liquidity risk .644 (0.010) 
 
Table 7.2: Correlation Results Based on Perception Analysis 
CG 
Significant Level 
(Standard 
coefficient) 
RM 
Significant Level 
(Standard 
coefficient) 
Support & operations .809 (0.000) Risk management 
(general) 
.868(0.000) 
Policies & procedures .797 (0.000) Credit risk .804 (0.000) 
Audit .780 (0.000) Operational risk .794 (0.000) 
Board effectiveness .751 (0.000) Market & liquidity 
risk 
.685 (0.000) 
Disclosure & 
transparency 
.548 (0.003) Shari’ah risk .605 (0.001) 
Structure, committee 
& management 
.491 (0.008)  
 
7.4. REFLECTING ON THE FINDINGS ON REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
The results on regression analysis demonstrate that not all dimensions have a high 
effect on CG and RM. As summarised in Table 8.3, the regression analysis results 
based on the disclosure approach show that ‘Shari'ah compliance’ and ‘Shari'ah 
governance’ are statistically significant. They explain 36% and 17.4% respectively. It 
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should be noted that the ‘board leadership’ dimension has a negative relationship with 
CG. Similarly, for risk management, when the same tool is used to examine the RM 
dimensions, the ‘reporting and disclosure’ and ‘risk management control’ are 
significant; explaining 52% and 31.2% of the RM while the other dimensions do not 
indicate any significance on RM. The ‘market and liquidity risk’ and ‘credit risk’ 
indicate a negative relationship with RM. 
Table 7.3: Regression Analysis: Disclosure and Perception Analyses 
 Disclosure  
Analaysis 
Significant 
Level (Standard 
coefficient) 
Perception 
Analaysis 
Significant 
Level (Standard 
coefficient) 
CG Shari’ah 
compliance 
0.001 (36%) Support & 
operations 
0.001 (62.3%) 
 Shari’ah 
governance 
0.098 (17.4%) Structure, 
committee & 
management 
0.019 (-35.3%) 
 Board Leadership Not significant, 
negative 
relationship 
Policies & 
procedures 
0.001 (32.7%) 
RM Reporting & 
disclosure 
0.001 (52%) Risk management 
(general) 
0.02 (89.3%) 
 Risk management 
control 
0.027 (31.2%) Market & 
liquidity risk 
Not significant, 
negative 
relationship 
 Market & 
liquidity risk 
Not significant, 
negative 
relationship 
Operational risk Not significant, 
negative 
relationship 
 Credit risk Not significant, 
negative 
relationship 
 
 
From the perception approach, the ‘support and operations’ dimension explains 62.3% 
of corporate governance in IBs. This is followed by ‘structure, committee and senior 
management’ and ‘policies and procedures’, which explain 35.3% and 32.7% of CG. 
The ‘structure, committee and senior management’, however, show a negative 
relationship. In this approach, the board does not have any impact on CG, which is 
quite inconsistent with a study by Hermalin and Weisbach (2001), which mentions 
that board composition does not affect performance. Based on their study, the board 
size has a negative effect on the firms’ performance. For risk management, the 
findings reflect that ‘risk management (general)’ explains 89.3% of RM in IBs. Other 
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dimensions do not seem to explain the variation in RM as the findings do not show 
any significant results. However, it is noted that ‘market and liquidity risks’ and 
‘operational risk’ have negative effects on RM. 
7.5. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
The results and analysis presented in this study found that the relationship between 
CG and RM is relatively unexplored. As observed in the literature, CG and RM have 
been pervasively discussed not just specific to financial crises but also in general. 
However, it is noted that in the period of post financial crises, the resurgence of CG 
and RM discussions has been intensified as the latter is perceived to be the triggering 
factor that is linked to a series of failures. Apart from financial crises and corporate 
failures, CG is generally discussed in the literature in relation to performance, 
regulations, disclosure, board and reporting to name a few.  
Going back to the relationship between CG and RM, Bhimani (2009) talks about the 
minimal amount of coverage between CG and RM which he also relates this in the 
context of management accounting. To this extent, this study has not managed to link 
to any previous study with respect to the CG-RM relationship as no papers have been 
found discussing such a relationship. Given the significance of developing a 
comprehensive CG and RM framework for banking practices, this study, through 
literature and theoretical foundations, explores CG and RM in trying to examine the 
CG-RM relationship with the objective of identifying weaknesses in each of their 
dimension by examining the particular aspect that explains CG and RM the most.    
With regards to disclosure, it is noted that corporate voluntary disclosure has been the 
focus of an increasing amount of attention in recent years (Chau and Gray, 2002:247). 
Forker (2012) for instance, mentions that board composition and internal control play 
a role over managerial remuneration, where this is reflected through disclosure (on 
financial statements). Janadi et al. (2013) also highlights the importance of CG in 
relation to disclosure based on their study on companies on the Saudi Stock Market. 
They mention that board composition, CEO duality, audit quality, and board size are 
among the significant factors that have significant contribution towards disclosure.  
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In conclusion, it is important to note that CG and RM disclosure is a matter of 
regulative bodies to enforce such practices in the financial and corporate sectors as 
well as the political economy and political culture of the respective countries.  
However, in the countries where Islamic finance has a reasonable size, political 
culture is away from being democratic to be able to produce a good corporate 
governance structure in general, and in particular for Islamic banks.  Therefore, ‘poor’ 
disclosure results emerged in this study has to be considered and understood within 
this particular context. 
7.6. THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS 
In exploring the theoretical concepts from both perspectives of conventional and 
Islamic corporate governance, it is found that agency theory is more pervasive in the 
practice of Islamic banks. ICG, in theory, is perceived to be skewed towards adopting 
stakeholder theory. However, this is quite contradictory to the empirical evidence 
produced in this study. Based on the outcome of this study, it seems that IBs do not 
differ much from the conventional banks in terms of their CG framework and risk 
management practices. Despite upholding Shari’ah principles, which are the most 
distinguishing feature of ICG, the research reveals that IBs generally have very low 
Shari’ah compliance and Shari’ah governance. As such, it seems that in the everyday 
practices of the financial world, there is hardly much difference in terms of ICG and 
CG. Both models are generally based on agency theory although in principle ICG is 
more aligned towards stakeholders theory. 
As for the larger policy model, as the results of ICG and IRM disclosure and 
perception analyses show, the practice seems to be more oriented towards the 
shareholders model than the stakeholder model. Thus, the Anglo-Saxon model seems 
to more prevalent despite the fact that ICG is expressed within the ‘tawhidi’ 
worldview of being closer to the European model of stakeholders.  The results provide 
evidence for the essentialisation of shareholders, as issues related to shareholders are 
presented with further care as compared to other issues. 
The observed ‘social failure’ as termed by Asutay (2007, 2012) seems to be prevalent 
in the area of ICG in the sampled Islamic banks in terms of failures in disclosing the 
necessary information but also in essentialising shareholders’ interest as the disclosed 
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information shows, regardless of how small the score is. Thus, ‘back to basics’ should 
be considered as an important public policy call for Islamic financial institutions and 
banks in encouraging them to operate within the parameters of Islamic values 
including structuring and strategizing their corporate governance and risk 
management practices and in particular the disclosure issues related to both the 
dimensions. 
7.7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As mentioned earlier, is the main limitation in this study has been the difficulty in 
gathering effective primary data through questionnaire survey; the similar limitation 
can be mentioned for the secondary data through annual reports. Perhaps lack of co-
operation faced in the data gathering process from most of the financial institutions is 
due to data confidentiality, especially on CG area (to support the perception 
approach). Furthermore, they are not abided by law to adhere to such requests. As 
such, the research has limited choice with regards to choosing the statistical research 
methods, as it barely surpasses the minimum requirements to employ certain methods 
and tools.  
Ideally, a more supportive initiative is needed from the financial institutions for 
research of this genre to be able to at least contribute to mainstream research. Should 
the accessibility for further to data was possible, this research might have been able to 
provide a clearer picture on the level of CG and RM being practiced in the IBs. It is 
quite discouraging that despite the efforts put into gathering data, this initiative was 
not quite supported by the people in the field.  
Nonetheless, it is important to note the limitation to the study which recognises that 
Islamic banks may not necessarily have developed good practices in disclosing their 
practices both in corporate governance or risk management. Apart from some 
ontological reasons for this, Islamic banking is a practice that is rather young with a 
steep learning curve in front of it. In fact, the macro regulative environment in most of 
the Muslim countries where Islamic banking prevails should also be considered as one 
of the reasons as to why Islamic banks may fail to disclose and establish a transparent 
governance mechanism. 
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This research is aimed at exploring CG and RM, in view of issues on corporate 
failures, from the perspective of Islamic banking development. The study aims to 
establish a CG and RM relationship, which requires that these two areas be jointly 
examined. By examining CG and RM through their relationship, overlapping areas 
can be avoided through a clear demarcation of related issues. This is important as this 
joint exploration of CG and RM could be empowered to focus on what matters most 
in the frameworks. 
Moving forward, it is viewed that future research should consider widening the 
dimensions of CG and RM in trying to develop a more robust and comprehensive 
framework. It should be noted that the scope of the current study is based on 
developed frameworks of CG and RM. Based on its conceptual framework of CG, the 
Shari’ah-related dimension has proven to be a significant dimension which could 
support IBs in terms of upholding Islamic principles. As for RM, the ‘reporting and 
disclosure’ and ‘risk management controls’ dimension are the most crucial, thus 
initiatives towards transparency and ethicality are highly observed as aligned with the 
Shari’ah. It is felt that the dimensions of CG and RM can be further enhanced by 
introducing more dimensions into the current frameworks.   
Therefore, future research might consider incorporating aspects such as organisational 
structure, strategic planning, succession planning and, business continuity into the 
framework through relevant dimensions to make the framework more robust and 
comprehensive. It is felt that issues in IBs mostly revolve around transparency and a 
shortage of skilled human resources. By identifying the appropriateness of the 
organisational structure (which could be reflected in clear reporting lines), issues such 
as transparency and disclosure could be addressed. As for succession planning, the 
inclusion of this area should help identify issues on inadequate human resources while 
retaining and attracting talented and skilled workers. Furthermore, the incorporation 
of the area on strategic planning may help the banks address issues on board oversight 
which could help the banks strategize their banking business and operations. As for 
the business continuity area, this will help banks establish business plans in the event 
of disruptions in their operations.   
In addition, the dimensions that the current study is based on could be further 
developed by identifying and establishing more constructs in the relevant dimensions 
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to strengthen and improve the comprehensiveness of the dimension itself. Although 
this might be quite a hurdle in terms of data gathering, the results could be 
worthwhile.  
On another note, it is felt that future research should consider establishing the 
fundamentals of the principles of the CG and RM framework. This could possibly 
allow for the convergence of Islamic and conventional banking. Through 
convergence, it is hoped that the mandate to uphold Islamic principles by Islamic 
banks will not be jeopardised. This could possibly be done through research based on 
a country case study approach in countries that have dual banking systems.  
7.8. EPILOGUE 
This research aimed at exploring the state of and relationship between CG and RM in 
IBs. In trying to identify the causes for financial crisis, it is important to analyse the 
issues in CG and RM by examining the framework through their respective 
dimensions. In trying to respond to its research questions, as stated in Chapter 1, this 
research employs two different approaches: disclosure and questionnaire survey, to 
obtain secondary and primary data respectively. Based on the analyses on the two 
types of datasets, it is revealed that CG and RM are correlated. 
With this, the research has fulfilled its aim and objectives as stated in its research 
questions (Chapter 1). The results from both the conceptual and empirical 
perspectives have provided a holistic view on the research area, providing an insight 
on different aspects of CG and RM with regards to how the banks adopt CG and RM 
and to what extent their practices are in line with their communications. The research 
also provides some insights on how CG and RM are perceived and to what extent they 
are observed as reflected through disclosure as stated in the IBs’ communication. 
To a certain degree, this study has managed to find a gap between practices and 
communications, as revealed in the findings, because what is communicated could be 
different from what is claimed and practiced. Besides, relevant dimensions should be 
given more emphasis with regards to enhancing overall frameworks in the future. 
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
Locality / Location: 
Position: 
Nature of the 
bank/financial 
institution:  
 
 
 
 
The Inception Year of 
the Bank: 
 
……………………….. 
 
……………………….. 
 
 
□Full-fledged Islamic Bank 
□Islamic Window of Domestics Conventional Bank 
□Islamic Financial Institution 
□Foreign Islamic Bank 
□Islamic Window of Foreign Conventional Bank 
 
…………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
GENERAL INFORMATION 
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PART 1: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS (BOD) 
 (Please tick (x) in the appropriate box) 
 
1. The roles of the Chairman and CEO are split, i.e. the roles are held by two people.  
□ Yes 
□ No 
For all the statements below, please express your opinion on the following statements  
(SD: strongly disagree to SA: strongly agree). 
No. Statement SD D N A SA 
1. The bank has an appropriate number of independent 
directors. □ □ □ □ □ 
2. The board:      
 a) is not over-powered by the Chairman. □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) provides an adequate oversight function. □ □ □ □ □ 
 c) has clear missions and vision. □ □ □ □ □ 
 d) has diverse background and expertise to steer 
the bank. □ □ □ □ □ 
 e) has strong credentials. □ □ □ □ □ 
 f) is ethical and transparent in carrying out their 
job functions. □ □ □ □ □ 
 g) oversees the strategic planning process. □ □ □ □ □ 
 h) monitors the management's execution of the 
corporate and business plan. □ □ □ □ □ 
 i) reviews with the management on the codes of 
conduct and ethics that are incorporated into 
the bank’s strategy and business operations. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 j) assesses resources and prioritises key 
operational matters of the bank □ □ □ □ □ 
 k) ascertains that there are no misleading financial 
statements; □ □ □ □ □ 
3. The board has effective succession planning (i.e. 
well-articulated strategies with assessment and 
benchmarking) to help decide on a future leader. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. The board convenes for regular meetings 
effectively. □ □ □ □ □ 
5. The bank adopts an effective system in board 
approvals on decision making. □ □ □ □ □ 
6. The board recognises the need to develop and 
strengthen their governance skills in light of 
technological developments and changing 
environments to become better leaders and change 
agents. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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STRUCTURE, COMMITTEES AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT 
 
No. Statement SD D N A SA 
1. An appropriate structure (e.g. committees, Shariah 
board/advisory) is in place to assist the board in 
discharging its functions.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
2. The bank has clear reporting lines as reflected in the 
organisational chart.  □ □ □ □ □ 
3. Shariah advisors:      
 a) are impartial and / or independent of the bank. □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) are resourceful and efficient. □ □ □ □ □ 
 c) are easily accessible by the bank. □ □ □ □ □ 
 d) have appropriate skill sets and experience.
  □ □ □ □ □ 
4. The role of Shariah advisors include to:      
 a) ensure that contracts, fatwa on transactions, 
sequence of execution, and policies are in 
accordance with Shariah principles. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 b) actively monitor the business and investment 
activities of the bank to safeguard shareholders’ 
interests. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 c) ascertain the internal controls, efficiency of 
financial operations, and the effectiveness of 
the bank’s conduct. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 d) ensure the adequacy of compliance with legal 
and regulatory requirements and policies in all 
aspects of business and its strategy. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 e) perform product approval.   □ □ □ □ □ 
5. The bank has competent senior management to 
oversee business implementation. □ □ □ □ □ 
6. The senior management:      
 a) develops strategic plans for board review; □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) oversees enforcement on policy 
implementation; □ □ □ □ □ 
 c) articulates the bank’s missions and vision 
effectively to all staff.  □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
 
 
Page 290 
 
DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
 
No. Statement SD D N A SA 
1. The bank conforms to the highest international 
standard and practices for financial and non-
financial reporting and disclosure.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
2. Bank accounting standards are harmonised with 
prudential standards. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
3. The accounting processes produce reliable 
information 
(e.g. for investors and strategic decision making). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. The bank discloses: □ □ □ □ □ 
 a) methods to calculate profits;  □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) the weaknesses of the products. □ □ □ □ □ 
5. The bank has no unresolved Shariah issues on its 
lack of standard. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
6. Information disclosure and transparency is 
appropriately done (timely and adequate).  
□ □ □ □ □ 
AUDIT 
 
No. Statement SD D N A SA 
1. Audit and / or review are done by independent 
auditors. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
2. The bank appoints a qualified external auditor. □ □ □ □ □ 
3. The board:      
 a) reviews the scope of audit.  □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) are aware of the highlighted audit findings. □ □ □ □ □ 
 c) ensures external auditors have adequate 
expertise to conduct Shariah audit. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. Auditors ensure the truth and fairness of the 
financial statements.     
□ □ □ □ □ 
5. Regular audit and compliance assessments 
continuously take place. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
No. Statement SD D N A SA 
1. Shariah governance framework is comprehensive. □ □ □ □ □ 
2. Shariah-related strategies and principles are: □ □ □ □ □ 
 a) approved by Shariah advisors. □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) incorporated in the business strategy  □ □ □ □ □ 
3. The business strategies define the:      
 a) eligible counterparties; □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) nature of approved Shariah compliant 
financing. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. The bank has comprehensive policies and 
procedures to support compliance with board 
policy. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
5. The policies and procedures:      
 a) address Shariah matter. □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) address legal matter. □ □ □ □ □ 
 c) ensure guidance on details of the bank’s 
business. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
6. The policies and procedures are:      
 a) effective. □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) regularly revised. □ □ □ □ □ 
 c) communicated across the board. □ □ □ □ □ 
 
SUPPORTS AND OPERATIONS 
No. Statement SD D N A SA 
1. Control processes are      
 a) adequate. □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) effective. □ □ □ □ □ 
2. The bank has □ □ □ □ □ 
 a) adequate resources to support the bank’s 
operations. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 b) an efficient system to support key business 
operations. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 c) appropriate systems to help with complying to 
Shariah in terms of products and services. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 d) a good reporting, documentation, and records 
management system.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
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 e) effective information and communication 
technology to ensure the dissemination of 
information to the management. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 f) put in place adequate and appropriate trainings 
for senior management and all employees.
  
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
PART 2: RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT (GENERAL) 
No. Statement SD D N A SA 
1. There is an adequate board risk oversight function. □ □ □ □ □ 
2. There is a robust risk management framework that 
is aligned with Shariah principles in place. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
3. Risk assessment is incorporated into all business 
decision making. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. The board  □ □ □ □ □ 
 a) understands risk management as the key drivers 
of success in corporate strategies. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 b) ascertains CEO and senior management are 
fully engaged with risk management. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 c) ensures independent risk management and 
business functions.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
 d) ensures policies and procedures in relation to 
risk adopted by the management is appropriate 
and comprehensive. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 e) oversees the management’s implementation of 
policies and procedures of risk is followed and 
effective.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
 f) knows whether the management has 
appropriately responded to risks.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
 g) monitors the potential risk in the bank’s culture 
and incentive system. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
5. The board reviews with the management:      
 a) risk appetite and other risk-related matters. □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) risk management policies and procedures. □ □ □ □ □ 
 c) reports on risk-matter from the audit, legal 
departments and regulators.  
  
□ □ □ □ □ 
6. Shariah advisors are aware of the risk exposure that 
arises from different jurisdictions in different 
locations. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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7. The bank has  □ □ □ □ □ 
 a) a dedicated unit to undertake the risk 
management process to manage each type of 
risk. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 b) competent and well-trained personnel to 
undertake risk management functions  
□ □ □ □ □ 
 c) strong MIS to support the risk management 
system. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
8. The controls      
 a) take into account the integrity of the risk 
management process. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 b) comply with the regulatory and internal policies 
and procedures. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
CREDIT RISK 
No. Statement SD D N A SA 
1. The financing strategies for various instruments 
comply with Shariah.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
2. The bank financing strategies include formal 
exclusions of any engagement that deals with 
haram or unlawful goods and services. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
3. The credit guidelines address credit risk associated 
with the specific features of Islamic financing 
contracts. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. The list of all allowable types of transaction are 
kept up-to-date and communicated to the relevant 
staff. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
5. The credit policies and procedures:      
 a) guide towards proper credit assessments. □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) address loan charge-offs and recoveries. □ □ □ □ □ 
 c) consider current collateral values where 
applicable in the recovery process. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
6. The bank       
 a) is able to recognize potential credit exposure at 
different stages of financing.   
□ □ □ □ □ 
 b) is aware of the relevant internal and external 
factors that may affect loan collectability. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 c) has specific methods used to validate models 
for credit risk assessment and credit risk 
management tools (e.g. stress tests and back 
tests). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 d) has appropriate tools, procedures and data used 
to improve the impairment of loans. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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MARKET RISK and LIQUIDITY RISK 
No. Statement SD D N A SA 
1. The framework for market risk can accommodate  
all assets held (such as Sukuk, Salam etc). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
2. The bank sets the objectives and defines criteria for 
each investment type of profit-sharing instruments 
(e.g. Mudarabah, Musharakah etc). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
3. Assessment on overall market risk is based on 
integrated views taking into account all products 
and business lines. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. Effective internal controls are in place (e.g. 
adherence to lines of authority and responsibility) to 
manage market risk. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
5. IT implementation and maintenance is adequate. □ □ □ □ □ 
6. Procedural guidelines and policy documents are 
aligned with the board’s directions. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
7. The bank:      
 a) employs appropriate risk measurement 
techniques that suit the nature, size, and 
complexity of the business and the availability 
of data. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 b) ensures that accurate and timely measurements 
of market risk are performed. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
8. The risk measurement system:      
 a) is responsive and sensitive to the market  □ □ □ □ □ 
 b) assesses all material risk factors associated with 
a bank’s assets, liabilities and off balance sheet 
positions. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 c) has well-documented assumptions and 
parameters.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
9. There is a mutual agreement with the bank and 
Mudarib /Musharakah partners prior to using the 
valuation methodologies (to assess the impact of 
their methods used to calculate and allocate profit). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
10. The bank:      
 a) ensures its liquidity risk commensurate with 
the abilities to have sufficient recourse to 
Shariah compliant funds to mitigate risks. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 b) examines all assets and liabilities 
simultaneously on a continuous basis to ensure 
a proper balance between funds mobilization 
and their deployment with respect to yield, risk 
exposure, etc. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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 c) ensures its tolerance levels on mismatches are 
timely fixed (for various maturities depending 
on asset liability profile etc). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
No. Statement SD D N A SA 
1. Key risk indicators (KRIs) are reviewed regularly. □ □ □ □ □ 
2. The bank has an IT system to: □ □ □ □ □ 
 a) accommodate to the bank’s business 
operations.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
 b) provide adequate check and balance to ensure 
that controls are in place.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
 c) cater for internal risk reporting and decision 
making.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
3. The bank reduces operational risks by identifying 
potential negative events and developing 
appropriate responses. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. Human resources in risk department are adequate 
and well-trained. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
SHARIAH RISK 
No. Statement SD D N A SA 
1. The bank is aware of the potential associated risk to 
society and the environment (such as its impact on 
environment, society, financial conditions and 
operations). 
□ □ □ □ □ 
2. The bank takes appropriate steps to address the 
above-mentioned risks (include disclosure of 
information) before underwriting deals. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
3. The bank assesses the potential impacts of its 
methods with regards to profit (i.e. in terms of its 
calculations allocations.) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. The bank ensures fund providers’ interests are taken 
care off. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
5. The methods used are mutually agreed between the 
bank and other stakeholders. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
6. The bank donates the penalty charges to charity to 
comply with Shariah. 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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APPENDIX 2: WORKSHEET FOR ANNUAL REPORTS 
 
 
Category No Questions Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 
Mission 
1 The text of the board’s written mandate is described. 0 0 0 0 
2 
The bank has a clear statement of the leadership, 
purpose, mission and values with reference to 
corporate governance. 
0 0 0 0 
3 
The annual statement contains statement addressing 
corporate governance. 
0 0 0 0 
4 
Reference is made to widely accept corporate 
governance principles.   
0 0 0 0 
5 
Assessment is made regarding current compliance 
(where relevant) with the mentioned CG principles. 
0 0 0 0 
6 
Clear statement of the stakeholders’ engagement on 
corporate governance issues and processes is 
provided. 
0 0 0 0 
7 
Communication policy for promoting effective 
communication with shareholders to encourage their 
participation is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
Composition of 
the Board of 
Directors 
8 
Identity of the chairman is provided (such as 
independent or non-executive, etc.). 
0 0 0 0 
9 
Profile of chairman is disclosed (qualification and 
experience). 
0 0 0 0 
10 
Proportions of non-executive members or proportions 
of independent members are provided. 
0 0 0 0 
11 
The identity of each director whether he/she is 
independent or non-executive is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
12 
Profile of each board member is disclosed 
(qualification, experience etc.). 
0 0 0 0 
13 
A leadership statement on how the board operates is 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
14 
The Board member’s formally assigned individual’s 
responsibilities outside the bank are provided. 
0 0 0 0 
15 
Statement on whether or not the board and its 
committees are regularly assessed with respect to 
their effectiveness and contribution is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
16 
If assessments are regularly conducted, the process 
used for the assessments is described OR if 
assessments are not regularly conducted, statements 
on how the board satisfies itself (whether its members 
and committees are performing effectively) are 
described. 
0 0 0 0 
Board 
Leadership 
17 
Reference to transparent and responsive process for 
evaluating performance of senior management is 
provided. 
0 0 0 0 
  18 
The way the board delineates its role and 
responsibilities is described. 
0 0 0 0 
Bank: 
Region: 
Page 297 
 
Category No Questions Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 
  19 
How the board facilitates its exercise of independent 
judgment in carrying out its responsibilities is 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
Board Meetings 20 
The number or frequency of the meetings is 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
  21 Members’ attendance at meetings is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
Nomination 
Committee or / 
and 
Compensation 
Committee 
22 Committee size is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
23 
Identity of the chairperson is disclosed whether he is 
independent or non-executive. 
0 0 0 0 
24 
Profile of the chairperson is disclosed such as 
qualification, experience etc. 
0 0 0 0 
25 Profile of each board member is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
26 
Whether or not the board has a compensation 
committee composed entirely of independent 
directors is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
27 
The proportion of independent members or non-
executive members is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
28 
The process by which the board identifies new 
candidates for board nomination is described. 
0 0 0 0 
29 
The process by which the board determines the 
compensation for the bank’s directors and 
management is described. 
0 0 0 0 
30 
If the board has standing committees other than the 
audit, compensation & nominating committees, the 
committees and their functions are disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
31 Number of meetings held during the year is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
32 
Attendance of each member’s committee meetings is 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
Shariah 
Governance 
33 
Statement on the endorsed conformity of Shariah 
compliance is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
34 Shariah supervisor structure is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
35 The board size is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
36 
Identity of the chairman of the Shariah board is 
disclosed (experience, qualification etc.). 
0 0 0 0 
37 
The chairman of the Shariah board whether he is 
independent or non-executive chairperson is 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
38 
Whether other Shariah supervisory board members 
are independent or non-executive are disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
39 
Qualification and relevant experience of all Shariah 
board are disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
40 
Formally assigned individual’s responsibilities of the 
board (outside the bank) are disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
41 
How the Shariah board facilitates its exercise of 
independent judgment in carrying out its 
responsibilities is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
42 
Policies and procedures on appointment and 
dismissal of members are described. 
0 0 0 0 
43 Number of meetings during the year is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
44 Members’ attendance at meetings is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
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Category No Questions Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 
Shariah 
Compliance, 
Supports and 
Operations 
45 
Mechanism on Shariah compliance monitoring is 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
46 
Treatment of all earnings realized from sources 
prohibited by Shariah is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
47 
Sources and uses of zakah and charity funds are 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
48 Method of zakah calculation is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
49 
The contractual rights of investment account holders 
are disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
50 
Investment and asset allocation strategies are 
provided. 
0 0 0 0 
51 
Rights and liabilities of IAH in the event of 
liquidation are disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
52 
Statement on the mechanics of smoothing the returns 
by the bank is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
53 
Notes related to the utilization of profit equalization 
ratio (PER) is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
54 
Notes related to the utilization of investment risk 
reserves (IRR) is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
55 
The treatment for the distribution of PER in the event 
of liquidation is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
56 
The profit calculation method and its share of profit 
earned attributable to IAH are disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
57 
Changes to policy with regards to profit calculation is 
provided. 
0 0 0 0 
58 
Changes to policy with regards to investment and 
asset allocation strategies is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
59 
Change to policy with regards to smoothing of 
returns 
0 0 0 0 
60 
Legal right due to unrestricted IAH pertaining 
comingled funds is disclosed 
0 0 0 0 
61 
Legal right due to unrestricted IAH pertaining 
Mudharib’s failure is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
62 
A report on appropriateness of Shariah basis of 
allocation of profit between equity holders and IAH 
is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
Ethical Business 
Conduct and 
Corporate 
Responsibility 
63 
The code of ethics for the directors adopted by the 
board is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
64 
If the board has adopted a written code, how a person 
or company may obtain a copy of the code is 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
65 
How the board monitors compliance with its code is 
disclosed OR if the board does not monitor 
compliance, how the board satisfies itself regarding 
compliance with its code is described. 
0 0 0 0 
66 
Any steps the board takes to ensure directors exercise 
independent judgment in considering transactions and 
agreements in respect of which a director or 
executive management have a material interest are 
described. 
0 0 0 0 
67 
Any other step the board takes to encourage and 
promote a culture of ethical business conduct is 
described. 
0 0 0 0 
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Category No Questions Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 
68 
Mechanism protecting the rights of shareholders is 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
69 
Policy and performance in connection with 
environmental and social responsibility is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
70 Waivers to the ethics code are disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
71 Code of ethics for all employees is provided. 0 0 0 0 
72 
Role of employees in corporate governance is 
provided. 
0 0 0 0 
73 Performance evaluation process is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
74 
Impact of environmental and social responsibility 
policies on bank’s sustainability is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
75 
Policy on whistle blower protection for all employees 
is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
Audit 
Committee 
76 Committee size is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
77 Identity of the chairperson is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
78 
Whether the chairperson is independent or non-
executive is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
79 
Whether or not the board composed entirely of 
independent directors is disclosed  
0 0 0 0 
80 Proportion of independent members is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
81 
Whether committee members include non–executive 
director is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
82 
The process by which the board identifies new 
candidates for board nomination is described. 
0 0 0 0 
83 
The terms of reference of the committee is formed 
and approved by the board 
0 0 0 0 
84 Scope of work and responsibilities is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
85 Term of reference of internal audit is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
86 
Board’s confidence in independence and integrity of 
external auditors is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
87 
Process of appointment of external auditor is 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
88 
Process for interaction with external auditor is 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
89 Duration of current external auditors is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
90 Rotation of audit partners is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
91 Proportion of audit/other fees is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
92 Number of meetings held during the year is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
93 
Attendance of each member’s committee meetings is 
disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
94 
The suitability of internal audit is provided (based on 
experience and qualification) 
0 0 0 0 
95 
The internal audit is said to be conversant with 
policies and procedures of the bank. 
0 0 0 0 
96 The effectiveness of IA is stated. 0 0 0 0 
97 
Related party transactions are placed before audit 
committee and approved by the board. 
0 0 0 0 
Risk Mgt 98 The board provides risk management oversight. 0 0 0 0 
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Category No Questions Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 
Committee or / 
and Asset 
Liquidity 
Committee 
(ALCO) 
99 
Full board is accountable and responsible for overall 
risk. 
0 0 0 0 
100 
Clear-defined mandate to continuously regulate risk 
activity is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
101 Other board risk committees are formed. 0 0 0 0 
102 
Other board committees are also involved in risk 
oversight. 
0 0 0 0 
103 Audit committee is also responsible for risk. 0 0 0 0 
Risk 
Management, 
Control Items 
and Risk 
Disclosures 
104 Bank’s risk management organization is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
105 
Senior management commitment in risk management 
is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
106 Risk management framework is disclosed  0 0 0 0 
107 
The top emerging risks that arise from the bank’s 
business models and activities are discussed. 
0 0 0 0 
108 The bank’s risk terminology is provided. 0 0 0 0 
109 The bank’s strategies or procedures are described. 0 0 0 0 
110 
The bank’s risk culture or its risk appetite is 
described. 
0 0 0 0 
111 
The use of stress testing or other measures is 
described. 
0 0 0 0 
112 
How the bank plans to meet regulatory ratios is 
provided. 
0 0 0 0 
113 
All risk information is presented together in a report 
OR a navigator index to locate the risk disclosure in 
the reports is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
Reporting - 
Accounting & 
Funding 
114 
The bank has an understanding of internal controls 
and procedures for financial reporting. 
0 0 0 0 
115 
The board’s accountability of the financial statements 
is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
116 
Statement of accounting in compliance in accordance 
to IFRS. 
0 0 0 0 
117 Statement on transparency and disclosure is provided 0 0 0 0 
118 
Statement stressing on Comprehensiveness of 
Policies and procedures  is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
119 
Assets tabulated in balance sheet categories which 
include collateral received are provided. 
0 0 0 0 
120 
Consolidated total assets, liabilities and off-balance 
sheet commitments by the remaining contractual 
maturity at the balance sheet date are presented. 
0 0 0 0 
121 
A narrative discussion of management’s approach to 
determine the behavioural characteristics of financial 
assets and liabilities is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
122 
The bank’s funding strategy, including key sources 
and any funding concentrations is discussed. 
0 0 0 0 
Market & 
Liquidity Risks 
123 How market liquidity is considered is disclosed. 0 0 0 0 
124 How bank manages its liquidity needs is described. 0 0 0 0 
125 
The linkages between line items in balance sheet and 
income statement are provided. 
0 0 0 0 
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Category No Questions Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 
126 
Qualitative and quantitative breakdowns of 
significant trading and non-trading market risk 
factors that may be relevant to the bank’s portfolio 
are provided. 
0 0 0 0 
127 
Qualitative and quantitative disclosures that described 
significant market risk are provided (such as 
measurement, model limitations, assumptions, 
validation procedures, use of proxies, changes in risk 
measures and models through time). 
0 0 0 0 
128 
The primary risk management techniques to measure 
and assess the risk of loss beyond reported risk 
measures and parameters are described (such as VaR, 
earnings or economic value scenario results through 
methods such as stress tests, expected shortfall, 
economic capital, scenario analysis, stressed VaR or 
other alternative approaches). 
0 0 0 0 
Credit Risk 
129 
Information on the bank’s credit risk profile which 
includes any significant risk concentration is 
provided. 
0 0 0 0 
130 Policies for identifying impaired loans are described. 0 0 0 0 
131 
Reconciliation of the opening and closing balances of 
impaired loans are provided. 
0 0 0 0 
132 
A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the bank’s 
counterparty risks that arises from its derivatives 
transactions is provided. 
0 0 0 0 
133 
Qualitative information on credit risk mitigation is 
provided. 
0 0 0 0 
Other Risks 
134 
Other risks types identified by the management are 
described. 
0 0 0 0 
135 
How they are identified, governed, measured and 
managed is disclosed. 
0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF ISLAMIC BANKS51  
No. Country No. Bank No. Country No. Bank 
1 Bahrain 1 ABIB  9 Pakistan 29 Al-Falah 
2 Bahrain Islam. 30 Meezan 
3 As-Salam 31 Bujr (Daw.) 
4 Khaleeji 10 Qatar 32 QIB 
5 Ithmaar 33 Rayan 
6 Eskan 34 IBQ 
7 ABCIB 35 QIIB 
8 Capinnova 36 QNB 
9 KFH 11 Saudi 
Arabia 
37 AlRajhi 
2 Bangladesh 10 S.Jalal 38 AlJazira 
11 Islami 39 AlInma 
12 Al-Arafah 40 Jadwa 
3 Egypt 13 Faisal 41 Riyadh 
14 Albaraka 12 Sudan 42 Al-Shamal 
4 Indonesia 15 Muamalat 43 Albaraka 
16 BSM (Sy.M.) 44 Faisal 
17 BNI Syariah 13 Turkey 45 Albaraka 
5 Jordan 18 JIB 46 Asya 
19 IIAB  47 KuveytTurk 
20 JDIB 14 UAE 48 ADIB (A.Dh) 
6 Kuwait 21 Boubyan 49 DIB (Dubai) 
22 Kuwait Intern. 50 Hilal 
7 Malaysia 23 BIMB 51 Emirates Isl. 
24 CIMB 52 SIB 
25 RHB 15 UK 53 Gatehouse 
26 Affin 54 BLME  
27 HL 55 IBB 
8 Oman 28 BMI 56 EIIB 
        16 Yemen 57 Tadamon 
 
 
  
                                                          
51 To expand the sample size, non-IBs offering Islamic products are also included. 
Page 303 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abdullahi, S. I. (2013). “Islamic Banking in West African Sub-Region: A Survey”. 
Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 2(5). 
Abu-Tapanjeh, A. M. (2006). “An empirical study of firm structure and profitability 
relationship: The case of Jordan”. Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences, 
22 (1), pp. 41-59. 
Abu-Tapanjeh, A. M. (2006). “Good corporate governance Mechanism and Firms' 
operating and financial performance: insight from the perspective of Jordanian 
industrial companies”. Journal of King Saud University. 
Abu-Tapanjeh, A. M. (2009). “Corporate governance from the Islamic perspective: A 
comparative analysis with OECD principles”. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 20 
(5), pp. 556-567. 
Acharya, V.; Pedersen, L.; Philippon, T. and Richardson, M. (2010). Measuring 
Systemic Risk. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper. 
Adams, G. R. and Schvaneveldt, J. D. (1991). Understanding Research Methods, 2nd 
ed, New York: Longman. 
Adams, R. B. (2012). “Governance and the financial crisis”. International Review of 
Finance, 12 (1), pp. 7-38. 
Aebi, V.; Sabato, G. and Schmid, M. (2012). “Risk Management, Corporate 
Governance, and Bank Performance in the Financial Crisis”. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 36 (12), pp. 3213-3226. 
Ahmad, K. (1976). Islam. Leicester: Islamic Foundation on behalf of Islamic Council 
of Europe. 
Ahmad, K. (1980). Studies in Islamic economics. Jeddah: International Centre for 
Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdul Aziz University. 
Ahmad, K. (1994). “Preface” In: Naqvi, S. N. H. (eds.) (1994). Islam, Economics, and 
Society, London: Kegan Paul International. 
Ahmed, H. (2007). “Waqf-based microfinance: realizing the social role of Islamic 
finance”. World Bank. [online] Available at: http://imfn.org/images/Litrature/Waqf-
Based%20Microfinance%20Realizing%20The%20Social%20Role%20Of%20Islamic
.pdf (Accessed on 25 March 13)  
Ahmed, H. (2009). “Financial Crisis: Risks and Lessons for Islamic Finance”, ISRA 
International Journal of Islamic Finance, 1(1), 7-32. 
Alam, A. and Shah, S. Z. A. (2013). “Corporate governance and its impact on firm 
risk”. International Journal of Management, Economics and Social Sciences 
(IJMESS), 2 (2), pp. 76-98. 
Alam, N. and Shanmugam, B. (eds.) (2007). Islamic Finance: The Challenges Ahead, 
Kuala Lumpur: University Putra Malaysia Press. 
Ali, A. and Thompson, H. (1999). "The Schumpeterian Gap and Muslim Economic 
Thought". Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 10, pp.31-50. 
 
Page 304 
 
Ali, S. S. (2007). “Financial Distress and Bank Failure: Lessons from Closure of Ihlas 
Finans in Turkey”. Jeddah: Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic 
Development Bank. 
Al-Janadi, Y., Rahman, R. and Omar, N. (2013). "Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
and Voluntary Disclosure in Saudi Arabia." Research Journal of Finance and 
Accounting, 4(4), pp.25--35. 
Allen, F. and Zhao, M. (2007). “The corporate governance model of Japan: 
shareholders are not rulers”. PKU Business Review, 36 pp. 98-102. 
Alzalabani, A. and Nair, R. D. (2013). “Financial Recession, Credit Crunch and 
Islamic Banks: A Case Study of Al Rajhi Bank in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”. 
Journal of Economics and Business, (1), pp. 15-36. 
Amihud, Y. and Lev, B. (1981). “Risk reduction as a managerial motive for 
conglomerate mergers”. The Bell Journal of Economics, pp. 605-617. 
Anderson, R. C. and Fraser, D. R. (2000). “Corporate control, bank risk taking, and 
the health of the banking industry”. Journal of Banking & Finance, 24 (8), pp. 1383-
1398. 
Ansell, J. and Wharton, F. (1992). Risk: analysis, assessment, management. New 
York: Wiley. 
Aoki, M. (1990). Information, incentives, and bargaining in the Japanese economy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Araki, T. (2005). “Corporate governance reforms, labor law developments, and the 
future of Japan’s practice-dependent stakeholder model”. Japan Labor Review, 2 (1), 
pp. 26-57. 
Arif, M. (1985). "Toward a definition of Islamic economics: some scientific 
Considerations." Journal of Research in Islamic Economics, 2(2), pp.79-93. 
Arif, M. (1989). "Towards Establishing the Microfoundations of Islamic Economics: 
The Basis of the Basics". Readings in the concept and methodology of Islamic 
economics. Selangor Darul Ehsan: Pelanduk Publications, 96-119. 
Arrow, K. J. (1974). “Limited knowledge and economic analysis”. American 
Economic Review, 64 (1), pp. 1-10. 
Arrow, K. J. (1974). The limits of organization. New York: Norton. 
Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J. and Heath, D. (1999)." Coherent measures of risk". 
Mathematical finance, 9(3), pp.203--228. 
Ashraf, M. (2012). Principle to Practice - ISLAMIC ECONOMICS. [online] 
Islamonline.com. Available at: 
http://www.islamonline.com/news/articles/105/Principle-to-Practice--ISLAMIC-
ECONOMICS.html [Accessed 1 Oct. 2014]. 
Askari, H.; Iqbal, Z. and Mirakhor, A. (2009). New Issues in Islamic Finance and 
Economics. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia). 
Askari, H.; Iqbal, Z. and Mirakhor, A. (2010). Globalization and Islamic Finance. 
Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia). 
Asutay, M. (2007). “Conceptualisation of the second best solution in overcoming the 
social failure of Islamic banking and finance: examining the overpowering of 
Page 305 
 
homoislamicus by homoeconomicus”. International Journal of Economics, 
Management and Accounting, 15 (2), pp. 167-195. 
Asutay, M. (2007). “A Political Economy Approach to Islamic Economics: Systemic 
Understanding for an Alternative System”. Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, 
1(2), pp. 3-18. 
Asutay, M.; Kosugi, Y. and Nagaoka, S. (2010). “Editor's Preface for the Special 
Issue: Islamic Finance at the Current Stage: Scopes and Issues”. Kyoto Bulletin of 
Islamic Area Studies, 3 (2), pp. 1-2. 
Asutay, M. (2012). “Conceptualising and locating the social failure of Islamic 
finance: aspirations of Islamic moral economy vs. the realities of Islamic finance”. 
Asian and African Area Studies, 11 (2), pp. 93-113. 
Atzori, D. and Mattei, F. E. E. (2009). “Moral values and financial markets: Islamic 
finance against the financial crisis”. [online] Available at: 
http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/20102517553642010.1_Policy_Brief.pdf 
(Accessed on 29 July 2013) 
Ayub, M. (2007). Understanding Islamic Finance. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Ayub, M. (2009). Understanding Islamic finance. 1st ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, p.43. 
Azid, T.; Asutay, M. and Burki, U. (2007). “Theory of the firm, management and 
stakeholders: an Islamic perspective”. Islamic Economic Studies, 15 (1), pp. 1-30. 
Babbie, E. R. (1998). The Practice of Social Research. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Pub. Co. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2004) Panel Data. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag. 
Banaga, A.; Ray, G. H. and Tomkins, C. (1994). External audit and corporate 
governance in Islamic banks. Aldershot: Avebury. 
Barney, J. B.; Ouchi, W. G. and Mundial, B. (eds.) (1986). Organizational 
Economics. San Francisco: Josey Bass. 
Basu, A. K.; Lal, R.; Srinivasan, V. and Staelin, R. (1985). “Salesforce compensation 
plans: An agency theoretic perspective”. Marketing Science, 4 (4), pp. 267-291. 
Baysinger, B. D. and Butler, H. N. (1985). “Antitakeover amendments, managerial 
entrenchment, and the contractual theory of the corporation”. Virginia Law Review, 
71 p. 1257. 
Baysinger, B. D. and Butler, H. N. (1985). “Corporate governance and the board of 
directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition”. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization., 1. 101-124. 
Baysinger, B. D. and Butler, H. N. (1985). “The role of corporate law in the theory of 
the firm”. Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 179-191. 
Beattie, V. (2005). “Moving the financial accounting research front forward: the UK 
contribution”. The British Accounting Review, 37 (1), pp. 85-114. 
Beatty, R. and Zajac, E. J. (1995). “Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk 
bearing in initial public offering firms”. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 8 (2), 
Page 306 
 
pp. 87-96. 
Beck, T.; Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Merrouche, O. (2013) “Islamic vs. conventional 
banking: Business model, efficiency and stability”. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37 
(2), pp. 433-447. 
Beltratti, A. and Stulz, R. M. (2012). “The credit crisis around the globe: Why did 
some banks perform better?”. Journal of Financial Economics, 105 (1), pp. 1-17. 
Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property. New York: Macmillan Co. 
Bessis, J. (2002). Risk Management in Banking. New York: Wiley. 
Bhat, G. (2008). Impact of disclosure and corporate governance on the association 
between fair value gains and losses and stock returns in the commercial banking 
industry. Working Paper, Washington University.  
Bhimani, A. (2009). “Risk management, corporate governance and management 
accounting: Emerging interdependencies”. Management Accounting Research, 20 (1), 
pp. 2-5. 
Bhimani, A. and Langfield-Smith, K. (2007). “Structure, formality and the importance 
of financial and non-financial information in strategy development and 
implementation”. Management Accounting Research, 18 (1), pp. 3-31. 
Black, T. R. (2002). Understanding social science research. London: Sage. 
Blackburn, V. L. (1994). “The effectiveness of corporate control in the US”. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2 (4), pp. 196-202. 
Blair, M. M. (1995). Ownership and Control. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute. 
Blommestein, H. J. and Funke, N. (1998). Institutional Investors in the New Financial 
Landscape. Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Bowie, N. E. (2002). “A Kantian approach to business ethics”, In: R. E. Frederick 
(ed.) (2007), A Companion to Business Ethics (pp. 3-16), Oxford: Blackwell. 
Breitung, J. and Pesaran, M. (2008). “Unit Roots and Cointegration in Panels”. In: 
Mátyás, L. and Sevestre, P. (Eds.) (2008), The Econometrics of Panel Data (pp 279-
322). Berlin:Springer.  
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009). “Financial crisis: mechanism, prevention and 
management”. Macroeconomic stability and financial regulation: key issue for the 
G20, pp. 91-104. 
Bryceson, K. (2006). 'E' issues for Agribusiness: The 'what', 'why', 'how'. 1st ed. 
Wallingford, UK: CABI Pub., p.290. 
Bryman, A. (2006). “Integrating quantitative and qualitative research: how is it 
done?” Qualitative research, 6 (1), pp. 97-113.  
Bryman, A. (2012). Social research methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bryman, A. and Bell, E. (2011). Business research methods. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Buchanan, D. A. and Bryman, A. (2009). The SAGE handbook of organizational 
research methods. Los Angeles: SAGE. 
Page 307 
 
Buchholtz, A. K. (2001). “Trust, Risk, and Shareholder Decision Making”. Business 
Ethics Quarterly, 11(1), pp. 177-193. 
Cadbury, A.; Butler, J.; Lipworth, S.; Macdonald, N.; Smith, A. H.; Brown, S. S, L, 
Charkham, J., De Trafford, D., Collum, H. and Others. (1992). Committee On The 
Financial Aspects Of Corporate Governance. Gee, London. 
Carrillo, E. F. P. (2007). “Corporate Governance: Shareholders' Interests and Other 
Stakeholders' Interests” Corporate Ownership & Control, 4 (4). 
Cernat, L. (2004). “The emerging European corporate governance model: Anglo-
Saxon, Continental, or still the century of diversity?”. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 11 (1), pp. 147-166. 
Chakrabarti, R. (2005). “Corporate Governance in India-Evolution and Challenges”. 
ICFAI Journal of Corporate Governance, 4, pp. 50-68. 
Chanlat, J. and Clarke, T. (2009). European corporate governance: readings and 
perspectives. Taylor & Francis 
Chapra, M. U. (1985). Towards a just monetary system. Leicester, UK: Islamic 
Foundation. 
Chapra, M. U. (1995). Islam and the economic challenge. Leicester, UK: Islamic 
Foundation. 
Chapra, M. U. (2000). The future of economics. Leicester, UK: Islamic Foundation. 
Chapra, M. U. (2003). “Development economics: lessons that remain to be learned”. 
Islamic studies, pp. 639-650. 
Chapra, M. U. (2007). “The case against interest: Is it compelling?”. Thunderbird 
International Business Review, 49 (2), pp. 161-186. 
Chapra, M. U. (2008, October). "The global financial crisis: can Islamic finance help 
minimize the severity and frequency of such a crisis in the future?". Paper presented 
at the Forum on the Global Financial Crisis at the Islamic Development Bank (Vol. 
25). 
Chapra, M. U. and Ahmed, H. (2002). “Corporate governance in Islamic financial 
institutions”. Occasional Paper No. 6, Jeddah:IRTI/IDB. 
Chau, G. and Gray, S. (2002). "Ownership structure and corporate voluntary 
disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore". The International Journal of Accounting, 
37(2), pp.247-265. 
Chong, B. S. and Liu, M. (2009). “Islamic banking: interest-free or interest-based?”. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 17 (1), pp. 125-144. 
Choudhury, G. W. (1993) Islam and the modern Muslim world. London: Scorpion 
Pub. 
Choudhury, M. A. (1986) Contributions to Islamic economic theory. New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 
Choudhury, M. A. (1999) Comparative economic theory. Boston: Kluwer Academic. 
Choudhury, M. A. and Hoque, M. Z. (2004). An advanced exposition of Islamic 
economics and finance. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press. 
Choudhury, M. A. and Malik, U. A. (1992). The foundations of Islamic political 
Page 308 
 
economy. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Christoffersen, P. F. (2011). Elements of financial risk management. 2nd ed. 
Academic Press. 
Cihak, M. and Hesse, H. (2008). “Islamic banks and financial stability: an empirical 
analysis”. IMF Working Papers, pp. 1-29. 
Claessens, S. (2006). “Corporate governance and development”. The World Bank 
Research Observer, 21 (1), pp. 91-122. 
Clark, G. L. and Urwin, R. (2009). “Leadership, collective decision-making and 
pension fund governance”. Rotman International Journal of Pension Management. 
Clarke, D. C. (2011). “Nothing But Wind? The Past and Future of Comparative 
Corporate Governance”. American Journal of Comparative Law, 59 (1), pp. 75-110. 
Clarke, T. (1998). “The stakeholder corporation: A business philosophy for the 
information age”. Long Range Planning, 31 (2), pp. 182-194. 
Clarke, T. (2009). “A critique of the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance”. Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy, 5 (3). 
Clarke, T. and Branson, D. M. (2012). The SAGE handbook of corporate governance. 
London: SAGE. 
Clarkson, M. B. (1994). "A risk based model of stakeholder theory", paper presented 
at Second Toronto Conference on Stakeholder Theory, Toronto: Faculty of 
Management, University of Toronto. 
Coase, R. H. (1937). “The nature of the firm”. Economica, 4 (16), pp. 386-405. 
Cochran, P. L. and Wartick, S. L. (1988). Corporate governance. Morristown, N.J.: 
Financial Executives Research Foundation. 
Coffee, J. C. (2005). “A theory of corporate scandals: Why the USA and Europe 
differ”. Oxford review of economic policy, 21 (2), pp. 198-211. 
Cohen, J.; Krishnamoorthy, G. and Wright, A. (2010) “Corporate Governance in the 
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Era: Auditors’ Experiences”. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 27 (3), pp. 751-786. 
Collis, J. and Hussey, R. (2003). Business research. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cornalba, C. and Giudici, P. (2004). “Statistical models for operational risk 
management”. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 338 (1), pp. 
166-172. 
Cornett, M. M.; Mcnutt, J. J. and Tehranian, H. (2010). “The financial crisis, internal 
corporate governance, and the performance of publicly-traded US bank holding 
companies”. Online, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1476969 (accessed 6 July 
2012) 
Damagum, Y. and Chima, E. (2013). "The Impact of Corporate Governance on 
Voluntary Information Disclosures of Quoted Firms in Nigeria: An Empirical 
Analysis". Research Journal of Finance and Accounting, 4(13), pp.166--178. 
 
 
Page 309 
 
Dar, H. A. and Presley, J. R. (2000). “Lack of profit loss sharing in Islamic banking: 
management and control imbalances”. International Journal of Islamic Financial 
Services, 2 (2), pp. 3-18. 
Darmadi, S.  (2011). "Board size and firm value: new evidence from two-tier board 
system." 8th International Annual Symposium on Management, Surabaya, Indonesia. 
Vol. 19. 
Dali, N., Yousafzai, S. and Abdul Hamid, H. (2013)." The Development of Islamic 
Banking and Finance. Underpinning Theory Affecting Islamic Banking Consumers 
Post Purchase Behaviour." [online] Academia.edu. Available at: 
http://www.academia.edu/4461742/The_Development_of_Islamic_Banking_and_Fin
ance._Underpinning_Theory_Affecting_Islamic_Banking_Consumers_Post_Purchase
_Behaviour [Accessed 1 Oct. 2014]. 
Davis, E. P. and Steil, B. (2001). Institutional investors. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D. and Donaldson, L. (1997). “Toward a stewardship 
theory of management”. Academy of Management Review, 22 (1), pp. 20-47. 
De Vaus, D. A. (2002). Surveys in social research. London: Routledge. 
Dekker, H. C. (2004). “Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on 
appropriation concerns and coordination requirements”. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 29 (1), pp. 27-49. 
Delorenzo, S. Y. T. (2006). “Shari'ah compliance risk”. Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 7, p. 397. 
Denis, D. (2001). "Twenty-five years of corporate governance research… and 
counting". Review of Financial Economics, 10(3), pp.191--212. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (2003). Strategies of qualitative inquiry. 2nd ed. 
Seven Oaks, C.A.: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Dillman, D. A. (2000). Mail and internet surveys. New York: Wiley. 
Dionne, G. (2013). “Risk Management: History, Definition, and Critique”. Risk 
Management and Insurance Review, 16 (2), pp. 147-166. 
Dionne, G. and Triki, T. (2005) Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The 
Importance of Independence and Financial Knowledge for the Board and the Audit 
Committee. HEC Montreal Working Paper No. 05-03. 
Dolton, P. J.; Lindeboom, M. and Van Den Berg, G. J. (2006). “Survey non-response 
and the duration of unemployment”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A 
(Statistics in Society), 169 (3), pp. 585-604. 
Donaldson, L. (1990). “The ethereal hand: Organizational economics and 
management theory”. Academy of management Review, 15 (3), pp. 369-381. 
Donaldson, L. and Davis, J. H. (1991). “Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO 
governance and shareholder returns”. Australian journal of management, 16 (1), pp. 
49-64. 
Donaldson, L. and Davis, J. H. (1994). “Boards and Company Performance-Research 
Challenges the Conventional Wisdom”. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 2 (3), pp. 151-160. 
Page 310 
 
Donaldson, T. and Preston, L. E. (1995). “The stakeholder theory of the corporation: 
Concepts, evidence, and implications”. Academy of management Review, 20 (1), pp. 
65-91. 
Drennan, L. T. (2004). “Ethics, governance and risk management: lessons from 
Mirror Group Newspapers and Barings Bank”. Journal of Business Ethics, 52 (3), pp. 
257-266. 
Drew, S. A., Kelley, P. C. and Kendrick, T. (2006). “CLASS: Five elements of 
corporate governance to manage strategic risk”. Business Horizons, 49 (2), pp. 127-
138. 
Dusuki, A. W. (2005). Corporate Social Responsibility of Islamic Banks in Malaysia: 
A Synthesis of Islamic and Stakeholders' Perspectives. PhD Thesis, Loughborough 
University, pp. 75. 
Dusuki, A. W. and Abdullah, N. I. (2006). “Customers’ perceptions of Islamic hire-
purchase facility in Malaysia: an empirical analysis”. IIUM Journal of Economics and 
Management, 14 (2), pp. 177-204. 
Eccles, J. (1985). “Model of students' mathematics enrollment decisions”. 
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 16 (3), pp. 311-314. 
Edwards, J. S. S. and Fischer, K. (1994). Banks finance and investments in Germany. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Edwards, M. and Clough, R. (2005). Corporate governance and performance: an 
exploration of the connection in a public sector context. Issue Series Paper No. 1. 
Corporate Governance ARC Project. Canberra: University of Canberra. 
Egan, B. (2003). “Monitoring risk in the financial system”. Apra.gov.au. [online] 
Available at: http://www.apra.gov.au/Speeches/Pages/03_19.aspx [Accessed: 28 Jan 
2011]. 
Einhorn, D. (2008). “Private Profits and Socialized Risk”. Global Association of Risk 
Professionals Review, 42, pp. 10-18. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1985). “Control: Organizational and economic approaches”. 
Management Science, 31 (2), pp. 134-149. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). “Agency theory: An assessment and review”. Academy of 
Management Review, 14 (1), pp. 57-74. 
El Qorchi, M. (2005). “Islamic finance gears up”. Finance and Development, 42 (4), 
p. 46. 
El-Hawary, D., Grais, W. and Iqbal, Z. (2004). Regulating Islamic financial 
institutions. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Financial Sector Global Partnerships 
Dept. 
El-Hawary, D.; Grais, W. and Iqbal, Z. (2007). “Diversity in the regulation of Islamic 
Financial Institutions”. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46 (5), pp. 
778-800. 
Eng, L. L. and Mak, Y. T. (2003). “Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure”. 
Journal of accounting and public policy, 22 (4), pp. 325-345. 
Erkens, D. H., Hung, M. and Matos, P. (2012). “Corporate governance in the 2007-
2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide”. Journal of 
Page 311 
 
Corporate Finance, 18 (2), pp. 389-411. 
Fahlenbrach, R. and Stulz, R. M. (2011). “Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis”. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 99 (1), pp. 11-26. 
Fama, E. F. (1980). “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”. The Journal of 
Political Economy, pp. 288-307. 
Fama, E. F. (1980). “Banking in the Theory of Finance”. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 6 (1), pp. 39-57. 
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983). “Agency problems and residual claims”. 
Journal of law and Economics, 26 (2), pp. 327-349. 
Ferreira, M. A. and Laux, P. A. (2007). “Corporate governance, idiosyncratic risk, and 
information flow”. The Journal of Finance, 62 (2), pp. 951-989. 
Financial Reporting Council. (2011) “Boards and Risk: A Summary of Discussions 
with Companies, Investors and Advisers”. [report] Financial Reporting Council, p. 3. 
Fischer, S. (2008). Overview and Concluding Remarks. Maintaining Stability in a 
Changing Financial System. Available at: 
http://www.frbkc.org/publicat/sympos/2008/fischer.03.12.09.pdf [Accessed: 20 Apr 
2012] 
Flick, U. (1998). An introduction to qualitative research. London: Sage. 
Flick, U. (2008). Designing Qualitative Research. London: Sage Publications. 
Fox, M. A. and Hamilton, R. T. (1994). “Ownership and diversification: Agency 
theory or stewardship theory”. Journal of Management Studies, 31 (1), pp. 69-81. 
Forker, J. (1992). "Corporate governance and disclosure quality." Accounting and 
Business research, 22(86), pp.111--124. 
Franks, J. and Mayer, C. (1997). “Corporate ownership and control in the UK, 
Germany, and France”. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9 (4), pp. 30-45. 
Franks, J. and Mayer, C. (2001). “Ownership and control of German corporations”. 
Review of Financial Studies, 14 (4), pp. 943-977. 
Friedman, M. (1963). Inflation. New York: Asia Pub. House. 
Ghauri, P. N. and Grønhaug, K. (2005). Research methods in business studies. 
Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
Ghoshal, S. and Moran, P. (1996). “Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost 
theory”. Academy of Management Review, 21 (1), pp. 13-47. 
Ghoul, W. A. (2011). “The Dilemma Facing Islamic Finance and Lessons Learned 
from the Global Financial Crisis”. Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and 
Finance, 7 (1), pp. 57-76. 
Gibbs, G. (2007). Analyzing qualitative data. Los Angeles: Sage Publications. 
Gibbs, G. (2008). Analyzing qualitative data. Los Angeles: Sage Publications. 
Glăveanu, V. (2008). “Research Methods in Social Psychology: A Comparative 
Analysis”. Europe’s Journal of Psychology, 4 (1).  
Goergen, M.; Manjon, M. C. and Renneboog, L. (2005). “Corporate Governance in 
Germany” In: K. Keasey; S. Thompson, S. and M. Wright (eds.). Corporate 
Page 312 
 
Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and International Comparisons. John Wiley 
& Sons, pp. 285-326. 
Goldberg, V. P. (1985). “Price adjustment in long-term contracts”. Wisconsin Law 
Review, p. 527. 
Gomm, R. (2004) Social research methodology. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J. and Metrick, A. (2003). “Corporate governance and equity 
prices”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (1), pp. 107-156. 
Gourevitch, P. A. and Shinn, J. (2005). Political power and corporate control. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Grabowiecki, J. (2006) Keiretsu Groups: Their Role in the Japanese Economy and a 
Reference Point (or a paradigm) for Other Countries. Chiba, Japan: Institute of 
Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (V.R.F Series), p. 37. 
Graham, J. D. and Rhomberg, L. (1996). “How risks are identified and assessed”. The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, pp. 15-24. 
Grais, W. and Kulathunga, A. (2007). “Capital structure and risk in Islamic financial 
services” In: S. Archer, R. Ahmed, A. Karim (eds.). Islamic Finance: The Regulatory 
Challenge. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 69-93. 
Grais, W. and Pellegrini, M. (2006). “Corporate governance in institutions offering 
Islamic financial services: issues and options”. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 4052. 
Gravetter, F. J. and Wallnau, L. B. (2008). Essentials of statistics for the behavioral 
sciences. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth. 
Greiner, L. E. and Metzger, R. O. (1983). Consulting to management. Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Greuning, H. V. and Brajovic Bratanovic, S. (2009). Analyzing banking risk. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Greuning, H. V. and Iqbal, Z. (2008). Risk analysis for Islamic banks. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank. 
Gujarati, D. N. (1978) Basic econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Gujarati, D. N. (2003). Basic econometrics. Boston: McGraw Hill. 
Gujarati, D. N. (2004) Basic econometrics. 4th ed. Boston: McGraw Hill. 
Gummesson, E. (1991). Qualitative methods in management research. Newbury Park, 
Calif.: Sage Publications. 
Höpner, M. and Jackson, G. (2001). “An Emerging Market for Corporate Control?: 
The Mannesmann Takeover and German Corporate Governance”. Max-Planck-
Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung. 
Haldane, A. G. and May, R. M. (2011). “Systemic risk in banking ecosystems”. 
Nature, 469 (7330), pp. 351-355. 
Haneef, M. A. (2005). “Can there be an economics based on religion? The case of 
Islamic economics”. Post-Autistic Economics Review, 34 (3). 
Page 313 
 
Haniffa, R. and Cooke, T. (2002). "Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in 
Malaysian corporations". Abacus, 38(3), pp.317-349. 
Haniffa, R. and Hudaib, M. (2007). “Exploring the ethical identity of Islamic banks 
via communication in annual reports”. Journal of Business Ethics, 76 (1), pp. 97-116. 
Hasan, Z. (2011). “Shariah Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia, 
GCC Countries and the UK”. Ph.D. Durham University. 
Hasan, Z. (2011). “Corporate governance in Islamic financial institutions: An ethical 
perspective”. Prime Journals of Business Administration and Management, 2(1), p. 4 
Hassan, A. (2009). “Risk management practices of Islamic banks of Brunei 
Darussalam”. Journal of Risk Finance, The, 10 (1), pp. 23-37. 
Hassan, A. (2010). The global Financial crisis and islamic banking. UK: The Islamic 
Foundation, UK. 
Hassan, K. and Lewis, M. (2007). Handbook of Islamic banking. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar. 
Hassan, M. K. (2009). The Global Financial Crisis and Islamic Finance. Available at: 
http://www.sesric.org/imgs/news/image/585-paper-1.pdf (accessed on 24 July 2012) 
Hassan, M. Kabir, and Mehmet F. Dicle. (2005). Basel II and capital requirements for 
Islamic banks. Sixth International Conference of Islamic Banking and Finance.  
Hermalin, B. E., and Weisbach, M. S. (2001). Boards of directors as an endogenously 
determined institution: A survey of the economic literature (No. w8161). National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Holmstrom, B. and Kaplan, S. N. (2003). “The state of US corporate governance: 
what's right and what's wrong?”. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 15 (3), pp. 8-
20. 
Hough, Alan and McGregor-Lowndes, Myles and Ryan, Christine M. (2005). 
"Theorizing about board governance of nonprofit organizations : Surveying the 
Landscape". In: 34th Annual Conference of the Association for Research on Nonprofit 
Organizations and Voluntary Action, 17-19, Washington DC. (Unpublished) 
Hoque, M. Z., Islam, R. M. and Ahmed, H. (2013). “Corporate Governance and Bank 
Performance: The Case of Bangladesh”. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208903 (accessed on 25 Oct 
2013) 
Ibrahim, A. A. (2006). “Convergence of corporate governance and Islamic financial 
services industry: toward Islamic financial services securities market”. Georgetown 
Law Graduate Paper Series, p. 3. 
Ibrahim, M. F., Eng, O. S. and Parsa, A. (2009). “International articles: Shariah 
property investment in Asia”. Journal of Real Estate Literature, 17 (2), pp. 231-248. 
Iqbal, M. and Molyneux, P. (2005). Thirty years of Islamic banking. Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Iqbal, Z. (1997. “Islamic financial systems”. Finance and Development, 34 pp. 42-45. 
Iqbal, Z. and Mirakhor, A. (2004). “Stakeholders model of governance in Islamic 
economic system”. Islamic Economic Studies, 11 (2), p. 43-63. 
Page 314 
 
Iqbal, Z. and Mirakhor, A. (2006) An Introduction to Islamic Finance. John Wiley & 
Sons (Asia). 
Iqbal, Z. and Mirakhor, A. (2007) An Introduction to Islamic Finance. Singapore: 
John Wiley & Sons (Asia). 
Iqbal, Z. and Mirakhor, A. (2011). An introduction to Islamic finance. 2nd ed. 
Singapore: Wiley. 
Izhara, H. and Asutay, M. (2010). A theoretical analysis of the operational risk 
framework in Islamic banks. International Journal of Economics, Management and 
Accounting, 18(1). 
Jackson, G. (2002). “RIETI - The Twilight of the Stakeholder Corporation? 
Germany's Relevance for Japan”. [online] Available at: 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/a01_0057.html [Accessed: 23 Mar 2013].  
Jankowicz, A. D. (2005). Business research projects. London: Thomson Learning. 
Jensen, M. C. (1983). “Organization theory and methodology”. The accounting 
review, 58 (2), pp. 319-339. 
Jensen, M. C. (1986). “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and 
takeovers”. The American Economic Review, 76 (2), pp. 323-329. 
Jensen, M. C. (2002). “Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate 
objective function”. Business ethics quarterly, pp. 235-256. 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976). “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs and ownership structure”. Journal of financial economics, 3 (4), pp. 305-
360. 
Jobst, A. A. (2007). “Modeling Constraints and Statistical Issues of Consistent 
Operational Risk Measurement”. Available at: 
http://www.continuitycentral.com/operationalriskpaperjan2007.pdf (Accessed on: 23 
April 2013) 
Jobst, A. A. (2007). The economics of Islamic finance and securitization. Washington, 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Dept. 
John, K. and Senbet, L. W. (1998). “Corporate governance and board effectiveness”. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 22 (4), pp. 371-403. 
Judge, W. (2010). “Corporate governance mechanisms throughout the world”. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18 (3), pp. 159-160. 
Jurgens, M., Berthon, P., Papania, L. and Shabbir, H. (2010). "Stakeholder theory and 
practice in Europe and North America: The key to success lies in a marketing 
approach." Industrial Marketing Management, 39(5), pp.769-775. 
Kahf, M. (1989). “Islamic Economics and Its Methodology”. In: Ghazali, A. and 
Omar, S. (eds.) (1989) Readings in the Concept and Methodology of Islamic 
Economics. Selangor Darul Ehsan: Pelanduk Publications. 
Kahf, M. (2004). Islamic Economics, What Went Wrong. Islamic Development Bank 
Roundtable on Islamic Economics: Current State of Knowledge and Development of 
the Discipline, Jeddah, pp.26-27. 
Kaplan, A. (1973). The conduct of inquiry. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 
Page 315 
 
Karamanou, I. and Vafeas, N. (2005). “The association between corporate boards, 
audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis”. 
Journal of Accounting research, 43 (3), pp. 453-486. 
Karami, A.; Rowley, J. and Analoui, F. (2006). “Research and knowledge building in 
management studies: an analysis of methodological preferences.” International 
Journal of Management, 23 (1). 
Kaserer, C. and Wenger, E. (1997). “German Banks and Corporate Governance-A 
Critical View”. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=11353 (Accessed on 24 April 
2013). 
Kayed, R. and Hassan, M. (2011). The global financial crisis and Islamic finance. 
Thunderbird International Business Review, 53(5), pp.551-564. 
Keasey, K., Thompson, S. and Wright, M. (2005). “Introduction” In: Keasey, K., 
Thompson, S. and Wright, M. (eds.) (2005) Corporate Governance: Accountability, 
Enterprise and International Comparisons. John Wiley & Sons. 
Khan, F. (2010). “How ‘Islamic’ is Islamic Banking?”. Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 76 (3), pp. 805-820. 
Khan, M. H. (1997). “Designing an Islamic model for project finance”. International 
Financial Law Review., 16, p. 13. 
Khan, M. M. and Bhatti, M. I. (2008). “Development in Islamic banking: a financial 
risk-allocation approach”. Journal of Risk Finance, The, 9 (1), pp. 40-51. 
Khan, M. S. (1997). “Islamic interest-free banking: a theoretical analysis”. Islamic 
Economics, 9 (1), pp. 3-36. 
Khan, T. (2009). “Corporate governance disclosure: an international comparison”. 
International Review of Business Research Papers, 5 (3), pp. 202-13. 
Khan, M. (2012). “The Philosophy of Islamic Economic Paradigm”. PIFFA Journal, 
7(1), pp. 8-10. 
Khan, W. M. (1989). “Towards an Interest-Free Economic System”. JKAU: Islamic 
Econ, (1), pp. 13-38. 
Kirkpatrick, G. (2009). “Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis”. 
OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2009 (1). 
Kirsch, G. and Sullivan, P. A. (1992). Methods and methodology in composition 
research. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press. 
Kluvers, R. and Tippett, J. (2011). “An exploration of stewardship theory in a Not-
for-Profit organization”. 35 (4), pp. 275-284. 
Kochhar, R. (1996). “Explaining firm capital structure: The role of agency theory vs. 
transaction cost economics”. Strategic Management Journal, 17 (9), pp. 713-728. 
Kosnik, R. D. (1987). “Greenmail: A study of board performance in corporate 
governance”. Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 163-185. 
Kothari, C. R. (1985). Research methodology: Methods and Techniques. New Delhi: 
Wiley Eastern. 
Kpodar, K. and Imam, P. A. (2010). “Islamic banking: how has it diffused?”. IMF 
Page 316 
 
Working Papers, pp. 1-29. 
Kuran, T. (1986). “Price adjustment costs, anticipated inflation, and output”. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 407-418. 
Kuran, T. (1986). “The economic system in contemporary Islamic thought: 
Interpretation and assessment”. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 18 (02), 
pp. 135-164. 
Kuran, T. (2004). "Why the Middle East is economically underdeveloped: historical 
mechanisms of institutional stagnation". Journal of Economic Perspectives, pp.71-90. 
Lane, C. (2003). “Changes in corporate governance of German corporations: 
convergence to the Anglo-American model?”. Competition and Change, 7 (2-3), pp. 
79-100. 
Lang, W. W. and Jagtiani, J. A. (2010). “The mortgage and financial crises: The role 
of credit risk management and corporate governance”. Atlantic Economic Journal, 38 
(3), pp. 295-316. 
Langfield-Smith, K. and Smith, D. (2003). “Management control systems and trust in 
outsourcing relationships”. Management accounting research, 14 (3), pp. 281-307. 
Langton, J., Trullols, C. and Turkistani, A. Q. (2011). Islamic economics and finance. 
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (2000). "Investor 
protection and corporate governance". Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1), pp.3-
27. 
Lave, L. B. (1987). “Health and safety risk analyses: information for better decisions”. 
Science, 236 (4799), pp. 291-295. 
Levine, R. (2004). “The corporate governance of banks”. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3404. Available at: 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/14239/WPS3404.pdf?s
equence=1. (Accessed on 24 May 2012) 
Levinthal, D. (1988). “A survey of agency models of organizations”. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 9 (2), pp. 153-185. 
Lewis, M. K. (2005). “Islamic corporate governance”. Review of Islamic Economics, 
9 (1), pp. 5-19. 
MackKinnon, J. G. (1996). “Numerical distribution functions for unit root and 
cointegration tests”. Journal of Applied econometrics, 11, pp 601-618. 
Mahlknecht, M. (2009). Islamic capital markets and risk management. London: Risk 
Books. 
Maingot, M. and Zeghal, D. (2008). “An analysis of Corporate Governance 
information disclosure by Canadian banks”. Corporate Ownership & Control, 5 (2). 
Maingot, M. and Zeghal, D. (2008). “An analysis of voluntary disclosure of 
performance indicators by Canadian universities”. Tertiary Education and 
Management, 14 (4), pp. 269-283. 
Malekian, E. and Daryaei, A. (2011). “Firm and Ownership Characters and Corporate 
Governance (in the Tehran Stock Exchange)”. Journal of Accounting Advances (JAA) 
(Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities). 
Page 317 
 
Mark, R.; Galai, D. and Crouhy, M. (2006). The Essentials of Risk Management. New 
York: McGraw-Hill Professional  
Marston, D. and Sundararajan, V. (2003). “Unique Risks Of Islamic Banks: 
Implications For Systemic Stability”. In: T. Khan and D. Muljawan (eds.) Islamic 
Financial Architecture, p. 93. Jeddah: IRTI 
Mason, S. P. (1995) 'The Allocation of Risk' In: Crane, D. B. (eds.) (1995) The 
Global Financial System: A Functional Perspective. Harvard Business Press, pp. 153-
195. 
Ahmad, K. (2011) First principles of Islamic economics. Markfield: Islamic 
Foundation. 
Mcburney, D. and White, T. L. (2010). Research methods. Belmont, Calif: 
Wadsworth/Cengage Learning. 
Mccahery, J. A. and Vermeulen, E. (2005). “Corporate governance crises and related 
party transactions: A post-Parmalat agenda”. Amsterdam Centre for Corporate 
Finance Working Paper. 
Mcritchie, J. (n.d.). “Corporate Governance Defined | Corporate Governance”. 
[online] Available at: http://corpgov.net/library/corporate-governance-defined/ 
[Accessed: 13 Apr 2013]. 
Meek, G., Roberts, C. and Gray, S. (1995). "Factors influencing voluntary annual 
report disclosures by US, UK and continental European multinational corporations". 
Journal of international business studies, pp.555--572. 
Melis, A. (2005). “Corporate governance failures: to what extent is Parmalat a 
particularly Italian case?”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13 (4), 
pp. 478-488. 
Meltzer, A. H. (1985). Financial failures and financial policies. 
Merton, R. C. and Bodie, Z. (1995). “A conceptual framework for analyzing the 
financial environment”. In: Crane, D. B. (eds.), The Global Financial System: A 
Functional Perspective. Harvard Business Press. 
MIFC. (2010). The Global Outlook of the Islamic Financial Services Industry. 
[report] Economist Corporate Network. 
Minnaar, R. and Vosselman, E. (2009). Shared service centers and governance 
structure change: A transaction cost economics approach. NiCE Working Paper 09-
115, Nijmegen: Nijmegen Center for Economics (NiCE) Institute for Management 
Research Radboud University Nijmegen.  
Mitchell, R.; Agle, B. and Wood, D. (1997). “Toward a Theory of Stakeholder 
Identification and Salience: Defining The Principle of Who and What Really Counts”. 
Academy of Management Review, 22 (4), pp. 853-886. 
Mitnick, B. (1973). “Fiduciary rationality and public policy: the theory of agency and 
some consequences”. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020859. (Accessed on 13 March 
2013) 
Mohammad Abdullah, Nadwi. (2012). "Analysing the Role of Shariah Supervisory 
Boards in Islamic Financial Institutions" . Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2217926 
Page 318 
 
Mohieldin, M.; Iqbal, Z.; Rostom, A. and Fu, X. (2011). The role of Islamic finance in 
enhancing financial inclusion in organization of Islamic cooperation (OIC) countries. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 5920. 
Monks, R. A. G. (2011). “A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other 
financial industry entities: the role of institutional shareholders”. Corporate 
Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International Perspectives, p. 134. 
Monks, R. and Minow, N. (1995). Corporate Governance. New York: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Moran, P. and Ghoshal, S. (1996). “Theories of economic organization: The case for 
realism and balance”. Academy of Management Review, 21 (1), pp. 58-72. 
Moran, P. and Ghoshal, S. (1996). Value Creation by Firms. (1), pp. 41-45. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1989). “Characteristics of hostile and friendly 
takeover targets” In: Alan J. Auerbach, (ed.) Corporate Takeovers: Causes and 
Consequences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp 101-136. 
Muljawan, D.; Dar, H. A. and Hall, M. J. (2004). “A capital adequacy framework for 
Islamic banks: the need to reconcile depositors’ risk aversion with managers’ risk 
taking”. Applied Financial Economics, 14 (6), pp. 429-441. 
Muth, M. and Donaldson, L. (1998). “Stewardship theory and board structure: a 
contingency approach”. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 6 (1), pp. 
5-28. 
Naqvi, S. N. H. (1981). Ethics and economics: An Islamic synthesis. Leicestershire: 
Islamic Foundation. 
Naqvi, S. N. H. (1994). Islam, economics, and society. London: Kegan Paul 
International. 
Naqvi, S. N. H. (2003). Perspectives on morality and human well-being. 
Leicestershire: Islamic Foundation. 
Ngoepe, M. and Ngulube, P. (2013). “An exploration of the role of records 
management in corporate governance in South Africa: original research”. South 
African Journal of Information Management, 15 (2), pp. 1-8. 
Nomani, F. and Rahnema. A. (1994). Islamic economic systems. London: Zed Books. 
Obaidullah, M. (1998). “Capital adequacy norms for Islamic financial institutions”. 
Islamic economic studies, 5 (1&2). 
Obaidullah, M. (1998). “Financial engineering with Islamic options”. Islamic 
Economic Studies, 6 (1), pp. 73-103. 
Obaidullah, M. (2002). “Islamic Risk Management”. International Journal of Islamic 
Financial Services, 3 (4). 
Obaidullah, M. (2004). Islamic financial markets. New Delhi: Institute of Objective 
Studies. 
Okabe, M. (2004). “The financial system and corporate governance in Japan”. Policy 
and Governance Working Paper Series, 17. 
Omran, M. M.; Bolbol, A. and Fatheldin, A. (2008). “Corporate governance and firm 
performance in Arab equity markets: Does ownership concentration matter?”. 
Page 319 
 
International Review of Law and Economics, 28 (1), pp. 32-45. 
Oshodi, B. A. (2010). “Unfolding the Integral African World System Thought”. 
Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1688462. 
(Accessed on 23 March 2013) 
Owusu-Ansah, S. (1998). "The adequacy of corporate mandatory disclosure practices 
on emerging markets: a case study of the Zimbabwe stock exchange". Ph.D. 
Middlesex University. 
Guillén, M. and O'Sullivan, M. (2004). “The changing international corporate 
governance landscape” In: H. Gatignon, J. R. Kimberly and R. E. Gunther (eds.) 
(2004) The INSEAD-Wharton alliance on globalizing. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 23-48. 
Ozcan, G. B. and Ccokgezen, M. (2006). “Trusted markets: The exchanges of Islamic 
companies”. Comparative Economic Studies, 48 (1), pp. 132-155. 
Pallant, J. (2010). SPSS survival manual. Maidenhead: McGraw Hill. 
Pathan, S. (2009). “Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking”. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 33 (7), pp. 1340-1350. 
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods. Newbury Park, 
Calif.: Sage Publications. 
Pearson, G. (2010). “The Impact of Theory on Practice » Blog Archive Chinese 
Corporate Governance | The Impact of Theory on Practice”. [online] Available at: 
http://www.gordonpearson.co.uk/06/chinese-corporate-governance/ (Accessed: 11 
Apr 2013). 
Pérignon, C. and Smith, D. R. (2010). “Diversification and value-at-risk”. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 34 (1), pp. 55-66. 
Pérignon, C. and Smith, D. R. (2010). “The level and quality of Value-at-Risk 
disclosure by commercial banks”. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34 (2), pp. 362-377. 
Peters, G. and Romi, A. (2011). “The Effect of Corporate Governance on Voluntary 
Risk Disclosures: Evidence from Greenhouse Gas Emission Reporting”. 
Pfeffer, J. (1972). “Merger as a response to organizational interdependence”. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 382-394. 
Pfeffer, J. (1972). “Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The 
organization and its environment”. Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 218-228. 
Phillips, R., Freeman, R. E. and Wicks, A. C. (2003). “What stakeholder theory is 
not”. Business Ethics Quarterly, pp. 479-502. 
Power, M. (2004). “The risk management of everything”. Journal of Risk Finance, 
The, 5 (3), pp. 58-65. 
Pratt, J. W. and Zeckhauser, R. (1985). Principals and agents. Boston, Mass.: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
Prigge, S. (1998). “A survey of German corporate governance” In: K. J. Hopt; H. 
Kanda; M. J. Roe, E. Wymeersch and S. Prigge (eds.), Comparative Corporate 
Governance: the State of the Art and Emerging Research. Oxford:Clarendon Press, pp 
943-1045 
Page 320 
 
Pyle, D. H. (1997). Bank risk management. Institute of Business and Economic 
Research, University of California, Berkeley. 
Rammal, H. and Parker, L. D. (2010). Audit and governance in Islamic banks: 
selection and training of Shari'ah Advisors”. Diss. University of Sydney 
Rapp, M. S.; Schmid, T. and Wolff, M. (2011). “Hard or Soft Regulation of Corporate 
Governance?”. HHL Research Paper Series in Corporate Governance, (6). 
Richard Anderson & Associates. (2009) Risk Management and Corporate 
Governance. [report] Kingscliff: OECD. 
Robson, C. (2002). Real world research. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Ross, S. A. (1973). “The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem”. The 
American Economic Review, 63 (2), pp. 134-139. 
Sacarcelik, O. (2013). "Corporate Governance and Ethics Compliance in Islamic 
Financial Institutions--Legal Perspectives." Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2357620 
Sadowski, D., Junkes, J. and Lindenthal, S. (2000). “The German Model of Corporate 
and Labor Governance”. Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J., 22 p. 33. 
Safieddine, A. (2009). “Islamic financial institutions and corporate governance: new 
insights for agency theory”. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17 (2), 
pp. 142-158. 
Santomero, A. M. (1997) “Commercial bank risk management: an analysis of the 
process”. Journal of Financial Services Research, 12 (2-3), pp. 83-115. 
Sarker, M. A. A. (1999). “Islamic business contracts, agency problem and the theory 
of the Islamic firm”. International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, 1 (2), pp. 
12-28. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2003). Research methods for business 
students 3rd Edition. Harlow, England: Prentice Hall. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2007). Research methods for business 
students 4th Edition. Harlow, England: Financial Times/Prentice Hall. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2009). Research methods for business 
students 5th Edition. New York: Prentice Hall. 
Schein, E. H. (1969). Process consultation. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. 
Co. 
Schieffer, A., Lessem, R. and Al-Jayyousi, O. (2008). “Corporate Governance: 
Impulses from the Middle East”. Transition Studies Review, 15 (2), pp. 335-342. 
Schmidt, D. and Wahrenburg, M. (2003). Contractual relations between European 
VC Funds and investors: The impact of Bargaining power and reputation on 
contractual design. CFS Working Paper, No. 2003/15. 
Schneider-Lenné, E. (1994). “The Role of the German Capital Markets and the 
Universal Banks, Supervisory Boards, and Interlocking Directorships.” In: Dimsdale, 
N. (eds.) (1994) Capital Markets and Corporate Governance. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, pp. 284-305. 
Scholes, M. S. (2000). “Crisis and risk management”. American Economic Review, 
Page 321 
 
pp. 17-21. 
Schulze, W. S.; Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N. and Buchholtz, A. K. (2001). “Agency 
relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence”. Organization science, 12 (2), pp. 
99-116. 
Segato, L. (2005). “A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Protections in Italy and 
the United States: Parmalat as a Case Study”. Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus., 26 p. 373-446. 
Sekaran, U. and Bougie, R. (2009). Research Methods for Business: A Skill Building 
Approach. 5th ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Sekaran, U. and Bougie, R. (2010). Research methods for business. Chichester: 
Wiley. 
Shafii, Z.; Salleh, S. and Shahwan, S. H. (2010). “Management of Shariah non-
compliance audit risk in the Islamic financial institutions via the development of 
Shariah compliance audit framework and Shariah audit programme”. Kyoto Bulletin 
of Islamic Area Studies, pp. 3-2. 
Shiller, R. J. (2003). “From efficient markets theory to behavioral finance”. Journal of 
economic perspectives, pp. 83-104. 
Shin, H. S. (2008). “Reflections on modern bank runs: A case study of Northern 
Rock”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(1), pp. 101-119. 
Shin, H. S. (2009). “Reflections on Northern Rock: the bank run that heralded the 
global financial crisis”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23 (1), pp. 101-120. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1997). “A survey of corporate governance”. The 
journal of finance, 52 (2), pp. 737-783. 
Siddiqi, M. N. (1989). “Islamizing economics”. IIIT, pp. 253-261. 
Sikka, P. (2009). “Financial crisis and the silence of the auditors”. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 34 (6), pp. 868-873. 
Slahudin, C. (2008). “OECD principles and the Islamic perspective on corporate 
governance”. Review of Islamic Economics, 12 (1), pp. 29-39. 
Sobel, P. J. and Reding, K. F. (2006). “Aligning Corporate Governance with 
Enterprise Risk Management”. Management Accounting Quarterly, 5 (2). 
Solé, J. (2007). “Islamic banking makes headway”. IMF Monetary and Capital 
Markets Department, 19. 
Solomon, J. (2010). Corporate governance and accountability. Chichester, West 
Sussex: Wiley. 
Sourial, M. (2004). “Corporate governance in the Middle East and North Africa: an 
overview”. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=508883. (Accessed on 27 March 
2013) 
Speklé, R. and F. (2001). “Explaining management control structure variety: a 
transaction cost economics perspective”. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 26 
(4), pp. 419-441. 
Speklé, R., Van Elten, H. J. and Kruis, A. (2007). “Sourcing of internal auditing: An 
empirical study”. Management Accounting Research, 18 (1), pp. 102-124. 
Page 322 
 
Sridhar, M. S. (2008). Introduction to Research Methodology. [PowerPoint slides]. 
Bangalore: ISRO Satellite Centre. Available at: 
http://www.slideshare.net/mssridhar/introduction-to-research-methodology-
presentation (Accessed 2nd January 2012). 
Stangor, C. (2011). Research methods for the behavioral sciences. Australia: 
Wadsworth Cengage Learning. 
State Bank of Pakistan. (2008). Risk Management Guidelines for Islamic Banking 
Institutions. Karachi: State Bank of Pakistan. 
Stebbins, R. A. (2001). Exploratory research in the social sciences. Thousand Oaks, 
Calif.: Sage Publications. 
Stein, M. (2000). “The Risk Taker As Shadow: A Psychoanlytic View Of The 
Collapse Of Barings Bank”. Journal of Management Studies, 37 (8), pp. 1215-1230. 
Stiles, P. and Taylor, B. (2001). Boards at work. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Strauss, A. L. and Corbin, J. M. (1998). Basics of qualitative research. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Styger, P. and Wyk, T. (1998). “The Proposed Additional Capital Requirements for 
the Management of Banks' Interest Rate Risk”. In: M. Bowe; L. Briguglio, L. and J. 
W. Dean (eds.) Banking and Finance in Islands and Small States. Routledge. 
Switzer, L. N. and Wang, J. (2013). “Default Risk Estimation, Bank Credit Risk, and 
Corporate Governance”. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 22 (2), pp. 
91-112. 
Tao, N. B. and Hutchinson, M. (2013). “Corporate governance and risk management: 
The role of risk management and compensation committees”. Journal of 
Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 9 (1), pp. 83-99. 
Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. (2003). Handbook of mixed methods in social & 
behavioral research. Thousand Oaks, C.A. Sage Publications. 
Thorne, S. E. (2008). Interpretive description. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press. 
Tickell, A. (1996). “Making a melodrama out of a crisis: reinterpreting the collapse of 
Barings Bank”. Environment and Planning D, 14 pp. 5-34. 
Tosi Jr, H. L. and Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1989). “The decoupling of CEO pay and 
performance: An agency theory perspective”. Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 
169-189. 
Tricker, R. I. 2010. Rethinking the Exercise of Power over Corporate Entities. 
[online] Available at: 
http://corporategovernanceoup.wordpress.com/2010/03/05/rethinking-the-exercise-of-
power-over-corporate-entities/ (Accessed: 11 Apr 2013). 
Tricker, R. I. (1994). International Corporate Governance. New York: Prentice Hall. 
Tricker, R. I. (1996) Pocket Director: The Essentials of Corporate Governance from 
AZ. London: Profile Books. 
Turnbull, S. (1997). “Corporate governance: its scope, concerns and theories”. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 5 (4), pp. 180-205. 
Ullah, S. (2007). “Inter-Bank Cooperation Between Islamic And Conventional Banks 
Page 323 
 
In Pakistan”. 
Van Den Berg, G. J.; Lindeboom, M. and Dolton, P. J. (2004). “Survey non-response 
and unemployment duration”. Working Paper, IFAU-Institute for Labour Market 
Policy Evaluation. 
Van Der Elst, C. (2003). “The equity markets, ownership structures and control: 
Towards an international harmonization”. Capital markets and company law, pp. 3-
46. 
Van Der Meer-Kooistra, J. and Vosselman, E. G. (2000). “Management control of 
interfirm transactional relationships: the case of industrial renovation and 
maintenance” Accounting, organizations and society, 25 (1), pp. 51-77. 
Vinnicombe, T. (2012). “A study of compliance with AAOIFI accounting standards 
by Islamic banks in Bahrain”. Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, 
3 (2), pp. 78-98. 
Vosselman, E. G. (2002). “Towards horizontal archetypes of management control: a 
transaction cost economics perspective”. Management Accounting Research, 13 (1), 
pp. 131-148. 
Wallace, R. (1988). "Corporate financial reporting in Nigeria". Accounting and 
Business Research, 18(72), pp.352-362. 
Warde, I. (2010). Islamic finance in the global economy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Weisbach, M. S. (1988). “Outside directors and CEO turnover”. Journal of financial 
Economics, 20 pp. 431-460. 
Williams, S. M. (2001). “Is intellectual capital performance and disclosure practices 
related?”. Journal of Intellectual capital, 2 (3), pp. 192-203. 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). “Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust 
implications”. New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1979). “Transaction-cost economics: the governance of 
contractual relations”. Journal of law and economics, 22 (2), pp. 233-261. 
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: The 
Free Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (1988). “Corporate finance and corporate governance”. The 
Journal of finance, 43 (3), pp. 567-591. 
Williamson, O. E. (1990). “A comparison of alternative approaches to economic 
organization”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), pp. 61-71. 
Williamson, O. E. (1990). “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story: 
Comment”. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 6 pp. 263-266. 
Williamson, O. E. (1993). “Calculativeness, trust, and economic organization”. JL & 
Econ., 36 p. 453. 
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Williamson, O. E. (2000). “The new institutional economics: taking stock, looking 
ahead”. Journal of economic literature, pp. 595-613. 
Page 324 
 
Williamson, O. E. (2002). “The theory of the firm as governance structure: from 
choice to contract”. Journal of economic perspectives, pp. 171-195. 
Wilson, R. (2004). “Capital flight through Islamic managed funds”, In: C. M. Henry, 
R. Wilson, (eds.). The politics of Islamic finance. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, pp. 129-152. 
Wilson, R. (2006). “Islam and business”. Thunderbird International Business Review, 
48 (1), pp. 109-123. 
Wilson, R. (2007). Islamic asset management. Departmental working papers (01). 
Durham: Durham University. 
Wilson, R. (2008). “Innovation in the structuring of Islamic sukuk securities”. 
Humanomics, 24 (3), pp. 170-181. 
Wilson, R. (2008). “Islamic Economics and Finance”. World Economics, 9 (1), p. 
177. 
Wilson, R. (2009). “The Development of Islamic Finance in the GCC.” Working 
Paper of the Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in 
the Gulf States. Wilson, R. (2009). “Why Islamic Banking Is Successful?” Islamic 
Banks are Unscathed. 
Wójcik, D. (2002). “The Länder are the building blocks of the German Capital 
Market”. Regional Studies, 36 (8), pp. 877-895. 
W'Ojcik, D. (2003). “Change in the German model of corporate governance: evidence 
from blockholdings 1997-2001”. Environment and Planning A, 35 (8), pp. 1431-1458. 
Yafeh, Y. (1995). “Corporate ownership, profitability, and bank-firm ties: Evidence 
from the American occupation reforms in Japan”. Journal of the Japanese and 
International Economies, 9 (2), pp. 154-173. 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. 
Yunis, H. (2006). “Growth of private equity funds using Islamic finance”. Islamic 
Finance News Guide, pp. 67-68. 
Zaher, T. and Kabir Hassan, M. (2002). "A comparative literature survey of Islamic 
finance and banking". Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, 10(4), pp.155-
199. 
Zajac, E. J. (1990). “CEO selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: 
A theoretical integration and empirical analysis”. Strategic Management Journal, 11 
(3), pp. 217-230. 
Zajac, E. J. and Westphal, J. D. (1994). “The costs and benefits of managerial 
incentives and monitoring in large US corporations: when is more not better?”. 
Strategic Management Journal, 15 (S1), pp. 121-142. 
Zaman, N. and Asutay, M. (2009). "Divergence Between Aspiration And Realities Of 
Islamic Economics: A Political Economy Approach To Bridging The Divide". 
International Journal of Economics, Management and Accounting, 7(1). 
Zarka, M. A. (2008). Duality of Sources in Islamic Economics, and its 
Methodological Consequences. (Position Paper). The Seventh International 
Conference on Islamic Economics. The Academic Papers presented to the Conference 
(English Section), Islamic Economics Research Center, KAAU, Jeddah.  
Page 325 
 
Zikmund, W. G. (1991). Business Research Methods. Chicago: Dryden Press. 
